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Abstract
The sociology of penal practice has failed methodically to investigate religion as a 
powerful cultural element in shaping of criminal justice systems. For many years 
Marxian, Weberian and Foucauldian works have dominated socio-cultural theories of 
punishment. They were concerned more with fields of class control and disciplinary 
domination rather than with cultural phenomena such as religion. Technological and 
bureaucratic analysis of punishment is the dominant discourse in the contemporary 
sociology of penal practice. Researchers have started to examine more attentively the 
function and role of culture in the foiming of penal policy and in the cultural 
ramifications of penal practices, and religion as a prominent element of culture, has been 
the site of intensive social inquiry. However, as yet, investigation into the role of religion 
as a prominent cultural element in shaping criminal justice system has not been 
systematically initiated. Whereas the vast majority of scholarly writings in legal subjects 
have not discussed the relationship between religion and criminal law, the area of 
criminal justice has in fact been often deeply influenced by religious beliefs. Despite 
secularist movements during past centuries, there is still common ground between 
religion, morality and criminal law.
The Durldieimian analysis of religion, society and punishment provides us with a 
systematic understanding of the relationship between religion and punishment. It is the 
contention of this thesis that, the religious nature of penal practice can be traced in 
various forms of penal practice. In Durklieim’s terms, sacred moral principles, as the 
totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average member of a society are the 
foundation of social integration, without which society cannot exist. The form and 
content of these moral principles may undergo transfoimation from one system to 
another, but their religious or sacred nature is unchanging. Differences between 
traditional and modem religions are more a matter of degree than of substance. The 
present study has undertaken to show that focusing on punishment as a political tactic, 
managerial technique, or calculated instrument for the pmposive control of behaviour is 
misleading and misses reference to an essential part of penal practice. I have illustrated 
this argument in two different contemporary societies, the USA and Iran. I have shown 
that how religious attitudes shaped criminal justice in America and what are the impacts 
of religious forms of government on criminal law and practice of punishment in the case 
of Iran. Such a superficial perspective on punishment can be misleadingly taken as 
pointing to the real substance of punishment. Thus, punishment should not be understood 
only in teiTns of complex forms of power and discipline, as Foucault explained or in 
terms of bureaucratic, professional and managerial considerations as described in a 
Weberian terms. The time has anived to take religion seriously as a powerful cultural 
factor in the sociological study of punishment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
After the Iranian Revolution in 1979 penal policy profoundly changed towards 
drug trafficking. The judiciary and political system considered this crime to be a threat to 
society as a whole. Punishment increased sharply and capital punishment was approved 
as the best means of dealing with even trivial crimes in this area. As a result drug dealers 
armed themselves and became more organised, using automatic machine guns against 
police forces because they had to kill or be killed; the price of drugs increased sharply 
and drug suppliers became more powerful, richer and more sophisticated. Drug 
trafficking became a highly profitable and attiactive trade. Enormous organised and 
armed groups entered into the area of drug dealing, and police forces could not tackle 
them leading to use of the amiy and other security forces. This process led to a civil war 
between drug traffickers and the government. From 1998 to 2004, 9573 amied clashes 
took place; some two million drug dealers were arrested; 11,172 gangs and groups of 
drug traffickers were detained; and 4000 drug dealers were killed by government forces,’ 
Between 1979 and 2005, 3350 police, revolutionary and security forces died as martyrs,^ 
and 10,000 were handicapped in what was seen as a sacred jihad.^ As a result of this 
process “ 75% of prison space was occupied by criminals who were directly (53%) or
1-Iran Newspaper. 23/9/2005. This statistic does not include those criminals that have been executed. 
They are killed in aimed conflictions against police forces and other governmental forces.
2-Martyi-ed in Islamic culture attributed to those individuals that are killed in a sacred war, in this case war 
on drug in Iran is considered as sacred war, since those who are scarified themselves are called martyied.
3- Iran Newspaper, Ibid, ’Jihad’ itself means sacred war. The terms ‘Sacred jihad’ is used for more 
emphasis on its sacredness. I
.
I
indirectly (22%) connected to drugs.”'’ Although there are no valid statistics regarding 
drug related deaths over the last 25 years, there is reasonable evidence suggesting that the 
number of executions was very high.
The war on drugs was not a single or random event in Iran’s revolutionary penal 
policy. It was a sign of a general shift in Iran’s penal policy towards a harsh penal 
practice including retaliation, public execution, public flogging and public shaming. 
These punishments were particularly targeted at religious, moral and political crimes 
Amnesty International termed these kinds of penal practices as “cruel, inhuman or 
degrading and [urged] the Iranian authorities to end all such punishments.”  ^Iran is 
second only to country China in terms of volume of executions.^
Iran’s pre- revolution criminal justice system was highly influenced by Western 
ideas of individualization and rehabilitation. These ideas, at least partly, expressed the 
overarching philosophy of penal practice in Iran. The Iranian legal system, in particular 
the Iranian criminal justice system, sought to replicate the Western “criminal justice 
model, in particular the French penal code. Iran’s penal law was mostly a translation of 
French penal code”.^  Correctionalist methods and treatment were accepted into criminal 
law and judges had great discretionary powers in the application of these principles. 
Psychological disorders and other physical illnesses and social deprivations were taken
4 For example, homicides, thefts, immoral crimes and so on can be considered as crimes that are related to 
drug dealing or addiction.
5 Amnesty International 13/ 08/ 2001 
6Amnesty International, 05/04/2005 
7 Mohseni 1997, pp. 41-42
seriously and criminals officially received different treatments for the same crime.^
Probation law in 1961 covered various criminal types and categorized them into different 
gi’oups: the mentally ill, habitual and addicted amongst others, that could receive 
particular probation orders.^ Juvenile delinquents were accorded regimes of treatment 
different to adults, including various privileged advantages, from irresponsibility to 
supervision orders by their parents or other social institutions.’’’
What caused the tremendous upheaval in the Iranian criminal justice system?
How and why did an increasingly modernized penal system turn back and convert into a
very traditional criminal justice system? How can one theoretically explain such an
unpredictable and unprecedented upheaval in the area of punishment? Which political,
cultural and social forces can be considered as capable of creating such a quick and deep
transformation? Such a gi'eat revolution in the area of criminal justice would suggest the
existence of powerful dynamic forces. The question becomes more fascinating through
investigation of parallel patterns of change in other modem countries. Finding a
convincing social justification in the case of Iran is not very difficult - a cultural and
religious revolution had taken place, well known as the Islamic Revolution of Iran - but
can one propose a similar social explanation for appearance of traditional, expressive and 
. .severe penal practice in the American criminal justice system during last three decades?
%More specifically what role could a powerful social force like religion play in the sphere 
of criminal justice in the modem world? The investigation of harsh penal policy in 'C
revolutionary Iran and the severity of penal practice in the USA brings up broad 7'U
8 Ghorbany 1989, Codes,22-24
9 Ibid., Article, 3 Probation Law 1961 
lOPublic Penal Code 1974 Article, Codes 33-36
questions as to the role of religious conceptions in a criminal justice system, and how this 
might be investigated.
10
”  Khomeini 1981, p. 18
'1
I-Religion and punishment
Religious perspectives must be considered as fundamental in transforming the
I:
penal system in Iran. In Iran’s religious society corruption and immorality are social evils
'Iwhich must be eliminated. In a society of believers and saints, crime and sin are similarly #
repulsive and intolerable, because they violate divine rules. In this society it was 
theoretically assumed that a godly determined penal practice could in the best way 
eliminate moral corruption. Islamic government, as a product of a religious philosophy 
and a new political ideology was justified on the basis of the idea that Islamic rules, like 
Islamic punishments, are derived from divine decrees which could not be implemented 
without an Islamic government. As Imam Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution 
argued:
A body of laws is not sufficient for a society to be refoimed. In order for law to 
ensure the reforai and happiness of man, there must be an executive power and an 
executor. For this reason, God Almighty, in addition to revealing a body of law 
(i.e., the ordinances of the Shari’ah), has laid down a particular form of 
government together with executive and administrative institution. ’ ’
Consequently, the most crucial role of an Islamic government is the implementation of 
the Islamic rules. After the Islamic Revolution, politicians were commissioned with 
these substantial and sacred duties.
11 I
Religion plays a key role in this political and bureaucratic system and gave rise to 
a profound change in the determination and application of Iranian penal practice. The 
proximity of socio-political values and institutions to religion gave them a colour of 
religiosity and sacredness. In such a climate penal policy could have a ruthless approach 
toward any wrongdoing against social, and even political, values, because every offence 
against these sacred institutions and the rules that they announced could be seen as a sign 
of impurity and wickedness and a violation against religion itself.
It may be thought that the involvement of religion in penal policy and the role that 
it could play in penal practice is a characteristic of traditional and developing societies 
such as Iran; it is a phenomenon that has not a substantial presence in the majority of 
modem countries’ penal practice. The time for a functional role for religion in criminal 
justice system areas is past and has become a matter for historical study.
However, a brief study of cun ent penal practices in highly modern and very 
democratic countries, such as the USA, suggests that this view cannot be entirely 
accurate. The clock has been turned back in American penal policy and nowadays 
punishment in the USA is not comparable with its counterparts in western countries in 
terms of severity. Instead, comparisons with the system of justice of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan or Nazi Germany have been more appropriate with the réintroduction of 
traditional sanctions such as chain gangs and public shaming and new styles of 
punishments like boot camps and electronic monitoring. As the justice system increases 
criminalization, prosecution of minors as adults, the abandonment of parole.
12
rehabilitative programs and indeterminate sentences and so on, in the increase cruel and
USA.
13
harsh punishments became more apparent. As we will see in chapter four, sending more
people to jail for minor offences, application of the death penalty, having the highest rate 
.of incarceration in the world, more than ten times the incarceration rate in Western
Europe are aspects of this growing movement toward the severity o f penal practice in the 0
Alongside this growing severity of punishment in the USA, there has been a 
parallel movement of increasing involvement of religion in American social and political 
life. This parallel movement may indicate a correlation between the two phenomena. 
Nowadays Americans “are much more religious than the citizens of other western 
nations; polls indicate that Americans are the most churchgoing in Protestantism and the 
most fundamentalist in Christendom.” ’^  One of the unquestionable realities of American
■s?
society today is that an extremely high percentage of people believe in God. Virtually all |
Americans , according to Gallup Princeton Religion Research Centre say they “believe in 
God or a '’'universal spirif \  96 percent in the most recent report,”’^  a figure which has
'tremained stable during recent years. After a long period of conventional separation
sbetween state and church in the USA, a new trend in the relationship between the 
phenomena of religion and penal justice has emerged. The popularity of religion and its
'I;entrance into the area of politics has generated a fundamental question: is there any |
significant connection between growing acceptance of religion and more punitive policy 
in a very democratic country such as the USA? .'ri.
12 Garland 2005, p. 349
13 Bishop 1963, p. 2 |
■■I
In the contemporary academic world, religious beliefs and penal practice are
rarely taken as parallel topics for serious discussion. Despite the great moral and
intellectual powers that religion has had over a variety of penal policies in many
countries, “it has not been systematically incorporated into theories of criminal
punishment.”*'’ While scholars have not discussed the relationship between religion and
criminal law, “thinking about crime and punishment is, for better or worse, in fact often
deeply influenced by religious beliefs.”’  ^ Despite secularist movements during past
centuries, there are still common spheres between religion, morality and criminal law:
“every religion implies some reward of virtue and punishment of sin.” ’^  It is true that
“religion was, during the 18th century, eradicated from the way legislation was j
formulated... [but] it did not disappear.”’^  The Christian tradition has never totally been
removed; it remains (at least in rhetoric) “highly influential in the moral outlooks of a |
i
18 !gi'eat many people in a variety of countries.” Notwithstanding the influential presence of |
religion as a sti ong cultural conception in the area of penal practice, it is not discussed as
a serious element in the social understanding of punishment. What we see as religious ;
investigations of penal practice are mainly other versions of philosophical studies of
punishment, and these studies can be seen as religious justifications or religious i
philosophy of punishment. The influence of religious ideas on legal theories and
theological considerations of crime, criminal and penal practice have been the main
theme of such investigations.
14 Savelsberg 2004, p. 375
15 Ibid
16 Stark 2001, p. 619
17 Peter 2004, p. 214
18 Murphy 2003a,p. 262
14
II-Religion and philosophy of punishment
The relationship between religion and punishment has occasionally been 
examined in terms of philosophical and legal theories. “Some of the greatest 
philosophical minds that have addressed the topic of punishment were deeply influenced 
by Christianity. One thinks of such obvious examples as Augustine, Aquinas and Kant.”’^
Such investigations are similar to non-religious philosophical studies of penal practice.
“contemporary influence of religious thought on legal thought,”^’ the effects of religious 
commitments, and the role that these religious values might play in contemporary legal 
theories.
If non-religious philosophers have offered various justifications for the state’s 
power to prosecute and punish offenders and have resorted to terms like deterrence, 
retribution, incapacitation and rehabilitation as purposes of punishment, religious thinkers 
have in turn tried to explain the judicial system in light of theological considerations. For 
example, these religious philosophers have tried to interpret the question “is (retribution)
15
Equally, the philosophy of punishment and religious studies try to answer how 
punishment can be justified and why punishment is true. This approach investigates the
19 Ibid
20 Murphy and Brennan 2003, pp. 259-260
In February 2002, Arizona State University hosted the conference ‘Religion and the criminal law -  legal
and philosophical perspectives’. This conference was sponsored by the College o f Law, the Department of si
Philosophy and the Department o f Religious Studies. The basic idea behind the conference was this: |
Thinking about crime and punishment is, for better or for worse, in fact often deeply influenced by 
religious beliefs; but these beliefs, in the contemporary secular university, are rarely brought to the table for 
open discussion. Ibid
21 Vining 2003, p. 313
a legitimate objective of a Christian view of punishment?”^^  They have justified penal 
practice “in teims of promotion of the common good and the spiritual reformation of the 
c r i mi na l . The y  have endeavoured to identify the “religious patterns in attitudes toward 
criminal punishment.” '^* Equally, inner dispositions of men, sin and expiation, retribution, 
rehabilitation, forgiveness and mercy are some other conceptions that are studied from a 
religious perspective on crime and punishment.
But it seems these philosophical studies have less to say about the function that 
religion could play in the sphere of penal practice. This is because, as Garland and Young 
have argued, the leading task of philosophy “is to question ‘punishment in general’ in the 
hope of establishing some rationale or justification for the ‘right to punish. A criminal 
justice system is not made up of legal theories, penological ideas, or some intellectual and 
philosophical tradition. Rather, what makes “ the system is social structure (the way 
society is organized) and social norms (people’s ideas, customs, habits, and attitudes). 
Penal practice should be studied in its social context and in connection with other social 
forces. Conformity between penal policy and social standards requires more exploration 
of the social meanings and social contexts of punishment.
22 Murphy 2003a, p. 270 
Ibid, p. 274
Savelsberg 2004, p. 373 
Garland and Young 1983, p. 11 
“  Friedman 1993, p. 6
16
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j ?
III" Religion and Sociological Studies of punishment
The sociology of penal practice has failed systematically to investigate religion as 
a powerful cultural element in shaping criminal justice system in the modem world.
Sociologists have rarely taken “religion as an analytical tool”^^  to investigate penal 
practice. Religion, as a prominent element of culture, has been the site of intensive social 
inquiry, but the crucial role that it potentially plays in the shaping of punishment has been I
overlooked. Moreover, “those who would bring an openly religious perspective to bear, 
however, are often treated in the academy as though they have done something in rather
■jll
bad t a s t e . T h e  moral, emotional and intellectual powers that religion potentially has in 
forming penal policy have been ignored and religion has not been methodically brought
:into theoretical studies on the relationship between punishment and society,
Notwithstanding that, the area of criminal justice has been “in fact often deeply
influenced by religious b e l i e f s . I
I
.f
Sociology shaped by predominantly Foucauldian and neo-Marxian perspectives 
has neglected the study of religion and for many years Marxian, Weberian and 
Foucauldian works have dominated socio-cultural theories of punishment. For Marx and 
Foucault penal practice is viewed either as a suppressive apparatus of the ruling class or 
as an efficient way of normalization in a power-knowledge framework. Marxist and 
Foucauldian theorizing in the 1970s and 1980s dealt with identifications of the social
27 Green 2005, pp. 102- 104. |
28 Murphy and Brennan, Introduction 2003b, p. 259 7
29 Savelsberg 2004, p. 375
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determinants and functions of penal institutions. They were concerned more with fields 
of class control and disciplinary domination than with cultural phenomena such as 
religion.
Although Weber did not directly address penal practice his theory of 
rationalization, professionalization and bureaucratization was an account of the general 
trends which have dominated the penal realm for long periods in western countries. 
Rationality points to the separation of the institution of punishment from its social, 
cultural and emotional backgrounds like religious convictions. Involvement of expertises 
and professionals in the process of sentencing and requirements of a bureaucratic system 
in the criminal justice system can be considered as a strict barrier against the presence of 
the irrational and non-scientific elements such as religion in shaping of criminal justice 
system systems.
Foucault argues that modem forms of punishment such as the prison are specific 
architectural foirnis of safety and security measures, disciplinary technologies, and a 
developed administration in which the categorization of time and space must be 
considered as part of a strategy of power to efficiently manage of individuals and 
populations. Foucault altered the conventional reading of punishment. From his point of 
view penal practice is a manifestation of the will to power. For Foucault, punishment in 
the classical period represents tactics of power. Crime attacks the sovereign physically 
and the power of the law reacts as the power of the prince. Penal law in modem society, 
for him, is an instrument of economic, political and social management. Penal policy
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should, in a profound sense, be understood as part of a broad strategy for the management 
of the individual and population. For Foucault there had not been and is no connection 
between punishment, be it classical or modern, and socio-cultural structures like religion.
However, contrary to Foucauldian thought, Durkheim has considered religion as a 
translation and embodiment of social forces. If, for Foucault, power-knowledge is a 
fundamental framework in which the totality of social life should be understood, for 
Durkheim religion is the foundation for all social institutions. It can be said that religion, 
for Durkheim, holds the same position as power in Foucault’s conception. For Durkheim 
religion provides “ not only an integrative bond, but also is the primordial source of 
thought, law, morality and ... all social institutions.” ’^’ Both Foucault and Weber 
recognized the crucial sociological role of religion, but they did not systematically use 
religion as an analytical tool in understanding society and punishment. The Durkheimian 
analysis of religion, society and punishment, however, provides us with a systematic 
understanding of the relationship between religion and punishment.
Pickering 1975, p. 164
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IV Religion, Culture and Garland’s Complex Theory of 
Punishment
The aim of this thesis is to show how culture in general, and religion in particular, 
contribute to development of penal practice in modem society. Relationships between 
cultural patterns, social values, and religious beliefs are the main themes of the present 
study. The two main parts of this study- an investigation of relationship between culture 
and punishment on the one hand, and the relationship between religion and penal practice 
on the other hand - are attempting to look at social and cultural meaning of punishment. 
Since Garland has, more than other thinker, investigated social contexts of penal practice, 
his work on punishment in modem society, must be a starting point for any contemporary 
sociological study of punishment. His “splendidly erudite, wide-ranging and thought- 
provoking study of punishment and modem society,” ’^ is a pre-eminent amongst recent 
works on the sociological study of punishment in modem society.
His broad and complex approach to the study of penal practice provides us with a 
comprehensive analysis of theories of social control, legal transfoimation and social 
organization. His methodology and the material that is provided by his investigations are 
sources of great insight in the sociological understanding of punishment. A significant 
part of Garland’s investigations in the area of penal practice has comprised looking at the 
social and cultural meaning of punishment. In an important sense, culture has been a 
main theme in his works from Vunishment and Welfare (1987) Punishment and Modern 
Society (1990), to The Culture o f Control (2001). As he himself has stated; “my work is
Murphy W.T (Review Author), 1992,p .497
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32often seen as being sympathetic to a ‘culturalist’ approach”, and a main concern of his
33works “has certainly been to bring culture back in.” For him, punishment is conceived
term as there are anthropologists”. But, since there are close relationships between 
culture and patterns of penal action he has tried to provide a definition for this broad 
term, proposing a broad definition which covers all cognitive and emotional aspects of
social life. He defines culture as mentalities and sensibilities. The first term (mentalities) ui
■ /refers to values, system of beliefs, system of ideas and ways of thinking and the second 
.(sensibilities) indicates passions, emotional configurations and ways of feeling.
This study has broadly followed this kind of approach to penal practice and
looking at culture through the lens that is provided by Garland. I have attempted to apply 
.his conception of mentalities and sensibilities and explain how these cultural elements
have major connotations for the ways that we approach punishment. In chapters three, 
four and five I have provided special sections to explain how changing modes of penal
Garland David 1990, p. 198 
Ibid, p. 195
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7:0
and developed within the medium of cultural languages, symbols and discourse: “Penal 
laws and institutions are always proposed, discussed, legislated, and operated within
0
definite cultural codes.” '^* Even if one explains punishment in terms of political and f
.economical interests, for him it remains necessary to explore these cultural meanings.
In Garland’s view the term culture is a generic and controversial notion that
Scovers various complex areas of phenomena: “There are almost as many definition of the
Garland David See: http://research.yale.edn/ccs/research/worldng-papers/garland_culturepnnish.pdf ‘
Ibid
i
culture regarding, crime, criminology, criminals and other penal conceptions transform 
the ways that we punish offenders. But, for me, this mode of analysis still needs 
something more, because changing mentalities and sensibilities is not by itself capable of 
showing the direction of this ti*ansfoiTnation in terms of severity or leniency, and we need 
to distinguish between the importance of different forms of sensibility and mentality.
In other words, this leaves open the fundamental question of how and why social 
sentiments respond differently to particular categories of conduct in different times and 
places. Garland has fully explained the transformation of mentalities and sentiments in 
the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries which gave rise to a more lenient penal 
policy. He has recognized the cultural resonance of punishment, but his broad 
description, including both cognitive and emotive aspects of culture, cannot wholly 
explain the essential nature of punishment. He has argued for the relationship between 
culture and severe penal practice in USA during the last thirty years. He aptly recognized 
that there is a kind of correlation between culture in terms of mentalities and sensibilities 
and penal practice. But for me Garland’s theory does not by itself show how, for 
example, the involvement of social passions gives rise to harsh penal policies. His theory 
of culture and punishment has remained at the general level. A deeper analysis is 
required to show how the nature of social values may lead to a gentler or a harsher penal 
policy. The present study claims that an understanding the role of social beliefs and 
sentiments in leniency or severity of penal practice is partly dependent on the essence of 
those social values. It is here that DurWieim re-enters the account.
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The naiTower Durkheimian description of culture, as a normative aspect of culture 
or moral culture, establishes a clearer and closer link between culture and penal practice. 
His conception of culture refers to those aspects of social life, ideas and sentiments, that 
are accorded a kind of obligatory^* ,^ moral and sacred character. Severity of punishment 
depends on degree of sacredness of those social and moral principles. Indeed, a powerful 
religious phenomenon can be identified in his analysis of culture, punishment and 
society. The Durkheimian notion of sacred social principles and religion in society will 
be applied here as an analytical tool to explain particular aspects of culture and its 
relation with punishment and society in the modern era. I have applied this sacred aspect 
of culture in the analysis of two different penal cultures, Iran and USA, to see how this 
neglected aspect of culture can be significant in understanding penal practice in modem 
society.
Garland has also recognised a particular form of culture that he terms ‘penal 
culture’. This penal culture for him “ is the loose amalgam of penological theory, stored - 
up experience, institutional wisdom, and professional common sense which frame the 
actions of penal agents and which lends meaning to what they do.”^^  Every external value 
which looks for a change in penal practice, firstly should transform penal culture. 
Operatives of penal culture such as, judges, probation officers, and prison staff transform 
cultural notions into penal actions. These experts in turn are affected by a wider cultural 
context and the demands of public opinion. In one way this analysis is similar to 
Durkheim’s radical description of penal practice as representative of collective
Thompson Kenneth 1982, p. 75 
37Ibid,p.210
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sentiments. But as mentioned above Garland considers these courses of action as part of a 
complex procedure of shaping penal practice in modem society, while for Durkheim the 
process of penal practice is simply viewed as implementation of collective consciousness 
through the operators of a criminal justice system. However, delineation of “the 
relationship which link this penal culture to the wider social setting in which it exists, 
has been part of Garland’s concem in the Punishment and Modern Society. Equally the 
present study shall attempt to study relationship between culture in the wider social 
context, political system, judiciary, executives and other performers in the area of penal 
policy. In both case studies I will try to show how public opinion, social mentalities, 
collective sentiments and religious attitudes influence legislation process, sentencing and 
penal practice.
However, punishment is viewed by Garland as “a complex cultural artefact.”^^  
Cultural forms can influence penal practice through an interactive relation with other 
cultural foiTus: “A specific cultural foiTu comes to influence or act upon penal practice 
only through a process of struggle, compromise, and alliance with a range of competing 
cultural foiTus.”"^  ^ Given this, if one considers punishment comprehensively, as a 
complex cultural artefact, determined “by reference to cunent mores and 
sensibilities”'^'and there is interactive relationship between cultural forms, how should 
one should investigate the role of religion as a crucial cultural factor in shaping penal 
policy?
3 8  Ibid 
Ibid, p . 198  
Ibid, p .2 0 9
^Garland David 1990 p. 195
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Analytically the influence of religion in the area of penal policy can be studied 
from two perspectives: as a cultural phenomenon which influences penal practices, and as 
a foundational element of society. From the first of these perspectives, religion is a 
powerful cultural factor capable of interaction with other social institutions and 
influencing penal practice in modem society. It is capable of explaining important 
dimensions of penal practice in both traditional and modem society. From the second 
perspective, religion functions as a series of sacred principles in society which are the 
foundation of social coherence. In this case religion more forcefully affects other 
dimensions of social life, including penal action. In both cases there is an intimate 
relation between religion and penal practice.
Garland makes no gestures towards seeing religion as a foundational base; he 
principally views the role religion as that of being one cultural factor amongst others in 
the historical shaping of punishment. Garland’s comprehensive study of punishment’s 
social contexts has not considerably addressed religion as an effective cultural factor in 
shaping penal practice -  or at least he has not chosen to single out religion as a factor of 
any special influence. Although he acknowledges that “throughout the history of penal 
practice religion has been a major force in shaping the ways in which offenders are dealt 
with,”"'^  religion has no a special position in his analysis of punishment and he has even 
not addressed the role of religion as a cultural factor in forming penal policy in current 
society. He explains briefly how in primitive societies crime has been associated with sin 
and impurity and punishment was involved a process of expiation. In this respect he has
Garland David, 1990 p.203
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followed a Durkheimian approach to ancient societies in which culture is religious in 
character and society reacts harshly against criminal activities.
Garland has briefly mentioned that religion is a cultural factor, “through which we 
see these individuals (criminals), understand their motivations, and dispose them as 
cases,”'^  ^but he does not systematically analyse the relation between religion and 
punishment. He is aware that nowadays Americans, for example, are much more 
religious than the people of other western countries, mentioning that: “polls indicate that 
Americans are the most churchgoing in Protestantism and the most fundamentalist in 
Christendom.” '^' He has described “the conservative call for a return to moral discipline 
and ti'aditional values”''^  in the United States, noting that neo-conservatism has 
inti'oduced into political culture “a strikingly anti-modern concem for themes of tr adition, 
order, hierarchy, and au t ho r i t y , f r om the mid-1970s onwards. He has shown that “the 
demand to get ‘ back to basics’, to resort to ‘family values’”''^  have become a familiar 
themes in America, but he has not, either generally or in the case of the USA, argued 
specifically about the role that religion as a cultural factor might play in shaping criminal 
justice in modern society, or the influences of these religious mentalities and sensibilities 
in the area of penal practice.
Where he has examined the role of religion as an influential factor in relation to 
the reformation of the penal policy it is in a historical context. Here he has shown how
Ibid,p.l95
Garland 2005, p. 349 
Garland David 2001, p,100 
Garland David 2001,p.99
47 Ibid
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religion shaped the penal refomis of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, “since 
religious conviction ... tended to play a crucial part in the motivation of those groups 
(penal refoimers) and in their understanding of the reformative process.”''® Overall, 
however, there is no doubt for him that from the medieval period onwards, through the 
development of modernity, legal systems have become increasingly separated from 
religious conceptions.''^ This argument can be seen in the framework of a more general 
theory in which religion has been removed from the scene of social life in the 
development of modernity.
This approach is consistent with an implieit theory of modernity underlying his 
work in Punishment and Modern Society which sees that “conditions of modernity lead to 
increasing secularisation and privatisation of religion.” '^' As a consequence “religion 
gradually loses its relevance and public influence in modem society.” '^ However, I would 
argue that this is not a suitable approach to the investigation of the relationship between 
modemity and religion. The contradictions and interactions between modemity and 
religious belief are still a matter of debate. As I will argue in chapter three, for example, 
for Max Weber the dominance of secularization, the expansion of industrial production, 
and finally the expansion of rationalization that occun ed in the realms of law, the 
economy and bureaucracy since the seventeenth century, weakened religious rationality 
in Western countries’ culture. But, one cannot “announce a necessary link between
Ibid, p.203
See Ibid, pp.203-209
50 Ibid, By secularization we mean the process by which sectors o f society and culture are removed from 
the domination o f religious institutions and symbols.
Brady Veronica et al
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modernity and a disappearance of religion or of the religions”/^ It is true that under 
conditions of modernity the public influence of religion has weakened, but, one cannot 
clearly show that how and “where the phrase ‘disenchantment of the world’ attains its full 
nieaning.”^^  It does not necessarily mean that religious views have been completely 
removed from the social scene: “Every human society is an enterprise of world-building. 
Religion occupies a distinctive place in this enteiprise.” '^' Since the explanation of human 
action and social life still has more or less a religious dimension, religion should remain 
“a viable and fruitful area of research”^^
Thus, while the present study has clearly been influenced by Garland’s sociology 
of punishment, there are also important differences in how we look at religion, not least 
because I shall argue that religion is a distinctive cultural factor that continues to have an 
influence even on modem penal practices. I shall investigate the relationship between 
religion and punishment fi'om the two different perspectives identified earlier: as a 
cultural element among the others and as a solution for social disintegration. In relation 
to the first I shall argue that religion is still actively involved in the foimation of penal 
policy in modem society. As will be shown in the following chapters, religion as cultural 
factor could push penal system towards either harshness or leniency. Of course, in the 
two case studies in this thesis religion is considered more in terms of its contribution 
towards harsh penal practice, but I do not claim that this is always the case. In chapter 
four, and in particular in chapter five, I have tried to show that how religion could affect
Lambert Yves 
Vincent P. Pecora, 
Berger Petri 1967, p.3 
Gill Robin 1977, p. V
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mentalities, attitudes, sentiments, public opinion, policy makers and operatives in the area 
of criminal justice and influence the penal system. This is not claim that religion can 
explain all the transformations that occurred in two case studies, only that religion is still 
an important factor in the shaping of penal practice and that the sociology of punishment 
should not ignore it. Before moving to the second part of this argument -a more detailed 
discussion of how to study the relation between religion and punishment - 1 shall briefly 
explain the role that religion, as a cultural factor, could play in favour of leniency of 
penal practice.
Although the main question that will be addressed in the present study is how 
religious ideas and the sensibilities that these bring about, conti'ibuted to the development 
of harsh punishment in contemporary Iran and the United States, this argument cannot 
fully explain the roles that religion can play in shaping penal justice. Historical studies 
show that harsh penal practices are not intrinsically associated with the religion as a 
cultural phenomenon. Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter, Durlcheim’s theory of 
penal practice has been criticized because he believed in a kind of correlation between the 
presence of religion and severe penal practice in primitive societies. Durkheim took his 
evidence on the legal order from classical antiquity and “appealed to Biblical evidence, 
arguing that in the Pentateuch there are very few non-repressive laws, and even these are 
not as foreign to penal law as may appear at first glance, for they are all bear the mark of 
religion.”^^  However, the idea of a consistent con*elation of religion and repressive law 
in primitive societies has not been accepted by a number of scholars. They have argued 
exactly the contrary: “that the Torah basically embodied religious and moral exhortations
Lukes Steven and Scull Andrew 1983 p .11
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devoid of punitive backings and existed alongside a legal system distinct from religious 
affairs and invoking restitution for secular offences.
I shall try to show in the two cases studies that religion could also drive the 
criminal justice system towards more lenient forms of criminal justice. The relationship 
between religion and penal policy is complex and religion should not be analysed as a 
cultural factor that consistently contributes to creation of a harsh penal policy. Various 
interpretations of core elements of religion like love of others, forgiveness and mercy, 
historically had and still have various functions. This is certainly ti'ue of the United 
States, for example, where both the advocates and opponents of capital punishment use 
biblical references in order to claim the moral high gi'ound.^® As “Christianity is 
compatible with a variety of views, even about capital punishment,”^^  it has played 
different roles in leniency and severity of punishments.
The relationship between Christianity and Islam, as two major religions, on the 
one hand, and penal policy on the other should also not be seen only in favour of severity 
of punishment. As I will show in chapter five and discuss briefly in following paragiaphs 
as the Christianity,^'' Islam also does not necessarily contributes to more repressive 
systems of punishment. On the contrary, the role of religious ideas in less severe 
punishment,'" and more humane penal practice is undeniable. The movement that
Ibid
Murphy Jeffrie G. 2003b, p.261
59 Murphy Jeffrie G 2003a, p. 275
60 I am not claiming that these two religions have had similar role towards leniency o f penal practice. I 
have shown in chapters four and five that how the Islam and the Christianity played various roles in 
severity of penal practice.
61 Savelsberg 2004, pp. 397-8
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formed the penitentiary system and developed the coiTectional system in the modem era 
was originally a religions one.^^ The rehabilitative ideal and the growth of the policies of 
probation and parole, have also had religious origins. According to Christian doctrine all 
that was required for the reformation and social adjustment of criminals was repentance 
and despair. “Generally the exhortation of the prison chaplain, solitary confinement and 
complete silence so that the delinquent might ponder over the sins of his past, was the 
cure that was prescribed.”''^
It is true that historically the Christian religion also conti'ibuted to the 
establishment of a harsh criminal justice through punishing religious crimes like 
blasphemy, heresy, false swearing, violations of religious values, sodomy, prostitution 
and so on. But religious ideas also encourage penal law to pursue the rehabilitation and 
re-education of criminals. For Jonas Hanway^'' who is considered as part of “a rising 
evangelical tide that inspired many advocates of reform in the late eighteenth century, 
reformation means religious conversion.”^^  According to his religious beliefs, penal 
practice should encourage the individual criminal to reconcile himself to God. The state 
cannot pardon the sinner, it can merely help him to repent his sin, and seek God’s 
forgiveness. These religious thoughts had been part of the principal early rationales for 
the establishment of penitentiaries in England “to give prisoners the solitude and serenity 
necessary to reflect on their crime and seek forgiveness for it.”"" These institutions 
“sei-ved in the words of an early English statute of penitentiaries by ... solitary
62 see e.g. Ignatieff, Rothman
63 A. Bruce Andrew, 1933 p. 18
64 He published Solitude in imprisonment in 1776
65 Morris Norval and Rothman David; 1995 , p.86
66 Witte John E. et al, 1994. ‘445
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confinement...labour, [and] due religious instruction... to accustom [prisoners] to serious 
reflection and to teach them both the principles and practices of every Christian and 
moral duty.”'"' Equally, religious ideas have been part of theories that brought about the 
penitentiary system in the United States."® And although the penitentiaries have 
subsequently been come to be seen as harsh regimes, it cannot be doubted that the 
motives and beliefs that inspired the reformers were to make punishment more humane.
Religion, then, has played a crucial role in the abolition of cruel and physical 
penal practices and the replacement of these severe punishments by the penitentiary"''. 
From the eleventh century on, significant numbers of hospitals, and religious associations 
devoted themselves to aiding poor, old people, abandoned children and other 
impoverished people. Prior to 1883 “Quakers in Pennsylvania had done much towards 
relieving the condition of debtors and accused person in jails.”™ By the twentieth century, 
“prisoners came to be included in this category (of the poor)-generally termed “the poor 
of Christ’V  and aiding prisoners became a systematic part of the religious charity 
organizations’ activities. A leading role in the revival of penal activism against death 
penalty in the nineteenth century was occupied by a group of evangelically minded 
Quakers. They opposed physical punishment, because they believed such punishments 
gave rise to a hardness and intensity of criminals and brought about more disorder in the 
prison. They believed in reformation as the only real task of punishment. For them, in a
67 Ibid, P.456
68 Ibid see
69 Morris Norval and Rothman David; 1995 p p l2 ,14,25,26,27,31,56,57,58,432,-33,437
70 A. Bruce Andrew 1993, p .19
71 Morris Norval and Rothman David 1995, p. .26
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“well-run prison the prisoner are ruled by kindness; chains are therefore unnecessary.”^^ 
For Quakers the inmates were made obedient by the gentle way of treatment and “the 
seeming incorrigibility of the criminal was the result not of human nature but of a 
mistaken punishment.
It is true that Islamic philosophy holds that a harsh punishment serves as a 
deterrent to serious crimes that haim individual victims, or which threaten to destabilize 
the foundations of society. According to Islamic law, intentional murder can be 
punishable by death, but forgiveness and compassion are strongly encouraged 
simultaneously.^'' I will show in chapter five how these principles play their roles in 
practice and in forming penal policy in Iran. The murder victim’s family is given a choice 
of either insisting on the death penalty, or pardoning the peipetrator and accepting 
monetary compensation for their loss.''" I will show there, for example, how planning for 
delays in the Islamic retaliation rituals of murderers in front of the victim and criminal’s 
family in Iran save criminals from punishment. Officials and the murderer’s family try to 
produce an atmosphere of compassion and convince the victim’s family to forgive a 
miserable man or woman who is spending the last minutes of his life. Indeed, it often 
happens that the victim’s family remove the rope from the murderer’s neck
The present study mainly focuses on showing how religion has served to 
produce a harsh justice in Iran, but at the same time I will show how religion has
72 Ibid. p.96
73 Ibid,p.95
74 Quran Sura 5,versus 32 See: 
http://islam.about.eom/cs/law/a/c_pimishTnent.htm
75 Quran Sura 2, Versus 178 Ibid.
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presented significant obstacles to the performance of serious punishment, so that a 
considerable portion of punishments become, fully or partially, impractical. Mercy in 
general and mercy for criminals (even murderers) is a Quranic principle.''" Following the 
Islamic law the Supreme Leader,^'' in various religious or national ceremonies, has 
exempted partially or fully a large number of convicted criminals from punishment.
There are also charitable institutions that pay for those criminals that are jailed because 
they cannot afford to pay their fines or financial damages.''®Victims or their family have 
no role in the prosecution or performance of penal practice in moral crimes like adultery, 
homosexuality, and crimes against religion and government. But in such cases Islamic 
criminal procedure is so complicated that most criminal activities do not lead to 
punishment It is as if there was no intention of sentencing or delivering the penalty.^" 
Islamic punishments in committing financial crimes are suspended in the case of poverty 
and want. According to religious principles and official criminal procedures judiciary 
officials must not insist on proving the case in moral and religious crimes,®" “rather 
religiously highly recommended that criminal should not confess.”®' Closer attention
76Quran, Sura 1, Versus 178 and 238
77 According to Constitution law Article 110 supreme leaders is privileged to pardon criminals. For 
example in last anniversary o f revolution 3401 criminals released through his pardon. ISNA. 10-02- 2005
78 A charity institution by the name Emdad Committee paid for 8000 prisoner in 2005 and released them 
from jail. ISNA. 6/2/2005
79 Present o f four impartial and virtuous female witnesses, fully witnessing the sexual intercourse, private 
and individual questioning o f witnesses, and looking for the most trivial difference between their 
statements as an excuse for their flogging, are examples of procedural obstacles in performance o f serious 
punishments.
80As a lawyer, I witnessed a case that a man had applied to the court for divorce certification because his 
wife had committed adultery. His wife was ready to confess, but there was no question about her offence. 
The judge asked some questions about divorce and issued the divorce certification.
81 There are two famous cases o f adultery that managed by prophet Mohammad and Imam All: that cited 
in Sunni and shi’ at traditional texts. In both case they tr ied to prevent from accused confession. They 
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shows that, these are almost impossible crimes since the restrictions of proof are so 
great.”®^
As the present investigation will show in chapter five, the procedural regulations 
and conditions of sentencing in harsh punishments like stoning, cutting off the hand,®  ^
and so on, in Islamic law are so complicated that most of time judges prefer to consider 
the case as non-religious crimes and follow the case according to non-religious penal 
laws. The presumption of innocence is, theoretically and constitutionally, an 
authoritative principle in the Islamic criminal procedure,®'' which means that judges must 
be one hundred percent certain in their sentencing: even a hivial hesitation is considered 
as an absolute obstacle to sentencing an offender to a punishment. Thus, although 
punishments in the Islamic criminal laws are very severe, there are great obstacles in 
proving and performing these punishments. These conditions considerably reduce 
severity of punishment in a criminal justice system.
However, if religion as a cultural factor may contribute to both leniency and 
severity of punishment, the overall effect of the religion as foundation of society is a 
harsher criminal justice system. I will discuss in chapter two, three and five that 
sometimes it is necessary that society resort to religious principles as foundations of
In case o f moral crimes like adultery, he or she should confess four times in front o f judges, as “confession 
in front o f other officials like inspectors, prosecutors, and police officers are not valid.” See: Official 
Newspaper 1992, p. 23
82 Ghavami (a clergyman and previous MP) 30-01- 2005 MP ISNA
83 There are around thirty stipulations that must all be met for the perfomiance o f the punishment. As I 
know this punishment is nowadays practically abolished in Iran
84Constitution law 1990, Article 37, provided that, Innocence is presumed, and no one is held guilty o f a 
charge unless his or her guilty is established by a legally authorized court.
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social integration. In this case religion is a fundamental element of social life and at this 
level generally contributes to harsher forms of punishment. This aspect of the relation 
between religion and penal practice is not addressed by Garland. Garland’s theory can be 
considered as a Durkheimian®" in that he has studied, reconstructed and developed 
Durkheim’s cultural theoiy of penal practice and he believed that Durkheim “does 
succeed in opening up important dimensions of the social process of punishment which 
are not otherwise apparent.”®" However, he does not address Durkheim’s theory of 
religion and society in his major work on The Elementary Forms o f Religious Life. In 
this book Durkheim applied religion as an analytical tool for understanding nature of 
society, attributing a foundational and independent role to religion in the shaping of 
society. He, himself, insisted that his theory of society had to be reconsidered in light of 
his new understanding of religion.®"
This later Durlcheimian approach towards religion and society has important 
consequences for his social theory, without consideration of which Durkheim’s theory 
cannot be fully understood. In this later work Durkheim does not consider religion as a 
cultural phenomenon, as he did in his earlier works such as The Division o f Labour or his 
writings on law®® The present study will argue in more detail, that according to 
Durkheim’s later work, religion is the foundation of social solidarity. I will try to show 
that, in Durkheim’s term, a modem society may shelter traditional values, such as 
morality and religion as foundations of social integiation. In this case religion becomes
85 W.T Murphy 1992,p.498
86 Garland David 1990 p.80
87 See Chapter Two Durkheim On Religion
88 These writing are collected in Lukes & Scull, Durkheim and the Law.
36
89 Giddenss Anthony 1995, p. 20 
See e.g. Garland David 1990b
37
symbol of society itself. As Giddens has argued, Durkheim saw religion as “society 
becoming conscious of itself, although in a symbolically transmuted form.”®" In 
Durkheimian terms, society had to be sheltered under a religious umbrella when social 
integrity was threatened. Indeed society appeals to religiosity and sacredness as defence 
mechanisms. It refers to sacred common values as the base of social cohesion, and any 
violation of these common values gives rise to a harsh reaction. I will endeavour to 
explain in both case studies that how this process contributes the severity of penal 
practice.
. , 7
gThe present study has not aimed at a comprehensive investigation of the 
relationship between society, culture and punishment, nor does it attempt a full
' 3understanding of the nature of punishment. It does not mean, however, that there is no I
similarity between this investigation and Garland’s sociological study of penal practice.
Garland’s general framework of study of punishment and, in particular, the great insights
that are offered by his theory of culture and punishment have had a considerable 1
influence on my study. His work has been essential to developing an understanding of 
,the different theoretical perspectives, and I have followed many of his insights here in
' I
discussing the work of Weber, Foucault, Elias and Spierenburg, and so on. I have not i;
aimed at showing all the advantages or limitations of these various perspectives, nor 
sought to provide a complex theory of penal practices."" However, I have contrasted
technical approaches and rational modes of crime control with investigation of cultural -Isensibilities and meanings of penal practice. Indeed the common theme of this study and
Garland’s theory of punishment, despite other differences, is the focus on culture and its
role in creation of penal practice.
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V- Durkheim’s Sociology of punishment
Durldieim’s analysis of punishment and society offers considerable insights into 
the relationship between penal practice and society. This framework, moreover, may be 
capable of clarifying analysis of new forms of punishments such as the reappearance of 
harsh punitive policies in the modem world. These transformations “call us back to 
Durkheim’s ironic vision”"' in which cultural perceptions in general-and religion in 
particular- have played a crucial role.
Cultural and expressive features of penal practice have long been out of the field 
of academic attention. There has been little consideration of social sensibilities, 
emotions, rituals and cultural resonances in social investigations of punishment. Despite 
the legacy of Emile Durkheim, the inteipretive search for cultural connotations has been 
displaced by more practical accounts of penal control. Although revival of cultural 
studies in the sociology of punishment is recent, it seems that the time has come for 
socio-cultural analyses of penal practice, and a considerable body of writing is now 
emerging. Researchers have started to examine more attentively the function and role of 
culture in the forming of penal policy and in the cultural ramifications of penal practices. 
However, as yet, investigation into the role of religion as a prominent cultural element in 
shaping criminal justice system has not been systematically initiated.
Sutton 1992,p. 1490
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Penal practice is considered by Durkheim to be a social phenomenon directly 
related to social organization. Punishment is a social action that draws a demarcating line 
between loyal members of society and others. For Durkheim, “punishment constitutes 
crime as a symbolic representation of social otherness, and binds group members in an 
attitude of condemnation.”"^  Both crime and punishment are normal events that 
functionally strengthen social cohesion. For Durkheim, punishment is a social and 
passionate reaction invoked in cases of threat to social integration. It is an automatic 
social self-defence that reinforce social togetherness; a vengeful social reaction against 
any violation and possible weakening of an otherwise strong state of social solidarity.
However, the central question is, what are the sources of these passionate and 
vengeful reactions? Why are these punitive social reactions often are harsh? A general 
discussion of the relationship between cultural perceptions and penal practice does not 
guide us to any specific analysis concerning the nature of penal practice. Durkheim offers 
a link between the notions of the sacred and of religion. The relationship between 
society and punishment can be understood in light of these fundamental conceptions as 
the base of social morality and solidarity. Without reference to religion, the content and 
function of morality and its relationship with punishment are implausible, as there are 
common sacred and moral principles in all societies. These constitute a functioning base 
for social integrity. Every encroachment on these areas faces a vengeful response. For 
Durldieim this is the permanent basis for punishment in all societies and in every stage of 
social development. This emotional and punitive character of punishment may be 
modified or disguised, but can never be intrinsically altered.
92 Sutton 1992 p, 1490
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It is the contention of this thesis that the religious nature of penal practice, Inowadays more apparent, can be traced in all forms of penal practice. In Durkheim’s 
terms, sacred moral principles, as the “totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the |
average member of a society,”"" are the foundation of social integration, without which 
society cannot exist. The form and content of these moral principles may undergo 
ti'ansformation from one system to another, but their religious or sacred nature is 
unchanging. For Durkheim, society as a conscious social being requires the creation of |
religion. Religion is a symbol of society and society in turn produces its own sacred gI:symbols. These sacred social principles can appear in terms of community religion or ;'g
traditional and supernatural religion. Of course, both traditional and modem religions are 
,marked by different degrees of sacredness, and the severity of punishment should be 
understood in light of the relevant degree of sacredness. Godly religions are more sacred, :and as they are functional in creating social integration, these give rise to harsh 4
ipunishment. Such religions stimulate passionate social sentiments, and the more
f
expiatory character of punishment serves to counterbalance these emotions of hostility 4
;against criminals. 4
93 Durkheim 1984, p. 38-39
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The present thesis is a theoretical, analytic and comparative sociological study 
endeavouring to explore Durkheim’s cultural and sociological theory of punishment, in '4/
particular his theory of religion, society and punishment, with specific analysis of its 
relevance to penal practice in modem societies (chapter two). This followed by an 
exploration through general trends in the social study of punishment in modem societies,
;
concentrating on the work of Foucault, Weber, Elias and others, to gain a wider 
understanding of punishment in modem societies, to develop a theoretical framework for 
further investigation, and to illuminate those aspects of punishment not discussed by 
Durklieim (chapter three). In one sense the various theories can be considered as an 
account of the various stages and shapes that punishment has taken in different stages of 
social development. Punishment graduated from the abolition of traditional and religious 
forms of punishment, such as torture and execution, to milder fonns during civilisational 
processes, to the establishment of prison as a general model of penal practice in the early 
19"^  century. Punishment was transformed through the rationalization of penal practice, 
the process of bureaucratisation of imprisonment systems, the emergence of therapeutic 
and rehabilitative ideals in the early century and lately to more complicated, 
technological and disciplinary fonns of punishment. Most recently, however, a retum to a 
more repressive style of criminal justice areas is being witnessed in some countries.
Then, current investigation will attempt to test the cultural and emotional aspects 
of punishment and illuminate the role of religion through scrutiny of the Iranian and 
American systems of criminal justice(chapters four and five). During the last thirty years 
punishment in both societies has undergone profound changes, and the relationship 
between the transformation of social structures and penal practice need to be addressed. 
The approach developed in the two case studies of Iran and the USA seeks to develop 
Durkheim’s communicative and expressive theory of penal sanctions . As Durldieim 
argues, “punishment is a fundamentally iiTational, passionate and vengeful response to
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serious violations of the [sacred] collective consciousness.”"'' There will be specific 
analysis of religion and it’s relevance to penal practice in modem society.
It should be pointed out that Durkheim’s theory has some limitations, in 
particular the description of the role of the state in society. For Durkheim, collective 
consciousness as a comer stone of society simply exists and actively functions in society. 
Punishment merely reflects and reaffiiTns values that already exist in society, and the 
state simply reveals the will of ‘the people’. This idealistic conception of the state as a 
representative of collective consciousness prevents Durkheim from introducing notions 
of political power and social conflict, or evaluating how political elites and politicians 
apply punishment as an instrument for their political purposes. Despite his neglect of 
political, technical, professional and organizational aspects of penal practice, the insights 
offered by his dramatic, communicative, expressive theory of punishment cannot be 
ignored or abandoned. Durkheim’s’ notions of the sacredness and morality can play a 
key role in understanding the processes and manifestations of penal practice.
94 Jushua 2004, P. 360
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Chapter II Durkheim’s Theory of Society and 
Punishment
Introduction
Durkheim’s theory of society is a controversial subject. It has been described as; 
functionalist,' positivist," rationalist," nominalist,'' realist," voluntarist,", idealist", 
moralist®, rhetoricist, sophist and futurist," individualist,'" constructionist," 
evolutionist,'" and anti-individualist.'" Durkheim himself has been described both as the 
founder of modem empirical sociology,''' and as a metaphysician, irrationalist, and 
dogmatic atheist.'" Although a comprehensive study of Durklieim’s ideas is not the 
concem of this thesis, it is worth saying something, by way of introduction, about the 
different terms used to describe Durkheim’s theory.
(1) Durklieim’s style and his metaphorical language are polemical, and it is 
claimed, “tended to betray Durkheim into misrepresenting his own ideas, and into
‘ Janssen 1997,p. 294 
" Merton 1999, p. 200 
" Mestiovic 1987 p. 567 
''Ashworth Nye 1971, p. 133 
" Ibid.
" Gohen 1975, p. 104 
" Parsons 1949, p. 468 
® Dubeski 2001, p. 1 
" Connie 1996, pp. 85-88 
Morske 1987, p. 1 
" Fisher Kyum 1998, p. 1 
Garland 1993, p. 48 
'" Merton Ibid 
''' Giddens 1995, p. 1 
'" Lukes 1973, p. 3
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misleading himself and his readers.” '" This style appeared throughout his work. For 
example, he used key terms like collective, religious and social forces not only as 
analogies of natural forces, but also saw them as operating in the same way, as if there 
was no difference between them. He does not provide a clear definition or a distinctive 
explanation for these very general terms. For him, however, these forces are real and 
work like physical and electrical forces on individuals in every society.
(2) Durkheim’s writings are translated, and since the different concepts have 
different connotations in variant times and places, there is not consensus as to these 
meanings. For example ''solidarité” has been translated as “solidarity,” despite the fact, 
“the cognates are not exact equivalents. The English word has, at least in its current 
usage, more of an ethical connotation than the French term had at the time Durkheim 
employed it.” '"
(3) Durkheim’s theory is scattered throughout his writings and each constitutes 
part of his theory. His ideas developed over the course of time, and “like most creative 
thinkers, Durldieim does not present his theories fully formed in his earliest writings.”'® 
In short, considering his writings independently gives rise to different understandings of 
his theory. For example, religion in his early works is considered as a mere social fact 
and a social institution amongst others, while in his final work, religion is employed in 
the wide sense of being equal with society itself and as the “womb of human 
civilization.”'"
'" Ibid., P. 34 See also Hamilton 1996, P. 338
'" Alpert 1996, P. 28 
'® Cottenell 1999, P. 49 
'" Hamilton , op. cit
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(4) Durkheim was not concerned with definition or precise clarification of tenus 
that are used in his work. For example, it is not clear whether terms like collective 
consciousness; representation collective, and collective sentiments are identical."'* 
Moreover, there is a lack of specificity in the use of words, and terms are used 
interchangeably, for example, “social institutions” instead of “social facts.”""
(5) Some commentators have attempted to examine Durkheim’s theory in light of 
their own intentions and assumptions. For instance. Parson considers Durkheim as 
“voluntarist” and “idealist” but his “interpretation often seems as much a function of his 
own perspectives as Durkheim’s.”"'
Notwithstanding these points, “Durkheim did more than any one else to develop a 
sociological account of punishment and to emphasize the social importance of penal 
institutions.”"" Durkheim’s theory of punishment is an account of the social values and 
functions of punishment. As such, Durklieim’s theory deseiwes consideration in 
analysing penal practices. Society is the cause and effect of punishment; it is the source 
of punishment and can be protected by penal practice. In his view punishment is located 
at the heart of society. It is the sanction of moral rules, as ties of social solidarity, which 
are the main concem of Durkheim’s theory of society. Morality for him is not separate 
from culture, because culture in Durkheim’s tenns is considered as those social 
sensibilities and mentalities which are related to social behaviour. For Durkheim, there
conscience collective or commune, as the set o f beliefs and sentiments common to average members of 
society which foims a detemiinate system that has its own life is translated as collective conscience, 
collective consciousness ( Lukes p .4) I use collective consciousness throughout my work 
"" Durkheim 1966, p. IVI
21 Pope 1973, p. 399
22 Garland Op. cit, p. 23
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are coiTelations between variations in severity of punishment and transfoimations in 
culture. Every change in the content of collective consciousness is reflected by a 
revolution in the nature of punishment. His historical study of punishment is rich from 
this point of view, and contains many potential insights which can be further developed. 
The richness of Durkheim’s sociological, cultural, and moral studies -and in particular the 
place of religion- theory and their relations with punishment can still provide a positive 
contribution to the study of punishment in modem societies.
More generally, Durkheim has long been recognized as a founding father of the 
sociological study of law, and law is a key element of his theory of society, because he 
achieved the most fundamental sociological knowledge about the nature of society 
through the study of law. For him law is an index of society and different social types 
can be recognized through different sorts of law. Laws are symbolic forms of societies, 
and are the only way in which invisible social phenomena can and should be studied.
Law may be considered as a “by-product of his t h e o r y , a s ,  or a “central part of his 
study” "^^ , but it is undeniable that law holds a crucial position in his sociological 
explorations. Thus, study of law, as a general discussion can be insightful in study of 
punishment, because his social analysis of law in general can more strongly be applied in 
penal practice area as the main sphere of my investigation.
This chapter is structured in three sections. The first is an examination of the role 
of punishment in social solidarity, which was a central concern of Durlcheim’s scientific
Garland 1993, p. 12 
Cotterrell Op. cit, p. xi
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life. The second is an analysis of how Durkheim studied morality as an integi'al part of 
his theory of society. This will be followed by discussion of Durkheim's theory of 
religion as a mysterious symbol of society. These apparently separate theses overlap in 
the most common and essential elements of Durkheim’s thought. Finally, despite all the 
criticisms that have been made of Durkheim’s theory, I shall endeavour to illustrate how 
his assumptions shape my study of punishment.
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I-Social Solidarity
“Our ordinary language experiences no difficulty in using society as a collective 
noun requiring only a singular verb. This linguistic fact reflects the feeling of oneness or 
togetherness which the teim sugges t s . Dur khe i m perceived society as a unit. Society 
for him is not simply the aggregation of individuals living in a common place, although it 
would be nothing if it were not a plurality and juxtaposition of individuals. Society, 
according to Durldieim, is a system of interaction, which is an objective entity that has 
independent being. For him, the characteristics of a society are different from the sum of 
the characteristics of individuals. To illustmte Durklieim’s holistic idea of society 
requires investigation of the crucial position of social solidarity in his theoretical 
framework. In this section, I shall explain how Durklieim studied social solidarity. This is 
followed by a discussion of relationship between social solidarity, the origins of 
punishment and its function in modem society.
Durldieim’s first lecture-course in 1887-8 was entitled Social Solidarity. In it he 
set out the argument of what was to become The Division o f Labour. As Lukes argues: 
The general problem on which he [Durldieim] embarked in this first course was 
nothing less than the nature of social solidarity itself: What are the bonds which 
unite men one with another? This indeed was the problem that remained central 
to the whole of Durkheim’s life work.^^
Alpert 1990, p. 28
Lukes 1973, pp. 138-139
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Solidarity, for Durkheim, is the source of social life and, as such, is placed at the 
centre of his sociological studies. For the same reason morality as the ground of social 
integi'ity has been a key point in his writings, from his major early work The Division o f 
Labour in Society to his major later work The Elementary Forms O f Religious Life,
Social solidarity constitutes the fundamental stiucture which he established as the basis of 
all his later works. It can be considered as a kind of grounding on which other 
hypotheses are drawn. He frequently returned to the question of solidarity in various 
ways and expressions. If one considers his early major work as establishing a framework 
for his later writings, “his subsequent works are certainly far more than a mere gloss upon 
the conclusions reached in The Division O f L a b o u r ,As will be discussed in the 
following section, Durkheim on religion, he found in religion a new foundation on which 
sociological conceptions such as morality, collective consciousness and social solidarity 
could be studied. He aclaiowledged this re-orientation “marked a dividing line in the 
development of my thought. For him, thereafter, religion became the base of morality, 
solidarity and society itself. Indeed, analysis of religion as a symbol of society is the 
zenith of his developmental theory of society. This aspect of Durklieim’s theory, 
however, is constantly overlooked. The sociological analysis of the role of religious 
perspective in forming and transfoimation of penal practice is crucial part of this 
investigation. I will frequently refer to this approach in this chapter and chapters four, 
five and six.
Giddenss 1972, p. 12 
s. Lukes 1973, p. 237
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His main project was to study the dichotomy of individual character and universal 
solidarity. As he pointed out in The Division o f Labour in Society the central question is: 
why, while individuals are becoming more autonomous, they simultaneously more 
closely depend upon society? “For it is indisputable that these two movements, social 
differentiation and social integration, however contradictory they appear to be, are earned 
on in tandem. Such is the nature of the problem that we have set ourse lves" .The  
nature of the social bonds, beliefs, and sentiments which resolve this contradiction and 
give rise to unity in society are the main subject of his work.
In The Division o f Labour, Durklieim attempts to trace the historical development 
of how traditional forms of social solidarity, in which the individual is attached to “his 
family, to his native heath, to the traditions that the past has bequeathed him, to the 
collective practices of the group"^^ have loosened, and how the division of labour 
produces a new foim of solidarity. He analyses social changes in industrial societies in 
terms of two kinds of solidarity: mechanical and organic solidarity.
How does he study and classify social solidarity? Durkheim considered himself 
the founder of the “science of morality and scientific sociology. He argued that, 
methodologically there are no differences between natural and social science. In spite of 
differences in subject-matter, he believed the discipline could pursue the same method of 
research as social life possesses the power of embodiment and that “collective habits find
Durkheim 1984, p. xxx 
Ibid., p. 333 
Ibid., p. XXV
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expression in definite foiins; legal rules, moral regulations, popular proverbs, social 
conventions, etc.”^^  Accordingly, through those specific materialised forms, social 
phenomena could be studied as natural phenomena.
Durkheim attempted to distinguish the nature of social cohesion experimentally 
through these definite forms, in temis of cause and effect. Studying causes through 
effects and imperceptible facts through visible symbols is recognised as the method 
crucial to his sociology. Like natural scientists, he observed social phenomena through 
their objective symbols. As he argued;
Science studies heat through the variations in volume that changes in temperature 
cause in bodies, electricity through its physical and chemical effects, and forces 
through movement. Why should social solidarity prove an exception?^^
Durkheim illustrates this methodology in The Rules O f Sociological Metho(f^ . In 
that work he argued that;
the degree of objectivity of a sense perception is proportionate to the degree of 
stability of this object; for objectivity depends upon the existence of a consistent 
and identical point of reference to which the representation can be referred.^^
Durkheiml966, p. 45 
Lukes and Scull, p. 35 
Durkheim 1966, p. 45 
Durkheim 1966, pp. 44-45
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Developing this argument Durkheim used the term “crystallization”, arguing that social 
solidarity possesses the potential of crystallization and objectification without 
transfoimation of its characteristics.
Visible symbols, crystallized symbols, and effects, for him, are not different from 
each other, but are various statements of the same meaning, and legal rules are the only 
instance that he cited as both crystallized symbols and effects of society. In The Division 
o f Labour in Society he argues that social cohesiveness, as a wholly moral phenomenon, 
is not itself open to precise scrutiny and, as a result, is not appropriate for measurement 
for the purpose of comparison and classification. Instead we must replace this inner 
conception,
which escapes us,[with] an external one which symbolises it, and then study the 
former through the latter. This visible symbol is the law. Indeed where social 
solidarity exists, in spite of its non-material nature, it does not remain in a state of 
pure potentiality, but shows its presence through perceptible effects.
This scientific approach led Durkheim to seek a new criterion for the 
classification of legal rules. For him, customary classifications of law, which divided 
legal rules into public and private law, were not valid because there is no affiliation 
between this classification, social solidarity and social changes. Instead it was appropriate 
to classify legal rules according to the dissimilar “sanctions” that are attached to them.
Durkheim 1984, P. 24
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He argued that; “every legal precept may be defined as a rule of behaviour to which 
sanctions apply. Moreover, it is clear that sanctions change according to the degree of 
seriousness attached to the precepts and the place they occupy in society.
He concluded that “legal rules must be divided into two main species, according 
to whether they relate to the repressive, organized sanctions, or to ones that are purely 
restitutory.”^^  The first group, the violation of which involves expiatory consequences; is 
well known as penal law; the second group that have merely reparative consequences, 
includes civil law and commercial law. With this in mind, it is now appropriate to move 
on to examine Durkheim's classifications of social solidarity, and the modes of law to 
which they correspond. According to Durkheim, every kind of social solidarity 
coiTesponds to a particular type of legal rule.The main subject matter in The Division o f 
Labour is the drawing of a sharp contrast between two types of social integration, 
mechanical and organic solidarity.
I-l Solidarity and forms of law
A better understanding of the bond of social solidarity to which penal law 
coiTesponds, for me, requires assessment of Durkheim’s perspective on the nature of 
crime and the source of punishment. He studied punishment and crime inductively in 
different types of societies, from primitive societies like Austialian aborigines, to more
Ibid
Ibid., p. 28
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civilised European societ ies .As an initial question he asked: what are the essential, 
permanent, and general elements of all crimes? Although there is a minority of acts that 
are universally considered as a crime, the vast majority of crimes and punishments are 
variable according to time and place. This signifies that acts are not inherently and 
intrinsically criminal. This idea finds parallel in the labelling theory of crime, in which 
deviance is not intrinsically criminal, but is the outcome of how individuals or their 
behaviour are labelled. As has been argued, “[t]he variations in repressive law at the 
same time prove that this unchanging character is not to be found in the intiinsic 
properties of acts imposed or prohibited by penal rules, because they display so great a 
diversity."'*^
Thus Durldieim holds, the permanent nature of crime should be sought elsewhere, 
in the relationships that crimes have with circumstances beyond their intrinsic character. 
According to Durldieim these relationships do not demonstrate an antagonism between 
crimes and social interests, because there are a “whole host of acts which have been, and 
still are, regarded as criminal, without in themselves being harmful to society.”"^* Even 
where crime is haimful to society there is not necessarily any proportionality between the 
harm and the punishment. Equally, he was not concerned with whether or not this social 
reaction is rational. He was not willing to attribute any specific end to the social reactions 
brought about by the criminal act, because these purposes are infinitely variable. He was 
looking for the consistent and intrinsic nature of these social responses.
Durkheim Ibid, pp. 89 -90 
Lukes and Scull 1983, p. 40 
mm r. anIbid., p . 40
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He pursued the study of penal practice through proposing the question: why is the 
codification of penal law different from legislation in civil law? In civil law the 
legislature firstly expresses the duties and then states the sanctions, while penal law just 
says “This is the punishment”'^^without any expression of obligations. For him there is 
only one reason for this divergence: “it is because the rule (duty) is known and accepted 
by e v e r y b o dy . T h e s e  judgments are already present in society. They are the rules and 
standards of the community. Penal laws are customary laws that have been officially 
confirmed, because a custom is ambiguous and can give rise to uncertainty and tension.
However, how are those rules already known and from where are they derived? 
For Durkheim these rules exist because they are recognized through an injury done to 
sacred collective consciousness or collective sentiments. The humiliation of sacred being 
is the pennanent nature of crime. But, if so, what is the distinction between crimes and 
immoral acts which violate the collective consciousness but are not crimes? For 
Durkheim, the former sentiments have a certain degree of intensity and are deeply written 
upon the conscience of every individual; there is no such intensity for the latter. As a 
result of this analysis he anives at the following definition: “an act is criminal when it 
offends the strong well-defined states of collective consciousness.”'^ '^  Therefore:
Ibid p. 43 and also see; Durkheim 1984 P. 35 
Ibid p. 44
Ibid p. 47 and also see Durkheim 1984 P. 39
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we must not say that an action shocks the conscience collective because it is 
criminal, but rather it is criminal because it shocks the conscience collective. We 
do not condemn it because it is crime, but it is a crime because we condemn it.'^ ^
According to this analysis, punishment is nothing more than a passionate and
V
emotional reaction against the violation of collective sentiments. The offender is I'punished because he must be punished: punish for the sake of punishing only. For this V
reason, punishment in primitive societies goes beyond individuals and stiikes animals, 
instruments and innocent persons as well.
there cannot be any other purpose for punishment except emotional reaction; “[t]hus the 
nature of punishment has remained essentially unchanged. All that can be said is the 
necessity for vengeance is better directed nowadays than in the past.
Giddenss 1995, p. 123-124 
Ibid. p. 46
Ibid. p. 48 and see also Durkheim 1984, p. 63
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Although the aims and effects of punishment are now better understood and more 
organized than previously nothing substantial has changed. As has been argued we try “to I
,îmake the punishment fit the seriousness of crime as exactly as possible. This gradation is 
unnecessary if punishment is only a defence mechanism.”'^  ^ Moreover, according to
Durkheim, the shame and stigma that attached to most punishments demonstrates that #
47  *’=•
Durkheim’s purpose in constructing this argument is to clarify how communal i
ideas and attitudes, as the basis of social solidarity, are the source of punishment. Thus
$
“Every strong state of the collective consciousness is a source of l i f e . I t  is these 
common sentiments and ideas that hold individuals together.
The ideas and sentiments constituting the individual’s conscience (consciousness) 
are, for Durkheim, real forces which enfeeble one another when they differ yet, 
when similar to those of others reinforce each other and fuse to produce new 
forces,
In other words, similar sentiments attract and strengthen one another, whilst 
opposite sentiments repel and weaken one another. When a crime offends similar 
sentiments, the threat increases their force of attraction. For Durkheim, all that tends to 
weaken this communal sentiment depresses us. This state is not merely an image of 
reality; “It is rather a (real) force, which stirs up around us a whole whirlwind of organic 
and psychological phenomena.”^^
Crime implies that these sentiments are not absolutely collective, and thus 
damages that unanimity which is the source of their authority. Society suffers and is 
dishonoured through disregard of its moral grounds: this requires a remedy. Thus 
expiation as an emotional response is necessary to recover the authority that has been 
disturbed. It is not that everybody is attacked individually, and not just a general reaction 
rather it is something collective. It is.
'^SbidP, 53I  .
Takla and Pape 1985, pp. 74- 
Durkheim 1984, p. 53
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vengeance for something sacred which we vaguely feel is more or less outside 
and above us... since these sentiments are collective, it is not us that they represent 
in us, but society. Thus by taking vengeance for them it is indeed society and not 
ourselves that we are avenging.^ ^
This statement and statements like it in The Division o f labour show Durkheim 
developing his idea of sacred nature of society, but this idea is less well-developed than 
in later stages of his social theory. He believed that the collective consciousness in 
primitive societies was religious in character. As a result, social reaction was often harsh 
in such societies. Deeper investigations into the nature of society, however, told him that 
there was no significant difference between traditional and modem societies in this 
regard. As we shall see later in this chapter, Durkheim eventually theorised religion as the 
base for society; without which the nature of social being could not be understood.
The offender, then, should be subjected to suffering and humiliation as a reaction 
to his or her behaviour. This reaction restores social and moral health to society and re­
establishes social cohesion. It is the collective consciousness that is wounded, and it is 
this common consciousness that resists; as a result, the response must be collective. The 
severity of this reaction depends on the strength of the feelings that are wounded, and the 
gravity of the offence committed. These sentiments are stronger the more unquestionable 
and common to everyone.
Durkheim Ibid., p. 56
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The major function of punishment, therefore, is that of strengthening and 
reaffmning the collective consciousness in the face of acts which question its authority 
and sacredness. In primitive societies,
there is a unitary religious system which is the prime embodiment of common 
beliefs and collective sentiments. Religion comprises all, extends to all, and 
contains an intermingled set of beliefs and practices regulating not only strongly 
religious phenomena, but also ethics, law, the principles of political 
organization.^^
Since all penal laws are originally religious in character, in the most primitive forms of 
society all laws are repressive. Drawing on his earlier definition of crimes, Durkheim 
concludes that the rules sanctioned by punishment are the expression of the most 
essential social sentiments.
In primitive societies penal law represents, affirms and reproduces the solidarity 
of likenesses. The kind of solidarity that has been brought about by similarities Durkheim 
calls mechanical solidarityP  What finally rationalizes the employment of this term is 
the truth that the tie that thus links the individual to society corresponds to that which 
associates things to the person: “the individual consciousness ... is simply a dependency
^^Giddens 1975,p. 76
As Giddens said, according to Durkheim in primitive societies, every individual is a microcosm of the 
collective type. Ibid p. 6
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of collective type, and follows all its motions, just as the object possessed follows those 
which its owner imposes upon it.” '^^
This fundamental resemblance is the base of social life and maintains social 
cohesion. In this kind of society strong elements of tradition and religion cover most of 
the individual spheres. As such, individuals should resemble one another in terms of their 
communal beliefs. There is less space for individual divergence. Individuals and their 
personality are absorbed in collective consciousness. Deviant activities cannot be 
tolerated, as they offend common sentiments, causing an emotional and punitive 
response. This solidarity is more intelligible when contrasted with other solidarity that 
Durkheim identifies; organic solidarity.
Social transformation in the course of social development is, for Durldieim, a 
fundamental change in the foundation of social solidarity. Indeed, for him, the social 
transformation from primitive to modem society is nothing less than a change in the very 
nature of solidarity, from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity. His theory of social 
change is based on the inter-relationship between individual and society in general, and 
the reconciling of individual freedom and social order in particular. The most important 
factor in studying the displacement of mechanical solidarity by the new form of social 
solidarity is the division of labour. Durklieim considers the increasing division of labour 
to be the source of modernization. He believed that the dynamic of density and quantity
Ibid. pp. 84. 85
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of population unavoidably leading to professionalization and the division of labour in 
modem societies.
“The division o f  labour varies in direct proportion to the volume and density o f 
societies and i f  it progresses in a continuous manner over the course o f social 
development it is because societies become regularly denser and generally 
voluminous
For Durldieim, these material factors are accompanied by moral and cultural 
factors. There is a transformation of the content of common principles from that which is 
restricted and tangible to the general and abstract, and the process of individualization 
provides individuals with more autonomy. Moreover, as the content of the collective 
consciousness is transformed and individuals become less dependent, that domination of 
ti adition declines and rationality increases in the area of morality and law.
As differentiation of functions proceeds, the number of rules or norms in society 
increases, but they relate only to their specialized sphere and so they carry less 
weight in society and can more easily allow for innovation. In order to become 
more general they must become more abstract and this in turn leaves more space 
for individual divergences.^*’
Ibid., p. 205(Ei-nphasis is original)
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As a consequence, the conditions of society alter profoundly. If in mechanical 
solidarity individuals resemble one another, in organic solidarity they are different from 
one another. If the previous condition required that individual personality be absorbed in 
the collective consciousness, the new condition provides free space for individual
■‘Ï
activity. Here the collective consciousness does not cover all individual spheres. For ,1Durkheim, the solidarity that the new situation gives rise to resembles “that obseiwed in
higher animals, in fact each organ has its own special characteristics and autonomy, yet |
the greater the unity of organism, the more marked the individualisation of the p a r t s . I
For that reason he calls this foim of solidarity, brought about by the division of labour,
organic solidarity.
I
The most important symbol of the new condition of society is the presence of |
restitutive law. For Durkheim, “the very nature of the restitutory sanction is sufficient to 
show that the social solidarity to which that law corresponds is of a completely different
58kind.” What distinguishes this sanction from the repressive is its reparative nature.
Rather than being expiatory, it simply consists of restoring a prior state of affairs. The 
wrongdoer does not suffer from being wounded or deprived of his liberty. In short, the 
law says nothing about punishment. Although this sort of law regulates relations between
'individuals rather than with society, society is not entirely absent. Society has to I
“intervene more or less directly and actively,”^^  according to its interests. Society is still 
present through the involvement of particular institutions.
What is clear is that the relationships which are established by penal law are 
different from those regulated by restitutory law. There is not relation between individual 
and collective sentiments and they do not provoke the same level social and emotional 
reaction. Therefore, there is no need to resort to penal sanctions: “in general, co­
operative relations do not convey other sanctions.”*’*^ This does not mean that the bonds 
of social solidarity, whose breach gives rise to a repressive response, are totally absent. In 
Durkheim’s terms while the extent and scope of repressive law in traditional society is 
greater, because the source of social solidarity in these kinds of society is likeness, in 
modem society the volume of punitive law has become smaller and restitutory law 
envelops more social affairs. This is because, in the second case, it is a system of 
specialised and distinctive functions that is the source of social solidarity. The Division of 
labour enhances individualization; it also creates an organic solidarity, based on 
interdependence of co-operative individuals and groups. It is a social integration based on 
functional interdependence of specialised individuals and gi'oups. Indeed, there are two 
kinds of solidarity; group solidarity and social solidarity that -in conflicts between two it 
would be resolved in favour of communal solidarity.
In modem industrial societies, labour is vastly divided. Individuals no longer 
carry out the same tasks, have identical interests, nor share the same essential 
perspectives on life. However, Durkheim holds that this does not immediately give rise to 
social disintegration. From Durkheim’s point of view, development of the division of
Ibid., p. 138
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labour is coupled with a growing level of contact between individuals as traditional 
structures vanish. The more the division of labour progresses, the more individuals have 
mutually to act and react upon one another. As has been mentioned, for Durkheim there 
is a kind of connection between the dynamics of moral and physical density. Increasing 
physical contact and mutual needs produce a form of moral relationship. Individuals are 
dependent on each other to perform economic functions that they themselves cannot 
perfoim. As such, the division of labour perfoims a key role in ensuring interdependence 
and in developing of new fomis of social ties. As a result of the formation of cities, the 
development of transportation and communication, and the increased density of 
population, social and moral contact increase. These conditions lead to the new foim of 
social solidarity in modern societies. This type of solidarity is embodied by legal rules 
defining the nature and relations of functions. These rules Durkheim terms restitutive 
law, because their infringement entails simply reparative, and not expiatory results. It 
should be mentioned that repressive law is still curoent in modem society, although “these 
consequences are exceptional” *^ in comparison with traditional societies.
Thus, Durldieim recognized only two kinds of solidarity. In the first, society is a 
totality of beliefs and sentiments common to all members of group: “it is a collective 
type. By contrast, the society to which we are bound in the second instance is a system of 
differentiated and specialised functions, which are united, in definite relations.”®^While in 
mechanical solidarity there is more similarity, less fr ee space for the individual, and
Durkheim 1984, P. 83 
Giddens, Op. cit, P. 138
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solidarity is stronger, in organic solidarity, on the contrary, the greater differences, 
specialized functions and free space for the individual gives rise to the stronger solidarity.
The former is best evident among primitive societies where a “mechanical 
solidarity” evidenced by repressive law prevails; the latter in advanced societies 
where populations evidence greater “dynamic density”, and juridical rules define 
the nature and relations of functions.
Durkheim does not imply that collective consciousness in modem societies is completely 
eradicated, but that it emerges in the form of new moral ideals: “The values and beliefs 
composing moral individualism [stress] ...the dignity and worth of the human 
individual.” '^* This is what Durldieim has called The cult of the individual’.
As with Durkheim’s general sociology, his sociology of law has faced a number 
of important challenges. His classification of law into repressive law and restitutory law 
has been criticized from two angles; its lack of comprehensiveness and its 
correspondence with the reality of societies and historical evidence. In relation to the 
latter criticism it has been argued that Durkheim’s theory of social evolution and 
transformation of law is overly simplistic and unilinear and that ethnographic records do 
not validate his account of the historical evolution of law. Durklieim took his evidence on 
legal order from classical antiquity and early Europe- and it could be argued that it is 
solely these epochs that support Durkheim’s theory. A number of scholars have,
Merton 1994, p. 17 
Giddens 1973, p. 7
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however, argued exactly the opposite: the “Torah basically embodied religious and moral 
exhortations devoid of punitive backing, and existed alongside a legal system distinct 
from religious affairs and evoking restitution for secular o f f e n c e s . A n d ,  as Sir Henry 
Sumner Maine (an authority on whom Durkheim himself relied) has argued, in ancient 
communities “repressive, vengeful action on behalf of the community was only taken in 
exceptional and serious c a s e s . T h e  law of ancient communities was not law of crimes 
but law of wrongs; what is termed Tort in the English legal system.
Therefore, it is argued that Durkheim’s evolutionary hypothesis not only cannot 
be proven by historical evidence but that the evidence seems sometimes directly to 
conti'adict+ Durkheim’s thesis. At the very least, it is clear that in his periodization 
Durkheim “overstates the importance of ‘repressive’ law in early societies and 
understates its role in advanced ones.”*’^  This criticism becomes stronger when one 
considers that Durkheim did not recognize any inteimediate stage between the two stages 
of law and society, as if there are only two stages in the evolution of law. Both criticisms 
imply that Durlcheim’s classification of law into repressive and restitutory law cannot be 
exhaustive. It may be necessary to recognize “a third class of ‘mixed sanctions’ 
combining elements of punishment and restitution.... regulatory law might well be 
considered to create a form of responsibility identified by mixed sanctions.”*’^  It can be
Lukes and Scull 1983, p. 11 
Ibid p. 11
Garland 1990a, p. 48 
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said tha t, “he fail[ed] to note that repressive and restitutive sanctions may often be
mixed”.
However, Durkheim did not claim to have earned out a comprehensive historical 
study of punishment. His analysis is “functional rather than historical.” *^* His argument 
focused on two social types and their relation to law. He discusses two kinds of solidarity 
-mechanical and organic- and how these kinds of solidarity give rise to different fomis of 
penal practices. As he himself stated, “we have only to classify the different types of law 
in order to be able to investigate which species of social solidarity correspond to them.” *^ 
His sociological and empirical study of legal forms led him to identify two kinds of 
common sanctions: ‘repressive’ and ‘restitutive’. These categories are not mutually 
exclusive, and the criticisms do not, therefore, undermine Durkheim’s functional theory 
or his ideas about the features of repressive and restitutive law. Moreover, inadequacy of 
historical evidence does not damage the essence of his theory of the relationship between, 
culture, sacred, religion on the one hand and punishment on the other hand.
Durkheim’s theory has also been criticised for ignoring the role of political 
institutions and lawmaking procedure. It is contended that he does not recognize an 
independent role for politicians and political issues as a whole and “ignored the intentions 
or skill of the law creator.”^^  Likewise it has been claimed that he does not take the role 
of interest groups in society seriously and simply discusses a ‘collective consciousness.’
^^Ibid., p. 33
Garland Op. cit, p. 49 
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For example, Garland argues that society is also - crucially made up of competing social 
movements and groups; we should perhaps talk of a ‘ruling morality’, or a ‘dominant 
moral order’, rather than collective sentiments/^ It may be true that Durkheim does not 
fully discuss the role of various interest groups, but nonetheless he was aware that in 
industrial societies, individuals no longer have the same interests, nor share the same 
perspectives. However, this does not mean that there is no collective consciousness, 
rather that there is a social solidarity based on functional dependence of professionals, 
individuals and groups. Durkheim states that by the collective consciousness he means 
those ideas and beliefs that are accepted by the majority of individuals in a society. Thus, 
there is no significant difference between what is teimed a dominant moral order and the 
collective consciousness.
It should be added that, beside mechanical and organic solidarity, Durkheim 
recognized another social condition that is different from both although it cannot be 
classified as third kind of social solidarity. It is an exceptional and temporary situation in 
occurring in the course of social development. He calls this condition anomie.
1-2 Social Anomie
Durkheim’s foiTnulation of social transformation in terms of mechanical and 
organic solidarity, based on likeness and the division of labour, is problematised by 
socio-economic crises in modem societies, in which a kind of relative normlessness is
Garland, Op. cit, p. 52
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visible in the of whole society or some of its component sections. If norms and moralities 
derived from division of labour lead to new forms of social integration, then how can 
such states of affairs be explained? Durkheim tried to solve this problem through the 
concept of ‘anomie’. He employed this concept in his Division o f L a b o u r , Suicide^ ^ 
and Moral Education. For him, anomie “springs from the lack of collective forces at the 
certain points in society; that is, of groups established for the regulation of social life.” *^’ 
For him “the state of anomie is impossible whenever interdependent organs are 
sufficiently in contact and sufficiently extensive. If they are close to each other, they are 
readily aware, in every situation, of the need which they have of one-another, and 
consequently they have an active and permanent feeling of mutual 
dependence.”^^Anomie is a condition of lack of regulation and breakdown of social 
noims.
Therefore, the trajectory of social progress for Durldieim is not a simple 
straightforward societal transformation from mechanical to organic solidarity and the 
development from traditional to modern morality is not free from disruption or crisis. A 
new condition for the division of labour requires a new regulatory process that “either 
does not exist or is not related to the degree of development of the division of labour.”^^  
For Durkheim, then, industrial and commercial crises or social conflict can be regarded 
as ramifications of unregulated relationships. Previous collective sentiments, based on
Durkheim 1984, p. 292-308,339 
Durkheim 1915 p. 258, 285,288-9, 357,382 
Durkheim, Ibid. p. 382
Giddenss 1972, p. 184, Durkheim 1984, p. 184 
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70
similarities, become more and more powerless, because functional diversity has 
inevitably developed and centrifugal tendencies increased, while simultaneously shared 
sentiments have grown weaker.
As a result of an extending market, the appearance of large-scale industry, and the 
specialization of functions, social relations change rapidly: “ these new conditions of 
industrial life naturally demand new organization, but as these changes have been 
accomplished with extreme rapidity, the interests in conflict have not yet had the time to 
become equilibrated.”^^  Primitive models of social stiucture have changed and “the 
morality corresponding to this type of society has lost influence, but without its successor 
developing quickly enough to occupy the space left vacant in our consciousness.”®** It 
should be noted that this anomie is not absolute, because total nomilessness is not 
possible. It is a matter of degree, as different societies are characterised by various 
degrees of normative regulation. Anomie may also occur differently in different 
segments of a society, for example in business or the family.
Although Durkheim did not discuss punishment in anomic societies, the 
ramifications of his theory in such societies are more or less predictable. As discussed 
previously, penal practice for Durkheim is a passionate reaction against any attack on or 
injury of collective sentiments: the more strongly those sentiments are held, the more 
severe the reactions. “Common beliefs have been disturbed. Tradition has lost its way.
Giddenss Op. cit, p. 186 
®** Durkheim 1984, p. 339
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However, in anomic societies, that normlessness is neither absolute, nor is a new
72
I
a  
I
Individual judgment has thrown off the yoke of the collective judgement.” '^ As a result, it 
can be said that the fundamental grounds of repressive law are underpinned or 
weakened by the growth of normlessness. |
1
morality corresponding to the new conditions of society totally established. Accordingly
there may be a substantial gap between official punishment and unstable social
conditions. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, in such conditions there is less
compatibility between present penal practice and social sentiments. Probably there is a
kind of tension in society about suitable penal practices. According to Durkheim’s theory,
. . .the more developed and civilized that segments of society are the greater tendency
towards a milder form of punishment and vice versa. f
7;,
Durkheim Ibid , p. .339
II-Durkheim on Morality and culture
Morality for Durldieim is not just a matter of “discipline, compounded by 
regularity of conduct”^^  and a source of legal rules. Rather, morality is the subject of 
society itself - “the domain of morals begins where the domain of the social begins.
For him, there is a kind of interaction between morality and society; while society is 
regarded as a source of morality, moral rules are the foundation of social solidarity. The 
object of this section is to investigate the exact meaning of culture in Durkheim’s theory 
of society. I will start by examining the position of morality in Durldieim’s thought and 
its relation to society. This is followed by a brief discussion of the aims of moral action 
and, finally, a discussion of the essential elements of Durkheim’s thought - collective 
consciousness and collective representations- and their relation with morality and culture.
Durkheim started his major early work with the study of moral life. In the preface 
to the first edition of The Division o f Labour he wrote: “This book is above all an attempt 
to treat the facts of moral life according to methods of positive s c i e n c e . A s  Lukes has 
argued, “Durkheim never ceased to think about morality.”^^  Morality has always been 
the “centre and end,” *^^ of his sociological investigations. He always conceived his 
contributions to sociology as being primarily focused within the more specialised field of 
the sociology of moral facts. He believed he had discovered in society “the end and the
82 Durkheim 1973, p. xi
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source of mora l i ty . Indeed,  it can be said that the “ ‘Moral’ is often synonymous with 
‘social’ in Durkheim’s work.”^^  Furthermore, moral rules, for him, are the spirit of social 
order and provide the ties of social solidarity. The durability of moral ideas and moral 
rules of behaviour are inseparable elements of his sociology. Of course, the nature of 
these ideas and codes of conduct changes alongside the evolution from mechanical to 
organic solidarity, but the moral quality of society is beyond doubt. Society has been and 
always will be under the constraints of morality, because it foims a crucial part of the 
very nature of society without which it cannot exist. However, Durkheim goes much 
further to insist that “Moral constmint is the very essence of collective life; society and 
morality are the one.”^^
If, as Durldieim claimed, morals is the aim and origin of society and morality and 
society are one, then how can one explain the relations between moral action and society? 
Wliat can be the aim and end of moral action? In other words, if morality is a 
“comprehensive system of prohibitions”,^  ^what end is seiwed by these limitations? For 
him, moral behaviour cannot be directed to personal ends or motivated by egoistic 
sentiments because these actions have no moral value. By the same token it follows that 
the sum of individuals have no more value than those of individual persons. If self- 
interest has no moral value, the collective interest in so far as it is the sum of self-interest 
is amoral as well. Quantity does not solve the problem. As Durldieim argued in Moral 
Education:
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"If society is to be considered as a normal goal of moral conduct, then it must be 
possible to see in it something other than a sum of individuals; it must constitute a 
being sui generis, which has its own special character distinct from that of its 
members and its own individuality which is different from that of its constituent 
individuals. In a word, there must exist, in the full meaning of the word, a social 
being.”®'
Thus, denying any utilitarian object for moral conduct and any egoistic sentiments 
as a motivation for moral behaviour, he insists that "an action is moral if and only if it is 
aimed at a social end or object. More specifically, it should be aimed at securing the 
common good,”^^  and finally that “an action is moral if and only if it is socially 
prescribed and/or in accordance with society’s ideals and values.
Durkheim is often called a “social constructionist.” '^^  One of his most important 
concerns is the origin of human society and how that society is constiucted. In his final 
major work, The Elementary Forms o f Society, he argued that the most essential factor in 
the creation and re-creation of human society was emotion. The coming or being 
together of a “certain number of men participating in the same”^^  rites, ceremonies and 
life give rise to emotions which transform the ordinary life of the individual, and they feel 
they have been elevated above themselves. In his new experience the individual is 
encircled by transcendent and holy feelings. These sentiments are engraved on symbols
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and ideas and become perpetually alive. As such, collective sentiments are created by 
assemblies and established permanently through symbols, ideas and common social 
principles. As we will see, these religious and collective forces are none other than 
unifying forces of a society.
■iI
For Durkheim common principles and moral rules are thus “emotionally 
grounded products of society. Individuals  who participate in special rites feel they are 
dominated by sacred powers. These sacred forces are superior to individuals and have a 
sense of dignity and superiority. These are moral powers, %
since they are made entirely from the impressions that moral collectivity as a
moral being makes on other moral beings, the individuals. Such moral powers do
not express the manner in which natural things affect our senses but the manner in
which collective consciousness affects individual consciousnesses.^^ I
We should be aware that according to Durldieim any society “only lives in and by means .1of the individual consciousnesses of which it is made.”^^
.Thus, it can be concluded that the most essential elements in his social thought are 
social ideas and sentiments. These sacred ideas and sentiments, which bind individuals
'1together, are fundamental factors of social solidarity. In the Division o f Labour the 
discussion of morality arrives at the conclusion that common morality “ordains that a
96 Shilling and Mellor 1998, p. 195 7
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man should be a man in every sense of the word, that is, possess all the ideas and 
sentiments that constitute a human consciousness.”^^  For him it is morality that “shapes 
the mass of individuals in to a cohesive aggregate.”’^ ® Indeed, morality is a complex of 
ideas and sentiments, of ways of seeing and feeling that give rise to social integration. He 
uses words like, “conscience, spirit, representation collectives, all of which refer in one 
way or another to the knowledge, beliefs, and values shared by members of the group. 
These and terms like collective consciousness, conscience collective, morality, 
representations collective, and collective sentiments, mark the essential elements of 
Durkheim’s sociological thought. Indeed, it is difficult to find an argument in which 
these key words are not used. The following discussion is an attempt to show the content 
of these essential terms.
If we see culture, in Durkheim’s sense, as the “totality of beliefs and sentiments 
common to the average members of s o c i e t y , t h e n ,  the core subject-matter of 
Durkheim’s sociological theory would be culture. Indeed it has been argued that 
“Durkheim covered the same ground with his notion of conscience collective and 
representations collectives that such cultural anthropologists as Edward Sapir, Bronislaw 
Malinowski, A.L.Ki'oeber and Robert Redfield (to name a few) did with their various 
developments of the idea of culture and its related concepts.” Likewise, “[t] he only
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suitable English word for this notion (Durkheim’s French notion of conscience) is the 
anthropologist’s term “culture.” Consequently, we can say that
phenomena... philosophies, sciences, theologies... folk prejudices and plain common 
sense. Likewise...fashion, manners...ethic, justice, and morality” are covered by that 
this term. Garland takes culture in its wide ethnographic sense, that is a complex whole 
that includes Imowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and 
habits acquired by man as a member of society.
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Durkheim’s main theoretical interest was in the functioning and content of the 
collective conscience and collective representations which encompassed much of 
what modem sociology calls culture, especially those aspects of culture that have
■Û,
an obligatory character, deviance from which brings into play sanctions typical of 
a society at that particular stage of development. i
Durldieim’s brief account of culture is far from the wide definition of culture
introduced by thinkers such as David Garland. In Garland’s view culture covers all sorts ; j
"L
of mentalities and sensibilities. He employs a broad description of culture which includes 
cognitive phenomena identified as ‘mentalities’, but also emotive phenomena usually
recognized as ‘sensibilities’. Garland’s definition “covers the whole range of mental
Equally, Durldieim discusses the totality of ideas and sentiments as the content of 
collective consciousness. But Durkheim’s description of culture is narrower than
Garland, because the term ‘mentalities’ from Durkheim’s perspective mostly refers to 
those ideas that are deeply held. Indeed, ideas for him are simply another word for 
beliefs. In this sense Durlcheim’s idea of culture does not cover the cognitive aspects of 
culture. A generic definition of culture is simultaneously everything and nothing. At least 
for the present study of punishment a wide definition of culture is not helpful, because I 
am looking for those aspects of culture that have a kind of sacred character and their 
violation bring about passionate reactions. These aspects of culture are more directly 
related to the area of penal practice.
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Ill- Durkheim, morality, law and punishment
Durldieim sought to uncover the moral foundations of law. He explains in relation 
to criminal, contract, property, succession, industrial and family law, the values that must
For Durldieim, law is an index of social solidarity expressing constitutional forms 
of social cohesion. Since “he tended to see law as derivative from and expressive of a
rules. For him “sociology gains its most fundamental knowledge about the nature of
80
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underpin modem regulation, justifying these sociologically in terms of the role of law and %/its historical development. Durkheim’s legal and moral questions were ultimately 
inseparable. This does not mean that law and morality cannot be analytically
‘■g
disentangled, but refers to the idea that the moral rules embodied in the conditions of
1social life are articulated by the law. Thus, for Durkheim, the study of law is an 
absolutely essential and central part of the sociological enteiprise.
A 
' isociety’s m o r a l i t y , m o r a l  phenomena can be studied through their reflection in legal
societies directly from law.”'®^ It is thus difficult to assume that law is peripheral to his
work; rather, “for Durkheim, the study of law was an absolutely essential and central part A
of sociological work,” ®^^ because it not only provides a crucial means of studying society
S.but also plays the role of expressing and protecting morality and social solidarity,
. ÏAccording to Durkheim, the relationship between morality and law can be studied
.in several ways. Firstly, the supremacy of legal rules can be understood by referring to 
------------------------------------------
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morality, because law derives from moral phenomena. As he argues: “law’s authority, its 
special nature as something to be respected, must be understood as paid of a broader 
understanding of the essence of moral phenomena.”  ^ The opposite is also true because,
for him, legal rules are the embodiment of moral rules. Secondly, law and morality, 
especially in primitive societies, are expressions of collective sentiments as the “totality 
of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of society.”  ^ Thirdly, both 
law and morality consist of systems of rules of behaviour which are accompanied by 
sanctions. The compulsory aspects of morality are not different from legal limitations in 
their intrinsic character. However, legal rules are “notable for their clarity and precision, 
whilst purely moral rules are generally somewhat fluid in character.” 'A l s o ,  for 
Durkheim, “sanctions (of moral rules) are administered in a diffuse way by everybody 
without distinction, whilst those of the penal codes are applied only through the 
mediation of definite body- they are organized”."^ Finally, legal rules can be considered 
as a particular way in which the sanctions of moral rules may be carried out. As a result, 
“the best entry into his legal theory is through his conception of relationship between law 
and morality.”” ^
If law is considered as a crucial part of Durklieim’s sociology, penal law, as the 
most functional part of law, should be taken to be a central object in his theoretical 
framework. Punishment is placed at the very heart of his theory of society because 
punishment for him is the symbolic and expressive reaction of the collective
Î 10 C otteiT ell Ibid p. 50
111 Durkheim 1984, p. 38-39
112 Durkheim Ibid p. 38
113 Ibid., p. 29
1 14  C otteiT ell O p. c it, p . 4 9
81
part of law in strengthening morality and social solidarity. As has been mentioned, 
society for Durkheim is nothing other than common principles that constitute the basic 
conditions of its creation and durability. These common or moral principles form the 
authority of society and create a sacred domain. The common feature of crimes is that 
“universally they strike the moral consciousness of nations in the same way and 
universally produce the same consequence.”"^ This is in general a passionate reaction, 
although severity of response “varies greatly from one society to another.”"^
Any offence against well-defined and deeply engrained states of collective 
consciousness give rises to strong feelings of anger in the hearts of believers, because 
these collective values are perceived as exalted sacred beliefs. Every criminal act against 
these imprinted values diminishes their authority and is a sign of demoralization. In these 
conditions the essential function of punishment is that of preventing of social power from 
losing its authority, “which infractions, if they went unpunished, would progressively 
erode.” Thus for Durkheim a punitive response is “an essential and necessary
component of any moral order.”
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consciousness and society itself. Penal practice is an expression of society’s morality, 
and both are aimed at maintaining the integrity of the social system. The relationship I
between the penal code and morality, for Durkheim, is more straightforward and obvious A
k■If;:,than morality’s relation with law in general because criminal law is the most functional
118
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However, injury done to the collective sentiments does not in every case 
constitute a criminal act. For this to happen, these common emotions need to be 
universal and have a definite degree of strength. Durkheim states: “there must be a 
certain average of intensity. Not only are they written upon the consciousness of 
everyone, but they are deeply written.”"^ The distinction between strong, intense and 
well-defined sentiments and other collective sentiments that do not encompass these 
characteristics is not free from ambiguity. In particular, it is difficult to recognize them 
empirically. In solving this dilemma, Durkheim resorts to specific official organizations 
that are charged with the defining of wrongdoing and the application of punishment. 
Thus, for example, “the existence of a court to condemn the offender and determine 
punishment” '^''could answer this question. Those social ideas and sentiments that are 
expressed through legislative process or sentencing procedure can be considered as 
strong and established collective consciousness.
Returning to our main discussion, Durkheim denies any utilitarian calculation or 
deten'ent effect for punishment. He views the most crucial function of punishment as the 
reassertion of the existing moral order. Therefore punishment should be earned out in a 
way which conveys a moral message. For that reason “the best punishment is that which 
puts the blame... in the most expressive but least costly way possible.” '^' In Durkheim’s 
terms the moral message of punishment is vital. Punishment without this crucial factor 
can be counter-productive.
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IV-Punishment and Culture
In the conclusion of my discussion of ‘Durkheim on Morality’ I argued that 
“Durkheim’s main theoretical interest was in the functioning and content of the collective 
representations which encompassed much of what modem sociology calls culture, 
especially those aspects of culture that have an obligatory c h a r a c t e r . I t  was argued that 
the content of morality and collective sentiments in Durkheim’s terms is very close to the 
notion of culture, and Durldieim’s narrow description of culture is more useful than a 
more general definition. Durkheim’s understanding of culture is more functional and 
analytically useful in an investigation of punishment, because it has a more obvious 
relationship with penal practice. Durkheim addresses those aspects of culture 
(sensibilities and ideas) that are crucial and deeply engrained in consciousness of 
individuals. He identifies and studies those parts of mentalities and sensibilities which 
have an obligatory character. It is from this angle that, for him, morality, religious forces, 
collective consciousness, social sentiments, and culture are common conceptions. These 
kinds of communal emotions are roots of social penal reaction.
Indeed for him the emotional aspects of culture are more crucial than the 
cognitive ones. In other words, a cognitive phenomenon is not intrinsically crucial until it 
converts to a deeply held belief which is supported by social sentiments in the case of any 
violation. Punishment for him is, more than anything, a passionate reaction that derives 
from the violation of the most respected and sensitive social subjects. It may be for this 
reason that Durldieim discussed social or collective sentiments more than common ideas.
122 Thompson 1982, p. 75
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Sentiments originate from ideas and support them. Indeed, in Durkheim’s account, an act
.is a crime when it offends strong and well-defined collective sentiments. It was for this
■A-
reason that I argued that Durkheim’s understanding of culture has more a direct and plain
Ai'relation with punishment than other’s broader definition of culture. These ideas and
I
sentiments, for Durkheim, are the fundamental basis of society. The automatic and
passionate social reactions to moral iirjury have been modified, graded and organized by |
.modem penal institutions. But, for him, the essence of punitive behaviour as an
expression of social sentiments has remained intact. Durkheim is fully aware that the 
extent and form of punishment is changeable in terms of time and space. What is stable Ifor him is the vengeful character of punishment. “It [punishment] adapts itself to the new 
conditions of existence created for it without thus undergoing any essential changes.
As a result punishment, in Durkheim’s account, has social implications and a 
profound cultural resonance. Indeed, in his account cultural patterns are deeply |
embodied in penal institutions. This is a crucial aspect, if not the most important feature, 
of the study of punishment. Durkheim has opened up unique aspects in the social process 
of punishment. He shifted our concerns from the professional, practical and 
administrative aspects of social penal practice to communal and emotional features. He 
does not agree with analysing penal practice as a limited industrial and technical process A
of crime control. Instead, he viewed punishment as an institution that operates as a |
isymbol of both individual and social emotions. The insights offered by his discussion of |
sacred and sentiments that are aroused by offence and penal practice, cultural, social and A
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moral significant of punishment are imperative to the understanding of penal practice in
:
modern societies. g
-1
According to Durkheim there is a direct correlation between collective 
consciousness, and type and severity of punishment. Collective feelings are the origin of I
punishment and the function of penal practice is expressing, protecting, and reproducing
124 Lukes and Scull 1983, p. 102
125 Ibid p. 114
: ; i 'common beliefs and sentiments. Any evolution in penal law can only be understood
Iwithin this framework. Punishment in Durkheim’s view is a matter of socio-emotional
reaction. The severity of this reaction depends on the degree of strength and sacredness 
.of feeling, and the gravity of the offences. Therefore, an alteration in the character of
"■/collective consciousness results in changes in the severity of penal policy. Hence, the
Ahistorical transformation of punishment should be seen in terms of historical variations of
•the content of culture. This will be examined in more detail below. A
Durkheim introduces two laws to explain the historical interaction between the
5;alteration of collective consciousness and variations in punishment. First, “the intensity |I
of punishment is the greater the more closely societies approximated to a less developed
type and the more central power assumes an absolute character.” '^ "' The second law states A
I
that “deprivations of liberty, and of liberty alone, varying in time according to the ■Sseriousness of the crime, tend to become more and more the normal means of social A
c o n t r o l . D u r k h e i m ’s first law will be discussed in two parts.
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According to Durldieim’s the historical development from ancient societies, 
through feudal times, to modem societies shows a general tendency to move from the 
barbaric and extreme punishments to milder foims of punishment. He endeavours to 
explain how punishments have become less severe as one moves from the most primitive 
societies to more advanced societies. He refers this question to his basic theory in asking 
which “punishment results from crime and expresses the manner in which it affects the 
public conscience.” For him, the collective consciousness in primitive societies is 
religious in character. These shared sentiments are not concerned with individuals, but 
are a collective entity. Criminal behaviour is considered as an attack that has been 
committed against transcendent beings: “a transgression is correspondingly more 
shocking if the offended being is superior in nature and dignity to the transgressor.”'^^  
Even a strong pity for the offender cannot contradict “the indignation aroused by the act 
of sacrilege” and reduce severity of punishment “because the two sentiments are too 
unequal.
However, conditions in advanced societies are no longer the same. His idea of the 
“cult of the individual”, for example, in which the object of collective sentiments is the 
individuals’ human dignity, explains the condition of modem societies in this regard. 
What has changed is the content of collective sentiments. An act, now, is criminal 
because it offends the human in general. For Durklieim, there are two reasons for 
weakening the average strength of punishment in modern societies. Firstly, the
126 Ibid., p. 122
127 Giddens 1995, p. 133
128 Ibid., p. 129
129 Ibid., p. 124
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respective positions of offender and offended are approximately the same: “[t]he offence 
of man against man can not arouse the same resentment of offence of man against 
God.” ' '^' Secondly, there is a strong feeling of pity for the offender, which serves to 
counterbalance the sentiments that he has offended and which react against him. These 
opposite sentiments are different only in degiee and not in nature. Human beings and 
humans in general have fewer differences between them than differences between man 
and god. Acts of lese-divinity and acts of lese-humanity are not the same. There is 
sympathy for humanity and sympathy for every man who suffers punishment, and a 
contradiction “in avenging the offended human dignity of the victim by violating that of 
the criminal. The only way... is to lessen the punishment as much as possible.”'^' 
Changes in the nature of collective sentiments therefore give rise to changes in the 
manner in which society reacts against crime.
The second part of the first law of the evolution of punishment concerns political 
sti'ucture and its role in the severity of punishment. Here, Durkheim explains the role of 
government in terms of the preceding considerations. For him, the intensity of 
punishment increases the more the central power assumes an absolute character. This is 
because absolute power makes government superhuman and offences against such a 
quasi-divine authority are considered as sacrilegious acts. Consequently, reaction against 
such offences will be more intense and the average intensity of punishment will increase. 
However, his short discussion of the crucial subjects of political structure is over- 
simplistic and inadequate for this issue. He examines the political structure as a
130 Lukes and Scull 1983, p. 125
131 Ibid., p. 126
phenomenon isolated from the collective consciousness and culture. However, it must be 
asked whether they are totally separate? And is there any relation between “societal 
complexity and political structure?” These questions will be addressed in later 
chapters.
However, in one way, his explanation of the relationship between absolute 
political power and the severity of punishment can be understood in light of his theory of 
religion, collective consciousness and its relation to punishment. “When the state 
becomes absolute, Durkheim argues, its moral power as symbol and living expression of 
society’s beliefs is intensified and overplayed with a kind of religiosity.” '^  ^As Durkheim 
argues.
In fact, wherever the government takes this form, the one who controls it appears 
to people as a divinity. [People] see in the power, which invested in him an 
emanation of divine power. From that moment, this religiosity cannot fail to have 
its usual effects on punishment.'^"'
As we have seen, in this circumstance the collective consciousness is religious in 
character and political power is representative of collective sentiments. As a result any 
encroachment into this field leads to harsh reaction and vengeful chastisement.
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A similar discussion was introduced in The Division o f Labour in Society where 
Durkheim discusses the proportionality between crime and punishment. He stated that 
“there are acts that are repressed with greater severity than the strength of their 
condemnation by public opinion.” Crimes like hunting and fishing, for example, are 
the object of punishment that is disproportionate to the indignation that they arouse in the 
collective sentiment. This severity, however, may be traced to another cause. The 
difficulty can easily be resolved if we perceive that the first and foremost task of an 
authority with power to govern is “to ensure respect for beliefs, traditions and collective 
practices - namely, defend the common consciousness from all its enemies.” Indeed, 
government became the symbol of collective consciousness and acts as its symbolic 
representative. Thus, government achieved a moral power and religiosity - legal rules are 
symbols of this sacred institution. Every unlawful act can be considered as an opposition 
against a quaisi- sacred being. Statements of this nature in part answer those critics who 
believe that Durldieim’s theory completely neglects the power of politics in the 
determination of punishment.
The preceding considerations pave the way for explanation of Durkheim second 
law; that deprivation of liberty according to the seriousness of crime appears as a nonnal 
means of social control. Theoretically, there is a similarity of analysis between the second 
law and the first. For him, qualitative changes in punishment (the second law) and the 
simultaneous quantitative changes have the same root; the motive forces which determine 
punishment have changed. Mentalities and sensibilities have altered and criminal acts are
135 Durkheim 1983, p. 41
136 Durkheim Ibid p. 42
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considered as offences that take place against people of equal status. “Blame is no longer 
the same (as it was in primitive societies in which collective consciousness is religious in 
character and any offence leads to a highly passionate reaction) and does not exclude 
pity; by itself, it calls for moderation.
137 Lukes and Scull 1983, p. 130
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V- Durkheim’s Communicative theory of punishment
Once we understand what punishment is about for Durkheim, we must consider 
the ramifications of this way of thinking on penal practice. Punishment is not a method of 
imposing misery on delinquents, deterring them or others from committing crime, 
rehabilitating the offender, a matter of crime control policy, or any other utilitarian 
consideration. Durkheim considered punishment as a symbol and a language with social 
meaning which has the function of reasserting moral authority. The essence of 
punishment is blame, which expresses the feelings aroused by the disapproval of 
behaviour, reproach, and the power of moral order. For Durldieim punishment is not a 
matter of suffering but rather a matter of expressing and strengthening the duty on the 
offender and those witnessing the penal practice. Therefore punishment “is only justified 
to the extent that it is n e c e s s a r y . I
Penal practice is thus a course of moral education. While Durldieim discusses j
■ jpunishment in schools as part of the process of education, he also made it clear that there jI
is no significant difference between punishment in a school and punishment in a society, |
for Durklieim, a “class is a society.” '^  ^The process of teaching should correspond to a
society’s historical and social context. Durkheim placed this argument in his general
framework, in the general context of differences in collective psychology between
civilized and uncivilized societies, arguing that:
138 Ibid
139 Durkheim 1984, p. 200. See also Garland Op. cit p. 45 and Cotterrell Op. cit, p. 77
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in societies still uncivilized where individual sensibilities are hard to affect... it 
may be necessary for blame... to be translated in to some violent forais. But 
among people who have achieved a certain level of culture... these gross 
procedures are no longer necessary.
For the same reason he believed in “the absolute prohibition of corporal punishment” '"" 
in modern societies.
Durkheim concludes that severe punishments are counter-productive in the 
conditions of modem society, because brutality is considered as immoral. Such forms of 
punishments are not only poor lessons for the criminal, but also fail to broadcast a 
constructive message to civil society. In contrast to primitive societies in which 
individuals are absorbed in collective ideas, in modern societies the cult of the individual 
constitutes, at least partly, the collective conscience. The human person is accorded a 
kind of religious respect and severe punishment is considered as sacrilege. In addition, 
the threat of punishment is more effective than its application, and punishment loses part 
of its influence when it is applied, “since one runs the risk of going through it too 
quickly, the threat-value of the penalty which retains its full force only so long as one has 
not been subjected to it may be rapidly exhausted.”'"*^ Another rule is thus that 
punishment should be a last resort. The weakness in Draconian laws is that they repeat 
themselves and lose their influence. As a rule he believes that the greater the severity of
140 Ibid
141 Ibid., p. 183
142 Ibid., p. 199
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punishments, the slighter effect they have - “As a result, the higher in the scale 
punishments are, the less economical they are.” '"'^
However, it seems Durkheim was not completely satisfied with his analysis of 
division of labour as a source of solidarity in modem society. The institution of cult of 
the individual, for him, is not accorded adequate sacredness - human or quasi-divine 
conceptions are not powerful enough to shore threats to social order in modern society. 
He was still eager to attribute a stronger moral character to society. As we saw, for 
Durkheim religion was a source of solidarity and identification for individuals within a 
society, especially as part of systems of mechanical solidarity. However, what is the 
source of social integration in a non-religious and amoral age? Durldieim had previously 
discovered elements of holiness in society. As we saw above he occasionally ascribed 
society to sacred and transcendental things. Further investigations told him that not only 
was and is religion a critical part of the social system, but also that society has all the 
requirements of being a wholly sacred subject.
Religion is eminently social: it takes place in a social context and, more 
significantly, when men honour sacred things, they unwittingly honour the authority of 
their society. If religion has given birth to all that is essential in society, it is because the 
idea of society is the soul of religion. Sacred things are nothing more than collective 
ideals that have fixed themselves on a material object. Thus, a new religion emerged in 
modem society as a base of social solidarity: the religion of society. Hereafter Durkheim 
recklessly attributed to religion all the characteristics previously attributed to morality
143 Durkheim 1972, p. 198
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and society. If already, for him, morality and society were the same, henceforth religion 
and society are one.
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VI- Durkheim’s theory of religion
It was not until 1895 that I achieved a clear view of the essential role played by 
religion in social life. It was that year that, for the first time, I found the means of
::tackling the study of religion sociologically. This was a revelation to me. That
course of 1895 marked a dividing line in the development of my thought, to such
an extent that all my previous researches had to be taken up afresh in order to be A
made to hamionize with these new insights. [This re-orientation] was entirely due
to studies of religious history, which I had just undertaken, and notably to reading
of the works of Robertson Smith and his school'"'"'.
What was this revelation, indeed revolution, which marked a line of
I -demarcation in Durkheim’s intellectual preoccupations? This statement has often been 
cited without any adequate explanation about the nature of his inspiration. There is no 
explicit account of the reasons for this shift by Durkheim himself, or his followers. It can
" :be said that, for him, religion is seen as “providing not only an integrative bond, but also
the primordial source of thought, law morality and ... all social institutions.”'"'*' In this 
section I will analyse the significance of religion in Durkheim’s theory. The section is 
split into four parts. The first is a discussion of the origin of religion. Then, I move on to 
examine the relationship between religion and society, and the functions of religion. This 
will be followed by arguments and criticisms surrounding his methodological orientations
A:
in the study of religion, and ambiguities in his theory of the origins of religion and 
------------------------------------------
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society. Finally, I will draw some tentative conclusions regarding the relationship 
between religion and punishment in modem society.
In developing his theory of religion Durkheim selected “totemism” "^^  ^as the most 
primitive religion, because it is the simplest and most original case. Constituent elements 
of “totemism” can be studied easily, and its original characteristics have not changed 
during the process of evolution, Durkheim hoped that through studying totemism he 
could gain insight into the nature, essential elements, causes, and functions of religion. 
He maintained that the nature of religion remained the same, that there is no significant 
divergence between primitive and developed religions, between the simplest cases and 
the most complex religions. All of them have “the most characteristic elements of 
religious life.” "^^  ^For him all religions fulfil the same function. In all its forms, its aim is 
to lift man above himself and to make him live a higher life than that governed by 
individual impulses.
totem is an object, usually an animal or plant (or all animals or plants o f that species), that is revered 
by members of a particular social gioup because of a mystical or ritual relationship that exists with that 
group. The totem— or rather, the spirit it embodies— represents the bond o f unity within a tribe, a clan, or 
some similar group. Generally, the members o f the group believe that they are descended from a totem 
ancestor... The totem may be regarded as a group symbol and as a protector o f the members of the grouP.
In most cases the totemic animal or plant is the object o f taboo: it may be forbidden to kill or eat the sacred 
animal. Totemism played an active role in the development of 19th and early 20th century theories of 
religion, especially for thinkers such as Emile Durkheim, who concenbated their study on primitive 
societies. Drawing on the identification o f social gioup with spiritual totem in Ausfialian aboriginal bibes, 
Durkheim theorized that all human religious expression was inbinsically founded in the relationship to a
group.
See;
http://site.answers.com/main/ntqueryysessionid==15b8htp7fv5yn?method-4&dsid=2055&dekey=totem&g 
wp=8&curtab^2055_l &sbid=^lc01 a&linktext=totems
"^^Lukes 1973, p. 418
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produce religious feeling.
Takla and Pape 1985, p. 79 
^^®Durkheiml915, p. 208-209 
Ibid
Ibid., p. 44
Durkheim sought to find the origin of religion in the sense of “the ever-present 
c a u s e s . F o r  Durkheim, society has all the essential conditions and necessary forces to
,I
“Society in general, simply by its effect on men’s minds, undoubtedly has all that 
is required to arouse the sensation of divine. A society is to its members what a 
god is to its faithful. A god is first of all a being that man conceives of as superior 
to himself in some respects and one on whom he believes he depends.
I
Thus god can be an attentive creature, like Zeus or Yahweh, or represent symbolic 
and mysterious forces as in totemism. However, society promotes in us the “sense of 
peipetual dependence ... society requires us to make ourselves its seiwants, forgetful of 
our interests. And it subjects us to all sorts of restraints, privations, and sacrifices without 
which social life would be impossible.”^
According to Durkheim “a religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices 
relative to sacred things.” ' Acc or d in g  to this definition, totemism - as the most 
primitive system of beliefs and practices - can be regarded as a religion, because it has all 
the fundamental elements of a religion. He argues that “ to isolate the factors underlying 
the origin of totemism is presumptively to discover at the same time the causes leading to
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the rise of the religious sentiment in humanity.” Every clan has its totem which is “the 
badge of a group” '^"'and the sacred symbol of the clan. In these societies individuals have 
their own totem that is sacred to them, but according to Durkheim these come “after that 
of the clan and in fact seem to be derived from it.” '^  ^ There are three kinds of sacred 
objects in these societies: totems, animals or plants whose name the clan bears, and the 
members of the clan themselves.
However, the religiosity of these three kinds of object cannot arise from each 
other. They not only have the same status, but also “these three classes of sacred object 
in turn form part of a general cosmology.” '^  ^For Australian aboriginals all these things 
are elements of the clan and have their position in the society, and each of them belongs 
to one totem. For example, clouds belong to one totem, as does the sun, and so on. What 
then, is the source of this sacredness? Durkheim argues that it could derive only from a 
principle that is shared by all alike. This is the common principle to which the cult in 
reality is addressed. In other words, “totemism is not the religion of certain animals... it 
is the religion of a kind of anonymous and impersonal force.” Durkheim did not use 
the terms, ‘principles’ and ‘forces’ in a metaphorical sense, because he believed these 
forces behave like real forces and in a sense, even are physical forces that bring about 
physical effects. “Does an individual come into contact with them without having taken 
proper precautions? He receives a shock that has been compared with the effect of an
Giddenss 1971, p. 106 
Durkheim 1915, p. I l l  
Ibid., p. 190 
Giddenss 1971, p. 108 
Durkheim 1915, p. 190
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electric c h a r g e . T h e s e  forces have moral characteristics as well, because members of 
a clan feel they must follow them as their ancestors have done.
Durkheim thus proposes a kind of social dynamism as the origin of religion, since 
coming together and participating in shared life is, for him, a source of energy that 
transfoims the individual from his ordinary position. “All he feels is that he has lifted 
above himself and that he is participating in a life different from the one he lives 
o r d i n a r i l y . I n  this new state of affairs he seeks external objects to materialize these 
experiences to them. He attributes these energies and forces to every thing that is 
available to him and attracts his attention. This is the origin of totemism as the simplest 
religion. It should be emphasised that Durkheim believed that there is no substantial 
difference between the simplest cases, like totemism, and the most sophisticated 
religions.
Thus, for him “the idea of force is of religious origin.”"’® These forces are the 
translation of common principles and religious forces. These collective values emerge 
when a certain number of individuals come together. This analysis also shows how 
“religion is social in terms of its origin.”'®' According to this analysis, society has all the 
essential elements to produce religious sensations for the creation of sacred being. This 
argument shows that society and religion are highly similar. According to his scientific 
method, the similar effects of religion and society are a sign of their likeness in reality.
Ibid., p. 192 
Ibid., p. 222 
'®® Ibid., p. 206 
'®' Talka and Pape 1985, p. 79
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For Durkheim, “religious forces are in fact only transfigured collective forces.” '®^
Indeed, for him, spiritual powers are no more than the common and universal values in a 
society. As Giddens has argued, Durkheim saw religion as “society becoming conscious 
of itself, although in a symbolically transmuted form.” '®^ Consequently, religion is the 
translation of society into symbolic language.
Before moving on it seems appropriate to discuss some of the criticisms which 
have been made of Durkheim’s methodology in the study of religion and his theory of 
religion and society. It has been claimed that there is a clear shift in Durkheim’s 
methodology from The Division o f Labour (1893) to The Elementary Forms o f Religious 
Life (1912). It has been said “Durkheim in his sociological epistemology and other 
related elements of his thought went off also, in his last phase, in another direction that 
has been called an “idealistic sociology”.'®'' by Talcott Parsons as However, as he himself 
frequently insisted in The Elementary Forms, '®® his methodology had not changed and he 
had constantly followed his positivist method of cause and effect. As Giddens argues,
The Division o f Labour “establishes a framework of thought which remained at the basis 
of all his later writings. Subsequent works (like, The Elementary Forms o f Religious Life) 
are virtually all elaborations of themes which are originally to be found there.”'®® It has 
been assumed that Durkheim was “interested primarily in religious systems of belief...
'®^  Ibid., p. 327
'®^  Giddenss 1995, p. 20
'®'' Parsons Talcott 1949, p. 468
'®® Durkheim 1915, pp. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 21, 22, 35, 84, 85, 92-93, 162, 191, 192, 203, 216, 227, 249, 420, 431 
'®® Giddenss 1995, p. 40 See also Giddens 1971, pp. 105-106
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[while] his interest was rather in the moral forces,”'®^which are social forces, translated 
and symbolized by religions ideas, Durkheim himself asserted that he “adopted a focus 
on religion in 1895 only after realizing that it provided the basis for his earlier attempt to 
ground an empirically valid ethics in the original version of The Division o f Labour in 
S o c i e t y What changed was the subject matter of his investigation, which is a system 
of ideas. These ideas are wrapped in mysteries and symbols. He maintained that the 
science of sociology should go beneath these symbols and discover their reality.
For Durkheim all human institutions, including religion, are real and we should 
“set ourselves before reality.” '®® He claimed that nothing is false in religion; religious 
conceptions, rites and practices are representative of the reality which is society, although 
these conceptions are translated in symbolic and mythological language. Sociology can 
and should discover the real meaning of these mysterious symbols. He claimed that he 
had compared all religious systems, “past as well as present, the most primitive and 
simple as well as the most modem and refined,”'®® without any exclusion in seeking out 
the most common and essential elements of religion. Contrary to Spencer,'®' he denied 
religion any supernatural or metaphysical characteristics, arguing that “religion [is] 
nothing other than natural manifestation of human activity.” '®® He put aside all 
commonsense notions of religion and tried to free his mind from these general ideas, as
'®® Rawls 1996, p. 438
'®® Ibid., p. 437
'®® Durkheim 1915, p. 22
'®® Ibid., p. 22
'®' Ibid., p. 22
'®® Ibid., p. 22
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influence of these rational notions “can prevent us from seeing things as they are.” '®^ In 
this there is no alteration in his methodology from his earlier works to his study of 
religion. On the contrary, as he explicitly states,'®'' he followed the same approach in The 
Elementary Forms o f Religious Life as he set out in The Rules o f Sociological Methods, 
The Division o f Labour in Society and Suicide.
It has also been argued that Durkheim closed off some initial and crucial 
questions about society. Some premises have been assumed to be self-evident, despite 
their containing serious uncertainties and ambiguities. For instance, he discusses society, 
its function and social dynamic, but is not concerned with the origin or creation of 
society.'®® Likewise, when he discusses social solidarity he asks “whether men draw 
closer to one another because of strong effects of social solidarity, or whether it is stiong 
because men have come closer together,”'®® but does not provide a clear answer. In 
addition, it is said that there are some circularities and contradictions in his theory of 
society. For example, in The Elementary Forms he studied rites and their influence upon 
vitality, belief, effervescence, and morality, but did not answer the question of whether 
these rites create society or, on the contrary, these ceremonies are performed in societies 
which already existed. Similarly he believed that “the collection of society was fonned
'®® Ibid., p. 22
'®'' Durkheim 1915, p. 22
'®® [“Durkheim does not explain how a sufficiently large number of individuals came together”.] See: 
Fisher; Kyuml989, p. 2 Footnote 
'®® Durkheim 1984, p. 25
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by all the individual consciences of its present and past,”'®® while simultaneously arguing 
“that society created the (individual) conscience.'®^
Although the contradictions and ambiguities in Durkheim’s sociological theory 
are not my main concern, a short discussion may be helpful. Durkheim believed that “like 
any other society, the clan only lives in and by means of the individual consciousness of 
which it is made.”'®® In other words social consciousness is constructed by the individual 
consciousnesses. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the nature of society and its forces 
is different from the sum of individuals as its constituent elements, just as water is made 
by hydrogen and oxygen, but the characteristics of water are not the same as its 
constituent elements. “The forces which are generated by human association”'^ ® are 
independent and have particular constraints upon the individual. Indeed it can be 
understood from this theory that the collective sentiment is constructed by individual 
consciousness but the outcome is not the same as sum of individual consciousnesses. 
These collective sentiments become additional, independent social forces that directly 
constrain individual behaviours. He does not argue about origin of society in more detail. 
His starting point is that where a society is already created. Thereafter the idea of forces 
can be the base for other social activities and social phenomena like religion.
Thus, his theory of individual consciousness constructing social consciousness 
and in particular his ideas about force, which are scattered through his works - especially
'®® Dubeski 2001,p. 61 
'®^  Ibid.
'®® Ibid., p. 223
'^ ® Giddenss 1995, p. 21
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The Elementary Forms o f  Religious life solve some of the above difficulties. His
argument here is that society is conscious and that social forces are real forces. For him, 
collective forces:
are forces as real as cosmic forces, though of another sort.. .the proof that the 
reality of collective tendencies is not less than that of cosmic forces is that this 
reality is demonstrated in the same way, by the uniformity of effects. [They] 
cause us to act from without, like physico-chemical forces to which we react.
This account of social forces recalls his definition of social fact:
“A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the 
individual an external constraint; or again, every way of acting which is general 
throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right 
independent of its individual manifestations.
These conscious forces are the origin and base of the important social 
conceptions. He frequently declares that religious forces are collective forces and 
religious forces are not other than collective. But these analyses could be justified when 
and where a smallest gi oup of societies like clans were already constructed.
Durkheim 1915, pp. 206-211-223-327-329-420-421-424 
Durkheim 1915 , pp. 309-10 
Durkheim 1966, p. 13
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The final part of this discussion will attempt to explain Durklieim’s functional 
theory of religion. This argument asks, essentially: to what social needs does religion 
correspond or, in other words, what are the social benefits of religion? From this point of 
view religion is placed at the heart of social functions. Durkheim argues, “that nearly all 
the great social institutions were bom in religion,”' '^' and it is only religion that is 
potentially capable of revitalizing these phenomena. For that reason he worries about the 
weakness or lack of religious considerations in modem societies: “the former gods are 
growing old or dying, and the others have not been bom.”'^ ®
For Durkheim, religion is seen as playing two important social functions, of 
which the moral function is the most fundamental. It can be said that, for him, the most 
basic function of religion is the creation and re-creation of morality as a base of social 
integration. The moral function is the “only one that is real.”'^ ® The effect of rites as a 
physical translation of religious beliefs is the “re-creation of moral being.” He argues 
that the main and “sole purpose of religious ceremonies is to arouse certain ideas and 
feelings, to... join the individual to s o c i e t y . T h i s  argument guides us to the second 
function of religion, that of social cohesion.
Religion, according to Durldieim’s definition, is the combination of collective 
ideas and practices, which are the basis of social integration. Indeed, it can be said that
' Durkheim 1915, p. 421 
'^ ® Ibid., p. 429
Durkheiml915 p. 379 
Ibid., p. 352 
Ibid., p. 382
106
the most important reason for his attachment to religion is the effect of religious ideas, 
sentiments and practices on social unity. This is because, as discussed earlier, social 
solidarity is his permanent concern.
What makes such a society a ‘society’ (for Durkheim) at all is the fact that its 
members adhere to common beliefs and sentiments. The ideas which are 
expressed in religious beliefs are therefore the moral ideals upon which the unity 
of society is founded.'^®
The members of a clan take part in the same rites; they behave alike, and repeat 
the same songs, words and movements. They bear the name of one totem. All of these 
similarities tell them that they are members of the same moral community and they 
recognize their kinship, which makes them closer to each other. They choose an emblem 
because it is a symbol and
a rallying point for any sort of group requires no argument. By expressing the 
social unity tangibly, it makes the unit itself more tangible to all .. .(and) fusion of 
all the individual feelings into a common one - the signs that express those feeling 
must come together in one single resultant.'®®
There is another kind of religious ceremony that has the same effect. Wlien a 
member of the clan dies, the clan faces a special situation. Social solidarity has been
'^ ® Giddenss 1971, p. 112 
'®® Durkheim 1915, pp. 231-232
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threatened through loss of a member - this condition pulls individuals closer together, and 
they hold to one another and cry. For Durkheim “the basis of mourning is the impression 
of enfeeblement that is felt by the group.” '®' The crucial function of this rite is to 
counteract the source of enfeeblement.
In conclusion, we can see that religion is an eminently social issue. “Religious 
representations are collective representations that express collective realities; rites are 
ways of acting that are bom only in the midst of assembled groups and whose puipose is 
to evoke, maintain, or recreate certain mental states of those groups.” '®®
Flow ever, although Durkheim generally believed that there is no difference 
between the role of religion in primitive and modem societies, he did not fully address 
the role and function of religion in developed societies. As we saw, he primarily 
investigated religion and its functions in ancient societies, asserting that the same role can 
be assumed for religion in all societies. This analysis is not readily extended to the 
modem, where religion and its related practices do not reach beyond the private sphere 
and “offences against the gods are (no longer) offences against society.” '®® Modem 
society cannot be simply conceptualized as a moral unit; it is more a “coalition or
compromise of interests.”194
'®' Durkheim Ibid , p. 405 
'®®Ibid., p. 9
'®® Durkheim 1984, p,50 
'®'' Cotterrell Roger 1999, p. 94
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In retrospect, solidarity that comes from likeness in primitive society is at its limit 
when the collective conscience completely envelops the conscience of the individual and 
leaves no space for independent thought and feeling. A powerful centripetal tendency is 
anticipated in these societies. Collective consciousness is religious in character in these 
kinds of societies. “In early societies, law and morality are both largely expression of 
collective beliefs or sentiments rooted in religious sources.” '®® But as discussed above “in 
the modem societies the situation is much more complex. It is no longer possible to think 
of religion as providing an all-embracing structure of beliefs dominating society.”'®®
As Durlcheim argues, as a result of the division of labour, the scope of common 
beliefs became smaller and its importance much reduced. In modem, industrial societies, 
the vast division of labour enhances individualization. Individuals no longer cany out the 
same tasks, have identical interests, nor share the same essential perspectives on life. 
“Society becomes more effective in moving in concert, at the same time as each of its 
elements has more movements that are peculiarly its own.”'®® The more the division of 
labour is extended, the stronger the cohesion that results from this solidarity. On the one 
hand, the movement of each member is much more individualised, as it is more 
specialized; on the other hand, each individual depends more finnly on society the more 
it is divided.
'®® Ibid., p. 33 
'®® Ibid., p, 52 
'®® Durkheim,!984,p, 85
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'®^Ibid., p,123 
'®®Ibid.,p, 122
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While collective consciousness is not in danger of disappearing completely, it 
increasingly comprises modes of thinking and feeling of a very general, indeterminate 
nature, which leave more room for a multitude of individual acts of dissidence.'®^ The 
core theme of the Division o f Labour is that sacred common principles and social
%
transcendent subjects always exist in society because without these fundamental moral
i
principles society would not exist. Society as a whole must rely on sacred common 
principle. This is the content of collective consciousness that is transformed in the course 
of social development. For example, if in primitive societies traditional religious and 
divine conceptions were the symbol of collective consciousness, in modem societies 
novel conceptions such as individualism, human rights, justice, nation, freedom of speech 
and such can be considered as the base of social solidarity. As will be discussed in the 
third chapter, a kind of civil religion has replaced traditional and metaphysical religion.
s
As all the other beliefs and practices assume less and less religious a character, Ithe individual becomes the object of a sort of religion. We carry on the worship of 
the dignity of the human person, which, like all strong acts of worship, has
already acquired its superstitions.'®®
'iI:
The necessity for the sacred common principles as the base of social integration in T
both ancient and modern societies is a crucial element of Durkheim’s theory of society.
However, the Division o f Labour implies an intrinsic paradox in Durkheim’s theory of
■f;
social solidarity in modern society; the greater the disparities, the greater the social
integration. In this sense he cannot fully resolve his concern with the contradiction 
between centrifugal and centripetal forces in contemporary societies. It is hard to accept 
that the more developed the division of labour, the more specialization, and the more 
differentiated and individualised are members of society, the stronger the social 
solidarity. Where does this strength of solidarity come from, once individualization is 
highly developed? How are contradictory moral guidelines of individual dignity and 
social interest to be reconciled in modern societies? Why should significant social 
disparities not be problematic in modern societies?
After his great discovery of the nature of religion in 1895, Durkheim returned to 
this question. He believed that human religion, like the “cult of the individual” in modern 
societies, could not fully function as divine and superhuman religions worked in 
primitive societies. It was for this reason that Durkheim sorrowed over the death of gods 
and the lack of rebirth. Although he believed religion to be something social and that 
society has all the requirements necessary for the creation of sacred things, but still he did 
not reach any clear conclusions as to how possible disintegrations could be resolved in 
contemporary societies. My concern is this: can it be claimed that religion could play the 
same role in cuiTent societies as it did in primitive societies? As a logical result of 
Durkheim’s theory of religion and society one could reply to this question in the 
afflnnative.
I will argue that religion, communal or supernatural, in every society is the axis of 
social integration. If an expressive individualization and exaggerated freedom places
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social solidarity in danger, an increasing movement towards divine and supernatural 
religion as a stronger foundation of social solidarity is possible. As a result of this 
reorientation, the essence of social values becomes more religious and sacred in j
character. This reorientation has profound effects on the area of criminal justice.
Violation of sacred normative rules brings about a severe social reaction. This subject 
will be discussed in following chapters, in particular chapters four and five (severity of 
punishment in the USA and Iran).
;ï
Vll-Conclusion:
Durkheim set out the argument in his first lecture-course, entitled social 
solidarity, of what was to become The Division o f Labour. He studied the nature of 
beliefs, sentiments, and bonds, which can solve the dichotomy and contradiction between 
individual personality and social solidarity. He recognized two kinds of solidarity that 
are symbolized by two kinds of law. In the first, society is a more or less closely 
organized totality of beliefs and sentiments common to all members of that society. This 
is the “mechanical solidarity” that is represented by repressive law. The second is a 
system of differentiated and specialized functions that are united in definite relations.
This is “organic solidarity” brought about by the division of labour and symbolized by 
restitutive law. Collective sentiment in the new situation is not absent, but its scope has 
become smaller and its content has changed from religious and sacred to a ‘cult of the 
individual’ that is less religious in nature. Any variation in severity of punishment should 
be understood within this framework.
Morality as the sacred normative principle for Durkheim, is the foundation of 
social integration. It is not just a matter of discipline and a source of legal rules, but is in 
addition the matter of social solidarity and society itself. Society is the end and source of 
common morality, and morality and society are one. Common morality includes all the 
ideas and sentiments that constitute a human consciousness and shapes the mass of 
individuals into a cohesive aggregate. For Durklieim collective or social sentiments, 
collective representations, morality, religious forces and social forces are common
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conceptions. These are the other terms for ideas and sentiments that, from Durkheim’s 
point of view, encompass much of what modem sociology calls culture.
Durkheim opened up important dimensions in the investigation of punishment as 
a social process. He denied any rational, utilitarian, calculative or deterrent effect for 
punishment. The symbolic, emotional, moral and expiatory character of punishment is the 
essential nature of punishment which, for him, may be modified or graduated but not
'Isubstantially changed. Emotions and sentiments are crucial elements in his sociological f
theory. Common principles and “moral rules [are] emotionally grounded products of
■3
society,”®®® and can only be protected emotionally. These collective sentiments are
®®® Shilling and Mellor. Op. cit, p. 195
fundamental in communal relations and social cohesion. Any offence against social 
principles gives rise to a punitive reaction. The severity of this response depends on the |
c l'strength and sacredness of the sentiments and the gravity of the offence. Punishment in 
Durkheim’s view has a profound cultural implication. For him, penal practice is an 
emotional, expressive, productive and a communicative social procedure.
After new investigations of religion in 1895, he realized that social phenomena 
like morality and social solidarity could best be analysed through the lens of religion.
This was a revelation which marks a departure in his intellectual reflections. According to 
his definition religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things.
Social integration can be considered as the crucial result of religion’s moral function. e
Further reflections show that religion, for Durkheim is a symbol of society and religious
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rites are ways of acting that are bom in the midst of assembled groups, the purpose of 
which is to evoke, maintain, or recreate certain collective mental and emotional states of 
those gi'oups.
However, after this re-orientation Durkheim stopped applying religion as an 
analytical tool of social investigation, and said nothing about the relationship between 
religion and punishment in modem societies. This is no great surprise, as he did not 
precisely explicate the position of religion in modern society. What he generally explains 
is that religion is something social, and there is no difference between primitive and 
modem societies. Supematural and traditional forms of religion were, for him, something 
that belonged to ancient societies. But the question of how exactly society in the modern 
era could be embedded in a religious form, was not answered by Durkheim. If it is the 
case, as Durklieim argued, that religion had originally been nothing more than a society 
that had become aware of itself, and that society has all the requirements for the creation 
of sacred being, it would be reasonable to argue that religion in traditional or civil form 
emerges when the social requires. For example, developed individualization, social 
conflicts, competing interests and fragmentation amongst social sectors can put social 
integration in danger. A conscious society could resort to religion, even in a traditional 
and supematural form, as a base for social solidarity. As a result, social morality and 
social solidarity become more sacred in character and any violation faces a repressive and 
severe reaction. This analysis would be in harmony with Durklieim’s theory of society, 
religion and punishment. In this thesis, I will attempt to develop this neglected part of
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Durkheim’s theory and utilize religion as a sociological analytical tool in the 
investigation of penal practice in the modem era.
But before starting that examination it is necessary to resort to the fact that, 
despite the great insights offered by Durkheim, his theory of punishment is not free of 
flaws. Durkheim provided a relatively simple picture of punishment and society. For him 
penal practice is an explicit expression of sacred social values. He failed to observe fully 
some crucial dimensions of penal practices in modem societies. The complexities of 
political relations and the influences of specialist institutions had little weight in his 
sociological analysis of punishment, and he ignored major sociological trends like 
professionalization, bureaucratization and the rational process of crime control policy 
(Weberian theory) and their influence on penal practice. Penal practice was simply an 
automatic and emotional reaction to any source of social threat. He failed to observe how 
prisons, for example, are managed through surveillance, organizational and bureaucratic 
rules rather than emotive and moral ones. For Durkheim, lawmakers, judges, and 
professional performers of punishment were just insti uments of public moral emotion. 
However, bureaucratic and organizational requirements can and do limit public 
involvement in the performance of penal practice. The iron principle of bureaucracy, and 
a technical and scientific approach to societal establishments including penalties at least 
partially prevent the performance of punishment from being fully social.
Modem forms of social control, considerations of political expediency, and 
technical and disciplinary mechanisms of repression are a new framework of analysing
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penalty in modem societies. Punishment is obseiwed by Foucault as a set of practical 
methods of power-knowledge for managing individuals as part of a political strategy of 
control. Today discussion about punishment without mentioning Foucauldian theory is 
implausible. Foucault’s analysis of penal practice promoted the position of the sociology 
of punishment and constitutes a significant section of the literature on the sociology of 
punishment. Nonnalization, standardization, and the economy of subjection as functions 
of punishment which are analysed by Foucault are significant to the nature of modem 
punishment. The Foucauldian approach and the Weberian theory of rationality and 
institutionalization are prime part focus in the next chapter.
117
Chapter III Modern Penal Culture
Introduction
The importance of Durkheim lies in his opening up of speculation about the 
relationship between law and social order. As was argued in the previous chapter, for 
Durkheim, punishment is a crucial means of studying society. It is a means of expressing 
common attitudes, protecting morality and upholding social solidarity. According to him, 
crime strikes the universal and sacred moral sentiments of nations and produces a 
passionate response. In the first stage of his investigation, sacred morality was the 
foundation of social solidarity, but once he discovered religion as an analytical tool, he 
argued that religion is an expression of society and that religion and society are one. Any 
violation of the sacred entity gives rises to vehement of anger amongst the believers.
Penal policy is a translation of public reaction against threats to the transcendent aspects 
and religious characteristics of a society. In his theory it is society that punishes in order 
to express and protect itself.
However, Durkheim overlooks certain aspects of modem punishment, in 
particular the technical and organizational dimensions of penal practice. He recognized 
the existence of state officials but considered “them as carrying out collective moral 
sentiments.”' For him, officials and governmental institutions are loyal interpreters and 
appliers of social morality and add nothing to the processes of penal policy making and
' Penner et fl/.2002, p. 670
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the application of punishment. As has been argued, “this enables Durkheim to ignore 
questions about power, conflict of interests, the role of professions [and] bureaucracy.”® 
He ignored managerial and administrative aspects of penal practices, and failed to 
obseiwe the crucial role of specialist institutions, bureaucratic considerations and rational 
processes of crime control. By contrast, technical apparatuses related to managerial goals, 
administrative systems concerned with risk management, and political concerns of power 
have leading positions in the contemporary analysis of penal systems. Bureaucratic and 
organizational demands can limit public involvement in the performance of penal 
practice. Lawmakers, judges and professional performers of punishment are not just 
instruments of public moral emotions but pursue their own professional ends. Effective 
crime control, security, bureaucratic rationality and the politics of cost - efficiency 
constitute important parts of the modem penal system. Prisons, for example, are managed 
through surveillance and bureaucratic organizational rules, rather than emotive and moral 
ones. Nowadays punishment is mostly performed behind walls in such a way that is not 
open to the public.
Such processes of rationalization and bureaucratisation (Weber) and the role of 
the technology of power in the determination of punishment (Foucault) constitute the 
main themes of this chapter. I will in addition address another dimension of modem 
culture which is not fully developed by Durkheim. Although Durkheim dealt with 
question of sensibilities and mentalities, he studied the issue at a macro - level through 
social structures like religion and tradition. He indicates the role of civilization in the
®Ibid
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softening of severe penalties, but does not address the function of the individual’s 
psychological and emotional reaction against cruel and barbaric punishment. Alterations 
of individuals’ sensibilities and mentalities, the process of civilization and the 
consequences of these procedures for modem punishment will be looked at in the latter 
part of this chapter. Finally I will show that although Foucault and Weber recognized the 
crucial role of religion in society, neither used it effectively in their social investigations.
120
I Weber
I~1 State Involvement and Rationalization of Punishment
The history of state intervention in the sphere of criminal justice system is a 
lengthy one, extending from the eighteenth- to the early twentieth- century. The state’s 
monopolisation and administration of the process of punishment as part of its 
monopolization of the legitimate application of violence: “it engenders, more generally, a 
foiTn of permanent public peace, with the compulsory submission of all disputes to the 
arbitration of the judge.”® Rationally ordered punishment and state justice replaced 
private vengeance. The intervention and monopolisation of the nation-state in the penal 
realm paved the way for the formation of modem institutions of criminal justice and the 
presence of trained professionals in specialist organisations. The professionalization of 
crime control as a general trend began in the nineteenth century. “The increasing 
presence of the state in the business of control of deviancy, the eventual development of a 
centralised, rationalised and bureaucratic apparatus for the control and punishment”'' is 
the main theme of this section. I will study this issue in the light of Weber’s theory of 
modem society.
At first glance there is no explicit account of punishment in Weber’s theory. 
However, although he does not present an independent discussion of penal practices, a 
deeper analysis shows that it is an account of the general trends which have dominated 
the penal realm for a long period in western countries. Concepts like rationalisation,
® Weber 1978, p. 908 
 ^Cohen 1994, p. 13
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professionalization and bureaucratization have widely influenced penal practice in 
modem societies. Rationality separates the institution of punishment from social contexts 
like religion and morality, or at least weakens the relationship between penal practice and 
its social giounds. Bureaucracy reduces the effect of social sentiments in organizations 
(e.g. personal knowledge of judge and jury). The reason for such conditions is that social 
organizations and their staff are primarily performing in accordance with their 
professional and institutional requirements of bureaucratic hierarchy, predetermined 
duties, expertise and so on.
The inteiwention of sciences like criminology, psychology and sociology, 
moreover, in the determination and application of penal policy have created a new penal 
culture. In this regard the Weberian literature introduces a different perspective on 
punishment including impersonality and dehumanisation. From this viewpoint, “love, 
hatred, and all...inational and emotional elements”  ^are eliminated from the official 
penal practice sphere. Criminal justice becomes an autonomous sphere that is governed 
by its own particular principles and managerial goals. Weber endeavours to present a 
value-neutral sociology of law. His description of law does in fact bring with it the 
suggestion that a rational, stable legal structure is to be preferred to laws which are 
emotional and unstable. However, Weber’s theory of modern society in general and its 
connection with penal practice should be analysed through study of two crucial elements 
of his theory, bureaucracy and rationality. Firstly, I will explain these two crucial pillars 
of Weber’s sociology of modernization and their relationship with law and punishment
 ^Weber 1991, p. 216
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then, at the end of this section, I will analyse the apparent contradiction between his ideas 
of rationality and bureaucracy on the one hand, and social, cultural and religious values 
on the other hand.
1-2 Bureaucracy
In Weber’s Bureaucracy can be seen theory as a particular example of the 
application of rationalization to human organisation and the hannonising of human 
behaviour. It is the dominant mode of operation in the state apparatus, and a distinctive 
sign of modem social structure in general.
In social terms generally, the rationalisation was constituted by the spread of 
bureaucratic control, the establishment of modem systems of surveillance, 
dependence on the nation-state as a controlling agency and the rise of new forms 
of administration.^
It is through bureaucratic co-ordination that the administration of huge industries, 
economic plans, and the control of large numbers of people by modem states is possible.
For Weber, historically, there was no inevitable correlation between the form and 
size of a state and its bureaucratic system of administration, but there is a kind of logical 
proportionality “between the degree of bureaucratization and the state’s expansionary
■'I
___________________________
Weber 1991, p. xix
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fbrce” .^ For instance, as he himself cites in Economy and Society^ the Roman and 
British Empires were the most expansive states of their time, but only partly rested upon 
bureaucratic foundations. However, he believed that “technically the large modem state
:■is absolutely dependent upon a bureaucratic b a s i s . I n  the qualitative expansion of Iofficial tasks, professionalization and division of labour invokes more strongly the
.necessity of bureaucratization than a quantitative expansion. He tries to provide 
historical evidence to show how the intensive expansion of administrative tasks gave rise 
to bureaucratization.
Bureaucratization and specialization are linked in Weber’s evolutionary theory of 
western political societies. These connections can partly be seen in the emergence of 
party politics and the career politician but also in the “development of war technique, 
[which] called forth the expert, and specialized officer, and the differentiation of legal 
procedure [which] called forth the ti-ained jurist.”
The centralization of the state and the gradual abdication of the prince’s autocratic 
rule in favour of an expert officialdom in confrontation with notables, estates and 
parliament in the stimggle for political power are the other parts of his theory of the 
simultaneous development of bureaucratization and professionalization in the political 
sphere.
 ^Weber 1968, p. 970 
 ^Ibid., p. 970 
"Ibid.,p. 971
Weber 1991, p. 88
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The separation of public functionaries into two categories ... [as] administrative
officials and political officials is considered as a kind of evolution in
specialisation and bureaucratization realm, as well among purely political factors,
the increasing demand of a society... for order and protection (“police”) in all 
_fields exert an especially preseiwing influence in the direction of 
bureaucratization. ^  '
In addition to the political factors mentioned above, there are a number of 
technical factors contributing to the development of bureaucratization and 
professionalization; for example growing wealth, the development of the tax system and 
public finance, and modern means of communication, like public roads, railroads, and 
telegraph. However the most important reason for the development of bureaucratic 
organizations, for Weber, is the technical superiority of bureaucracy over any other form 
of organization. As he argues: “the fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares 
with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of 
production.
The superiority of bureaucratization over any other traditional form of 
organization related predominantly to certain characteristics of bureaucracy. According to 
Weber, these characteristics can only be seen in fully developed modem states or in the 
most advanced institutions of capitalism in the private economy. Bureaucratic authority 
in the public sphere and bureaucratic management in the private economic sphere,
Weber 1968 p. 972 
Weber 1968, p. 973
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required “fixed and official areas, which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or
organization and private enterprises.” "^^
communications required specialized office management: “the necessity of specialization 
to fulfil specific administiative tasks is as important as size [of state] in promoting
Weber 1991, p. 196 
Weber 1991, p. 197 
*^Giddens 1971 p. 158
administrative regulations.” ^^  The regular activities, the authority to give commands, and
methodical provision for the accomplishment of duties are, according to Weber, three 
essential elements of this principle. The principle of office hierarchy aligns the regulated 
activities of lower office to the decisions of higher authority. This principle “is found in 
all bureaucratic structures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as well as in large party
The management of the modem office through written drafts is another key 
principle of bureaucracy. The more important issue for Weber, however, is the 
separation of the office from the private property of the official: “office property is not jgowned by the official, and a separation is maintained between the official and office, such
I rthat under no conditions is the office owned by its incumbent.”
Office management is specialized and the modem office requires qualified and 
trained officials. This increasingly holds for the modem executive and employees of
' I .
.private enterprises as well as state officials. The division of labour, the expansion of
§social services, the emergence of differentiated social tasks, and the development of
126 I
bureaucratie specialization.”^^  The requirement of technical qualifications in 
administrative organization is an ever-increasing phenomenon. The only exceptions to 
this general rule, Weber argues, are top politicians like ministers and presidents. 
“Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion.... are 
raised to the optimum points in the strictly bureaucratic administration.”’  ^In modem 
capitalist economies, the rise of the national and international markets has played an 
important role in the development of specialized bureaucracy.
The reduction of modem office management to general rules, their 
implementation, and the importance of documents grant the bureaucracy a functionally 
impersonal character. As Weber argues:
developed bureaucracy also stands, in a specific sense, under the principle of sine 
ira ac studio (without anger and without enthusiasm). Bureaucracy develops the 
more perfectly, the more it is “dehumanised”, the more completely it succeeds in 
eliminating from official business love, hati'ed, and all purely personal, inational, 
and emotional elements which escape calculation. The more complicated and 
specialised modern culture becomes, the more its external supporting apparatus 
demands the personally detached and strictly objective expert, in lieu of the lord 
of older social structures who was moved by personal symphathy and favour, by 
gi’ace and gratitude.’^
‘^Giddenslbidp. 159 
Weber 1991, p. 973 
Weber 1968, p. 975
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Expert officials, professional knowledge, political and disciplinary considerations, 
objectivity, and loyalty in power have led to the permanent and powerful character of the
’^Ibid.,p. 228
Weber 1968, p. 228 
21 . __Ibid., p. 975
Edelman and. Suchman 1997, p. 480
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bureaucratic machine which, for Weber, is superior to every resistance of mass or even
I
of communal action.”’  ^ These features give the bureaucracy a kind of immunity and ’
.stability both from inside against individual bureaucrats (which, for Weber are only 
single cogs in an ever-moving mechanism), and from outside against social change, 
revolution and political powers, even of absolute monarchy. As he argues, bureaucracy is 
“among those social structures which are hardest to destroy.’,20 V..?
4
For Weber, there is a coiTelation between the development of bureaucracy and
.law. On the one hand, “only bureaucracy has established the foundation for the
administration of a rational law.”^’ On the other hand, law can be introduced as a key
.element in processes of bureaucratization. Most characteristics and functions of
.bureaucracy - official jurisdictional areas, regular activities, distribution of duties in a 
stable way, application of office hierarchy, the management of office, are based on 
written documents - became possible through legal rules. For Weber, law is a crucial
:
component of bureaucracy. “Modern organizations are immersed in a sea of law. They
.are bora through the legal act of incorporation, they die through the legal act of 
bankruptcy, and they continually work in a legal environment.”^^
There is moreover, a close relationship between juristic rationalization and 
professional politics. Weber considers the jurists trained in the universities on Roman 
jurisprudence to be gi'oup who had great influence on the conduct of politics. As he 
argues: “everywhere [in continental countries] the revolution of political management in 
the direction of the evolving rational state has been borne by trained j u r i s t s . T h e  
process of rational juridical thinking independent of theological fonns of thought can 
only be seen in occidental countries, “through the borrowing of ancient Roman 
jurisprudence.” "^’ Weber traces this process in various political institutions of continental 
countries from the sixteenth century onwards and concludes that one can find 
“everywhere the spirit of j u r i s t s . T h e  presence of lawyers in occidental politics after 
the rise of parties is understandable. The craft of the trained lawyer is to plead effectively 
the cause of interested clients (as is the case in the management of politics through 
parties). In this, “the lawyer is supeiior to any officials... only the lawyer successfully 
pleads a cause that can be supported by logically stiong argument.
Broadly speaking, all aspects of modem punishment are influenced by the 
bureaucratic system and by specialized bureaucrats. Bureaucrats pursue their professional 
functions in a bureaucratic environment and in accordance with bureaucratic 
requirements. These conditions have transformed the culture of punishment in modem 
societies. The increase in population, the abolition of coiporal and capital punishment, 
rising rates of criminalization, and the centralization of government accompanied by their
Weber 1991, Ibid p. 93 
Ibid., p. 93 
Ibid., p. 94 
Ibid., p. 94
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monopoly on punishment eventually installed the prison in “the central place in the 
system of criminal punishment”^^  in late nineteenth century societies.
Prison officers, psychiatrists, probation officers and criminologists are not mere 
instruments of penal policy. They have their own ideologies. They apply these attitudes 
in the performance of penal practice and influence the criminal justice system. They work 
on the basis of considerations of expediency and effectiveness, not morality or public 
opinion. Their expertise, accompanied by firmly fixed principles of bureaucracy, grants 
them a kind of immunity against other social forces. The iron principles of bureaucracy 
and technical approaches in social institutions like punishment prevented penal practice 
from being fully social. Penal practice “becomes increasingly technical and 
professional.”^^  The conectional facilities and mental institutions, constructed in the 
United States in nineteenth century, are remarkable instances of this new trend in the 
sphere of punishment.
These developments may be seen as a reduction in the expression of “political 
concem”^^  within the act of punishing, or as part of a political and economic strategy of 
increasing state involvement “in the habituation, supervision, tiaining and pacification of 
the domestic popu l a t i on .Ho wev e r ,  this process shows that penal practice in modem 
societies is less accessible to the public because, as Weber argues, from the bureaucratic 
and professional point of view the inteiwention of public sentiments in such a
Rothman 1971, p. 240 
Garland Ibid., p. 187 
Garland Ibid., p. 187 
Cohen and Scull 1983, p. 312
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professional sphere is destructive, and disturb managerial goals. The construction of 
prisons with sturdy walls on the outskirts of cities in mid - nineteenth century USA 
symbolically shows the detachment of the new trend of crime control from communal 
attitudes.
Although Weber never fully articulated the temi “instrumental rationality” in his 
elaboration of the process of formal rationalization, it is not far from his idea of 
rationalization. He treated bureaucracy as an instrument that can be used by every 
political system, democratic or non-democratic. Such an analysis can be applied to the 
Weberian theory of law, because formal rational law can be considered neutral and 
practical in every cultural context:
For example, in contemporary Islamic states, there is ample evidence of partial 
secularization, the formal rationalization of legal system through legal 
codification (as in Turkey and Egypt) and of instrumental rationalization: 
professionalization of legal actors, differentiation of legal structures, and 
bureaucratization of legal administration. However, the direction of this 
rationalization has been strongly influenced by values that are historically 
“Western” in origin... values thus influence the shape of the legal changes that 
are characterized as rational in our model.^’
31 Sterling and. Moore 1987, p. 82
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However, the characteristics of bureaucracy, mentioned above, led Weber to 
assume bureaucratic organizations to be independent institutions, and to ignore the 
existence of forces that are located within and outside them. For him bureaucratization is 
considered a process that prescribes to the bureaucrat an essentially fixed route. He 
erroneously supposes “that precise obedience would become habitual and the basis of all 
order,”^^  He does not discuss the role of bureaucrats and participants in social 
organizations and the fact that their interests and goals are not necessarily the same as 
those of the organizations. He also ignores the role of environmental forces outside 
bureaucratic organizations - political and cultural forces - and their influence on 
bureaucrats. These internal and external forces could have crucial influence on 
organizational goals. Bureaucrats do engage in struggles which “arise within 
organizations over interests, values... Goals, policies, rules, procedure, task, and so 
for th .Consequent l y  it can be said that the autonomy of organizations can never be 
considered as absolute; rather it is limited and relative.
Although Weber did not talk of the prison as an example of a bureaucratic system, 
it shows bureaucratization, rationalization and professionalization par excellent in the 
institution of punishment in modem societies. The development of penal practice as 
bureaucratic system in modem societies, particularly the USA, began primarily as a 
religious idea. Religious conceptions of self-reflection, repentance, and moral 
rehabilitation played an important role in the penitentiary movement of the nineteenth
Rudolph and Rodolp, 1979 p. 207 
”  Ibid p. 209
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century. The role of religious ideas in developing milder forms of punishment^"’ and 
developing the penitentiary system is undeniable.
“In theory, the penitentiary facilitated intensive self-reflection through “cellular 
isolation” separating prisoners from each other, as well as the outside world 
coupled with equally intensive religious instruction. Practically, however, it 
became a pioneer in a new regime of harsh penal discipline.”^^
Through these penitentiary systems designed to promote the moral refoim of inmates “by 
imposing a regimen of silent, solitary se lf reflection, the penitentiary became the purest 
example of the “Pennsylvania plan” of “cellular isolation.” *^’
The institutions of the criminal justice system in modem societies can be divided 
in to three main categories: lawmakers, courts, and enforcement penal institutions. The 
first class, particularly in democratic countries, cannot be free of social responses and 
influences, because laws or political decisions can, at least partly, be seen as an 
expression or translation of social demands. Categories of crime and punishment are part 
of everyday life in modem societies, and the demand for punishment for serious crime 
and the rising rate of crime visible phenomena. Politicians are not free of these public 
pressures. A historical correlation between the structural transfomiation of society and 
the shifting of penal policy- post - French revolution 1789, Islamic revolution 1979 and
"^’Savelsberg 2004, p. 397-8
S e e ;  h t t p : / / \ v w \ v . a m p l i i l s o c . o r g / l i b r a r y / m o l c / s / s t a t e p e n , h l m # a d d i l i o n a l i n l b  
S e e ;  h t t p : / / w v v \ v . a n i p h i ] s o c . o r g / l i b r a r y / m o l e / s / s t a t e p e n . h t m
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contemporary American criminal justice, for example, shows that impact of cultural and 
political forces on the criminal justice system. Professional and managerial agencies play 
a role in the process of legislation modifying these social forces.
Despite the fact that penal systems are founded upon the law, the organizational 
and professional impact on criminal courts is undeniable. Criminal courts are 
bureaucratically organised and judges and prosecutors can be classified as professional 
gi'oups. Thus, bureaucratic principles and professional requirements can be applied here 
as well. Yet “even with carefully drawn standards sentencing will vary across courts 
which vary in their formal and infoimal organization.”^^ . However, the existence of a 
bureaucratic system and professional staff in the criminal justice system, particularly in 
criminal investigation, prosecution and policing could, to a certain extent, immunize the 
penal system against collective sentiments.
Notwithstanding the above argument, modem courts, more than at any other time, 
have been made into a public spectacle and have become an area for the expression of 
moral sentiments through the role of the press and mass media. Nowadays public 
opinions is no less sensitive about processes of conviction and sentencing than before. 
The scientific and managerial approach, which conceives of punishment in technical 
terms, as a question of social ill, or risk-management, is not fully accepted by this 
division of criminal justice. This is because for the courts these technical approaches do
Dixon 1995, p. 1192. An extensive investigation which has examined sentencing outcomes in 73 
countries in Minnesota to appraise three theoretical approaches to sentencing. 1-The formal legal theory 2- 
Substantive political theory 3-Organizational maintenance theory and concluded that: ‘the effects o f plea 
are conditioned by the level o f bureaucratization in courts'(see Ibid., p. 1157)
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not give any sign of ‘the social condemnation that crimes should receive.Moreover ,  
the dramas and rituals that are:
regularly produced today in courtrooms, newspaper editorial pages, the Internet, 
the floors of Congress and state legislatures and on television -  tend to reinforce 
common-sense categories (e.g. worthy/unworthy, legitimate authority/illegitimate 
authority) that underpin the dominant moral order. In short, penal dramas do 
express and reinforce collective sentiments.
With respect to the third class, the autonomy of the criminal justice system is 
more tangible. An extensive network of institutions, ranks of experts and the 
establishment of prison as the principal form of punishment fundamentally alter the 
performance of punishment. Prisons became the cradle of criminology in the nineteenth 
century and attracted the attention of scientific knowledge experts such as psychologists. 
Gradually, professional groups “and experts continue to increase their monopolistic 
reach”40 while they were “not directly nor necessarily acting in the best interests of the 
state.”41 They follow their professional ethics and managerial goals in regards to 
criminal treatment, solving social problems, and so on. Thus, there are fewer places for 
the manifestation of social sentiments, because they contradict professional and 
managerial demands.
Garland 1990, p. 185 
Page Op. cit p. 361 
Cohen 1985, p. 164 
Ibid
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I"3 Rationalization
Rationalization is the most general, but also the most the most crucial, element in 
Weber’s sociological theory and his theory of historical development. It is a general 
pattern which according to Weber originally developed in the culture of western 
countries. Weber traces this developmental line in the music, architecture, universities, 
law, science, and political organizations of occidental civilization. He attempts to 
discover the context and origin of rational organization and the calculated administration 
of economic activities to provide “a valid explanation for the particularity... western 
rationalisation.”"’^
As Schluchter argues, “For Weber “rationalism of world mastery” was the 
product of a long ethical, religious and institutional development paralleling the 
“disenchantment” of the w o r l d . W e b e r ’s theory of rationality cori'esponds to a process 
of disenchantment in the world and the displacement of mystical procedures by rational 
systems of thought and practice. The modem world freed itself from the superstitious. 
What in earlier ages was managed by mystical and magical forces is now rational, and 
becomes calculable and predictable. Secularization is another aspect of Weber’s theory 
of rationality, causing the weakening of traditional and religious moral authority in 
favour of scientific rationality. From a technical point of view, rationalization is a 
process of the application of knowledge to an ive at a desired end. It is characteristic of a 
new style of life, a product of scientific specialisation and “technical differentiation,
Schluchter 1985, p. 12 
Ibid., p. XV
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peculiar to western culture.”"’"’ The notion of rationality in this aspect is related to greater 
efficiency, productivity, distribution of goods and seiwices and so on.
For Weber, the worldly asceticism of Calvin, in addition to rational conduct on 
the basis of an idea of the fixed ‘calling’, provides an “ethical justification of the modem 
specialized division of labour.”"’^  Providential interpretation of profit making, for Weber, 
is not merely the essential element of the spirit of capitalism, but of all modem rational 
culture.
However, Weber’s discussion of the relationship between religious values and 
capitalism has seemingly been overshadowed by his discussion of the sociology of law in 
Economy and Society, because sociologists give little significance to this argument.
Freund 1970, p. 18
Ibid., p. 163 For Weber the doctrine o f predestination is the most significant part o f the Calvinist world 
view. For Calvin a “small portion o f men are chosen for eternal gi'ace.”* Feelings o f unprecedented inner 
loneliness surround individuals. Each man must follow his own path to eternal salvation, without 
assistance. No church, priest, or even God can help him, “for even Christ has died only for the e l e c t . A l l  
magical and sacramental forces are considered as superstition: “This negative attitude towards all sensuous 
culture... shows a very fundamental element of Puritanism.”  ^The time during which magical forces and 
superstitious beliefs were eliminated from the world was, for Weber, an important historical process in the 
development of religion. For Calvin lack o f certainty o f eternal grace is a sign o f lack o f faith, and worldly 
activities are necessary for the achievement o f confidence. All worldly activities are-> -^directed solely to 
the glory o f God and God “requires social achievement of the Christian.”'* This idea eliminates all mystical 
types o f Christian religion. Fulfilment of these daily tasks can “assume a peculiarly objective and 
impersonal character, that o f service in the interest o f the rational organization of our social environment.”  ^
For all See: Ibid p. 103- 1099
In considering Baxter’s writing on puritan ethics, Weber examines another aspect o f Puritanism. Wealth, 
by itself, is considered a great danger, and morally suspect, because it leads to laziness and relaxation.
What increases the glory o f God is not leisure and pleasure -“only activity serves to increase the glory of 
God.”'*^ Nothing is more pleasing to God than daily work and the perfonnance o f his decrees through a 
fixed daily work. The wasting o f time is the worst sin because it is a loss o f labour for the glory o f God. 
Working hard in a calling, and labour in itself came to be considered “the end o f life, ordained as such by 
God.”'*^ For Baxter, even for the wealthy there is no exemption from this absolute duty. According to him 
it is a religious duty and an ethical principle. “Outside a well-marked calling the accomplishments o f a man 
are only casual and irregular... therefore is a certain calling the best for every one.”  ^It is not just labour 
that pleases God but rational labour in a fixed calling with the purpose of profitableness. The opportunity 
of gainful calling is a gift o f God that should be used by men.
‘*Ibid.,p.l61
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Modem law for Weber can be considered as an outcome of the general process of 
rationalization. It is a “rational and technical historical apparatus.”"”’ In his sociology of 
law, the trajectory of law in western countries is viewed as an evolution from patrimonial, 
traditional and personal fonns to a formal-rational and bureaucratic type.
1-4 Max Weber, legal rationality and punishment
The importance of law for Weber is in one way similar to Durkheim because he 
also sees law as “an explanatory variable in understanding society.”"’^  For Weber the 
developmental history of law is a theoretical model for the clarification of socio-historical 
change. Every society is accorded a certain legal form in its developmental trajectory. He 
also insists that the modern legal system operates independently of social, political and 
moral forces. Weber’s “approach to sociology of law is through an analysis of the 
“internal” foims of legal thought, rather than the actual content of law, and of efficacy of 
law in assuring order and predictability (“calculability”) in social behaviour.”"’^
Weber identifies two major classifications in the administration of justice: 
rational/irrational and formal/substantive. He classifies both lawmaking and law finding 
“in terms of whether they are rational or irrational either procedural (formal) or 
substantive.”^^  Rationality or inntionality, according to Weber, refers to the presence or 
absence of general and predictable norms of judgement in particular cases. The norms to
Weber 1954 p. 321 
Sterling 1987, p. 67 
Ibid., p. 67-68 
Schluchterl981, p. 87
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“which substantive rationality accords predominance include ethical imperatives, 
utilitarian, and other expediential rules, and political maxims,” *^^ considered as natural 
law, which influenced “the codification of the pre-Revolutionary nationalistic modem 
state, as well as the revolutionary codification.”^’ Rational formal justice, for him, is 
based on supreme, calculable, general abstract rules, originating in Roman law and 
developed by rationally trained experts in universities. The enacted legal code, produced 
through correct procedure at official institutions, can be seen as the embodiment, in 
Weber’s terms, of rational-formal law.
Law is formally inational when it is associated with “means, which cannot be 
controlled by the i n t e l l e c t , an d  supernatural forces such as prophetic orders or 
revelations determine decisions. There is no general or standard rule for decision­
making, and sentencing is unpredictable. This is charismatic law, which he views as 
primitive or pre-modem law. The law is substantively irrational when decision-making is 
not based on general or particular norms, but “influenced by concrete factors of the case 
as evaluated upon an ethical, emotional or political b a s i s . I t  is characterised as 
traditional law. Kadi-justice is a famous fonn that Weber cited as example of this kind of 
law.
Weber’s typology of formal and substantive law is concemed with the level of 
autonomy of a legal system from social forces. This categorization “concerns the extent
Ibid., p. 957 
Weber 1954, p. 873 
Ibid., p. 656 
”  Ibid., p. 656
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to which legal rules and procedures are generated from within legal system, as opposed to 
external criteria such as religious, ethical or political values.” "^’ The more social conflicts 
are solved by legal procedures, the more a system is “formal”; and the greater the reliance 
on social and extralegal contexts, the more a system can be described as “substantive”. 
Rationalization of a legal system for Weber means generalization and institutionalization 
of both lawmaking and law finding in a system in which there is no place for the 
irrationality of individual case and irrational adjudication. Resort to outside moral and 
political systems for decision-making is in contrast with calculability and thus formal 
rationality of the legal system. For him “the use of “discretion” in the legal system would 
be contrary to the movement towards an autonomous legal system.
Weber believes in a kind of self-institutionalization process through, which legal 
systems in modem society became independent and legal rules no longer looked to 
extemal social, political and cultural forces. The substantive and procedural rules of the 
legal system are preferred to ethical or social considerations. “The legal system abides 
by these rules despite cries of outrage from members of the community who want to see 
criminals sent to p r i s o n . F o r  Weber, formal rational law legitimates itself, contrary to 
substantive rational law in which legal rules are derived from social structures outside the 
legal system, like religion and ethics. He suggests a sort of relative legal autonomy and a 
legal system also to “ operate independently of the influence of power, political forces
Ibid p. 72
Sterling and More 1987, p. 76 
Ibid, p. 69
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and ethics in society.”^^  For example, he describes the judge as an automaton: “the legal 
documents, together with the costs and fees, are dropped in at the top with the 
expectation that the judgement will emerge at the bottom, together with more or less 
sound arguments and apparatus accordingly whose functioning is by and large calculable 
or predictable.”^^
However, it can be said that Weber neglected the full interaction between social 
structures and the legal system. He overlooked the process of law making and law 
finding and their complicated legislative and executive functions. Legislation and the 
execution of law is a sophisticated process, which is affected by a combination of 
political, cultural, technical and economical factors. An automatic legal system 
endeavours to achieve social order by means of universality and objectivity of law, but 
maintaining social order requires society’s moral judgment. The development of 
generalized rules cannot fully separate “legal noims from the more general political and 
social norms existent in society. If we accept the relative independence of a cun ent 
legal system, it is hard to explain how the initial fomration of the legal system could be 
free from influences of social values.
Arguably Weber further neglects the goals and function of legal action, and the 
values this serves. But if we analysis his theory of rationality in terms of instrumental 
rationality, it is clear that a rational legal system could serve various social goals. Thus
ibid, pp. 68-69 
Weber 1968, p. 1395 
Sterling and More 1987, p. 86
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his theory of a foiTnal legal system can have different inteipretations in various cultural 
contexts. A useful example is the classification of uniform justice and the discretionary 
power of judges as a form of tension between formal and substantive rationality. The 
movement towards codification and positive law in nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
was aimed at the abolishing the arbitrary powers of judges, preventing cruel punishment. 
That movement was accompanied by the introduction of rehabilitation as an overarching 
idea of nineteenth and twentieth century penal policy. But generalization, 
objectification, predictability and equality before law as characteristics of Weberian 
formal rational legal system, as we will see in the next chapter, serve contemporary 
America’s harsh penal practice. The mere coexistence of a standardized justice and 
discretionary justice within a legal system shows that Weberian formal rational legal 
system could instrumentally play various roles and there is essentially no permanent 
correlation or contradiction between this conception and social cultural values.
Unlike Durldieim Weber articulates institutional and material forms of the legal 
system rather than the contents, grounds and goals that they serve. He investigates visible 
and material manifestations of modernity, and ignores other socio- cultural grounds, and 
the content of these institutions. He endeavours to show the technical and procedural 
respects of modem culture that are not seen by other thinkers. He addresses rational, 
professional, institutional, economic and legal activities as new patterns of modem social 
life. Durldieim holistically investigates the permanent and essential cultural grounds of 
these institutional activities. According to this analysis, not only is there no essential 
inconsistency between Durklieimian and Weberian explanations of law but, Durldieim’s
142
theory can even be considered as complementary to Weber’s theory of law, rationality 
and bureaucracy. Thus, there is no essential contradiction between legal rationalization 
and social values. This instiumental understanding of rationality can be employed in 
Weber’s theory of bureaucratization, professionalization and rationalization.
If we take the conception of ‘sacred’ as a central theme of religious beliefs, 
moreover, it can be claimed that there is a serious challenge for secularization thesis as 
describing decay of religious institutions and a shift in collective consciousness from 
religious to a technical, empirical and rational orientation. “Modem justifications may be 
expressed in temis of “rationalization” or “technocratic” vocabularies, but there is scant 
evidence suggesting that individuals in modem societies are lees preoccupied with sacred 
conceptions that were our “primitive ancestors,” ’^’ These sacred social forces exist in the 
modem world and are honoured as in primitive societies. Sacred conceptions such as, 
individual dignity, national identity, collective goals, democracy, justice, equality are 
constituent elements of “civil religion”. These sacred notions are highly respected in 
modem societies - “the deification o f ‘democracy’ equality, justice, liberty, and progress 
is evident in their respective founding documents, civil celebrations, political speeches, 
and every day dialogue.”^’ Allegiance and obedience to the law and sovereignty of a 
centralized nation-state are modem symbols of organizational and structural gods. These 
facts suggest that modem social morality is hardly becoming secularized and less 
religious in character.
Crippen 1988, p. 327 
Ibid.. p. 331
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If we recall Durkheim’s analysis of sacred and religion as a symbol of sacred 
common principles, an act is a crime when it strikes deeply held social beliefs. If we 
look at modem penal law in various legal systems we can trace the role played by sacred 
modern conceptions such as liberty, rights, equality, justice, individual dignity, 
sovereignty and law in the criminalization of individual behaviours and aggravation of 
punishment. This means that crimes typically are those activities that violate these 
modern sacred conceptions. A crime is an act against an individual’s liberty, his dignity 
and rights, or against national sovereignty. The unity of crime and law breaking in 
modem penal culture can be analyzed in this regard.
However, In Weber’s theory, every state is based on force: the “state is a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly o f legitimate use ofphysical forced  
Weber recognises three main modes of legitimacy in the application and administration 
of force. First, authority based on traditional domination, which predominated in pre­
modem societies and is founded on a belief in the sacredness of traditions and habitual 
orientations. Secondly, charismatic authority, which is founded on qualities of individual 
leadership. It is an extraordinary characteristic of a person, which comes from grace of 
God, heroism and so forth. Finally, “there is domination by virtue of ‘legality’ by virtue 
of the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional ‘competence’ based on 
rationally created rules - this domination as exercised by the modern servant of the 
state”^^  and bureaucratic organizations.
Weber 1997 p. 78 
^^Ibid., p. 79
144
In Weber’s sociology of law, his categorization of legal thought is similar to his 
typology of political legitimacy: charismatic, traditional and formal-legal. Charismatic 
and tr aditional legitimacy are associated with irrationality (including formal and 
substantive) and substantive rationality. In these first two categories the legal system is 
connected with extra legal and cultural grounds. But in the third, where legitimacy is 
based on the formal legal system in modem societies, there can be a kind of “conflict 
between an inner and outer rationality, between the requirements of the legal system and 
requirements of its social surroundings.”*’"’
However, Weber did not directly address the relationship between his theory of 
legality, rationality and political legitimacy on the one hand, and penal practice on the 
other. And notwithstanding the fact that analytically Durkheim and Weber have 
employed different teims in their theories of society and law, there is no essential 
contradiction between them. In pre-modern societies policies, including penal policies, 
are deteimined by supematural forces like prophetic orders, revelation, ethical 
imperatives, emotions and politics. Govemment and political institutions are accorded a 
divine or quasi-divine character as a representative of a moral, traditional and religious 
society. As a result of the sacredness and religiosity of social values and the political 
structure, the violation of social morality and govemmental decrees would necessitate a 
harsh and repressive penalty.
Ibid., p. 79
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However, the Weberian account of penal practice in modem societies differs from 
Durkheim. While for Durkheim punishment is and should be an account of social 
sentiments, notions such as rationalization, bureaucratization and specialisation indicate 
the separation of the institution of punishment from its social contexts and reduce the 
influence of social sentiments in the institutions of penal practice. The Weberian 
literature introduces a crucial and necessary outlook on penal practice, without which 
punishment in modern societies cannot be understood. Impersonality and 
dehumanisation are crucial characteristics of this perspective. From this standpoint, love, 
hate, and all iiTational and emotional elements are eliminated from the official sphere of 
penal practice. The mere intervention of sciences like criminology, psychology and 
sociology, as well as their related expertises and bureaucratic institutions, significantly 
reduce the effects of emotional and irrational elements in the determination of penal 
policy.
The prisons, insane asylums, and reformatories, which were created by 
“Jacksonians in the decades follows 1820s”*’^  in the United States, are pre-eminent 
examples of this general trend in the area of penal practice. The disenchantment with the 
view that origin of insanity rested with God’s will, and the emergence of aetiology of the 
deviant, made changes to these conectional institutions. The differentiation and 
classification of criminals with a view to recognising the environmental or biological 
causes of their deviant behaviours essential to their rehabilitation, led to the creation of
Rothman 1980, p. 4
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various bodies of scientific knowledge. These conditions gr adually led to the presence of 
experts such as physicians, psychiatrists and criminologists in correctional institutions.
The preceding analysis, comparing and contrasting Weber and Durkheim, 
accompanied by some distinctions, can equally be applied in the comparison of a 
Durldieimian and Foucauldian account of society and punishment. Foucault like Weber 
appears to reject the emotional, moral and religious character of punishment. Foucault’s 
disciplinary theory is an account of the strategies of power, which cover all social 
policies ands social institutions. He focuses on the prison as a crucial aspect of 
punishment in modem society, as part of the technology of power. His analysis of the 
prison constitutes the main theme of the next section.
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II Foucault
There are some similarities between Weber and Foucault and it is important to 
note these. Indeed their similarities are such that, for some analysts of Foucault’s 
perspective, there is serious doubt about “the creativity and originality of his thinking 
[because his work] in many ways reminds one of Max Weber.” '^^  It has been said that, at 
least part of his oeuvre can be considered as an extended and developed investigation of 
the components of Weber’s theory: “the more important continuity between these two 
writers relates to their shared concern with the forces of discipline, bureaucracy, and 
rationalization, and the impact of these forces upon the social world and human 
r e l a t i o n s . A s  Dreyfus contends, “from Weber he (Foucault) inherits a concern with 
rationalization and objectification as the essential trends of modern c u l t u r e . W h i l s t  
Foucault starts from quite a different set of interests from Weber, “his entire work can be 
read as a series of essays on the emergence of specific rationalities in a number of central 
spheres of modem s o c i e t y . I t  can be argued that Weber’s idea of reaching desired ends 
through scientific means is developed by Foucault in his analysis of power-knowledge 
relations. In particular, Foucault explicates how the human sciences are applied as an 
instrument of power and subjection of body: “he (Foucault) is constantly interested in the 
social processes through which rationality is constructed and applied to the human 
subject, in order to make it the object of possible foims of knowledge.
Smart B 2002,p. VIII 
Garland 1990a, p. 177 
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Moreover, shifting attention from traditional and emotional social action is seen 
by both Foucault and Weber as a characteristic of modem society. For both, despite their 
differences, punishment has been transformed from socially expressive and morally 
charged practices to an increasingly bureaucratized, professionalized and passionless 
form of practice.
However, it should be emphasised that, despite similarities and shared concems, 
their differences are such that one could hardly consider Foucault as Weberian. Unlike 
Foucault, Weber distinguished political and bureaucratic institutions. For Weber, 
bureaucratic organizations their characteristics, their functions and their relationship with 
political establishments are regarded as crucial issue of his project. But investigation of 
these political and bureaucratic organizations is not prime project of Foucault’s studies. 
According to Foucault power is an omnipresent phenomenon which can operate through 
these and other institution. For him, power is a set of methods to increase subjection and 
efficiency in social control.
As previously mentioned, according to Weber the process of rationalisation is a 
general trend in westem societies: “rationalism is a historical concept which covers a 
whole world of different things.” '^ Foucault’s idea is not necessarily an evolutionary 
theory and, unlike Weber, rationalism is not placed at the heart of his investigation. 
Foucault believed “one must confine one’s use of this word [rationalization] to an
Weber 1992, p. 78
149
instrumental and relative m e a n i n g / W e b e r  investigated the historical processes of 
government and legitimacy in various epochs, while Foucault’s exploration cannot 
essentially be considered as a fully historical study. As Foucault stated: “my books aren’t 
treatises in philosophical fragments put to work in a historical field of problems.”^^
Moreover, as we will see below, what is analysed by Foucault as mechanisms of 
individualization and the microphysics of power cannot be found in Weber’s writings, 
Foucault extended and complemented these concepts, by adding a “macro - physical 
analysis of practices whose focus is the administration not of individuals but populations. 
Practices rather than institutions remain the primary objects of the inquiry.’’^ "^ In this 
respect he studied strategies and programmes that address individuals and populations as 
problems. As a result of this brief discussion, Foucault’s following statement seems 
reasonable: “I don’t think I am a Weberian, since my basic preoccupation isn’t rationality 
considered as an anthropological invariant.”^^
However, returning to the main argument, if there are distinctions between 
Foucault and Weber, it is difficult to point to similarities between Foucault and 
Durkheim’s analysis of social institutions. For example, there is no sign of Foucault’s 
sociological analysis of power and punishment in Durkheim’s expressive theory of 
punishment. For Foucault, Durklreim’s perspective of punishment as an index of society 
is derived from his holistic sociology, in which he studied only general forms of society
Burchell. Gordon and Miller, 1991, p. 79 
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and saw a direct relationship between social values and penal policies. While for 
Durkheim punishment is an expression of social and cultural ideals, for Foucault the 
process of penal practice should be viewed, historically, as the tactics of power.
I I -1 Foucault and transformations of punishment
Foucault began his elaborate historical study of punishment with transformations 
in techniques of punishment in the period of 1750-1820. Foucault investigated the history 
of punishment as a genealogy of power, tracing this technology of power in both classical 
and modem fornis of penal practice. For Foucault, the theatrical spectacle of punishment 
and reproduction of crime’s scene through executions in the eighteenth century was a 
process of reviving and annulling the crime before the eyes of all. Attaching a placard to 
the back of the guilty as a sign of his crime, the declaration of his sentence at the foot of 
the scaffold, the confession of the condemned man in front of the public, performance of 
the execution and the exhibition of the “corpse of the condemned man at the scene of his 
crime,”^^  were components of that process. “Justice had the crime re-enacted before the 
eyes of all, publishing it in its truth and at the same time annulling it in the death of the 
guilty man.”^^
The slowness of the ritual of torture and execution, the suffering and cries of the 
guilty man, the waiting for a decree of mercy in front of the scaffold, for Foucault, are to 
be analysed simultaneously as both judicial and political process. “It [the public
Ibid., p. 44 
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execution and its ritual] belongs, even in minor cases, to the ceremonies by which power 
is m a n i f e s t e d . T h e  guilty man must be punished intensively not because he injured 
somebody or damaged something or even broke the rules, but because he attacked the 
dignity of the sovereign. He has offended “him [the sovereign] personally, and since the 
law represents the will of the sovereign, it (the crime) attacks him physically, since the 
force of the law is the force of the prince. The intensity of punishment and inequality
between crime and punishment, for Foucault, shows the presence of the sovereign’s 
power and active forces of revenge.
The presence of armed military forces around the scaffold is the embodiment of 
the king’s armed justice and his forces. For Foucault, the huge ritual surrounding public 
executions is not merely the action of justice, but is a theatrical ceremony, revealing the 
relationship between the forces of power and law. From Foucault’s perspective, there is 
no connection between classical punishment and social structures. Guilty people are 
considered as rebellious and hostile which calls for vengeance. There is not fundamental 
difference between an act of disobedience and rebellion. It is civil war, which must lead 
to the triumph of power. This victory must be visible and manifested through the body of 
the ondemned
Closer attention shows that in this there is no significant difference between 
Foucault and Durkheim in their analysis of penal practice in the classical era. They 
deliver a similar account of the intensity of punishment, symbolic rituals, theatrical
Ibid., p. 46 
Ibid., p. 47
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ceremonies, lessons for others, and so forth. However, Foucault replaces the collective 
consciousness of Durkheim’s theory with the will of sovereign power. Both of them 
talk of an inequality between crime and punishment. For them, there are superior forces 
that react forcefully to every attack on superior and honoured issues in society. For 
Durklieim these sacred matters can be called sovereignty or power, as well, but, for him, 
the superior power that is embodied in the legal system is only the symbol of social and 
moral forces in society. Government is the representative of social sentiments in the 
application of punishment, although this delegation is not constantly real or direct. 
Howevr, as we will see in this chapter, Durkheimian and Foucauldian analyses of penal 
practice in the modern era are more divergent.
Foucault’s analysis of the penal transformation from the classical to modern era is 
complex. This transition, and the appearance of novel forms of penal practice, should be 
seen as new tactics of the technology of power, disguised as humanitarian or refoimist 
styles of punishment. Tracing this development, Foucault describes how theatrical and 
corporal forms of punishment gave way to gentler foims of punishment. As he notes, at 
the end of the eighteenth century public executions were no longer a source of deteiTence 
and order. Ignoring the role of social structures like religion and culture in the 
transformation of punishment Foucault insists that it was power considerations that 
eventually gave rise to enduring the public tortures and executions of the classical era.
For Foucault it is this fundamental framework that can explain diminution of the cruel 
penal practice and emergence of a more humanized for of punishment from the end of the 
eighteenth century onwards.
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Foucault does not explicitly or implicitly specify how and why “the crowds came 
to mock the authorities and to transform the condemned man into a popular hero.”^^  For 
him, the study of penal practice should not be seen through the evolution of legislation 
because it “would run the risk of allowing a change in the collective sensibility, an 
increase in humanization.” '^ For him, Durkheim’s perspective on the decrease severity 
of punishment as a general trend in penal processes is derived from his mistakenly 
“studying only the general social forms”^^  while these processes “are rather one of the 
new tactics of power”.
II-2 Prison
Foucault selected the institution of the prison as the object of his exploration. His 
work on the prison and the disciplinary approach to punishment transformed the way 
social scientists conceived of penal practices. Foucault termed Discipline and 
Punishment as his first book “not because it was literally the first, but evidently because 
he thought it his best, the one that most fully embodied his theory.” "^' Elsewhere he 
asserted that “‘I don’t mean to suggest that the prison was the essential core of the entire 
penal system,”^^  and that it is possible to study penal history through paths other than the
Garland 1990a, p. 141 
Foucault 1977, p. 23 
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history of the prison. But in Discipline and Punish he takes the prison as the axis of his 
analysis of punishment to “answer the question; how does one punish”?^ ^
In the eighteenth century new disciplinary projects were experienced in clinics, 
army barracks, monasteries and schools. The main object of these projects was the body, 
which could be trained, manipulated and improved. Correctionalist institutions developed 
to fulfil the requirements of refoimist programmes. They were no longer punitive 
establishments. The inmates were supervised in prisons by a strict schedule. Sleeping, 
waking, eating, exercising, training and other routine activities of prisoners were under 
peimanent surveillance. Individualization, classification of inmates, codification of time 
and space, movements and measured ti'eatment were applied to control and transform the 
individual. These methods, which made possible the meticulous operations of the body, 
“assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of 
docility-utility, were called disciplines”.^ ^
This disciplinary approach was methodologically totally different from slavery 
and vassalage. The latter system was founded on a relation of possession of bodies and 
their products, while disciplinary programs did not just aim at improving the body’s 
ability nor at the increasing of its subjugation, “but at the formation of a relation that in 
the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and 
conversely.
Ibid., p. 74 
Foucault 1991,p. 137 
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According to Foucault in the nineteenth century, the policy of punishment 
changed. This no longer dispensed costly violent methods of penal practice. Instead, the 
object of the new policy was to influence the individual’s mind and soul. Indeed the soul 
is a product of the policy of coercion that acts upon the body through the disciplinary 
machine. The principal function of these disciplinary techniques is to increase “ the 
mastery of each individual over his own body.”^^  As mentioned above, from the 
eighteenth century onwards punishment no longer addressed itself to the body as a site 
for the infliction of pain. As Foucault argues, “The expiation that once rained down upon 
the body must be replaced by the punishment that acts in depth on the heart, the thoughts, 
the will, the inclination.” '^'
Moreover normalization was a new method of sanctioning in modem societies. 
What reformers considered as a rehabilitative and con*ectional system or, as Foucault 
termed it, “the gentle way in punishment,”^' was according to Foucault, a system of 
standardization. This method included instruments of “knowing how the individual 
performs, watching his movements, assessing his behaviour, and measuring it against 
rule.”^^  The idea of the panopticon,which he borrowed from Bentham, provided one of
Ibid., p. 137 
Ibid., p. 16
Foucault. Ibid., p. 104 
Garland Op. cit p. 145
Bentham's Panopticon is the architectural figure o f this composition. We Icnow the principle on which it 
was based: at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide 
windows that open onto the inner side o f the ring; the peripheral building is divided into cells, each of 
which extends the whole width o f the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, conesponding to 
the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the 
other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a
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the best means to analyse and explain this idea of surveillance, supervision and regulated 
conduct.
The role of penal labour in prison is crucial, not because of its economic value, 
but rather by virtue of its influence on the human ‘mechanism’. For Foucault penal 
labour should be analysed as a process of order and regularity. It prevents inmates from 
engaging in disorderly activities and imposes power and supervision over them. This 
method gives the inmates habitual discipline and obedience without the use of violent 
repression. Through penal labour the prison became “a machine whose convict-workers 
are both the cogs and the products; it occupies them continually, with the sole aim of 
filling their moments.” "^' Thus, the physical excitement of the body and the engagement 
of the mind to particular objects gives rise to calmness of the soul.
The final section o f Discipline and Punish is entitled ‘the carceral’. According to 
Foucault, the official opening of Mettray (a reformatory for youth) marked the 
completion of the carceral system. This was not only because it was the utmost 
disciplinary system and the site for the all- powerful controlling technologies of conduct, 
but also because “in it were to be found cloister, prison, school, regiment.”^^And not just 
because techniques of surveillance, knowing, ti aining, and transformation were operated 
in these institutions, but also, for the particular reason that it was not simply a prison.
madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect o f backlighting, one can 
observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive shadows in the cells of 
the periphery. They are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly 
individualized and constantly visible. Ibid, p,200 
Ibid., p. 242 
Ibid., p. 293
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Mettray was an establishment which received problem cases, offenders and non­
offenders, who were placed under the same system. This “carceral archipelago” is a 
symbol, which shows how the punitive carceral-based system began to cover the other 
spheres. For Foucault this huge carceral net contains a disciplinary field that operates 
throughout society. “A subtle, graduated carceral net, with compact institutions, but also 
separate and diffused methods, assumed responsibility for arbitrary, widespread, badly 
integrated confinement of the classical age.”^^  For Foucault, the frontier between 
disciplinary and punitive institutions is to vanish in modem society, establishing a great 
carceral continuum that brings penitentiary methods to other disciplines. According to 
Foucault those methods cover all anomalies, irregularities and deviations.
Foucault enumerates other social institutions, like agricultural sections belonging 
to the central prisons, colonies for the poor, and almshouses for female offenders or poor 
girls found in the hospital and lodging houses all of which were all managed by all or 
some of the carceral methods and disciplinary mechanisms. These institutions operated 
throughout society. As he argued “the carceral archipelago transported this technique 
from the penal institution to the entire society.”^^  The principle of supervision and 
regulation covers the whole body of society and extends from the lowest degree of 
iiTegularity to the most serious of crimes. The reformatory, school, prison, and 
orphanage are part of the carceral continuum, covering the whole range of methods from 
the coiTection of irregularities to the punishment of crime. As a result, a substantive link
p. 297 
Ibid., p. 298
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exist between the least iiTegularity and the biggest crime, as “it was no longer the 
offence, the attack on the common interest, it was the departure from the noim, the 
anomaly”^^  that should be controlled.
In such a way of thinking punishment is part of a massive strategy of 
noxmalization. There is no a significant difference between punishing, curing and 
educating. It is a matter of degree, and punishment can be considered as an extension of 
those less coercive processes. Prison simply represents “an additional degree in the 
intensity of a mechanism that has continued to operate since the earliest forms of 
punishment.
The most important result of this extension of the carceral continuum is that 
system, legal punishment becomes more legitimate and tolerable. The great carceral 
system extended throughout the legal sphere of justice. The prison, as a model of justice, 
is transmitted throughout the network of the carceral system. Disciplinary institutions 
imitate its legal rules giving them a kind of official sanction. The disciplinary power 
which operates in these institutions does not seem arbitrary, because they apply 
mechanisms of justice at a lower level and with less intensity: “carceral continuity and 
fusion of the prison-form make it possible to legalize, or in any case to legitimate 
disciplinary powers, which thus avoids any element of excess or abuse it may entail.”""'
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On the other hand, the skilful gi adation of the instruments of disciplinary 
mechanisms in the carceral pyramid provides a context in which inflicting penal practices 
“appear to be free of all excess and all violence,”"" because it is a fraction of what has 
been done previously. There is no significant difference between the rehabilitative 
institution “where one is taken in order to avoid prison”'"^ and the prison that one has 
been sent to after committing a certain crime. The universality of the carceral, which 
operates at every level of social body, in addition to mingling “the art of rehabilitation 
and right to punish, lowers the level of adoption of punishment as something natural and 
acceptable.”"'  ^ Moreover, Foucault explicates another answer to the question of how 
punishment became natural and acceptable and how it found new foundation, in 
particular, after the French revolution. For him the answer was to be found in the theory 
of contract, “by the fiction of a juridical subject given to others the power to exercise 
over him the right that he himself possesses over them.”"'"'
There are other important results for the new form of punishment. According to 
Foucault, the predilection of judges for medicine, psychology, and criminology one the 
one hand, and the extension of judging and normalizing to other gi’oups like teachers, 
doctors and social workers on the other, shows that the nature of power exercised by 
judges has changed. Criminal justice becomes a combination of principles of legality and 
principles of normalization. This noimative power which is “borne along by the 
omnipresence of the mechanisms of discipline, basing itself on all the carceral
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apparatuses, has become one of the major functions of our society.”'"  ^This argument 
offers a new perspective on the sociology of punishment. This “powerful perspective”'"  ^
gives a control orientation model to the nature of modern punishment in contrast with an 
emotive, expressive or punitive model. Foucault’s disciplinary model of punishment is 
an account of new trends in which a,
social control system served the requirements of the emerging capitalist order for 
continual repression [and simultaneously] continued to mystify every one 
(including the refoiTners themselves) into thinking these changes were fair, 
humane and progressive.'"^
For Foucault, there is no room for humanitarian aims in the changing of punishment or 
the failed stories of punishment and the prison. As will be discussed, Foucault believed 
that the pre-determined goals of the prison system have been continuously successful.
II-3 Foucault and conceptions of power-knowledge
As noted above Foucault begins his major work with a contrast between the 
spectacle of public torture, the exhibition of execution and the schematized timetable in a 
disciplinary institution. “He contrasts traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of power
Ibid., p. 304 
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with panopticism, a subtle, calculated technology and economy of subjection.”'"® This 
clearly demarcated change in penal styles has to be seen not as quantitative change, a 
leniency of penalty and a decrease in the intensity of punishment, but as a qualitative shift 
in methods of punishment. Foucault’s thinking about punishment can be understood 
within his universal framework of rationality and techniques of power in modem 
societies. For him, the gi'owth of freedom and democracy during the Enlightenment, the 
efforts of reformers in penal practice, and the revolution of science, particularly human 
science, all should be viewed as part of the modern strategies of power.
For Foucault power is present and operates everywhere, it is the social skin which 
covers all individuals. There are no margins “for those who break with the system to 
gambol in.” '"  ^Escaping from power is not possible, because there is no sphere where 
power has no play. Power relations are entangled with other social relations like family, 
production, sexuality and so on. Moreover, “these relations do not take the sole form of 
prohibition and punishment, but are of multiple fomis.”""
Foucault’s perspective on power is different from the conventional conception of 
power, which is usually opposed to freedom. Power for him is not a matter of political 
ideologies or the exercise of authority by political institutions like parliament. It cannot 
be considered as property which belongs to individuals or political institutions; in fact 
Foucault’s study of power is not based on investigations of the state. He does not discuss
'"® Kaplan Martha 1995 p. 85 
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the resources, elements and forces of the state. Strategies of power for him are not a plan 
that is made by a particular institution or decision maker. In this regard he was not 
concerned with the coherent domination of an individual, “group or class over others.”" '
Power is a series of actions and practices that are performed in various socio­
political institutions and other social relations. The object of these strategies and 
practices is the body. To analyse the political investment of body, he employ the term the 
‘body politic,’ which he considers
as a set of material elements and techniques that serve as weapons, relays, 
communication routes and supports for the power and knowledge relations that 
invest human bodies and subject them by turning them into objects of 
knowledge."^
This is what Foucault termed the micro-physics of power. For him thinking of power is 
thinking “of its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very 
grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, 
their discourses, learning process and every day lives.”"®
There is no clear difference and distance between who exercises the power and 
who is dominated: “power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as
'"  Foucault i 980, p. 39 
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something which only functions in the form of chain.”""' Power operates via networks of 
organizations and social relations. Individuals are not only the “effects of power”"® but 
also “the vehicles of power.”"" Power forges souls, desires and subjects, thus one should 
not have a hierarchical, descending analysis of power, but “one must rather conduct an 
ascending analysis of power.”"^ In this analysis of power comes from below. For 
Foucault in a feudal regime individualization is ascending. “The more one possesses 
power or privilege, the more one is marked as individual by rituals, written accounts or 
visual reproduction.”"® But in a disciplinary regime, individualization is descending - “as 
power becomes more anonymous and more functional, those on whom it is exercised 
tend to be more strongly individualized.”"" Power is exercised not only over bodies but 
it is also enacted over the individual movement and gestures of the body. Practices of 
power lead to haiTnonization of these movements and attitudes, codification, 
categorization and continuous supeiwision.
Foucault’s concepts of individualization, supervision, obseiwation and the 
application of sophisticated and subtle technologies in social institutions like punishment, 
are powerful insights. These also constitute techniques for reduction of the cost of power 
and increasing docility and utility. In the new form of social control, subjection is not 
obtained by physical force; it is applied through calculated, organized and technical 
apparatuses. Schools, clinics, factories, prisons and so on, in Foucauldian terms are to be
""'ibid
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seen as a part of a grand strategy of power. In this new trend power is applied at the 
lowest possible price, and the most expansive and efficient mode. It is quite different 
from the arbitrary and direct exercise of force. Political technology covered the body 
through the sophisticated techniques of knowledge.
This loiowledge is not the same as knowledge of the functioning of the body. For 
Foucault “this knowledge and this mastery constitute what might be called the political 
technology of the body.”'^" This technology is not systematically formulated to 
constitute a particular discourse. It is a collection of means and methods that cannot be 
placed in any ad hoc establishment or state foundation.
What the apparatuses and institutions operate is, in a sense, a microphysics of 
power, whose field of validity is situated in a sense between this great functioning 
and the bodies themselves without their materiality and their forces.'^'
From Foucault’s standpoint, it is therefore barely possible to distinguish between 
power and knowledge. In the mastery of the body there is interaction between these two 
phenomena. It can be said that strategies of power are deteimined by scientific political 
technologies of the body. The history of human sciences and the history of penal law, as 
tactics of power, should not be studied as two separate, but overlapping, disciplines, 
which have some overlaps, but one rather should ask “whether they do not both derive
Ibid., p. 26 
Ibid., p. 26
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from a single process. In short, make the technology of power the very principle both of 
the humanization of the penal system and of the knowledge of man.” '^ ^
From Foucault’s perspective modern institutions invented a new context for the 
practice of assessment, supervision, obseiwation and recording of the population to 
administer and manage them through education, health and the penal system. “This is the 
original matrix of the human and social science ... we might speak of social science as 
sti'ategies of power designed to minimized the cost of power, to maximize its 
coverage.” '^ ® For Foucault the transformation of individuality through a ritual mechanism 
changed to a scientific and disciplinary mechanism. “When the sciences of man become 
possible is the moment when a new technology of power and a new anatomy of the body 
were implemented.” '^ "' Indeed it is not power, but rather the subject that is the main 
theme of his investigation. This subject is essentially constructed through external 
control of power over the body performed by omnipresent institutions throughout society. 
According to him this self-policing is an extension of the religious confessional in 
modem society.
The human sciences, then, are productions of particular models of power, which 
need obseiwation, surveillance, examination, and an exact knowledge of humans and their 
conduct. The disciplines of criminology and psychiatry, for instance, can be understood 
in this context of power-knowledge relations. These sciences are significant modes of
Ibid p. 23 
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studying the human being and his individual and social behaviours. They are the 
outcomes of a close examination of internal and external forces in the conduct of human 
beings.
Later, in The History o f Sexuality, Foucault extended his theory of power and 
distinguished for it another function, namely the administration of life. He asserted that 
leniency of punishment does not occur because of humanitarian feelings rather, the 
function of power is the proliferation and protection of life, and increasing life 
expectancy is part of this strategy. This sti’ategy directly contradicts coiporal punishment 
and the death penalty, for in such an analysis death is a limitation of power. When the 
role of power is sustaining, multiplying life, and putting life in order, how it can operate 
against health and life, in terms of coiporal punishment and death penalty? If torture and 
the ritual of execution once strengthened the sovereign, today, ‘death is power’s limit.’
Eventually, Foucault formulated his theory as power over life, which evolved in 
two major patterns or two poles of development, which constitute a great network of 
relations. The first pole focused on the body as a machine:
its disciplining, the optimisation of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the 
parallel increase of its usefulness, and its docility, its integiation into a system of 
efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedure of the 
power that characterised the disciplines: an anatomo-politic o f the human body.
125 Foucault 1991, p. 138
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The second that formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body 
imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological 
processes; propagating, birth and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy 
and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause this to vary. Their 
supeiwision was affected through an entire series of intervention and regularity 
controls: a bio-politic o f population. The discipline of the body and regulations 
of the population constituted two poles around which the organization of power 
over life was deployed.'^"
Power over life can have both negative and positive consequences. The former prevents 
individual from brutal and corporal punishment, in particular the death penalty, and the 
latter gives rise to a normative and disciplinary penal strategy.
Foucault demonstrated to a wide audience “the far-reaching sociological 
significance of punishment and kinds of insights, which might be gained from a close 
examination of its p r a c t i c e s . H i s  works which “are complex in thought and 
language’"^®opened up and developed new perspectives in analysing penal practice. His 
conceptions and descriptions of punishment now stand at the very heart of any 
comprehensive study of punishment. His perspective on the analysis of penal practice 
developed and strengthened the position of the sociology of punishment, and has had a 
tremendous impact on contemporary sociology and intellectual culture. His positive and
""ibid., p. 139
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productive approach to power introduced a new framework of inquiry which covers all 
realms of life including, health, education, insurance, as well as the institution of 
punishment. He changed traditional and cunent ways of thinking about punishment and 
penal institutions. Thus, “To write today about punishment and classification without 
Foucault, is like talking about the unconscious without Freud.”'®"
Although punishment was not the sole object of Foucault’s research, it is a 
remarkable example of the positive effects of institutional disciplinary mechanisms. He 
“regards punishment as a complex social function.”'®" It works at directing strategies of 
power to make the body a useful force. But “the body becomes a useful force only if it is 
both a productive body and a subjected one.”'®' This subjection is not necessarily 
achieved by force, violent or ideological. The body needs to be known through a 
particular laiowledge which Foucault called “the political technology of the 
body.”'®®According to Foucault this technology does not continuously have the same 
formulation, and is not located in any particular institutions or state establishment. As he 
stated, it is “diffuse, made up of bits and pieces, [and a separated collection of] tools or 
methods.” '®® This technology is not systematic or uniform, but this does not mean that 
there are not coherent results. What institutions perform, in Foucault terms, is a “micro­
physics of power.”'®"' This technology is a set of different tools and methods, 
accompanied by knowledge, which are used by institutions. Penal policy should be
'®" Cohen 1985, p. 10 
'®" Foucault 1991, p. 23 
'®' Ibid., p. 26 
'®® Ibid., p. 26 
'®® Ibid 
'®"' Ibid
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considered as a technique of a comprehensive strategy of power: “[t]he form of law with 
its effects of prohibition needs to be resituated among a number of other non-juridical 
mechanisms,”'®® Law is an instrument of economic and political management.
Foucault changed traditional and classical interpretations of punishment and 
introduced a new focus for the investigation of punishment. If his analysis is not a full 
account of penal practice, it is perhaps because the full study of punishment was not the 
leading aim of his investigation. He did not claim to have introduced a general theory of 
punishment, but thought of punishment as a set of practical methods of power-knowledge 
for managing individuals. For him, “penal policy is, in a profound sense, a political 
strategy of control.” '®"
A short comparison of Foucauldian and Durkheimian perspectives shows that 
they investigated punishment from different angles. As argued above, Foucault studied 
punishment in terms of power, while Durklieim’s theme is the relation of punishment to 
social morality. Punishment in Durkheim’s view is a sudden burst of flames, which 
erupts at the violation of respected social sentiments. For Durkheim, punishment is a 
direct account of collective sentiments and collective consciousness. It is a defensive 
reaction, which derives from an assault on sacred beliefs, which are deeply held. In 
contrast to Foucault, for Durkheim there is no strategy or pre-determined aim, as 
punishment spontaneously achieves its goals. Punishment can be graduated or directed 
by particular institutions but this does not change its essence. The nature of punishment
'®®Ibid
'®" Garland 1990b p. 5
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is vengeance. Dynamism and energy of this punitive reaction is latent in the heart of the 
individual and of society, which during the release finds its function in the strengthening 
of social bonds.
For Durkheim, dimensions of social life are manifestations of ‘social forces’, 
‘collective consciousness’, ‘common social principles’, ‘social facts’, ‘social morality’ 
and ‘religion’. For Foucault, however, representations of social life are embodiments of 
power. If we consider Foucault’s view of power as a non-personal issue which prevails 
throughout society, however, there is a kind of similarity between Foucault and 
Durkheim’s theories of society. For Durkheim social forces lie beneath social dynamics. 
As we saw in chapter one, the idea of force was central in Durkheim’s analysis of 
religion and society. The dynamics of power for Foucault play the same role as force for 
Durkheim.
For both Durkheim and Foucault, then, there are coercive forces that cover all 
social life. Any behaviour against these forces receives a kind of reaction. These 
reactions for both thinkers are functional. For Durkheim there are two kinds of social 
reaction, diffuse yet social reactions against any immorality, and organised responses to 
the crime. Power in Foucault’s theory functions in a more complicated and 
institutionalized way. The outcome of punishment, for Foucault, is discipline both for 
individuals and society. If we consider discipline as a new form of culture in modem 
societies, then punishment can be understood as a functional institution in cultural terms, 
as we saw in Durldieim’s theory of punishment. From this point of view punishment for
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Foucault can be considered as an expression of the disciplinary requirements of modern 
culture.
Discipline is an essential demand of modem society. This is the religion of 
contemporary society. Discipline, law and order have become a sacred principle of 
modern societies. Discipline is an as undeniably sacred issue, without which social life 
and society as whole would be in danger. Discipline and social order in current societies 
are so important that, as we are witnessing in the war on terror, some modern states try to 
protect themselves against terrorism at the cost of scarificing individual libeifies. For, it is 
the very basis of modem social life. Discipline in theory of Foucault plays a similar role 
to that which morality plays in the theory of Durkheim. If the invariability of punishment 
in Durklieim’s theory is due to morality and social solidarity, the unavoidability of the 
penal institution for Foucault is due to discipline and power. In this way, the differences 
between the two thinkers can be viewed as less severe; more a matter of model and 
analytical form than of content. These dissimilarities become still less severe when we 
attend to Foucault’s fascination with the role of religion in the Islamic Revolution of Iran 
in 1979.
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Ill Foucault and Weber on Religion
These discussions of Weber and Foucault should not lead us to the conclusion that 
both absolutely ignore religion. As already mentioned, Foucault’s theory of “discipline” 
and the Weberian idea of “rationality” can be regarded as new versions of civil religion in 
modem society. They are sacred principles of the modem world. However, traditional 
religious conceptions are so powerful that great thinkers like Foucault and Weber could 
not fully ignore them. Although they have not applied religion as an analytical instrument 
in their understanding of the modem world, they recognized the potential and actual 
power of religion in modem society.
HI-1 Foucault and Religion
Foucault attempted to analyse religious ideas and practice in light of his general 
framework of power relations. In doing so he suggested that the dynamics of power 
“reveal the processes of ‘subjectiflcation’ in a religious practice,” such as disciplined 
religious ritual, or confession. For Foucault being the subject of others through control 
and dependence, and being subject of the self through conscience are both outcomes of a 
religious practice. Foucault’s work on religious issues, however, cannot be considered as 
a “systematic ti'eatment of religion” as they constitute only a diverse and fragmented 
series of comments. However, “Foucault’s analysis was radical enough and his interest 
sufficient to raise profound questions about religion and bring Christianity from a
R. Canette Jeremy 2000, p. 39 
Ibid., p. 129
173
marginal excess to a central strategic theme of his work.” ^^  ^ Values and religious beliefs 
for him were seen as patterns of self-control in the administration of human conduct. He 
“contested the 'spiritual’ in terms of the politics of experience, in terms of a corporality 
which challenges the very fabric of theological dualism.
However, his approach to the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 is more 
conti’oversial and problematic.^"^* His writings on the Islamic revolution in Iran were 
published in Italian and French periodicals between the autumn of 1978 and spring of 
1979 142 Publication of these articles resulted in harsh criticisms and damaged his 
reputation; he faced “negative, if not hostile, reactions”*"*^ while at the zenith of his 
scientific reputation. He went to Iran for first time in October 1978. “He landed in 
Tehran days after Black Friday, on which the aimy had opened fire on a crowed of 
demonstrators, killing an untold number.”*"*"* He was placed in the middle of a battlefield 
between religion and embodiments of modernity. As we will see in chapter five the 
Shah’s regime consisted of a developing bureaucracy, a well disciplined and equipped 
army, a flourishing economy, relatively modem prisons, and a powerful and well trained 
secret police and force. “The Iranian Revolution, in its attempt to overthrow the Shah,
*"*** Ibid
*"** He first visited Iran in September 1978 and then met with Khomeini at his exile residence outside Paris 
in October. He travelled to Iran for a second visit in November, when the revolutionary movement against 
the shah was reaching its zenith. During these two trips, Foucault was commissioned as a special 
con espondent o f the leading Italian newspaper Coiriere Della Sera, with his aiticles appearing on page 
one of that paper. He published other parts o f his writings on Iran in French newspapers and journals, such 
as the daily Le Monde and the widely circulated leftist weekly Nouvel Observateur. Student activists 
translated at least one of his essays into Persian and posted it on the walls o f Tehran University in the fall of 
1978.Afary Janet and Anderson Kevin B. (2004)
*"*^  Leezenberg 2004, p. 99
*"*^  Ibid., p. 101
*"*"* Macey , 1993, p. 408
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revealed to Foucault the full force of religious phenomenon in holding the ‘collective 
wilF, spirituality forming the key factor in the people’s challenge to institutional 
p o w e r . T h i s  historical movement, in particular the readiness of Iranian population to 
undertake any risks including imprisonment, torture, and sacrifice of the life was 
fascinating and disturbing for him, and he “tried to discover precisely what gave them 
this apparently totally unified, and heroic will.”*"*^
Foucault was clearly involved in a dilemma regarding the presence of a 
charismatic and “mystical personality of Khomeini,”*"*^ and a “fearlessness and perfectly 
unified collective will,”*"*^ involving the Shi'at religion in mass mobilization and political 
struggle. He “gropes at length for an explanation”*"*** of this phenomenon. At first, he 
sought to analyse this phenomenon as a resistance against state power or as “the most 
modem form of revolt-and the maddest,*^*  ^but this did not seem adequate.
Foucault conceptual tools and his strategy-based view of power could not extend 
to an analysis of the Iranian Revolution. His attention, therefore, gradually shifted 
toward the peculiar phenomena of religion and collective will. “He was convinced that 
he was seeing the emergence of a unified collective will.”*^* The Islamic Revolution had 
a profound impact on Foucault: what was mobilized was not a class struggle, and
*"*^  Foucault 1994,pp 379-401 in R. Varrette Jeremy, 2000, pp. 137 cited from Stauth, G. 1991, Revolution 
in Spiritless Times: An Essay from Foucault’s Enquiries into Iranian Revolution’s in Smart 1994, Vol, III 
,pp. 379-401
*"*^  Leezenberg 2004, p. 102 
*"*'^  Ibid., p. 103 
*^  ^ Ibid 
*"*^  Ibid*50 Ibid
*5* Macey 1993. p. 410
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involved neither competing interests, nor the presence of a foreign enemy. There was no 
particular political party or disciplined institution to immobilize people. As he said, it
was
a groundswell, with no vanguard, no party.. .it was the profoundly religious 
element that gave the Iranian revolution its unique force; religion had become a 
real force... the force that can make a whole people rise up, not only against a 
sovereign and his police, but against a whole regime, a whole way of life, a whole
world. *5^
For Foucault the ultimate motivation for the populations’ heroic and self-sacrificing 
behavior was “to introduce or reintroduce, spiritual dimension into political life.”*^^
As such Foucault distinguishes another conceptual tool in his analysis of political 
and social life: ‘political spirituality’. This dimension of social and political life for him 
was not something that belonged just to Iran and Islam, but rather he believed that 
“events in Iran recalled something the west had forgotten since the Renaissance and the 
great crises of Christianity, namely the possibility of a ‘political spirituality’.”*5^  ^ In 
response to some criticisms of his fascination with religion he argued that every 
possibility offered by Islam should not be rejected “in the name of the ‘age-old reproach
*5^  Ibid
*5^  Bemauer and Carrette, 2004, p. 106
*5^  Macey David, 1993, p. 410
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of fa n a tic is m , ”’*5^  and that every interest taken in Islam by a westerner should not be 
considered as “a sign of his scorn for
One could disagree with Edward Said’s inteipretation of Foucault’s shift as a 
general “disenchantment with the public sphere, [resulting in] his pursuit of ‘different 
kinds of pleasures,’ and ... his ‘unusual experience of excess’ that was the Iranian 
revolution.” His outstanding shift of focus towards religion cannot be denied; he had 
witnessed religion as an ideology and a powerful cultural element actively involved in 
political struggle and mass mobilization. As such Foucault was forced to recognize that 
there were other social, cultural and political forces that must be considered in the 
analysis of social and political life.
In an open letter to the Mehdi Bazergan, the first prime Minister of Iran after 
Revolution, published in mid-April 1979,*^  ^Foucault took a universalistic position and 
argued for the essential obligations of government. He called the revolutionary trials and
*55 Ibid
*5^  Ibid
see Bemauer James and Carrette Jeremy 2004, p. 106
He was aware o f reactions and criticisms that would raise against him. Who he argued o f political 
spirituality he wrote, “I can already hear some Frenchmen laughing, but I know they are wrong.” ‘such 
statements were not acceptable to all Foucault’s readers. Even the loyal Muariac hold doubts about 
‘spirituality’ where politics were concerned, but finally accepted that ‘politics without spirituality was 
equally dangerous.’
A particularly savage attack came from Claudie and Jacques Broyelle in the pages o f  Le Matin. They 
criticized Foucault for having become an apologist for ‘a spirituality which punishes and disciplines’, for 
an illegal regime. Foucault did not deign to reply, saying that he had always refused to take part in 
polemics, and that he objected to being asked to admit my mistakes.” Ibid
Ibid. He continued that; ‘it was for the first time Foucault’s theories o f impersonal, authorless activity 
had been visibly realized and he recoiled with understandable disillusion.
*5^  Ibid., p. 110
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summary executions “ s h a m e f u l .” The morality he defended was not relativist, but anti- 
strategic. He said;
Be respectful when any singularity rises up, and intransigent when power 
infringes universal s. A simple choice, but a difficult task, as one has to be at once 
slightly above history, watching for what is breaking or upsetting history, and 
slightly behind politics, watching unconditionally over anything that might limit 
politics. After all, that is my work I am neither the first, the last, nor the only one 
to do it. But 1 chose it*
Notwithstanding this shift it should be noted that his theory was not initially free 
from cultural conceptions. Although ‘truth’ is a complex notion in Foucault’s work,**** 
the crucial conception of the ‘regime of truth’ in Foucault is closely linked to the concept 
of culture. He argued that “each society has its regime of tixith; that is, the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true.”*^  ^ He believed that the regime of 
truth in western countries is by and large the same as that which is different in the regime 
of truth in countries like China: “The concept of ‘regime of truth’ [in his theory], then 
seems to play much the same structural role that such notions as ‘culture’ or ‘world 
view’ play in more idealistically inclined authors.”***^
*59 Ibid
***** Macey David, 1993, p. 411, see; Tnatile de se Soulever?’, Z,eMo«c/e, 11 May 1979 
*^ * R. Canette Jeremy. 2000, p. 138 
***^  Bemauer and Carrette, 2004 p. 109 
*'5 Ibid
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But, Foucault could not explain the persistence of torture in Iran, a state that (at 
least under the Pahlavi regime) “slavishly emulated the western regime of truth’, where 
need for torture has supposedly been replaced by more disciplinary ways of punishing, 
such as imprisonment.”***"* The persistence of non- disciplinary ways of punishing in the 
Iranian modern penal system can be considered as a sign of inadequacy of his theory of 
modernity and punishment.
In conclusion, it can be said that Foucault took religion as an effective cultural 
element that could play a crucial role in social and political life. But, the entirety of 
Foucault’s analysis of the institution of punishment emerged before his analytical shift 
toward religion and his structural investigation of society. Once he accepted concepts 
such as unified collective will, moral obligation and religion as notions that should be 
addressed sociologically, his understanding of penal practice may also have transformed, 
and become closer to what we saw from Durkheim in chapter one. However, such an 
analysis of punishment never appeared.
II-2 Weber and Religion
Weber’s trip to America in 1904 and his essay on “Churches and Sects in North 
America” “marked an important shift in Weber’s personal outlook.”*^* During the four 
months of his stay in the United States he tried to study various aspects of ordinary 
American life. The fruit of this activity according to Marianne Weber “was his discovery
***"* Bemauer and Carrette , 2004, p. 105 
*^ 5 Mariane Weber 1975, pp. 279-304
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of moral kernel beneath America’s objectified s h e l l .”***^ Weber himself wrote, “that the 
trip had widened his scholarly horizons.” He was highly stimulated by what he had 
seen: “It was a glimmer of a way out of the “iron cage” of reified modem s o c ie ty ,” ***® and 
a spirit of the world without spirit*^ ** jjg had found what had been lost in a tragic process 
of modernization and saw a possibility of breaking through the iron cage.
It is very important to note that for Max Weber modernization and secularization 
were not necessarily identical. He believed that “in modem societies the ‘functions’ of 
religion can be maintained even while the institution is altered”*^** As he wrote: “the 
tremendous flood of social structures which penetrates every nook and cranny of 
American life is constituted in accordance with schema of the [religious] ‘sect.’”**'* As 
we saw, for Weber, in one way secularization was shaped by particular cultural and 
religious values, but in the essay on ‘Churches and Sects in North America’ he provided a 
different understanding of secularization, and criticized the univocal rationalization 
thesis. That essay led him to focus on “an extensive elaboration of [the] decisive role 
played by religion in modemity.”*^  ^Indeed, conflict between religious values and ideas 
of modemity should be analyzed as a practical and historical event. It is “the fate of us 
Germans,” Weber observed that the “religious revolution at that time [i.e., the 
Reformation] meant a development that favoured not the energy of the individual but
*^  ^Ibid., p. 901 
'^^Ibid 
*^ ® Ibid
Foucault 1998, p. 211. The full statement o f Foucault is: Iran spirit o f the world without spirit 
*™ Loader. Alexander 1985, p. 2.
*^*Ibid. These functions can be fulfilled by secular groups, whose role is largely defined by the nature of 
the religious community from which they gi'ew. Ibid 
**”^  Ibid., p. 3
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prestige of the ‘office’.”**'^  For him, in the USA, these religious forces resulted in a 
“radical idealism” which fostered individualism, flexibility and democracy.
From this point of view there is no essential contradiction between the concepts of 
rationalization, values and religion. As he wrote, “While the conduct of the sect 
members is rational, it is strongly tied to values.”**'"* Although, in much of Weber’s work, 
the rational act has anti-evaluative over tones, (in terms like objectivity), his vision of the 
sect inti'oduced “a modem actor whose very rationality is rooted deeply in value 
standards [which] allows us to understand a non -utilitarian aspect in Weber’s later 
discussion of rationality.”**'^
Thus, if rationalization is technically the process of the application of knowledge 
to anive at a desired end, and if we study rationalization in tenus of instrumental 
rationality, then apparent tensions between religion and rationalization disappear, for 
what prevents technology, science, complex organizations, and professionals from 
serving traditional religious ideas? We will see in the case of America, and in particular 
Iran, how all manifestations of modemity, like institutionalization and technology are 
employed in the perfoimance of traditional religious punishment.
However, as we saw above, Foucault’s theory challenged the fundamental 
principles of modem western culture. He questioned liberal assumptions, originating in
*73 Ibid 
*7"* Ibid.
*75 Ibid., p. 3
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the Enlightenment. As mentioned above, for him, the growth of freedom and democracy, 
the Enlightenment, all efforts of reformers in penal practices, the revolution of science, in 
particular human science, conti'ibuted to the sophisticated modem fonns of social control 
and oppression. For Foucault the impacts of the process of civilisation and humanization 
on the content and form of punishment should be understood in this general framework of 
rationality and power. In the following section 1 will investigate impacts of these 
processes and changes on penal policy.
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IV Punishment and culture
I want now to focus on cultural detemiinations of punishment, and how cultural 
mentalities and sensibilities influence penal practice. In one sense this is a continuation 
of the previous sections, because culture in its widest sense covers all aspects of social 
life. Foucault’s political and technological theory of society and punishment and Weber’s 
bureaucratic forms are themselves features of a cultural analysis. Foucault and Weber’s 
theories can be considered as explorations of the characteristics of modem society’s 
culture.
The key question in this section is how new moral and cultural structures, 
pemiissions and prohibitions influenced attitudes and emotions to such an extent that the 
application of corporal punishment in modern societies seems cruel and barbaric. Before 
addressing this question in more detail, a brief explanation of the relationship between 
emotions, attitudes and culture is necessary.
Sensibilities, attitudes and mentalities constitute the wider cultural pattems of a 
so c ie ty . *7^  Mentalities include mental phenomena such as values and beliefs which help 
human beings to construct their worldview. Religions, moral values, customs, 
superstitions, and traditions can be studied within the general framework of mentalities.
*7^  David Garland, ‘intended to use a wide definition (of culture) which will cover those phenomena of 
cognition known as ‘mentalities’ and also those o f affect or emotion usual termed ‘sensibilities’. In its 
cognitive aspect, culture refers to all those conceptions and values, categories and distinctions, frameworks 
of ideas and system of belief which human beings use to construe their word it thus covers the whole range 
of mental phenomena... philosophies, sciences, and theologies are included alongside traditional 
cosmologies, folk prejudices, and ‘plain common sense.’ These ‘mentalities’ or wags o f thinking are in 
turn, closely linked to wags of feeling and sensibilities, so that the cognitive aspects o f culture become 
inseparable from its affective dimension. (Garland 1990a, p. 195)
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These mentalities directly influence our sensibilities. As we saw, scientific and 
rationalistic mentalities can give rise to a dispassionate reaction against crimes, while 
traditional and religious mentalities may cause an emotional response. It is my contention 
that that these two conceptions are barely separable. Intellectual content and emotional 
aspects of culture are closely intertwined. The way we think directly affects our feelings. 
The “ideas can become beliefs, thus fusing emotions and specific intellectual content.”*7'^
However, it was not only “in the pre-modem era [that] the pattern of punishment 
in western societies broadly followed the cultural v a lu e s ” *7® _ the history of punishment 
as a whole demonstrate the dynamic impact of thoughts and moral, and emotional forces 
on the penal form. “The criminal law of England [for example] has always been sensitive 
to the needs and aspirations of the English people, and it has continuously changed under 
the impact of the predominant opinion of the day”.*79 penal measures like the flogging of 
bodies, exposing offenders to the crowd and violent treatment, gradually contradicted 
contemporary sensibilities and disappeared from modem countiies’ criminal justice 
systems.
Penal culture in modem societies deeply affects penal policy. Viewing criminals 
as mentally ill or inational individuals brought about diverse penal practices in which 
evaluation of the criminars character became a crucial part of sentencing. These 
practices, have increasingly been influenced by scientific culture from the nineteenth
*7^  Me Gowen 2000, p. 9
*7® Pratt 2002, p. 422
*79 Radzinowicz 1948, p. Ix
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century onwards and this variety of Icnowledge shaped “scientific criminology, 
penology, psychology, and so on,”*^** which through their discourses and specialized 
vocabularies, transformed penal culture. As a result, it can be said that changing modes 
of repression can be an expression of changing mentalities.
This is why Spierenburg, for example, studied the subject matter of changing 
modes of punishment “fiom the angle of the history of mentalities.”’ *^ For Spierenburg, 
transformations in penal practices cannot be explained, “without taking changing 
sensibilities into a c c o u n t . ” H q  considers changing modes of repression as a reflection 
of shifting sensibilities. These sensibilities are important elements of cultural structure. 
“The human organism is not an empty vessel into which culture simply pours its 
c o n t e n t s . ”*^3 Emotions and sensibilities are part of the personality of a human being that 
developed through processes of socialization and civilization. Thus, emotions are 
socially constructed, since “the range and refinement of the feelings experienced by the 
individuals, their sensitivities and insensititivities... show considerable variation across 
cultures.”*^"* But in saying this, the following question emerges: what is meant by the 
teiTn civilization?
*^ ** Garland 1990a, p. 206 
*^ * Spierenburg 1984, p. vii
TUirl «  1 V*^ 3 Ibidp Ix 
*^ 3 Garland 1990a, p 213 
*^ "* Ibid
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IV-1 Civilizing Punishment
For Norbert Elias “the concept of “civilization” refers to a wide variety of facts, 
[including] the form of judicial p u n i s h m e n t .  ”*^ 5 por him civilization is the “outcome of 
long-terai processes of cultural, psychological change from the middle age onwards,”*®^ 
that leads to two prime consequences. First, the gradual monopolization and 
centralization of the modem state in using force over citizens and legal sanctions over 
social disputes.
Second, citizens in modem societies came to internalize restraints, controls and 
inhibitions on their conduct, as their values and actions came to be framed around 
increased sensibility to the suffering of the others and the privatization of
disturbing e v e n t s .
According to Elias, the advanced state of labour division, a greater level of social 
interdependency, the centralized state, and innumerable rules and restrictions in long term 
processes transformed and refined the instinct of aggressiveness, and “all other 
in s t in c t s .A c t iv i t i e s  like fighting, killing, torture, and burning which were socially 
permitted, and even celebrated, in the Middle Ages became abnormal and prohibited in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For him there was a psychological mechanism 
through which socio-cultural changes gradually become part of the personality stmcture 
of the individual. For him, what is socially undesirable and disapproval by generating 
anxiety through punishment fight with hidden impulses and refined them. As he
* 5^ E lias , 2 0 02 , p 5 
Ibid
*^7 Pratt, 1999 p 273  
E lias 2 0 0 2  p 161
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explained, the naked and pmposeless torture and public execution prevalent in the 
sixteenth century nowadays arouses revulsion. It is a sign of “advance in the frontiers of 
shame, in the threshold of repugnance (and) standards of affect” tfrat have taken place 
in civilized societies.
For Spierenburg, the civilization of punishment and absence of physical 
punishment occurred in two phases. The “disappearance [of] most forms of mutilation in 
the early seventeenth century” has been considered by commentators “as a sign of the 
greater civilization of their own time.”*^* But it was not until around 1800 that, among 
certain groups of elites, all forms of public and physical punishment were considered to 
be uncivilized. Second, it was during the course of the last two hundred years that 
civilized sensitivity spread to the middle classes and foimed public opinion. The pattern 
of punishment in modem societies broadly “followed the cultural values implicit in the 
civilizing process. As the thresholds of sensibility and embarrassment were raised, so we 
find changing attitudes to corporal and capital punishment.”
The history of sensibilities and their correlation with the history of punishment 
documents the relationship between changes of attitudes and shifts in penal practice. 
Historians have given numerous instances of death penalty and public execution for 
minor and major crimes during sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: “At some periods in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of English history criminal law was administered
*^ 9 Elias 2002, p 172
*9** Spierenburg 1984 , p 185
*9* Ibid.
*97 Pratt 1999 p.22
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with great rigor.”*9^For a long time public torture and execution were normal 
punishments, and “different forms of mutilations were considered a c c e p t a b l e . ”*9"^ Not 
only was there no significant opposition to such spectacles among the public but, they 
were often happy to take part in such ceremonies.
If the death and suffering of human beings was increasingly regarded as a painful 
event, it was because individuals were gradually seen as equal in their humanity. If the 
execution of a nobleman in the fifteenth century was sad and distasteful, this became a 
general expression of objection against public execution as a whole by the end of the 
eighteenth century. Terms such as ‘horrible spectacle,’ ‘terrible spectacle,’ and ‘cruelty 
of justice’, which prevailed in eighteenth and nineteenth century penal culture illustrate 
the increasing of repugnance of such punishments.
Sympathy “was also called “humanity” and humanitarians often used ‘sympathy’ 
when characterizing their relation to suffering in explaining their motives for acting.”*^  ^
This sympathy and humanitarianism are remarkable elements of western culture, and 
have had a deteiminant role in shaping penal practice. Termination of public executions 
and the infliction of physical punishment are treated as a “triumph for humanity”'9** 
because these cruel penal practices are regarded as being against human sentiments. 
Moderated modern punishment is the outcome of a “victory of human values expressing
*93 Radzinowicz 1 9 4 8 ,  p  139  
*9^* Ibid., p 1 3 9 -1 4 1  
*95 McGowen, 19 8 6 ,  p p 3 1 3 - 3 1 4
*95 McGowen 1 9 9 4  p  2 5 8
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the cultural supremacy of the present.”*9^  in contrast to defenders of eighteenth-century 
penal policy who believed “the gallows inspired teiTor in those whose duty was to 
obey,”'9® according to new feelings, reliance on capital punishment was a mistaken 
policy.
The refoimers introduced a different analysis of sympathy. For them, this 
compassion was considered to be a new basis for social solidarity. Sympathy for all 
humans including the poor and criminals implied that punishment should “be constant to 
the feelings and sympathy of m a n k i n d . ”*9^  in this way of thinking punishment, in 
particular severe punishment was considered destructive. It was argued that punishment 
should rely upon those elements grounded in human psychology to promote an ever 
greater social solidarity.
Durkheim had also noted this understanding of punishment. For him, severe 
punishment could create and protect social union. As was explained in the second 
chapter, for him, severity of punishment depended upon the strength of sentiments that 
were offended against and the gravity of the crime. For him, collective sentiments in 
primitive societies were religious in character and have a collective identity. Even strong 
feelings of sympathy for an offender cannot modify the anger that is aroused by sacrilege. 
But the content of collective consciousness in modern society has changed. Traditional 
religious sentiments were replaced by the ‘cult of the individual’ and now an act is
*97 Garland 1990a, p 196 
*9® McGowen 1986 p 313
*99 Ibid., p  312
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criminal because it offends humanity in general and not ti'anscendent issues and divine 
rules. Thus, sti'ong feelings of pity for the offender in modem societies can not only 
counterbalance the sentiments he has offended and that react against him, but also dictate 
that cruel punishment is an immoral act of sacrilege.
IV-2 Culture and the Public opinion
Public opinion is a new phenomenon, which appeared in democratic countries 
from the early eighteenth century onwards, “when popular images of the king changed 
from a legendary figure to the individual leader who might be held responsible” *^*** for 
social problems. Then, in democratic countries where the new form of sovereignty, the 
public, replaced the traditional form of the ruler, the relationship between public opinion 
and government policy became closer. For example, as will be argued in the next 
chapter, in the USA investigations show that “current public opinion does influence death 
penalty sentencing rates. ” *^** Nowadays, in a number of western countiies, campaigns for 
or against certain punishments are known. These political and popular pressures 
sometimes change the nature of penal policy. This is why some penal policies have been 
labelled as “populist punitivism.” *^*^
In countries where there is a correlation between elections and the institution of 
the judiciary, (for example, where the head of the judiciary is a member of cabinet), the
7**** Beniger 1996, p 660 
7*** Norrander, 2000, p 771 
3**7Tonry2001,p517
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effects of public opinion are more visible. In democratic countries, crime, punishment, 
law and order are often campaign issues in elections. This process creates “an 
atmosphere which sensitized the public to crime problem. Concern about (rising) crime 
intensified, resulting in a hardening of attitudes towards criminals and a greater demand 
for hard penalties.”3**®
Public opinion is a complex process and “pollsters adopt different definitions’’^**"*, 
yet “the problem of definition is fo re m o s t .” *^*^  Public opinion can be described “as the 
opinions of all members of a defined u n iv e r s e .” *^*5 it can be understood as a 
communication between citizens and their government. Since in democratic countries in 
which this communication exists there is “access to information on the issues with which 
public opinion is c o n c e r n e d ,” *^*7 public opinion can be actively present and can fulfil 
certain functions.
Public opinion regarding crime and punishment is a key ingredient of penal 
culture. Therefore it needs to be taken into account in every social and cultural 
investigation of punishment. CuiTent public opinion is a reflection of the ideas, 
mentalities and sensibilities established in any given society. Although mass media and 
political campaigns can effectively alter current public opinion
7**3 Ranking, 1979 p 207 
7**'*.Plowman 1962, p 331 
7**5 Ibid
7**5 Sedmanl932, p 339 
7**7 Speier 1950, p. 377
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Ultimately, public opinion on crime and punishment is a complex mix of 
perception, reason, emotion and social ideals of justice, one that cannot be readily 
reduced to political slogans and newspaper headlines/**®
In civilized countries few can deny the energetic and governing force that public 
opinion exerts, and the fact that governments must take notice of public opinion. Public 
opinion is extracted through various methods: polling (means of standard questions 
presented to an appropriate sample,) platform meetings, general strikes, press reports and 
elections. Among other indicators, electorates have now become synonymous with public 
opinion. There is a direct link between voting and government action. Nowadays “voting 
for public office directly indicates the opinions of the masses.”3****
Public opinion in modem societies influences penal policy in various ways. Even 
in countries like America the supreme courts - considered as unelected and 
democratically unresponsive institutions - are affected by public opinion. Their 
“decisions not only correlate with public opinion but are directly influenced by public 
o p i n i o n . ”3*** Judges are members of society and, more than lay people, are aware of 
trends and attitudes that prevail throughout the community. They are “broadly aware of 
fundamental tiends in ideological tenor of public opinion, and ... some justices, 
consciously or not, may adjust their decisions at margins to accommodate such
7**® W arrM arkl995,p302
7**9 Benson 1967, p 566
3*** Mishler and Sheehan 1996, p 711
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fundamental trends.”7** These judges are indirectly influenced by public opinion. As 
mentioned above, even in countries like America where superior judges are unelected 
(which gives rise to greater independence) they are not fully free from public opinion 
because “the people elect the president and the president selects the justices with advice 
and consent of the senate.”7 *7 As a result of these direct and indirect influences of public 
opinion on sentencing, recent research shows that “shifting tides of public opinion can 
have important effects on supreme court decisions.
But how does public opinion participate in sentencing and the performance of 
penal practice in contemporary societies? Where is the spectacle? And in what way is 
public opinion involved in penal practice’s ceremonies, where privatization, 
bureaucratisation, and disciplinary measures in modem forms of punishment have 
replaced spectacles of punishment? Nowadays, in particular, there is no place for rituals 
like public execution and public torture. There is no direct access for the public into the 
sphere of penal practice. However, as was discussed in previous section, public opinion 
has different functions in different processes of criminal justices such as courtrooms, the 
process of sentencing and the declaration of punishment.
The processes of legislation and declarations of law are more than ever, accessible 
to the public. The “principle of publicity, in which the public text of the law (The Penal
3** Ibid
7*7 Ibid
3*3 Mishler 1996, p 169
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Code) was supplemented by the procedural publicity of trial,”3*"*can be seen as a sign of 
public involvement in the system of criminal justice. Criminal procedure and the process 
of sentencing in countries like the United Kingdom is “organized so as to minimise[the] 
dramatic p o t e n t i a l ” ^ * ^  o f  public opinion on the legislative process, and English lawyers 
and judges “resisted several efforts to render the law in the modem public form of a 
c o d e .”3 *5 However, this should be regarded as exceptional case among continental 
countries.
Moreover, “the courts have tended to become the forum where ‘justice is done’ to 
which public attention is directed,”3 although one should be aware that, this is not the 
general rule and every court and process of sentencing does not have the capacity to 
attract public attention. Remarkable cases, like murder trials which are “notable for the 
peculiarity of their facts, the character of the criminal, or the notoriety of the trial at the 
time it took place,”3*® have the capacity to generate public attention. But, public attention 
to “remarkable trials” can be considered as a symbol of public sensitivity. It seems that 
social issues, like crime and punishment, are capable of “generating levels of public 
passion and social consensus”3*9in all societies.
Consequently, current public opinion nowadays should be considered as a crucial 
factor in the detemiination of punishment. As Radzinowicz argues, once public
3*"* Farmer 2003 p. 150 
3*5 Ibid., p. 150
3*5 Ibid., p 151
3*7 Garland 1990a, p. 71 
3*® Farmer 2003 p. 164 
3*9 Warr 1995, p. 296
194
consciousness was “aroused it did not allow itself to be stifled.”^^** Elsewhere he cites 
from Buckle that in England “as soon as public opinion is formed, it can no longer be
withstood. ”33*
339 Radzinowicz 1948 p. 39
33* Ibid p.39 cited from Buckle 1908,p.503
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V Conclusion
My study in this chapter was an effort to fill the gaps in Durklieim’s theory of 
punishment. As mentioned above, Durkheim ignored significant aspects of modern penal 
culture. These are major trends, which have had a substantial influence on the institution 
of punishment in modem criminal justice. Punishment in modem societies is affected by 
a collection of political, technical and organizational factors. As we have seen in 
Weberian theory, principles of bureaucracy, scientific attitudes, professional groups, 
processes of rationality and calculable foiTns of social practices are essential components 
of westem culture and have had a great impact on punishment in developed countries.
Modem forms of social control, considerations of political expediency and 
disciplinary mechanisms of repression provided us with a new framework of analysing 
penalty. Foucault replaced social sentiments in Durkheim’s theory with the will to 
power. Punishment is explored by Foucault as a technology of docility and 
administration of life. Normalization, standardization and economy of subjection, which 
are analysed by Foucault, are also highly significant to understanding the nature of 
modem punishment. These technical, professional and managerial dimensions of modem 
penal culture are not examined by the Durkheimian structural and expressive account of 
society and punishment.
Moreover, Durldieim studied collective sentiments as the origin of punishment 
and saw coiTelation between the changing of these sentiments and the severity of 
punishment; but he viewed this phenomenon only at the macro level of society, ignoring
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the dynamism of individual sensibilities and emotions at the micro level, and the 
relationship of this phenomenon with alterations in punishment. However, Elias and 
Spierenburg have shown, new feelings of civilized individuals have led to major shifts in 
penal practice in modern societies, such that barbaric traditional forms of penalty have 
become totally impossible in these countries.
However, Foucault and Weber’s political and technical theories of society and 
penal practice can be seen as a new version of culture and religion in modern society. 
Combinations of sacred modem notions such as nationhood, human rights, human 
dignity, freedom, civilization, discipline, and order give rise to the construction of a civil 
and communal religion. These holy conceptions are deeply held and play a considerable 
role in criminalization and penal practice. Although Foucault and Weber have not 
developed their ideas on religion and society, they both acknowledged the significant role 
of traditional religion.
Despite the above arguments, Durklieim’s theory still has significant insights to 
offer. Cultural resonance coupled with psychic and emotional aspects of punishment - 
especially the role of sacred notions in general and religion in particular - in Durkheim’s 
theory of penal practice- are significant dimensions of punishment in modern society.
His theory expresses crucial dimensions of punishment in both traditional and modem 
societies. The essence of punishment for him has remained an automatic and emotional 
reaction against violation of common and sacred social sentiments. The modern analysts 
of penal practice have ignored these crucial religious and moral aspects of Durkheim’s
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theory of punishment in the modem world. The passionate reaction against violations of 
sacred social values are productively routinized and modified by professional institutions, 
but they have not changed the permanent essence of punishment. In the following two 
chapters I will examine two different case studies to test Durkheim’s cultural, expressive 
and religious theory of punishment. The alterations of punishment in America from 1970 
onwards and in Iran following the Islamic revolution in 1979 constitute the main themes 
of these chapters.
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Chapter IV: Harsh Punishment in America 
Introduction:
Severity of Punishment in USA
Criminal punishment in the U.S.A. has undergone profound changes over the last 
30 years. American penal policy is now in the midst of a national movement toward a 
uniformly severe approach to crime. Nowadays punishment in the United States is not 
comparable with its Western counterparts, instead is compared by critics like Whitman 
with Taliban Afghanistan or Nazi Germany\ The USA turned “sharply toward 
retributivism and permanent incapacitation of habitual offenders.”  ^The USA now has the 
highest rate of incarceration in the world, more than ten times that in Western Europe. 
Further, they have revived “old sorts of punishments, from chain gangs to public 
shaming,”  ^ accompanied by new sorts of punishment, from boot camps to electronic 
monitoring. The American system of criminal justice, therefore, has shown a systematic 
and fundamental movement toward increased harshness.
The last third of the twentieth century was “the age of the war on c r i m e . T h i s  
war occun-ed on various fi’onts and used many weapons. When the crime rate increased 
dramatically during last thirty years, the public put enormous pressure on politicians to do
Whitman 2003, p.4
3^
 Ibid
Ibid., p. 3 
 ^Dubber 2004, p. 50
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something. “A reaction set in (and) a wave of conservatism swept the country.”  ^ As a 
result of this pressure, the penal system underwent a backlash against a system perceived 
as what too lenient. Both parole and indeterminate sentences were abandoned in some 
states in 1977. The American system denied measures of individualization and thus 
shifted “its emphasis from offender to the offence.'''^ Criminal justice institutions like 
police and prison lost their discretionary, professional autonomy and were forced to 
follow state-imposed standards. Faith in rehabilitation collapsed and “during the1960s 
through the mid -  1980s, legislatures, judges and commentators abandoned the 
rehabilitative ideal of the criminal justice system.”  ^ Today, correctionalist programs “no 
longer claim to express the overarching ideology of the system, nor even to be the leading 
puipose of any penal measure.”  ^ The rehabilitative rationale was not only assumed to be 
non-efficient idea but also counter-productive.
In conti'ast to most of the twentieth century, in which policy makers mostly ti led 
to create alternatives to prison -through probation, fines and various kinds of community 
penalties - in the last thirty years this tendency has been reversed. Incarceration is no 
longer for the con ection of criminals, but instead, a way of maintaining the separation of 
offenders from society and for the suffering of criminals. The incapacitation of 
dangerous groups is now the main goal of incarceration. Following these new trends 
rates of imprisonment rose sharply and increased rapidly : “In the period from 1973 to
 ^Friedman 1993, p. 305 
 ^Ibid., p.305.306 
^Vitielio 1997, p. 397 
 ^ Ibid., p.8
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1997, the number of inmates incarcerated in the US rose by more than 500 percent.”^
The USA prison population now stands at two million'^ - the largest prison population in 
the world - in addition to “four million or so under various forms of non-carceral control, 
including parole and probation.”  ^^  This equates to more than six million, or three percent 
of the population under direct state control. These staggering figures are the outcome of 
various approaches to crime that became to penal policy. Commonly used tenus such as, 
“three strikes and you’ re out,” “truth in sentencing”, “zero tolerance policy,” “law and 
order model”, “war on drugs”, and “get tough approach” partly show the features of the 
new American appetite to punish.
American penal literature from around 1970 onwards can illustrate this approach. 
The general preventive effects of punishment came to occupy a central position in penal 
legislation, sentencing policy and in the field of criminology. It was believed that the 
idea of the ineffectiveness of punishment “in eliminating proscribed behaviour ... was 
wrong.” Deterrence was considered as the fundamental rule of human behaviour in 
society. Research demonsti ated that severity of punishment associated with certainty of 
punishment had a detenent effect upon rates of crime: “certainty and severity combine to 
jointly influence crime rates.”^^
 ^Garland 2001, p. 17
Beck and Kardery, March 2001 Bureau of Justice Statistic Bulletin, 
Dubber 2001 p.832 
Andersons 1975, p.338
Antunes George and A. Lee Hunt 1973, p. 486
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The new use of relatively fixed and fiiur punishment in American penal policy 
can also be attributed, in part, to the retributive (just desert) approach. According to this 
idea punishment should be unpleasant and criminals should serve their prison time as 
atonement for their crimes. In line with this belief, recent trends in American criminal 
justice have stressed the importance of longer sentences and obligatory sentencing. One 
of the primary changes in this area “has been the enactment of truth -  in sentencing; 
legislation.” '"^  This term implies a kind of stability, and predictability in penal process. 
This policy “requires offenders to seiwe a substantial portion of their sentence in prison, 
and which reduces the discrepancy between the sentence imposed and actual time served 
in prison.”'  ^ Since the enactment of truth-in-sentencing laws in early 1995, offenders 
have had to serve at least 85 percent of their prison sentence. This retributive approach 
was a movement against parole as a system that reduced the severity of punishment.
These examples are not disparate events in the American penal system; rather 
they are signs of new general and systematic trends that have overwhelmingly 
transformed the nature of American criminal law. Following the transformations in 
policies noted above, substantive and procedural criminal law has been made to be more 
compatible with new the circumstances. Once the state decided to defend communal 
interests, it tried to achieve this efficiently. “Crimes must be easily detected and easily 
proved, with minimal constraints.”'  ^This policy required, on the one hand, abandoning 
or reducing constiaining laws against searches and seizures, and on the other that
B. Wood Peter and Dunaway R. 2003, p. 139 
Ibid., p.140
Drik Dubber Markus 2003, p. 54
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substantive criminal law define crimes widely, and reduce the constituent elements of a 
crime. “The fewer elements there are, the fewer elements the prosecutor has to prove.”
The American Law institute’s Model Penal Code (MPC), completed in 1962,'^ 
abandoned the traditional distinction between attempted and consummated crimes.'^ It 
was this policy that “softened up these iron-clad principles (mens rea and actus reus) of 
criminal-law”^^  and paved the way for a tougher approach to crime. It gave the system a 
kind of flexibility with which to terminate the evil of crime. As a result the form and 
content of punishment broadly changed -  including more ‘’’moral offences,”^' , minors 
prosecuted as adults,disorderly conduct considered as a felony, the defence of insanity 
wae abolished in some states,, mercy and parole reduced or abolished, and mitigating 
factors like ignorance eliminated. As a result of this deep transformation in law 
enforcement, crime should be controlled through wider control: not only “every 
defendant is guilty but [ ...] every one is g u i l ty . I n d e e d  there is no place for the 
presumption of innocence. Everybody should be searched and then released. It is a fight
Ibid Ingredients o f this reversal movement can be seen as early as 1933, in the writings o f Francis 
Sayer. As he states, “what is badly needed is some form of administrative control which will prove quick, 
objective and comprehensive.... The line distinguishing offences which so and those which do not require 
mens rea in the absence of statutory direction depends upon (a) the character o f the offence, and (b) the 
nature of the penalty involved in its violation. In general, offences not requiring mens rea are the minor 
violations o f laws regulating the sale o f intoxicating liquor, impure or adulterated food, milk, drugs or 
narcotics, criminal nuisances, violations o f traffic or motor-vehicle regulations, or of general police 
regulations passed for the safety, health, or well-being o f the community and not in general involving moral 
delinquency. See: Francis Bows Sayre 1933, p.69 
Dubber 2003, p. 59
19 It is a conventional distinction in which ‘attempts had been punished considerably less severely than 
consummated crimes. Ibid, p. 19 
Dubber 2001, p.995 
Whitman 2003, p.3 
Ibid., p. 34 
Dubber 2001, p. 50
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“on behalf of the community of actual and potential victims against a community of 
actual and potential offenders.” "^'
Up until now, I have tried to show how the form and content of criminal justice 
system in the United States has changed through the use of “get tough” measures. There 
are, of course, still many supporters of a more humane system, who believe that criminals 
can be rehabilitated. However,
the predominant call (in American society) is for tougher laws, more and longer 
sentences, more and bigger prisons... Whenever voters got a chance to express 
themselves, they almost invariably cast ballots for law and order, toughness, 
stringency not for due process or reform.^^
The major question, however, is why the American penal system has undergone 
such deep transfoimations towards a populist and punitive approach. Are these the 
effects of a failed rehabilitation system? Are they the result of sharply increasing crime 
rates particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, which led to public questioning of the state’s 
ability to control crime? Which theory can best explain these new trends in the criminal 
justice system? Could they be analyzed in the light of a Foucauldian technical and 
strategic approach to penal practice? What is the relationship between a Weberian 
bureaucratic, scientific and institutionalized framework and cuiTent penal policy in the 
USA? Are these the only possible analyses of modern trends of current penal practice in
Ibid
Friedman 1993, p. 452
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America? How these transformations can be explained in the light of Garland’s theory 
of The Culture o f Controll Can one resort to a Durkheimian structuralist view, looking at 
penal practice as an index of social values?
As we will see, there has been a growing movement in the USA toward religion 
and other traditional values during the last thirty years. There is a correlation between this 
transformation in social values in American society and the return of old foims of 
punishment, as well as the development of new forms of harsh and strict penal practice. 
Notwithstanding conventional analyses of penal practice, it seems that the role of 
powerful cultural forces like religion has been overlooked in sociological understandings 
of punishment in modem American. I attempt to address this gap through considering 
other possible explanations of this systematic and fundamental movement towards harsh 
punishment.
ÎA
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I High crime rate and harsh punishment
Increasing crime rates during the past fifty years have been a very visible social 
fact in American society. Over this period, violent crime, street crime and drug abuse 
became commonplace features of social experience. In New York City, for example, "in 
1974, there were 519,825 complaints of serious crime, or about one complaint for every 
sixteen persons in the city.”^^  At the same time, robberies, aggravated assaults, rapes and 
non-negligent homicides significantly increased. “From 1968 to 1974, the rate of non- 
negligent homicide increased 67%, forcible rape 122%, robbery 43% and aggravated 
assault 44%.”^^  The recorded crime rates “by the early 1990s, despite some levelling off, 
were as much as ten times those of forty years before.”^^  Therefore, crime and threats of 
crime became a prominent fact of everyday life, and the management of crime became a 
key concern of society.
The fact that high rates of crime became part of everyday life in post war USA 
may seem toexplain harsh justice in America. “The ups and downs of punishment rates 
are seen as the result of varying rates of crime in different places and different t i m e s . I t  
is argued that penal policy simply reflects the quality and quantity of crime, and that there 
is a correlation between high crime rates and severe penal policy. Conversely, it is 
claimed that harsh punishment has an impact on crime rates, or is assumed that high rates 
of crime increase fear of crime in society, and this give rise to harsh justice. Increased
Fishman 1977, p. 283 
Ibid
Garland 2001, p. 106 
Savelsberg 1994, p. 915
206
imprisonment is considered as “an almost mechanistic consequence”^^  of high rates of 
crime. There is no doubt that high crime rates directly or indirectly influence penal 
policy and can make it more severe. For instance, some investigations and data on 
official rates of violent crime showed “a strong, positive, non-linear relation between 
public support for capital punishment and crime rates across regions of the U.S.” '^
It is not implausible to hypothesize that increased victimization would anger 
frightened citizens and amplify demands for harsher policies. The empirical evidence, 
however, does not lend weight to this hypothesis. Social facts do not support a positive 
con elation between crime rates and the quantity and severity of punishment.
Decline in punishment while crime rises during the 1960s (in USA) and a rapid 
increase in punishment beginning in the 1970s when crime rates had just begun to 
stabilize can hardly be interpreted as direct causal relation.
Equally, crime rates and fear of crime are distinctive phenomena that, 
notwithstanding their relation, can be studied independently - which Incidentally would 
reinforce a Durkheimian analysis of simultaneously increasing social anxiety and 
harshness of punishment. This means that fear of crime as an independent social factor 
could bring about a harsh punishment regardless of crime rate. In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s in the United States police research studies showed that “some measures
Tonry 1995, p. 168 
Ranking 1979, p. 194 
Savelsberg 1994, p. 926
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might fail to reduce actual crime rates but nevertheless succeed in reducing the reported 
levels of fear and insecurity.”^^  Such fear may be brought about by false information that 
can be removed by virtue of true information. In the 1970s people were seriously worried 
about rising crime and believed the problem to be getting worse -  despite the fact that 
“recorded and actual rates (were) stable or declining.” "^'
Sometimes it has been tried to show a positive relation between harsh punishment 
and rates of violent crime. This claim is supported by FBI data on violent crime rates, 
which found that, “a rather strong, positive, nonlinear relation between support for capital 
punishment and violent crime rate was re v e a le d .T h e re  are, however, a number of 
arguments which may discredit this conclusion. Firstly, this investigation only showed 
the relation of violent crime rate to public attitudes toward punishment, rather than the 
relationship between high crime rates and the harshness of punishment in general. 
Secondly, increasing public support for the death penalty did not begin for three years 
after the “relatively large increase in the official violent crime rate (FBI).”^^  Thirdly, as 
this inquiry showed, changing attitudes toward punishment are often a reflection of 
media’s coverage of violent crimes, and violent crime itself.
As will be discussed below, fear of crime is considered to be a crucial factor in 
the relationship between crime rates and harsh penal practice, but there is not necessarily 
a direct relationship between violent crime, fear of crime and the punitive approach in
Garland 2001, p. 122 
Ibid., p. 107 
Ranking 1979, p. 207 
Ibid
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American criminal justice. For example, although the violent crime rate and Americans’ 
fear of crime have remained essentially stable since the early 1970s, “recent years have 
seen rising public support for punishment of crim inals.M oreover, rising crime rates 
were also experienced in continental countries yet this did not produced the same effects. 
The rising crime rate can logically support the punitive approach in the United States, 
“but cannot by itself explain it.”^^  Thus, high crime rates can support the hardening of 
penal policy, but a positive causal relation between high crime rates and hard penal 
policy cannot be demonstrated.
Therefore, there may be other forces at work that brought about these changes. 
Even if one considers a high crime rate as an important factor in the shift in the American 
justice system, we must still trace other technical, organizational, social, political and 
cultural factors that may have shaped how penal policy should respond to the new 
conditions.
Shaw, Shapiro, Lock and Jacobs. 1998, p. 405 
^^Savelsberg 1994, p. 539
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II Foucauldian technical approach and American penal policy
As we saw in the previous chapter, Foucault saw penal policy as a strategy of 
social control. He considered power as something autonomous and beyond social values, 
that predicts, calculates, and purposively determines all techniques of social control. He 
analyzed punishment in light of the sociology of dominance and control. He investigates 
a power strategy, its programs, and combination of material practices that seiwe those 
predeteimined strategies. These strategies are applied to a passive society to make it 
disciplined and productive. Manifestations of punishment as an instrument of power are 
visible in the United States penal policies.
The administration of the American prison system had great effect on his theory 
of the prison, because “American prison is the only prison that Foucault ever visited.
As he observed, the great carceral system is well developed throughout the American 
criminal justice system. Rehabilitative treatments, disciplinary programs, sophisticated 
devices of surveillance in prisons, a developed probation system, electronic monitoring 
and so on are representations of a Foucauldian view of penal practice. These are the 
disciplinary techniques of comprehensive strategies of power.
A quasi- Foucauldian and Weberian explanation for new penal policy called 
'actuarial justice, ‘ captured some aspects of the changes in law enforcement in the 
United States. Actuarial justice is a set of specific technologies that target dangerous 
gi'oups to manage their likely risks. Incapacitation, preventive detention, and profiling
Ibid., p. 126. French prisons do not (or at least did not) accept visitors
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are considered by Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon as key elements of this new 
pohcy/°
The target of this strategy is population and the prevention or minimisation of 
risk. Crime is considered as a normal fact of modem life. It is seen as a typical risk to be 
calculated, predicted and avoided. From this point of view, penal policy pushed away 
from rehabilitation, retribution and even deterrence to a concern “with prevention, harm- 
reduction and risk management.”"" Data of risk assessment, indicators “such as 
residency, marital status, employment status, criminal record, education and the like can 
also be systematically included in developing profiles of dangerousness.P rison , 
probation and parole, in the actuarial justice thesis, are justified in light of their respective 
degree of reduction of dangerousness. From this perspective, dealing with the 
‘underelass’ through violating traditional principles of equality can be justified “ by a 
powerful new social logic, risk management.”"'^  The study of actuarial justice can be 
considered as a new dimension of crime control in modem society. This new pattem of 
dealing with crime, and criminals, potential and actual, has its own logic, language and 
technology, and brought about a new style of crime control in modem penal culture.
However, the rejection of individualization and rehabilitative programs, and the 
continuation of traditional, populist penal policies, the performance of capital 
punishment, and the expiatory character of prison can hardly be justified according to a
Feeley and Simon 1994, pp. 174-177 
"" Garland 2001, P. 171
Feely and Simon 1994, p. 179 
Ibid., p. 193
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Foucauldian framework. As Simon and Feeley argue, “This reform movement responded 
to precisely the features of disciplinary punishment that Discipline and Punish identified: 
the intrusive demands to penetrate in to the subjectivity of the offender; the legal power 
given to experts to individualize sentences; deceptive denial of the punitive elements 
remaining in penal practice.”"'"' The unprecedented expansion of prisons replaced the idea 
of prison as correctional project. The disciplinary policy of standardization and 
noiTnalization of criminals “has been replaced by a mission of providing long-tenn 
warehousing of population with little place in the economy.”"'^
Foucault argued that the birth of the prison and new ways of punishment were 
reflected of a new conception of man and social discipline. For him, in the prison as in 
hospitals, schools and military organizations, “discipline” was established to produce a 
citizen that was docile, “hardworking, regular in his habits, productive, pious, and above 
all self-regulating.”""^ This analysis is not fully in harmony with America’s policy of mass 
imprisonment, which aims at incapacitation, detemence, and the separation of criminals 
from society. The strict regime of prison in the USA, denying prisoners’ access to higher 
education in some states,^^ the shame and stigma attached to the prisoner show that 
prison is more a socially punitive reaction than an institution of disciplinary docility. 
Rebellion and disorder in prisons, and the presence of recidivists who have previously 
served their punishment in prison further contradict Foucault’s theory of prison as a 
disciplinary and productive institution.
"'"' Simon 1996, P. 318 
"'^  Ibid
White Hayden 1976 p. 318 
"'^  Page Joshua 2004, p. 373
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I ll  Garland’s Culture of Control’
One of the most influential explanation of these dramatic developments in US 
criminal justice over the last thirty years is David Garland’s The Culture o f Control. It is 
important to consider this not only for the arguments about the US, but because he locates 
his theoretical explanation of the change in an account of a changing penal culture. Like 
Punishment and Modern Society this work is a theory of social and penal changes, of how 
cultural, social and economic forces “have reshaped criminological thought, government 
crime policy, and the attitudes of penal culture.”"'^  As he has said, this book builds upon 
his earlier work in Punishment and Welfare, which describes the rise of a welfarist fonn 
of criminal justice at the start of twentieth century, and Punishment and Modern Society, 
which developed a social theory of punishment that stressed the cultural as well as the 
political element of penal institutions."'^ It is also important to consider the weight that he 
accords to religious beliefs and institutions-the main theme of my argument- in his 
examination of changing penal practices in the US.
There is no doubt that The Culture o f Control “is to date the best and boldest 
analysis of the dramatic developments in the criminal process in the United States during 
past quarter century.” "^ The aim of Garland’s book is to analyse the “movement from the 
penal welfarism which characterised most of the twentieth century with its emphasis on 
rehabilitation, conectionalism and refoim, to what he terms the ‘crime control complex’,
Garland David 2001,p.x 
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the culture of conti'ol which has emerged in the last 30 y e a r s . A s  he states, it is about 
the spectacular developments that have taken place in our social “response to crime 
during the last thirty years and about the social, cultural and political forces that gave rise 
to them.”^^  His starting point is that a new form of dealing with criminal activities has 
emerged which involves a set of strategies and practices which are characteristically 
“different from the penal welfare and correctionalist crime control policies which were 
associated with modemity.”^^  The practices that were centred around the reform of 
individuals through treatment programmes and the reformation of offenders through 
application of various scientific techniques, came under increasing critical scrutiny and 
lost their cultural and political support. He suggests that over the past thirty years in the 
USA, there has been a revolution in the values that have motivated private and public 
actors in the area of criminal justice. The growth of crime and the increase in public 
concern and fear of crime, accompanied with economic, social, political and cultural 
changes, brought about a new and complex system of crime control in the United States.
The important question for him, however, is how one can explain these changes and 
the forms that they have taken. His argument is that current crime control policies in the 
U.S are formed by two fundamental social forces: “the distinctive social organisation of 
the late modernity, and the free market, socially conseiwative politics that came to 
dominate the USA .... in the 1980s.” "^' The focus of the book is on these social forces, 
and the author presents an account of how these cultural forms provoked and informed
Young Jock, 2002 p. 228 
Garland David 2001,p.vii 
Matthews Roger 2001,p.217 
Garland David, 2001,p.x
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the development of crime contiol and criminal justice policy. He attempts to demonstrate 
“how the experience of crime is densely woven into the fabric of collective mentalities 
and sensibilities, reaching far beyond the issue of crime itself.”^^  ‘Fear of crime’ is a 
major public i s su e , an d  social institutions, public and private, have purposively planned 
to deal with this new collective experience of crime. For Garland, fear of crime has 
become of new salience since the 1970s. It has come to be regarded as “a problem in and 
of itself, quite distinct from actual crime and victimization.”^^  According to Garland, 
public opinion research has confirmed the emergence of fear of crime- a generalized 
sense of insecurity, anger, resentment correlating with patterns of risk and victimization. 
There is a general sense on the part of a large majority of the public in the United States 
that crime has increasingly become worse and “there is little public confidence in the 
ability of the criminal justice system to do something about this.”^^
Along with this argument he discusses the relationships between fear of crime, 
mass media and politics. As a result of mass circulation newspapers as a central 
institution of modern life and in particular the television revolution, local or limited 
significant problems such as racism, sexism, child abuse come to be perceived as 
everyone’s problem. “Fears and resentments that are such a feature of life in high crime 
societies find a cultural outlet and expression on the TV s c r e e n . O v e r  the last quarter 
of the twentieth century high crime rates, movements for victims support, public fear of 
crime, lack of confidence in the criminal justice system and in the state’s capacity of
Ibid. 686
O’Malley Pat 2002, p.260 
Garland David 2001 p. 10 
Ibid
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contiol crime, a perceived lack of security and the role that media played in 
intensification of these conditions, all had significant implications for state authorities 
and penal policy. The transformations in media “have helped create a greater level of 
transparency and accountability in our social and governmental institutions.”'’'' The rise 
of mass media, “the universalizing of democratic claims, and what Edward Shils called 
the politics of ‘mass society’ put in place new laws and forms of accountability with 
regard to criminal justice authorities.”^' In the 1990s “the pattern was for high visibility 
crime cases to become the focus of a great deal of media attention and public outrage, 
issuing in urgent demands the something be done.”^^  He is not saying that the media has 
created fear of crime or popular punitiveness as a strong political current, but his point is 
rather “that the mass media has tapped into, then dramatized, and reinforced, a new 
public experience... and in doing so it has institutionalized that exper ience.Publ ic  
opinion about criminal justice is founded on these collective representations rather than 
correct infonnation.
Politicians had their own concerns and this social context was considered as a 
golden opportunity for America’s political actors, because politicians need issues that 
have a relatively broad appeal. The aggravation of critical sentiments through the mass 
media and electoral competition urged them to react. For politicians in democratic 
countr ies like America acting in the context of electoral competition, “policy choices are 
heavily determined by the need to find popular and effective measures that will not be
Ibid. p.86 
Ibidp.146 
Ibid p.92 
Ibid, p. 173 
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viewed as signs of weakness or abandonment of the state’s responsibility to the public.” "^' 
In such conditions political actors are concerned more with the anxiety and outrage 
provoked by crime and intensified by mass media. Television’s coverage of factual or 
unrealistic crime dramas pushes politicians “to respond to crime as and emotional, human 
drama and prompt [them] to think of criminals as more numerous, more threatening, and 
more dangerous than they typically are.”^^
As a result of this new situation, the relationship between politicians, the public 
and penal experts has clearly been transformed into one “in which politicians are more 
directive, penal experts are less influential, and public opinion becomes a key reference 
point for evaluating options. Criminal justice is now more vulnerable to shifts of public 
mood and political r e ac t i on . Nowadays  current legislators are highly concerned with 
public attitudes and sentiments about punishment and control. In the process of penal 
policy making there are fewer intervening obstacles between the political process of 
legislation and allocation of punishment and “public demands for greater punishments are 
now more easily and instantly translated into increased sentences and longer jail s.
Similar conditions can also be identified in the process of sentencing.
For Garland, however, these transformations are best explained in Foucauldian 
terms.^^ His theory in The Culture o f  Control “is a genealogical account that aims to
Garland 2001, p. I l l  
“  Ibid. p. 158 
Ibid, p. 172 
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Garland David 2001 p.l61
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trace the forces that gave birth to our present-day practices and to identify the historical 
and social conditions upon which they still depend.”'’'' He develops, “a social and 
historical nanative designed to map the social conditions of existence which underlie 
contemporary crime control.” "^ The book thus inti'oduces a complex and theoretically 
informed account of how particular social policies came into being.
Garland analyses these changes in criminal justice policy according to a 
Foucauldian framework of social control. He contends that it is accurate to attribute 
“authorship of these ways of thinking and acting to the countless unnamed managers and 
staff, whose job it has been to come up with practical solutions to counter the problem of 
crime as it affects their particular enterprise.”^' For him private and governmental 
approaches have to be seen as a disorganized, diffuse field of methods and crime control 
techniques “composed of a multitude of small -scale i n ve n t i o n s , a s  recipes and 
problem-solving activities which have “come to be taken up and developed by 
criminological experts.
Given the perception of high crime rate as a noimal fact of life, accompanied by the 
institutionalized fear mentioned above, the new limits of the criminal justice are set by 
public mistrust, the belief that “nothing works” The limitations of the criminal justice 
system suggest, in Garland’s view, the erosion of the “myth” of sovereign state and its 
ability to deliver law and order and control crime within its tenitory: “The political
Garland David 2001. p.2 
™ Matthews Roger 2002, p. 218 
Garland David 2001 p .161 
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sector and policy world face a predicament to which its agents feel compelled to 
respond.” '^ "' Garland recognizes two contradictory and co-existent^^ reactions to this 
social crisis, which he terms adaptive and non-adaptive responses. The adaptive 
responses include series of strategies that are characterized by a sophisticated level of 
administrative rationality and creativity. He describes six main sorts of adaptation, 
including “ the rationalization of justice; the commercialization of justice; defining 
deviance down; redefining success; concentrating on consequences; and redistiibuting the 
responsibility.” *^’ Then, as will be discussed below, he sketches out the new ways of 
criminological thinking that associated and facilitated them. “The agencies involved 
have, over time, recognized the predicament they face, and respond to its challenges by 
revising their practices, renegotiating their external relationships, and building new 
institutions.” '^^
In the second fonn of (non-adaptive) response, the political machine has repeatedly
engaged in a form of denial and avoidance. From the 1980s to the 1990s, policy 
making in the area of criminal justice become more politicised and subject to 
greater public, press and electoral procedures. This new form of reaction is 
described by Garland as impulsive, unreflective action which avoids realistic 
recognition of foundational problems. “Policymaking becomes a form of acting 
out that downplays the complexities and long-term character of effective crime
Ibid
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control in favour of the immediate gratification of more expressive alternatives.”^^  
Non- adaptive or denial responses preferred by politicians are embodied in ideas 
like “prison works”, and strategies such as three strikes, chain gangs, Megan’s 
law and other similar punitive reactions. These are described by Garland as 
emotional and irrational aspects of penal practice in modem American society, 
because they are more political and emotionally determined patterns of penal 
policy than those managed by professional considerations. Governmental research 
regularly investigates the character and level of social anxieties, “categorising and 
measuring the emotional reactions prompted by crime,”'"" in order to determine 
patterns of penal policies.
Garland goes on to describe two contradictory criminologies -  as more theoretical 
responses to the perceived situation -both considered as reactions to the failures of penal 
modernism. These are the ‘criminology of everyday life’ and the criminology of the 
‘other’. The correctional criminologies associated with penal modernism aimed to change 
the values and attitudes of criminals and bring deviants back into the social order through 
moral education and correctional practices that transfoimed their values and behaviour. 
Criminologies of everyday life, however, approach social order as a problem of system 
integration. Instead of the moral integration of human beings into society, the new 
approach aims to redesign social systems and institutions in such way as to give rise to 
fewer opportunities for offenders. This new criminology considers how social systems 
such as the transport system, shops, schools, housing and so on should operate so as to
Ibid, p. 134 
ibid p. 10
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create fewer security weaknesses. This is a kind of technological approach to the issue of 
social order rather than seeing it as based on shared moral values.
The ‘criminology of the other’, by contrast, views criminal activities in the 
language of warfare and social defence. This is “a criminological echo of the culture of 
wars and neo-conseiwative politics According to this perspective, the problem with 
modern society and the penal modernism that it has created “is that they suffered a failure 
of moral nerve. This criminology is intentionally anti-modem in its themes, and based 
on absolute moral standards and the assertion of traditional values. According to the 
ideals of this criminology, criminals are considered as wicked, evil, dangerous enemies 
and so opaquely monstrous that we must be ready “to condemn more and to understand 
less.”^^
This criminology has “reinstated an older, metaphysical conception that depicts the 
offender as evil-doer, and the criminal act as unconditioned evil cho i ce . Ga r l and  
describes this perspective as anti-modem, in which “social order necessitates social 
consensus, but it is consensus of a pre-modem, mechanical kind, based upon a shared set 
of values not a pluralism of tolerated differences.” "^' Those “who do not or cannot fit in 
must be excommunicated and forcibly expel l ed .He concludes that although the 
characteristics of these two new criminologies are different “they share a focus upon
ibid, p. 184 
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.
.'f-c o n t r o l ,viewing, crime as normal social fact, and a reaction against the criminologies 
of penal welfarism.
'I
He accepts that “there are unmistakable resonances here of Emile Durkheim’s 
account of the repressive, mechanical solidarity of pre modem society. However, as I |
will argue below, he is not ready to develop this Durklieimian perspective and analyse
,/
new transfonnations in American penal policy accordingly. He is not even ready to 
explicitly bring Durkheim’s theory into account and discuss it in the main pages of the 
work, as the similarity between criminology of the ‘other’ and Durkheim’s account is 
indicated only in the endnotes of his book. I would suggest that he has not accorded 
sufficient weight to Durkheimian approach in this respect, and has mainly relied on a 
Foucauldian framework in analysing new changes in American penal policies. This has 
meant that he has not gone on to ask why and how society and politicians have resorted 
to morality, traditional values and religion, and the impacts of this new trend in the penal 
sphere.
I hope to show in this chapter that what I have discussed generally in light of 
Durldieim’s theory of relationship between religion, society, social solidarity and religion 
can also be true in the particular case of the harsh punishment in the United States. 
Society has resorted to stronger sacred moral principles as a new foundation of social 
solidarity because it was perceived that social integration was threatened. I will argue
Ibid, p. 185
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222
below that how this argument is close to what Garland sees in the criminology of the 
other.
Notwithstanding the apparent similarity between Garland’s description of the 
criminology of other and the older, solidaristic, approach in Durkheim’s account of 
punishment and social solidarity, Garland has developed a different perspective. He 
explains the criminology of the other in teims of exclusion, denial, and avoidance . This 
aspect of penal practice not only has nothing to do with social integration but is also seen 
as an antisolidaristic approach. Garland has explained in more detail that exclusion of 
criminals is, at least partly, a consequences of social demands to do something in 
response to crime. They should be expelled because of their anti-social behaviour. But 
he has ignored another, and more important, dimension of this penal policy. This 
response which is embodied in ideas like ‘prison works’ and policies like ‘three strikes’ 
can be considered as simultaneously exclusive and inclusive. He focuses on first aspect 
and ignores the latter. He explains that according to this perspective those who do not or 
cannot fit in must be excluded, but he has not considered the fate of law-abiding citizens. 
This penal approach excludes a small group of people as criminals but on the other hand 
has strengthened a social integration that can include the rest of society. Unlike 
Durkheim he has not addressed how this exclusive approach to criminals could give rise 
to greater integration amongst other members of society.
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Although Garland frequently argues that we have moved away from solidaristic 
policies of welfare state^^ he does not address the question of whether an alternative 
solidarity based on new morality is emerging. In a Durkheimian framework in such a 
situation society seeks for new foundation of social integration without which society 
does not exist. For Durkheim sacred moral values and religion function as symbol of 
society’s solidarity. The re-emergence of new solidarity based on higher sacred values 
and religion is a crucial theme of the present study and can play crucial role in 
influencing the severity of penal practice in modem society.
This can be illustrated by considering how changes in penal policy have been 
accompanied by a rethinking of citizenship and the nature of civic responsibility. All 
citizens are simultaneously considered as owners of the rights and as the subjects of 
responsibilities. The relationship between government and citizen is being rethought in 
terms of “a new contract between the citizen and government, based on responsibilities 
and r i g h t s . T h i s  is inclusive in the sense that it sees that a strong and cohesive society 
can be built “where rights are matched by responsibilities.”^^  The problem is that those 
who commit crimes are seen as not fulfilling their obligations and cannot be seen as full 
citizens until they accept their responsibilities. It is not that they are excluded 
permanently. The fulfilment of the citizen’s obligation builds social cohesion. In civil 
society all individuals should accept responsibilities for the results of their behaviours.
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The common element in all crimes is that it causes fear and “that can so often limit 
people’s lives, making them feel afraid of going out or even afraid in their own homes. 
Freedom from the fear of crime is then seen as a crucial citizenship right. Respecting 
other’s feelings and rights and not frustTating their life “by causing them to fear crime is 
one aspect of helping them to realize their full p o t e n t i a l . T h e r e  are no rights without 
responsibility. Thus, those who break law should be excluded from society. According 
to this explanation punishment is not only an exclusive approach rather it excludes 
criminals from society to create a more cohesive society. These principles of rights and 
responsibilities can be seen as another account of new kind of morality or new civic 
religion that can give rise to social integration in the new situation of modern society.
For me Garland has endeavoured to explain a deep and structural problem of social 
disintegiation mainly through an analysis of technical apparatuses of crime control 
technologies. Fie has approached social disorder in the U.S as a problem of system 
disintegration, not social disintegration. It seems that in Garland’s problem- solving 
methodology a paitly Durkheimian problem is primarily attempted to be solved 
according to a Foucauldian and Weberian framework of social control. Fie is not 
interested in analysing the harshening of penal practice in American current society in the 
light of religion as a cultural factor and in relation to religious values as new foundation 
of social integration.
Home Office 2003, p,13 cited by. Ibid 
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The materials and sources that are provided by Garland himself can also be 
analysed in the light of Durkheim’s theory of religion, society, social solidarity and 
punishment but Garland has not sought a systematic and structural connection between 
these phenomena. Garland’s description of social crises in American society, explicitly 
and implicitly show how social integration has been perceived as seriously threatened. 
As he argues, neo-liberal politics, market fundamentalism and absolute faith in value of 
competition and enterprise, brought about greater social inequalities. “The result was a 
widening of inequalities and a skewed structure of incentives that encouraged the rich to 
work by making them richer and compelled the poor to work by making them poorer.”^^  
For Garland, the ending of solidaristic politics, the opening of class and race divisions, 
widespread insecurities, threats of crime and violence, group hostility, multiculturalism, 
individuals rights, and so on give rise to a more divided society. As he states “a central 
outcome of politics of the 1980s was thus a hardening of social divisions.”^^  As a result 
of the decline of the welfare state and of the solidaristic ideas of the Great Society a 
deeply divided society emerged,
“with one sector being deregulated in the name of market enteiprise, the other 
being disciplined in the name of traditional morality. These new divisions worked 
to further imdeimine the old solidarities and collective identities upon which the 
welfare state had depended.”^^
Garland David 2001 p.99 
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He has seen that in late modem America there was a “ wave of anxiety about the 
breakdown of family... and the collapse of informal norms of restraint. It has been 
pointed out that Garland at times sound like “a modern-day Jeremiah, lamenting the 
excesses of individualistic culture, longing for a return to a more communitarian spirit 
and warning of the harsh consequences of continuing social disintegration.”^^  For him, as 
a result of the pluralism of late modernity, living with difference had become the 
unavoidable fate of everyone. He contends that complex societies such as America 
require more organization, that markets can manage economic activities but that “they do 
little to bring about moral constraint, social integration, or a sense of group belonging.”^^  
Going further, neo-liberal policies have reinforced the social stratification and worked to 
further undermine the old solidarities and collective identities and “the possibilities of 
interclass identification of mutual sympathy across income divides, of a shares 
citizenship and mutual regard these became increasingly unlikely.
As a result of these transformations, for Garland, an increase in social problems 
such as violent crime, street crime and drug abuse is not surprising. But for him these 
social problems have “eventually produced a renewed obsession with control.”*®*^ For 
Garland, then, “the underlying problem of order was viewed not as a Durkheimian 
problem of solidarity but as a Hobbesian problem of order.” The diversities and 
multiculturalism give rise to the emergence of behaviours and people that are hardly
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tolerable. The response to this is that “new and more coercive policies of social and 
penal control increasingly targeted these [behaviours and p e o p l e ] . T h e s e  
transformations and “changes in the structure of the family, with increasing female labour 
force participation, divorce rates”, a n d  moral individualism present American society 
with a serious challenge. “These changes contributed to sharply increasing crime 
rates".
Garland’s description of American society as a divided society and Friedman’s^ ^^  
account of that society as a country of immigrants, a country of rolling stones, 
exaggerative individualism and so on, suggests that the moral foundations of society had 
been shaken and social solidarity has been seriously threatened. But as I discussed in 
chapter one, according to Durkheim’s theory of society and religion, society could 
respond collectively and resort to religion as a series of sacred moral principles to 
function as a base of social integration. A great deal of crime can be seen as an obvious 
sign of a demoralized society, a modem anomie in which social and moral norms are 
dishonoured. In such a situation according to Durkheim, religion can be functional in 
strengthening moral principles and social solidarity. This is a point that has been 
perceived by some political commentators as well. For example, Jim Wallis has argued; 
“the violence we see in our society today may be for us a wake-up call. Violence is 
not the problem, violence is a consequence of the problem. We need to understand 
that violence is not just caused by poverty, it is caused by a profound lack of
Ibid
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hope... So our politics must be rooted in spiritual values, and it must begin to move 
beyond the labels of conservative and liberal.
Because of his Foucauldian focus, it is arguable that Garland does not give proper 
weight to the arguments of the American religious right as a solution to the problems of 
social disintegration, high crime rates and rising violent crime. It is these commentators 
and politicians who have articulated most clearly a “striking anti-modem movement and 
serious concem for the themes of tradition”
Garland partly attends to Durkheim’s theory of anomie and solidarity but only 
selectively indicates those parts of Durkheim’s theory which support his idea of more 
private and public organization as a resolution against rising crime rate, common sense of 
insecurity, and requirements of crime control policy. For example he states that in 
Professional Ethic and Civic Morals^^^ Durklieim “long ago pointed out, social 
arrangements of this kind pose acute problems of social order and call for the creation of 
govemmental institutions and civic associations that can build social solidarity and 
ensure moral regulation.” But, as a general criticism of Garland’s work, I would say 
that he has not fully considered the most developed part of Durldieim’s theory of society 
in Elementary Forms o f Religious Life. While, for Durkheim himself this is the most 
developed part of his theory that all other works should be understood accordingly. For
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me without considering this major work of Durkheim his theory cannot comprehensively 
be understood.
Garland is aware of “the demand to get back to basics”  ^ to restore traditional 
values such as “family values,”  ^ the demand of ending” liberation licence in art and 
culture”  ^ and condemnation of the immoralities such as “the new sexual morality”  ^ “a 
strikingly anti modern concern for themes of tradition”  ^ and increasing movement of 
“American religious right”^^ ,^ but he has not systematically addressed these themes in 
relation to religion and harsh penal policy in U.S. He witnessed “the conservative call for 
a return to moral discipline and traditional values,”^ h e  accepted that these movements 
“did result in a renewed discipline and a tightening of control.”’ But for him these 
approaches mainly affected poor individuals and marginalized communities. As will be 
discussed below the powerful present of religious ideas a cultural phenomenon, religious 
groups and their involvement in political area and policy making in American society, 
return of this society to traditional and religious values as a new base of social 
integration and generally the role of religion in new changes in American penal policy 
have not attmcted Garland’s attention.
The present study attempts to argue that additional variables such as religion should 
be considered. “Understanding America without understanding religion would be like
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looking at Switzerland without the Alps.””  ^ As Kai Eriksson has argued, puritan beliefs 
“have influenced practices of punishment throughout American history.””  ^ As 
Savelsberg contended the “current religious movements in the United States, especially 
among fundamentalist and evangelical christens, so represent attitudes toward 
punishment that closely resemble those of puritan believers.” Public opinion 
researches have shown that these groups of Christians believe strongly
“in the innately bad character of offenders, in eternal condemnation, and in the 
justification of retribution [they more likely support] capital punishment, harsher 
courts, tougher laws, corporal punishment of children, and determinate 
punishment.” ’^ ’
I do not claim that Evangelical movements make modem American criminal law, 
but these perspectives can be traced in the new culture of control. “Jacobs and 
Carmichael found a clear association between the strength of evangelical Christian group 
across U.S. and the intensity of punitive policies in these s t a t e s . S a v e l s b e r g  concludes 
that, “we thus identify close parallels between early puritan deployment patterns, cunent 
belief systems of conservative protestants, and recent innovations in (American) criminal 
j u s t i c e . A s  a result, religion whether as a cultural factor or foundational element
Guinness Os, 1994
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should be part of every comprehensive investigation of relationship between society and 
punishment.
232
IV Political institutions, Bureaucratic organization and 
punishment
As I tried to show in my discussion of Weber, particular features of a developed 
bureaucracy lead to a dehumanised criminal justice system. The more perfect the 
bureaucracy, the greater the success in eliminating emotional and irrational elements 
from official business. Bureaucracy is a powerful obstacle in the trend toward populist 
penal policy. Bureaucrats act based on their professional and expert considerations, not 
political credibility or public support. The media in countries, like that of the USA, 
frequently and honibly report on crime yet European politicians have less opportunity to 
manipulate the fear of crime as the European state apparatus remains relatively 
“autonomous, largely steered by bureaucracies that are far more insulated from 
democratic pressures than are American bureaucracies.”’^ '’
In this context bureaucracy faces two principal pressures: that imposed from 
inside, by experts, for more effective methods, and that from outside, through 
considerations of budgets and resource. The heavily bureaucratic systems of Germany 
and France, for instance, largely immunise criminal justice against public instincts and 
pressures. In both countries, the tension between democratic demands and bureaucratic 
control result in situation whereby, “bureaucrats have succeeded in keeping control of the 
punishment process.” If Americans punish more harshly it is because the 
administration of penal practice in this country is more given over to democratic politics.
Whitman 2003, p. 199 
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The death penalty is an illustrative example. “There is always majority 
opposition to abolition of death penalty in every country. American is not distinctive in 
this,” '^’’ but what makes America distinct is that there is an easier translation of collective 
sentiment to punishment. “There is, in fact, an intimate nexus between the politics of 
mass mobilization, unchecked by bureaucracy, and the making of harshness in criminal 
punishment. Equally, the impact of mass media on public policy varies considerably 
across various countries, at least partly because of this reason.
The position of administrative institutions in power relations and power 
distribution, however, is not as simple as suggested above, as the role of bureaucracy in 
America’s multi-layered government is more complicated than in other industrial 
countries. A federal version of the state, the complexity of multi-level governance, 
policies, and multiple divisions among institutions, makes investigation of this area 
complicated. Here I can look at this question in very general terms.
Political leaders in America have recently tried to strengthen their control over 
institutions that work in the public service. They have tried to reduce the role of 
administrative institutions through various tactics. The Government Performance Result 
Act, for example, “is to a great extent, an instrument for politicians (especially congress) 
to assert their control over public policy and administration.”’^  ^ Also, other agencies like
Ibid., p. 200 
Ibid., p. 15 
Peters 2001, p. 173
234
General Accounting Offices that report to Congress, are instruments for Congress to 
supeiwise public institutions.
More generally, what makes political and bureaucratic power-relations in 
America different from continental countries is the presence of Congress and its 
characteristics in the political system. In the parliamentary system, the principal struggle 
is between bureaucrats and their ministers, while in the US the most important conflict is 
between congress and administrative establishments, as “congress is eager to exercise 
effective oversight over the public bureaucracy.” ’^  ^ Although there are still public 
servants at the federal level involved in policy-making, “political leaders appear to have 
resumed more their presumed role as the drivers of change within the Federal level. 
Nowadays political leaders are considered more as sources of innovation in the 
generation and propagation of policy and administration. Budget process must be 
approved by congress, which “provides congress with yet another crucial level of control 
over the bureaucracy” ’^ ’ in the United States.
However, if, in general in the area social policy there is a tendency to decentralise 
control over policy-making and law enforcement, the opposite is true of American 
criminal justice policy. Federal government has tried to have a stronger presence in 
policing and law enforcement. In particular, state plays a significant role in funding local 
police activities.
Ibid., p. 173 
Ibid., p. 176 
Ibid.
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For example (during Clinton administration), the Federal government has 
extended its own criminal code to include a number of crimes that had been the 
concern of state and local government, and has established very severe penalties 
for violating those laws.’^^
The above argument should not lead us to the conclusion that there is no room for 
bureaucracy and bureaucrats in the American criminal justice system. Although their 
involvement has changed, they still have powerful presence in this sphere. For a better 
understanding of this issue, the role of bureaucrats in the area of penal practice will be 
studied at two different levels: penal policy formation and the enforcement of policy. In 
the former, the characteristics of political institutions, their relations to public attitudes.
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In consequence, it can be said that these transfoimations have been very much “a 
way to put politicians back on top, and administers more on tap.”’^^  Moreover, in
addition to the political concerns that tend to keep bureaucracy under control, “in
■comparison to other industrialized democracies [...] the United States bureaucracy
appears to be much smaller and leaner. It relies on the private sector to deliver goods and
sei'vices.”’ '^’ What will be discussed here in teims of privatization, industiialization and 
.the commercialisation of crime control can be considered as signs of the weakened 
presence of bureaucratic organizations in American’s penal practice.
■-■II
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and their control over administrative institutions give rise to a more populist penal policy. 
Political institutions are more affected by public sentiments than by professional and 
expert considerations. They are under less pressure from professional bureaucrats.
As we saw in the discussion of actuarial justice, criminal justice in modem 
countries has its own particular requirements and demands. These professional 
understandings are crucial obstacles to the simple translation of public demands to penal 
policy as they work through their own instruments, and styles. The organizational and 
bureaucratic characteristics of the criminal justice system give rise to their own particular 
culture. The criminal justice system can be considered as a more or less isolated sphere, 
governed by its own special principles and managerial goals. Even in a punitive and 
expressive penal system like America, prison officers, probation officers and other 
specialized staff are not just instrument of political parties or policies. Modem 
organizations, like prisons in the United States, as a highly developed and complex 
industry, have a degree of immunity against social and political forces.
One of most striking developments in criminal justice has been the movement 
toward professionalization: "If we take a long-term view of the criminal justice system, 
from its beginnings in the colonial past to the end of the twentieth century, this 
(professionalization) is surely one of the master trends of the entire period.”’^^  Although 
the presence of the jury in the courts and election of judges who sit in criminal court 
through an elective system make American criminal justice comparatively different from
^Friedman 1993, p. 67
237
its European counterpart, other parts of the criminal system have moved markedly toward 
professionalization. High crime rates, professional criminals, and the culture of mobility, 
and sophisticated methods of committing crime, required professionals in criminal justice 
area. “Hence the need for police, detectives, prison officials, medical examiners, forensic 
scientists, and in general, a growing army of criminal justice workers.
Victory in the war against crime required the trained, equipped and professional 
officers. It is true that indeterminate sentences are not common in the U.S.A, but the 
rehabilitative system is not totally abolished. Correctionalist methods and apparatuses, 
for example probation officers and juvenile systems of justice, are still in use. “Social and 
psychiatric experts are still employed to prepare social inquiry reports, provide diagnostic 
seiwices, and to help manage and treat offenders.’ Strategies of classification, 
identification, evaluation and solution have not been removed. Their credibility has been 
weakened but has not disappeared.
Whiles more than two million are incarcerated and more than six million of 
people in America are under direct state management, control considerations and the 
industry of crime control cannot be ignored. The high number of prison staff, probation 
officers, social workers and other professionals in the criminal justice sphere have led to 
a huge and complex industry, that can, in itself, affect the area of policy making and the 
determination of penal practice. Needless to say, these of experts pursue their function in 
accordance with their own mentality and professional culture which, in turn, affects
Ibid., p. 209 
Garland 2001, p. 170
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culture of penal practice. Thus, if the role of bureaucracy has become limited at the level 
of politics and policy formation, bureaucracy has preserved its position in the 
enforcement of punishment and in dealing with criminals. In the contemporary American 
penal system this huge bureaucratic institution is an unavoidable social fact. 
Categorization, professionalization and presence of experts in the incarceration system 
have led to more bureaucratization because, as mentioned in chapter 2, the requirement of 
technical qualification in administrative organization has been an ever-increasing 
necessity. This remains the case, notwithstanding the increasing privitization of US 
criminal justice institutions.
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V Privatization of crime control
The industi'ialization and privatization of crime control is a remarkable trend in 
American society. Fear of crime and the sense of insecurity paved the way for a kind of 
privatised and infoimal crime control. “People were not satisfied with the protection of 
the state and its law, they privatised protection and created a private regime of law.” '
This can be considered as a modem form of reaction against criminal behaviour. If in 
ancient societies individuals had to protect themselves and react against all wiongdoers 
due to the absence of govemmental forces or the lack of nation -state, in modem societies 
the public are involved in preventive and punitive actions according to the new 
conditions of social life. Dealing with crimes and criminals is delegated by the public to 
professional agencies and govemmental institutions, but in the case of their inefficiency 
the public retain the power to re-enter the process. Thus, the dividing line between the 
private and public sector, in which crime control was considered as solely a govemmental 
task, hasbecome blurred. Various commercial, industrial organizations and other 
elements of civil society have entered the crime control process, and crime prevention 
efforts have spread beyond specialist govemmental organizations.
Thus, for example, the private commercial security industry undertakes, to 
provide “the hardware and protective services” to produce more security in society.
The policing and construction of the prison have become a mixed economy of the public 
and private sectors. In this society, “burglar-alarm companies were flourishing; [ . . . ]
Friedman 1993, p. 452
Garland 2001, p. 18
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self-defence seminars were springing up like weeds; and [....] thousands of people were 
buying car phones,”’'"' and so on. “The recurring message of this approach is that state 
alone is not, and cannot be responsible for preventing and controlling crime.”’'”
The project of ‘responsibilizing individuals’ and private sectors of society has 
several advantages for the state, as it was no longer the sole institution charged with 
crime control. This strategy reduces the costs of crime control programs. Moreover, this 
was an “attractive strategy for criminal justice executives hoping to avoid being blamed 
for the shortcomings of their organizations.”’'’^  Governmental penal institutions could 
attract social support for their penal policies. Those groups that had the resources, and 
were not dependent on state agencies, selected the new measures of control. Various 
tactics of reducing the opportunities for crime, such as teaching effective security and 
establishing residential communities developed in the private sector, and were supported 
by the state. The demand state of the victim movement for more effective policy can also 
be regarded as part of the process of private involvement in penal practice.
Commercial institutions regarded this situation as an opportunity for success and 
profit. Security devices, intruder and car alarms were produced for the public. Urban 
planners, architects, and construction companies began to “adapt their designs to enhance 
the level of security that they offered to clients and residents.”’'’^  The private sector
Friedman 1993, P. 452 
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performed its particular model of sanctioning of supervision, excluding, shaming and 
scolding in their own residential areas.
The expansion of the ‘prison industrial complex’ is another feature of 
privatization of crime control in the United States. The USA has the largest number of 
private prisons in the world. “One of the fastest growing sectors of the prison industrial 
complex (in this country) is private coiTections companies.” The emergence of a 
‘prison industrial complex’ over the last two decades reflects “the increased importance 
of private interests in criminal justice policy.” ''’^  This which has been described by critics 
as ‘punishment for profit’, becomes a factor of harsh penal practice because, the prison 
industrial complex can grow only if more and more people are incarcerated. Three 
Strikes, and mandatory minimums such as harsh and fixed sentences without parole 
(argued above) “are two examples of the legal superstructure quickly being put in place 
to guarantee that the prison population will grow and grow and grow.”’'"^  Critics have 
argued that privatized prison companies have an interest in increasing prison populations 
as they have little motivation to implement effective methods for dealing with prisoners. 
Prisons are considered as a source of jobs and a source of tax revenues. The more aiTests 
and convictions there are the more profits will be achieved from crime. “ Low pay and, 
consequently, high attrition has often led to gi'ossly under-qualified and inexperienced 
s t a f f w h i c h  in turn damages rehabilitative programs and could lead to harsh 
punishment. As result the ‘ commodification’ of crime control and the creation of a
Goldberg and Evan, 2005 
Cooper and Taylor, 2005, p.504 
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242
“substantial private coiTections industiy, plus the emergence of a host of other 
technological and industrial interests who profit from penal expansion, makes any 
reversal (or even slowing) of penal gi’owth exti’emely unlikely.”
Both processes of responsibilization crime control and privatization of prison 
industiy contribute to the severity of penal practice in US, but I will show that these 
developments are not strong enough to provide a complete explanation of harsh 
punishment in the US. In one sense, privatization of crime control can be considered as a 
result of social demands for a comprehensive policy against crime. The private sector 
entered the area because of shortcomings of official facilities and practices. Thus, 
privatization of crime control should be analyzed as an effect of harsh penal policy not as 
a cause of it.
Jones 2002, pp. 398-9
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VI Politico-Cultural Contexts
Political ideologies and cultural factors such as mentalities, sensibilities, public 
opinion, and religion are also influential elements in shaping penal practice. In particular, 
in democratic countries like America, variations in social values can easily translate into 
the criminal justice system. A culture of victim support, for example, that views 
criminals as enemies of the society, may lead to a harsh penal approach to offenders. The 
attack on rehabilitative ideas was not only a matter of discontent with technical and 
professional responses to punishment (or of success measured in terms of rates of 
recidivism). It was part of broader change in political, correctional and social culture. I 
will try to show how cultural elements like sensibilities, mentalities, religion, and public 
opinion changed in America, and how these transformations were reflected in penal 
practice.
Cultural conceptions are dynamic and sophisticated phenomena and cannot 
readily be categorised or separated out. For example, mentality as a cultural 
phenomenon, itself, could cover a wide area of intellectual and emotional subjects such 
as political, philosophical, religious, scientific, moral, prejudicial issues and so on. Some 
level of interweaving and interaction can be seen between these social phenomena. As 
we have seen in the second chapter, ways of thinking are closely related to ways of 
feeling. So emotional aspects of culture are barely separable from its cognitive features. 
Religious conceptions of crime and punishment, as we will see in this chapter, can give 
individuals feelings of hate or sympathy for criminals and affect penal practice in a 
society.
244
Public opinion can be considered as an outcome of current mentalities and 
sensibilities in a society. Sensibilities are the result of various historical, cultural and 
social events over time. Having exact definitions for these complex phenomena, and 
drawing a clear boundary between them is extremely difficult and not my concem. 
However, this does not mean that there is neither distinction nor similarity between these 
cultural themes, or that their independent identification is impossible. Following the 
discussion chapter two, I will introduce a brief explanation of each conception that I have 
chosen, and study its relationship with policy-making and punishment. Before doing so I 
shall say something about political considerations, institutions and penal policy to see 
how crime and punishment became politically significant, and therefore affected the 
shape of penal practice in the USA.
VI-1 Institutions, Politics and penal policies
Penal practice became politically significant in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century in the USA. Over this period, high crime rates, movements for victims support, 
public fear of crime, lack of confidence in the criminal justice system and in the state’s 
capacity of control crime, and a perceived lack of security, all had significant 
implications for state authorities and penal policy. “There were louder and louder 
outcries that something had to be done.”’'’^  Politicians had their own concerns as the
Friedman 1993, p. 452
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aggravation of critical sentiments through the mass media and electoral competition 
urged them to react.
Crime and punishment are among the most sensitive and important social 
problems that face American society. As a social phenomenon, crime is capable of 
creating a level of public anger that “can reasonably be described as h a r s h . "Cr i m i n a l  
justice in this country is not an autonomous system because it is under continuous 
external pressure from the outside. A catastrophic increase in crime after the sixties put 
politicians under enormous pressure to provide a suitable response. For politicians in 
democratic countries like America “acting in the context of electoral competition, policy 
choices are heavily determined by the need to find popular and effective measures that 
will not be viewed as signs of weakness or abandonment of the state’s responsibility to 
the public.”'^' Political actors are concerned more with the anxiety and outrage provoked 
by crime than controlling crime. Criminalization, penalization, sentencing guidelines, 
truth-in-sentencing policies, and three strikes law are expressive penal policies that were 
selected in response to public concerns.
Over the course of thirty years, crime and punishment have become highly 
charged electoral issues, because they are located at the centre of public attention. 
Opposition parties try to show their ‘toughness’ on crime to increase their credibility and 
popularity. Of course there are still many people who support a more rehabilitative 
system and believe in more humane ways of punishment, but the predominant demand is
WaiT Mark 1995, p. 296 
Garland 2001, p. I l l
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"for tougher laws, more and longer sentences, more and bigger prisons.” Political 
actors have eagerly manipulated these views and sentiments: “cast your ballot for x and 
he will light a fire under the system.” Politicians disregard whether crime responds to 
the severity of punishment or not, and respond solely to public anxiety, their credibility, 
and their popularity. "The practical effect, once the political passion had spent itself on 
getting the change, [was that] the polity somehow lost interest.” Such concerns 
provide a context for a new political discourse in which politicians compete for tougher 
punishment. “In the choice of policy response, those that can most easily be represented 
as strong, smart, and effective or expressive are most attractive.”'
As a result, in order to win elections and thereby to govern, politicians have 
addressed crime issues in polemical and stereotyped ways. Because it is difficult 
to oppose polemical claims about emotional subjects with sound arguments, 
American politicians compete to show who is tougher.
As in most democratic countries, America’s politicians feel they must respond 
accordingly. In a majority rule model policy should ‘directly reflect public opinion.’ 
Once the death penalty, for example, became very popular, ‘hardly any politician dares 
oppose it’'^  ^because of majority support for death penalty. On the other hand, this social
Friedman 1993, p. 452 
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context can be considered as a golden opportunity for America’s political actors, because 
in a politically stable country like the U.S.A, with extended national parties, politicians 
need issues that have a relatively broad appeal
However, whether this is the manipulation of collective sentiments for political 
concerns or an honest “attempt to give democratic expression to public feeling, the 
outcome is the same”'^  ^- a punitive, expressive and populist penal practice. “What sets 
America apart is the relatively easy translation of majority sentiments into policy.” '*^ ''
VI-2 Politico-Judicial institutions and public demands
American’s political and judicial institutions were probably more ready to be 
affected by public pressures than other democratic countries. Closer attention to the 
position of these establishments may better show this reality. Universalistic personalism 
in members of American congi’ess makes them “relatively independent from their 
political parties, but personally accountable to their constituency”'*^ ' and means they are 
more dependent on voters in politicised issues. Executive institutions and political actors 
are closely dependent on public support. “The administrative leadership is more strongly 
exposed to public opinion given the presidential election by nationwide, popular 
votes,” as opposed to the parliamentary elections of some European countries. 
Relatively similar conditions can be seen in the judicial system of the United States.
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Most judges and prosecutors in the U.S. “are either elected or nominated and confirmed 
in political processes.
Such political and judicial institutions brought about conditions that make the 
American criminal justice system closely related to public demands. Activities of these 
policy makers are directly or indirectly affected by public attitudes. For example, as after 
President Ronald Reagan was shot and seriously wounded in 1981 by John Hinckley, the 
jury of the federal district court declared that Hinckley was “not guilty by reason of 
insanity.” '^ "' This verdict gave rise to a huge wave of protest. Around 80 percent of the 
public were against this verdict. It was believed that this kind of defence would lead to 
individuals committing the same crime again. All this may seem nonsense of course, 
“but congress heard the thunder and saw the lightning c l e a r l y , a n d  in 1984 changed 
the law, so one could barely resort to this defence in the federal courts. This example 
clearly shows the impact of public opinion on penal policy makers.
This is true even of the US Supreme Court- an unelected and apperantly 
democratically unresponsive institution. As has been argued: “Supreme Court decisions 
not only correlate with public opinion but are directly influenced by public opinion.” 
Judges are members of society and more than lay people are aware of attitudes that 
prevail in the community. They are “broadly aware of fundamental trends in the 
ideological tenor of public opinion, and at least some justices, consciously or not, may
Ibid 
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adjust their decisions at margins to accommodate such fundamental trends.” In the 
USA judges are indirectly elected by the people, because “the people elect president and 
the president selects the justices with advice and consent of the s e n a t e . A s  a result it 
can be said that public opinion can both directly and indirectly influence sentencing.
As result of these the new penal policies can be studied in the light of these 
political forces. The introduction of ‘zero tolerance policy’ for minor offences, after the 
election of Governor George Pataki and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in 1994 in New York 
State, for example, shows how this politicized aggressive approach towards wrongdoers 
could be implemented.
The term zero tolerance has a longer history than in the policing of New York 
City. The origin of this approach can be traced to Reagan’s ‘war on drugs’ in the 1980s. 
American politicians were under public pressure to ‘do something’ about the drug-trade 
which, at that time, was perceived as a “massive national t h r e a t . T h e  policy adopted 
was “interdiction at the source, the an'est of users, and pushers, draconian punishments, 
and, on the official level, no understanding, no mercy, no letup in the war.”'^  ^ Federal 
drugs policy took a zero tolerance'^' approach and “sought to create a ‘drug-free 
America’ by the year 2000.” '^ ^
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This openness to political pressure also facilitated the adoption of sentencing 
guidelines. From 1970 many states started to think about sentencing guidelines to abolish 
indeterminate sentencing. The guidelines movement bridged the American political 
divisions and both wings of public opinion supported this movement. Harshness of 
punishment, of course, was not an essential result of this movement, “it is merely a 
consequence of the fact that the movement coincided with the rise to electoral success of 
law-and-order conservatives who succeeded in shaping other statutes.” But this 
movement had other implications, as it aimed “to take sentencing decision out of the 
hands of the punishment professionals such as judges and prison professionals.”'^ "' It was 
a profound change in American penal policy. Indeed “the guidelines are symptomatic of 
a larger shift away from the judicial and toward the legislative in American criminal 
law.” '^  ^ It was a step towards the démocratisation of the American judicial system. 
Moreover, it should be viewed as a movement in the United States that increased 
connections between public opinion and penal policy. It took penal policy out of the 
hands of judges and gave it to the public, “which means that the guidelines inevitably 
lend themselves to the worst excesses of American d e m o c r a c y . A t  the same time the 
codification movement cut the power of judges to create new common law crimes.
“More and more states passed comprehensive penal codes; by implication, anything not 
listed was simply not crime. As Dubber firmly announced at the end of twentieth 
century in America: “the age of common law is over. Penal law now is made by
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legislators, not in court opinions by j u d g e s . T h i s  was another process that paved the 
way for the translation of collective sentiments into penal practice through a political 
process.
It seems to me that one may still ask whether a populist penal system is 
essentially equal to a harsh justice. Is it the case that involvement of social sentiments in 
penal practice, politicization of crime and punishment, the accountability of political 
institutions and application of public demands in the legislation process, the close 
relationship between the elected and unelected judicial institutions and public opinion 
and so on, must give rise to an aggressive approach towards criminals? My answer to 
above questions is not necessarily in the affirmative, because historical experiences and 
observations from other democratic countries do not confirm the conelation between 
democracy, involvement of public opinion, social sentiments and social demands on the 
one hand and a harsh justice system on the other. As we saw when looking at Elias and 
Spierenburg in chapter three, the outcomes of social sentiments on penal policy can be 
quite the opposite: the elimination of cruel justice and harsh penal practice. What then is 
source of these harsh reactions?
As I suggested earlier in the second chapter, there is a kind of con elation 
between social forces and penal practice, but this argument by itself does not show that 
social passions must automatically give rise to harsh penal policies. The role that these 
social forces play in the determination of a brutal or gentle penal system depends largely
Dubber 1999, p. 50
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on content of these social emotions. As Durkheim told us, it depends on the godly or 
humane content of collective consciousness. In his view the severity of a punitive 
reaction mostly depends on how deeply held are the violated collective beliefs. In others 
words it depends on the degree of sacredness of those cultural conceptions Durkheim 
argued that penal practice in traditional societies had been harsh because collective 
sentiments in those societies had been religious in character. I do not claim that religion 
can explain all the transformations that have occurred in American penal policy during 
last thirty years, but I do want to argue that without addressing this powerful social and 
cultural element one cannot analyse the subject adequately. This is what is missing in 
conventional explanations of punishment in modern societies in particular American 
penal policy. Religion has not been seriously applied as an analytical tool in social 
understandings of punishment. The role that religion could play in socio-political life and 
the aggravation of public attitudes toward criminal activities and harsh penal practice in 
modern world has been ignored.
VI-3 Politics, Religion and punishment
The entrance of religion into the arena of politics is a crucial factor in the cultural 
and political aggravation of American penal policy. After a long period of separation 
between state and church in western countries, including America, a new trend in the 
relationship between these phenomena has appeared in the USA. One of the 
unquestionable realities of current American society is that there are an extremely high 
percentage of people that believe in God. Virtually all Americans, according to Gallup
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Princeton Religion Research Centre (PRCC 1996), say they “believe in God or a 
“universal spirit”, 96 percent in the most recent repoit;” '^  ^a figure which has remained 
stable during recent years.
It is obvious that belief in God, by itself, has no effect on policy-making. One 
crucial issue in this regard therefore is the political involvement of religious groups. In 
other words the question is whether there is relationship between these religious groups, 
their values and political conduct, and policy-making in general and penal policy-making 
in particular? A short look at America’s approach to these subjects during the last third 
of the twentieth century can help to answer that question. Specifically, I want to 
determine whether American people support an accomodationist view, and believe that 
the government should support America’s religious heritage in their decision-making, or 
whether they support a separatist view “in support of the traditional Jeffersonian ‘wall 
separation’ between church and state,”' a n d  refuse to allow religious ideas and 
sentiments to enter penal practice. Investigations of these issues has demonstrated, that 
since 1950 the American people have gradually accepted the political involvement of 
religious gi’oups, and a closer relationship between religious thought and penal policy.
In 1968, Americans appeared to have supported church involvement in social 
issues, but they did not have a favourable attitude towards the “direct involvement of 
religious figures in electoral politics.”'^' As mentioned above, however, despite short-
Bishop 1990, p. 2
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terni fluctuations, recent investigations show a progressive movement in favour of the 
involvement of religious groups and leaders in American politics. By the late 1980s, a 
solid majority of the public believed that religious ideas had become too influential in 
politics. In 1990 a majority of Americans voted for the Republican candidate in spite of 
the involvement of conservative Christians in the Republican Party. This indicates that, to 
a certain extant, the public have accepted the political involvement of religious groups. 
Therefore, religious institutions moved “from the margin to the mainstream of national 
p o l i t i c s . T h e  trend toward increased religious involvement in politics area is also 
evident in presidential elections. Thel993 Gallup poll indicated that 72 percent of 
American people said that they would not vote for a presidential candidate “who did not 
believe in God.” '^ ^
Furthermore, socio-political investigations in American society suggest that the 
role of religious doctrine in political conduct is greater than was previously thought. 
Before dealing with this question, it should be mentioned that in contemporary America, 
traditional divisions between Christian and Jews, Catholics and Protestants, have become 
politically less important than the distinction “between religious “conservative” and 
religious “liberal.” '^ "' This means that purely religious conflict has been transformed into 
a kind of competition between political understandings of religion. Nowadays, religious 
affiliation has a strong and direct impact on American political behaviour, in particular on 
partisanship. Catholics are more likely than Protestants to vote Republican. It is possible
Ibid., p. 596 
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that the loyalties of secularists and religious liberals to the Democratic Party or religious 
ti'aditionalists to the Republican Party may glow strong enough that these groups may 
support their parties’ candidates regardless of their policy p o s i t i o n s . T h e  involvement 
of religious groups in political activities, and the increasingly presence of religious ideas 
amongst politicians and policy makers, directly influences penal policy in the USA. The 
criminalization of abortion, and other ‘immoral’ conduct are signs of this movement.
But there remains the crucial question of how one can explain the appearance of 
religion as an active social force in American society. I will attempt to answer this 
question in light of a Durkheimian theory of religion and society. According to 
Durkheim, religion operated as a powerful force in traditional society. But the reason for 
the reappearance of religion as an influential social force, and its role in social solidarity 
in a modem society like America, can analysed in a Durkheimian framework.
Durkheim’s main concern was answering the following question: what are the 
bonds which unite men one with another? Solidarity, for Durkheim, is the source of 
social life - for the same reasons that morality, as a ground of social integrity was a key 
point in his writings. This can be considered as a kind of grounding theory on which the 
other hypotheses are drawn. For him, moral constraints are the very essence of collective 
life - society and morality are one. “ 'Moral’\s often synonymous with 'social’m 
Durkheim’s work.” '^ *’ Moral rules, for him, are the spirit of social order and ties of social 
solidarity. The durability of moral ideas and moral rules of behaviour are inseparable
Ibid., p. 307 
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elements of his sociology. Morality, for him, is a comprehensive system of prohibitions, 
and bonds that presei*ve social integrity.
Likewise, he asked, to what social needs does religion coiTespond? In other 
words, what are the social benefits of religion? He argued, “that nearly all the great 
social institutions were born in religion,” and it is only religion that has the potential to 
re-create and strengthen these phenomena. It was because of this that he woiTied about 
the weakness or lack of religious consideration in modem soc i e t i e s . The  effect of 
religious beliefs for him is the “ re-creation of moral being” and the most basic 
function of religion is the creation and re-creation of morality as a base of social 
integi’ation. He argued that the main and “sole puipose of religious ceremonies is to 
arouse certain ideas and feelings, to ... join the individual to society.” '^ *' Social cohesion 
is the other utility of religion. It can be said that the most important reason for his 
attachment to religion is this the effect of religious ideas and practices on social unity, 
because social solidarity was his lifelong concem. “What makes such a society a “ 
society’ (for Durkheim) at all is the fact that its members adhere to common beliefs and 
sentiments. The ideas which are expressed in religious beliefs are therefore the moral 
ideals upon which the unity of society is founded.”'^'
Durkheim 1915, p. 421
188 (cphg former gods are growing old or dying, and the others have not been bom.” Ibid p. 429 
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Religion, for him, has several functions, but he refers to morality as the most 
important. As I tried to show in the second chapter, Durkheim sought to find the origin 
of religion in the sense of “the ever-present c a u s e s . F o r  Durkheim, society has all the 
essential conditions and necessary forces to produce religious sensation.
Society in general, simply by its effect on men’s minds, undoubtedly has all that 
is required to arouse the sensation of divine. A society to its members, in 
primitive societies, had been what a god is to its faithful.
For him “ the idea of force is of religious origin.” '^ "' Theses forces are, a 
translation of common principles and religious forces. According to Durkheim, society 
has all the essential elements to produce religious sensations and the requirements of 
creation of sacred being, that society and religion are highly similar. These similarities 
between religion and society are a sign of their unity. Indeed, for him, spiritual powers 
are none other than the shared values in society. Religion is a translation of social reality 
and the “real function of religious rites is to seiwe moral ends.” '^  ^ As Giddens has 
argued, Durkheim sees religion as "society becoming conscious of itself, although in a 
symbolically transmuted fonrn. Religion then is the translation of society into 
symbolic language.
Tendzin N.Takla; Whitney Pape 1985, p. 79
Diirkheiml915, p. 206
Ibid., p. 206
Ibid., p. 374
Giddens 1995 p. 20
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In these terms the movement toward tradition, morality and religion in the United 
States, requires careful analysis and consideration. The U.S.A “was a country of 
immigrants, a country of rolling stones; it was also a country in which it was possible to 
rise in society - and also to fall.” '^  ^ During the twentieth century, America underwent a 
profound shift in social conditions. “Slowly giadually, the twentieth century broke with 
the past. It became the century of the s e l f t h e  century of exaggerative individualism. 
This new concept of unrestricted freedom of personality and self was found form in 
social movements like feminism, the sexual revolution, and the civil rights movement and 
so on.
Various segments of American society had established the right to administer 
their own group. Different gi'oups of people, classes, races and tiibes looked for the right 
to run their own social affairs: “old rules and arrangements fell,” '^^and majority culture 
and higher morality were defeated. In such a society, “authority becomes horizontal, not 
vertical.” *^'*' As a dark side of this social transformation, however, the crime rate 
increased, and it has been suggested that “a great deal of twentieth century crime can be 
explained, if at all, in terms of the exaltation of the self, a twentieth century 
p a t h o l o g y . T h e  explosion of crime in particular violent crime, indicates that society 
failed to educate people effectively in superior moral principles.
Friedman 1993 p. 12
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Friedman argued that the current ‘fatal l i b e r t y , “culture of mobility and the 
culture of the self are not c o s t l e s s . A  mobile society has a background involving the 
creation of criminals and victims, and in particular fiscal crimes. “Mobility also means, 
above all, the ripping up of roots, the destruction of fixed, settled ways.”'^ "^' These 
profound social and technological transformations, “snowballing for a century, stronger 
and faster and bigger all the time, have undoubtedly imprinted themselves on American 
culture and personality.” '^'^  Those elements of modem culture that were related to self 
were taken as crucial factors and in turn, “old ‘bourgeois values’ get thrown out the 
window; values such as self-discipline, delayed gratification and r e s t r a i n t . I n  these 
kinds of situations individuals easily feel free to leave their traditional homes, and move 
to greener pastures. Also, those who have stayed at home are not free from the culture of 
mobility; they experience mobility psychologically through the mass media. As a result 
social, economical and class positions are ripe for real or false ti’ansformations. The first 
can lead to a kind of social ambiguity, the second, crime.
The modem personality gradually became so powerful that it influenced family 
authority: “[T]he family is crumbling, in all sorts of senses. Traditionalists wony about 
the decay of the nuclear family.” "^^  Following the disintegiation of family authority, 
decline of traditional authority, exaggerated individualism and choice, “the vulgarity of
By fatal liberty probably he indicated to a kind o f excessive freedom in American culture.
'"hbid
Ibid., p. 196 
Ibid., p. 439 
Ibid
Ibid., p. 443
260
media messages, the rampant narcissism and consumerism of American society: 
coupled with easy access to guns and culture of social pathology, a wave of crime- 
overwhelmed society. In late twentieth century America, there was a general sense of 
insecurity, a lack of immunity from sudden, violent and unpredicted attack. In such a 
society, “Danger is everywhere and comes from everywhere.
Contrary to nineteenth century society, which focused on discipline and conti'ol, 
raising self-expression and personal development, American social scientists believed 
that in the modern America parents are “no longer interested in inculcating moral and 
religious principles.”^'" Moreover, most criminologists and social experts no longer 
believe in born criminals or the transmission of bad blood from father and so on. Rather 
they look for the answer in personality, family and environmental contexts; for them a 
criminal is a “misraised, mistrained person, unsuccessfully socialized.”^" As previously 
mentioned, the crime explosion, and gi'owth of violent crime in the United States is 
considered as a clear sign of the collapse of a system of restrictive values. It shows that 
society’s moral roof is seriously damaged.
The dramatic shift in the American society towards tradition, morality and 
specially religion during the last few decades can be analysed in light of the Durkheimian 
understanding of the role of these social structures as bases of social integration. It is 
believed that what could integrate and preserve society in the past can aid the re-
Ibid., p. 445 
Ibid., p. 454 
Ibid., p. 455 
Ibid., p. 455
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integration of the community in the modem era, as well. The social disintegration and the 
destruction of society’s moral roof, mentioned above, led to a movement toward 
strengthening traditional and sacred social values and a conservative politics. Religious 
ideas and symbols played a crucial role in this regard. Religion as the most common and 
powerful social force, could play a significant role in solving social disparities and 
strengthening social solidarity. Once again society became conscious of itself and 
reinstated religion as an emblem of social integration.
As we saw above, one of the undeniable realities of American society today is 
that an extremely high percentage of people believe in God. Nowadays, religious 
affiliation has a great and direct impact on American social and political behaviour. 
Investigations of these issues have demonsti ated that American people gradually began to 
accept a more expansive role for religion in their social life, and more political 
involvement for religious gi'oups. The implications of a doctrine of biblical literalism^ 
show that even acceptance of various interpretations of religion may damage social unity. 
However, this does not meant that American society is going to be as completely a 
religious society as ancient societies, or that traditional religion has become the e only 
base of social solidarity.
Conservative Protestants consider the Bible to be the ultimate source o f authority and guidance, 
providing reliable, empirically verifiable, and sufficient ti uths to guide the conduct o f all human affairs,
... in contrast to their secular counterparts., conservative Protestant writers ... attach little importance to the 
latest findings o f social science researchers. Instead, they gauge the usefulness o f any no- biblical 
information by its compatibility with biblical principles, as they are understood within Conservative 
Protestant communities... In contemporary parlance, literalism  implies an interpretive 
sti'ategy that (1) presumes and (2) is committed to sustaining the unity and inenancy o f the text 
See: Ellison and Sherkat
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But for me, as a result of the social disintegi'ations discussed above, a trend of 
reaction toward morality, has given rise to a revival of religious traditions as a new basis 
for social cohesion in American society. In Durkheimian teims, American society has 
sheltered under a religious umbrella because it was in a dangerous situation. For example, 
“[I]n the weeks immediately following the terrorist attacks (September 11), Americans 
flooded into houses of worship, packing weekend seiwices and engaging in prayer and 
reflection.”^ In d eed , it is suggested that a new form of Durkheimian mechanical 
solidarity has emerged in American society.
As Lewis Solomon's work explains, a deep transformation in cultural values and 
social noims-which were created by factors such as technological progress, shifts in 
sexual behavior and family structure, the rise of single parent families and economic 
forces - has led to a “fall of moral standards and the defiance of traditional virtues, which 
according to [Solomon’s] definition includes hard work, diligence, sobriety, frugality, 
and sexual restraint.” '^"' Such a deep transformation “may cause a destructive impact on 
society by inflicting a variety of social ills, including juvenile delinquency, drug use, 
dropping out of school, violent crime, etc.” '^  ^ American society has tried to find 
constructive and positive remedies for social decay. Social processes of positive value 
formation, moral restoration, and spiritual renewal are very complicated. “However, as he 
(Lewis Solomon) vehemently put into context, ‘religion is perhaps the one force in
Rogers 2002, p. 36 See: http://pewfbrum.org/publicatioiis/reports/liheveryvoice.pdf, 
^'"'oiiveira, 2003, p. 95 
Ibid
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American society that will help promote a cultural renewal’.”^'" He affirms that Faith 
Base Organizations can play a unique role in solving societal troubles by promoting and 
rebuilding families and communities.
As has been argued in this chapter, the close relationship between these religious 
groups and their values on the one hand, and social life, political conduct and policy­
making on the other, are signs of social transformation in the USA. Despite short-teim 
fluctuations, recent investigations show a progressive trend to favour religious ideas, 
religious groups and leaders in American society and politics. As we saw above, by the 
late 1980s, religious ideas became very influential forces in politics. In 1990, a majority 
of Americans voted for the Republican Party candidates, in spite of the involvement of 
conseiwative Christians in the Party. Therefore, religion increasingly moved “from the 
margin to the mainstream of national politics.”^
As the above argument shows, a shift toward traditional values of order, family, 
religion and social authority swept American society. As a result “some distinctively 
fierce American Christian beliefs”^ a n d  sentiments have affected American penal policy 
in the last three decades. Indeed, the revival of religious beliefs and emotions as forceful 
ideas and sentiments in American society were, at least partly, the results of these social 
transformations. That wave of backlash in late modem America, which showed serious 
concem for traditional values - order, family and authority - and put the United States’
Ibid., p.5 96 
Ibid., p. 596 
Whitman 2003,p. 6
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penal policy under heavy pressure were effects of the movement toward a new solidarity. 
Those values were most clearly articulated by the American religious right, which 
transformed “as a political force from the mid-1970s onwards,”^'"
Nowadays, as result of religious ideas the majority of American parents use 
physical punishment on their children. There is a link between conservative protestant 
affiliations and the use of physical punishment “ to discipline toddlers and preschoolers 
and old c h i l d r e n . T h e  effects of these conservative values, moreover, have gone 
beyond the use of corporal punishment by teachers and parents, to the area of penal 
practice more generally. The overall result of these religious ideas and sentiments has 
been a tougher approach to criminal behaviour. Such traditional religious and sacred 
beliefs were strong enough to engender passionate hatred for criminals, and therefore to 
lead to harsh punishment.
As a result of the entry of the religious outlooks into the sphere of criminal law, 
there is nowadays no significant distinction between sin and crime in the American 
criminal justice system. “The identification of disorder with sin made it difficult for 
legislators and ministers to distinguish carefully between major and minor infractions.”^^ ' 
As Durkheim argued in relation to primitive societies, once collective consciousness 
becomes more religious in character, so social reactions become more repressive and 
punitive. This is because an act that violates something that is religious in character
Garland 2001,p. 99 
Ellison e /a / 1996,p. 2 
Rotliman 1971, p. 15
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results in vengeance for something that is sacred. The return of retribution to American 
penal practice “is closely associated both with populist justice and with deep-seated 
Christian s e n t i m e n t . t h e  new American penal policy, offenders are considered as 
dangerous and evil. Contrary to continental countries there is a kind of returned to a 
“quasi-Christian attitude.
Whitman, 2003, p. 194 
Ibid., p. 201
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VII The changing culture of crime and punishment
The history of punishment reveals the dynamic impact of thoughts, moral and 
emotional forces on penal forms, and documents the relationship between changes of 
attitudes and shifts in penal practice. I will now examine how there cultural changes have 
affected modem American penal policy, looking in particular at how changing modes of 
repression can be an expression of changing perceptions and attitudes.
VII-1 Changing conceptions of criminology, crime and criminal law
A remarkable manifestation of changing thoughts and their effects on penal policy 
can be found in the transfonnation in criminological ideas in the United States. 
Criminological theories during the post war period were mainly based on psychology and 
sociology. Crime was considered as a symptom of abnormality and anomie, in individual 
character or social structure respectively. Criminals were criminals because of their 
being deprived of education, a job, proper treatment, good family and so on. Thus 
society and state should offer them con ectional treatment and address their psychological 
or social problems.
On the contrary, however, contemporary criminological theory influences penal 
policy through a different set of beliefs. New criminological theses have since the 1970s, 
viewed criminals as rational and free actors who follow their instincts and temptations. 
From this perspective crime and delinquency are the outcomes of insufficient conti'ol. 
Contemporary criminology views crime as an act that is committed intentionally, and
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thus must be suppressed. As it has been pointed out, “This way of thinking has tended to 
reinforce retributive and detenent p o l i c i e s . I n  this theory, criminal disposition is not 
a crucial issue. Rather, crime is a routine activity that should be managed, and penal 
policy should focus on preventing criminal opportunities. This aspect of penal practice 
was discussed earlier in this chapter, in the discussion of actuarial justice and risk 
management.
Diverse beliefs regarding crimes and criminals lead to diverse strategies in 
responding to wrongdoers. Considering criminals as normal and free, or abnormal and 
irrational individuals, give rise to varying penal policies. Responding with ‘evil-by-eviT, 
Kant and Hegel’s traditional theory, or with Beccaria and Bentham’s theory of 
deterrence, inevitably result in divergent penal policies. The pendulum swung back, in 
America, toward eighteenth century penal practice, when it was thought that, if 
punishment is sufficiently severe and certain and the cost of crime is greater than its 
benefits, crime becomes unlikely.
Different perspectives on justice, morality, human nature and the state give rise to 
different forms of punishment. If one believes that crime is the result of free choice, 
rather that socioeconomic poverty one may advocate severe penal policy. Richard Nixon , 
for example, believed that the cause of crime was “insufficient curbs on the appetites or 
impulses that naturally impel individuals toward criminal a c t i v i t i e s , a n d  “ was the 
first to have the vision and the power to put a program for the systematic and
Garland 2001, pp. 15 - 16
Chevigny 2003, p. 80
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comprehensive eradication of criminal threats into a c t i o n . T h e  governor of New York 
State in 1994 emphasized that there is no relationship between social factors and criminal 
actions. For him “there was no connection between social ills and crime."^^^
Such beliefs encourage a zero tolerance response to minor offences. Unlike the 
rehabilitationist “who thinks all criminals are at bottom good and therefore curable [,] 
the incapacitationist thinks they are all bad and incurable.”^^® The abandonment of the 
merciful version of individualism was an outcome of a version of egalitarianism. In this 
view, individualism is considered as a kind of discrimination as similar crimes are not 
treated alike. The idea of dangerousness, on the other hand, viewed certain offenders as 
incoiTigible, and led to a harsh strain of individualism. Accordingly, criminals had to be 
permanently incapacitated or eliminated, since “the spirit of (merciful) individualization 
is no longer dominant in A m e r i c a . A s  such, merciful individualism has been 
abandoned in the American criminal justice since the early 1970s.
As I discussed in the previous section, not only is there a close relationship 
between the state and the church in contemporary America, but religion has also entered 
into more aspects of social life. Indeed, religious perspectives in the sphere of criminal 
justice have effectively transfoimed the process of thinking about crime and criminals. 
Viewing crime as a sin and criminals as evil leads to particular penal practices. 
Historically, life in the colonies of America was religious. American society had been a
Ibid
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traditional and hierarchical society in which criminal justice was shaped by religious 
ideas and social structure. These facts of ideology and structure had “shaped types of 
punishment and the very definitions of crime.”^^ " For example, in Massachusetts 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey religious ideas had a powerful influence on the criminal 
justice system.”^ '^ Indeed puritan colonies were “governed by the word of God.”^^  ^
There was little or no distinction between sin and crime, and “a religious message leapt 
out of virtually every page of the early puritan c o d e s . T h e  measurement of heresy and 
blasphemy as serious crimes in the early criminal law Massachusetts is a striking 
example of a religious system of criminal law. The Bible was considered as a reference 
in sentencing. The use of shame and shaming punishment- for example lashes on a bare 
back, or other religious rituals - demonstrate the religious nature of the legal system 
during colonial periods.
However, the process of religious and moral criminalization tended to reduce, 
during the course of the eighteenth century. For instance an examination in seven 
counties in Massachusetts during 1760 and 1774 showed that only “13 percent (of 
prosecutions) were for religious o f f e n c e s . T h u s ,  “[T] he post-revolutionary age was 
an age of reform in criminal justice”^^  ^in the United States. Codification of the trial, the 
Bill of Rights, a pessimistic approach to barbarism, grace, and mercy, rationalization and 
humanization were key indicators of the reformist movement.
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However, nowadays, strong manifestations of religious thought are again obvious 
in American penal policy from the second half of twentieth century onwards. As a result 
of the entry of religious beliefs into the sphere of criminal law, nowadays there is again 
no remarkable distinction between sin and crime. The idea of zero tolerance, for example, 
proposed that minor disorders lead to more serious crime, and reduce the willingness for 
law abidance in the population. “Others have taken this further and agreed that many of 
those people involved in more minor disorders and crimes are also likely to be in more 
serious o f f e n c e s . T h u s ,  police targeted the low-level incivilities, public drunkenness, 
public begging, squeegeeing and so on. To clean up the space they focused “as much on 
minor infractions and incivilities as on major c r i m e s . T h i s  policy “accompanied by 
systematic stop and frisk, especially for minority youths (pursued) for the purpose of 
creating atmosphere of order and surveillance.”^^  ^This policy suggests a get-tough 
approach towards incivilities and disorders.
This theory recalls Durkheim’s idea that, once an act violates something that is 
religious in character, resulting in vengeance for something sacred, there is no a 
significant distinction between minor and major crimes. The impact of these primarily 
religious mentalities and sensibilities are visible in American’s political, educational and 
penal culture as well. This is because, as Durklreim told us, in such conditions collective 
consciousness and all social values are more sacred in character and therefore minor
Jones and Newbum 2002, p. 186 
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disorder can be considered as a serious crime. Since all major and minor crimes have in 
common the violating of sacred moral principles, trivial offences may lead to a 
disproportionally harsh reaction. The mere breaking or disobedience of highly sacred 
values is of itself a heinous sin or crime.
VII-2 Changing attitudes toward punishment
As I argued in the two previous chapters, for Durkheim, Elias and Spierenburg 
tiansfbiTuations in penal policy cannot be understood without having first looked at 
changes in sensibilities. The dynamic impact of emotional forces on penal policy is 
undeniable. Civilizing punishment, shifts in sensibilities, and sympathy to offenders led 
to the abolition of cruel and barbaric forms of punishment, give rise to a gentle way of 
punishment during nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During the nineteenth century and 
the half first of the twentieth century, criminals were considered as victims of their social 
conditions, or abnoimal personality.
However, a kind of reversion to the classical or even traditional system of 
punishment is obvious in contemporary American penal policy. Sympathy for victims 
replaced sympathy for criminals. The victim movement started with criticism of 
sympathy for criminals. The proponents of this movement accused the criminal justice 
system of caring more for offenders than victims. It portrayed a sympathetic image of the 
poor victim’s situation. The picture of an innocent woman, or elderly person raped or
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killed is “in short, blameless, pure stereotype, with whom all can i d e n t i f y . T h e  use of 
victim impact statements in criminal sentencing in the USA is a sign of the victim 
support movement mentioned. This movement led to the enactment of a victims’ bill of 
rights in Oklahoma in i981 and California in 1982, the result being a harsher reaction 
against criminals.
The presence of victims or their family members and the expression of their 
vindictive emotions in court could give rise to the harshest possible punishment. If the 
civilizing process reduced the intensity of punishment through sympathy for others, in 
particular sympathy to the offenders, the victims’ movement has brought about sympathy 
for individual victims, and harsher penal practice. If, previously, inflicting pain and 
suffering on criminals was intolerable, nowadays it is “the grief-stricken plea of the 
mother of a murdered child (that) carries a potent affective c h a r g e . I n  these 
conditions, punishment has not only renounced sympathy for offenders, but the penalty 
itself can be considered as a satisfactory solution for the victims, and for society.
Moreover, the crucial role of the victim in American penal discourse has played a 
dramatic political and social role in the ideology of the ‘war on crime’ and provoked 
more communal sentiments against offenders. It was believed that the protection of social 
interests, including victim’s rights, is a state function. Thus “the essential division in the 
crime war model is not between offenders and victims, but between the state and
Friedman 1993, p. 308
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everyone else.” "^^* In victimless crimes, like drug-possession, this role is more obvious; 
there is no personal victim except the state. Indeed, in such circumstances the state is 
considered as “v i c t i m . I n  other words, the actual and potential victim is society itself. 
The victim became a symbol of an injured society, and the state acts on behalf of society.
The backlash of the last three decades, which shows the return of traditional 
values - order, family and authority -changed the face of the United States penal policy. 
“These themes were most clearly articulated by the American religious right, which 
developed as a political force from the mid-1970s o n w a r d s . T h e  return of retribution 
to American penal practice in this period “is closely associated both with populist justice 
and with deep-seated Christian s e n t i m e n t . I n  the modem American penal culture, 
offenders are considered as dangerous and evil. In contiast to continental countries there 
is a kind of returned to “quasi-Christian attitude.
A new wave of alarm, which has been raised by proponents of liberal principles in 
the treatment of children, is a reaction to the developed use of corporal punishment by 
parents and teachers across American society: as now “a majority of the U.S. parents use 
physical pun i s hment . Fur t he r  investigation showed a link between conservative 
protestant affiliations and physical punishment. This new trend is an implications of the
Dubber 2003, p. 50 
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“doctrine of biblical l i t e r a l i s m , i n  which there is a belief in the weakness and 
sinfulness of human nature and more emphasis on sin and punishment: “the wages of sin 
are d e a t h . T h e  result of these components of religious belief is a tougher approach to 
criminal behaviour. The effects of these crucial points of conservative Protestantism have 
gone beyond the use of coiporal punishment by teachers and parents, to the area of penal 
practice more generally. According to this conservative interpretation of Christianity, 
“our (American) tendency is toward selfishness and stubbornness and sin. We are all, in 
effect, “strong-willed children” as we stand before God.” "^^  ^Such traditional religious and 
sacred beliefs lead to a passionate hatred of criminals and therefore to harsh punishment.
More generally punishment in the United States has been driven “much more by 
ideology (and) emotion... than by rational analysis of options and reasoned 
d i s c u s s i o n . A s  a result, American penal practice has been described by George 
Herbert Mead as a war on “common enemies”^^  ^ and the punitive emotions unleashed by 
crime like the “emotions of battle.
There are two points in this that seems worthy of note. First the relationship 
between Christianity and penal policy is complex -  as “Christianity is compatible with a 
variety of views, even about capital punishment.”^^  ^ Various interpretations of core
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elements of Christianity like love of others and forgiveness may lead to the defence or 
condemnation of capital punishment. Second, the above analysis does not necessarily 
mean that Christianity has had the most significant contribution to the severity of 
punishment. On the contrary, the role of religious ideas in less severe punishment,^^'^ for 
example the development of the penitentiary system is undeniable. In America, the 
movement that shaped the reform of punishment and the penitentiary was been 
essentially religious. However, the question addressed in this part of my study was that of 
how the ideology of Christianity, and sensibilities that it brought about, contributed to the 
foimation of harsh punishment in contemporary America.
However, it should be mentioned that the modem form of harsh justice is different 
from that of primitive societies. Indeed, there is little similarity between traditional forms 
of physical punishment and torture and modern forms of penal practice in American 
penal policy. There is no place for “truly savage, draconian me a s u r e s . T o u g h n e s s  of 
punishment should be seen in terms of the separation of offenders from society, 
deprivation of liberty, more supeiwision, surveillance, incapacitation, shame, and 
degradation. But still more severe punishment means more suffering. In a civilized 
society freedom is a key element - thus deprivation of liberty is a harmful and symbolic 
form of punishment. Indeed psychological suffering in modem penal practice has 
replaced the physical suffering cential to pre modem system of criminal justice.
224 Savelsberg 2 0 0 4 ,  pp. 3 9 7 - 8  
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VIII Conclusion
The main theme of the argument in this chapter was an analysis of the increased 
severity of punishment in America over the last thirty years. The present study tiied to 
show how and why, in the USA, moral and victimless crimes were increasingly 
recognized, minors persecuted as adults, disorderly conduct considered as a felony, and
defences like insanity abolished. Punishment was harshly enforced and mercy and parole 
cases were significantly abolished.
I have endeavoured show how extra-legal conditions could explain why and how 
penal practice has transformed so toward more punitive approach. High rates of crime, 
alone, cannot fully account for harsh punishment. We saw the rejection of
policies, the strict regime of prison in the USA, denying prisoners’ access to higher 
education in some states, the performance of capital punishment, and an expiatory 
character of prison that could hardly be justified according to the Foucauldian theory of
■ Îindividualization and rehabilitation, continuation of traditional, moral and populist penal
-ipunishment. The weakening of scientific and specialised methods of dealing with 
criminals, corresponding with movements toward truth in sentencing and more fixed 
punishments, do not support a technical and correctionalist approach in American 
criminal justice. The disciplinary policy of standardization and normalization of 
criminals is substituted by long-term warehousing of a population with little importance
I
to the economy. The shame and stigma attached to criminals and prisoners have made 
punishment more an instrument of social expression than a disciplinary and productive
#
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institution or, as Foucault would have it, an institution of disciplinary docility utility, 
without physical force.
Closer attention showed that fluctuation in penal sanctions is related to changes in 
social context. Political considerations play an important role in this regard. Alterations 
in social structure in the USA, therefore, are reflected in penal practice. Public opinion 
became a deteimining factor in policy-making. Political actors and institutions were 
affected by and influenced public opinion. Executive agencies, members of congress and 
even the judicial system directly or indirectly became dependent upon public demands.
But the attribution of harsh justice to cultural factors such as mentalities, 
sensibilities and public opinion is too general and vague, because these explanations still 
do not make clear why a society is looking for severe penal practice. This study argues 
that all previous cultural explanations have missed out something very crucial. Harsh 
justice in the USA cannot be full explained without addressing notion of the sacred and 
religion. As a result of some disintegration in America’s community, society has resorted 
to religion as a common and sacred base of social solidarity. As the above argument 
showed, a movement toward traditional values of order, family, social authority and in 
particular religion swept American society. “Some distinctively fierce American 
Christian beliefs”^^ '^  and sentiments developed as a political force from the mid 1970s 
onwards. The more sacred a society is the more severe a reaction against the violation 
sacred social values is expected.
22^  Whitman 2003, p. 6
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As a result of religious ideas, crime became once again mixed with sin and 
criminals treated as evil. Correctionalist ideas were put aside and incapacitative policies 
appeared. Sympathy for offenders was replaced by sympathy for victims and a kind of 
antagonism toward criminals emerged. Degrading, humiliation and shame attached to 
punishment again. Offenders were no longer social ills but social enemies that should be 
eliminated or separated from society.
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Chapter V: Harsh Punishment in Iran 
Introduction
Severity of punishment in Iran
Iran’s pre- revolution criminal justice system was highly influenced by Western 
criminologists of the nineteenth and twentieth century. A belief in individualization and 
rehabilitation (largely) expressed the overarching ideology of the criminal justice system. 
Rehabilitative measures were accepted as penal policy, and judges had wide discretionary 
powers. Although judges had to sentence based on law enacted by parliament, mental 
disorders, psychological and physical illness, social factors like deprivation and 
unemployment, psychological and environmental issues had to be taken seriously in 
criminal procedure, and criminals could receive different treatments for the same crime. ^ 
According to the probation laws of 1961 different criminals could receive particular 
probation orders.^, based on their degree of dangerousness and the category in which 
they are placed (mentally ills, habitual, addicted and so on) Juvenile delinquents were 
treated under different criminal procedures from adults and accorded various liberal 
regimes of treatment. The most common sentences were parental supeiwision or other 
foims of institutional supeiwisions.^ Juvenile courts were separate from public courts and 
followed different procedures.
' Ghorbany 1971 cited from Collection o f Penal Code, 1989 
2 Article; 3 Probation Law, 1961
2public Penal Code 1974, Article 33-36 http://www.ghavanin.com/index.asp
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As is frequently noted, the Iranian legal system, in particular the Iranian criminal 
justice system, had obviously tried to follow Western model of criminal justice. “The 
legal and the court systems (went) along European models and with the adaptation of 
European civil and penal codes...criminal codes (of Iran) were based on French law.”  ^
The Iranian criminal justice system was substantially inspired by the French penal code 
of 1810 and its further amendments.  ^Indeed it could be seen as a translation of French 
penal code.*" For example, conditions of aggravation, mitigation, suspension of 
punishment, and other general conditions of proof and punishment were borrowed from 
the French Penal Code.
This does not mean that penal practice of pre-revolution Iran was wholly 
westernized. On the contrary, there were cases of severe punishments like the death 
penalty carried out for crimes such as murder^ highway robbery,  ^and armed rebellion.^ 
But generally it can be said that criminal justice system was moving toward a less severe 
penal practice. Policy- makers, out of professed devotion to Islamic law, had enacted a 
penal code that provided that, if conditions for the application of Islamic rules in crimes 
such as adultery, incest, robbery, homosexuality and so on were met, criminals should be 
punished accordingly.^^ But these rules were never taken seriously. It was taken for
4 Sami 2003, p. 189 
2 Faez 1991, p. 33 
*" Mohseni 1997, pp. 41 -42 
7 Public Penal Code 1926, Article 170 
 ^Ibid., 1932 Article 1 
 ^ Ibid., 1932 Article 60 
Ibid., Articles 207 and 222.
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granted that Islamic punishment was not applicable in modern times. For example, 
according to the previous Penal Code, appliance of these penalties required employment 
of jurists (Mujtahids) from religious seminaries (Houzeh), but that process never 
happened. Instead the Penal Code provided, for the crimes mentioned above, a relatively 
less severe punishment^ ^
However, in the post-revolution penal system a completely different image of 
criminal justice has emerged. Revolutionary courts (created by Council o f  R e v o l u t i o n )  
and Special Courts were established a few months after the revolution. Extraordinary 
and Accelerated Courts o f Anti-Revolution Crimes were constituted five months after the 
revolution (1980) to prosecute criminals quickly, outwith nonrial criminal procedures, 
and to caiTy out harsh for crimes against the revolution. Officials of the previous 
regime who had taken part in the massacre and the torture of people at the time of 
revolution time were punished, and other actions were punished severely. These courts, 
administered by three judges, were managed by a Mujtahid as a key court member and 
owner of the right of veto in sentencing. The prosecution and process of punishment to
* * Ibid., Article 2 1 2  .It should be mentioned that articles like this are outcome o f constitutional revolution 
in 1 905  in which religious leaders had played crucial role. They can be considered as a symbol of Islamic 
culture of Iran. Historical competition between western supporter intellectuals and clergymen during and 
after constitutional revolution gi adually led to victory o f intellectuals due to lack o f interest in political 
involvement among the religious leaders on that time. Accordingly there was no inclination in application 
of Islamic penal practice 
'2 Official Newspaper 1 9 8 0 ,  NO.1 0 0 3 9  
'2 Ibid., 1 9 8 0 -N O .1 0 0 1 8
Conspiracy against government, murder, espionage, treason, armed theft, rape, drug traffic, looting of 
public treasury, and other important economic crimes.
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take place summarily. For example, according to the regulations, after accusation and 
prosecution, the accused had only fifteen hours time to prepare a defence.
Amnesty International has recorded the names of many thousands of detainees 
who have been executed in Iran since the proclamation of the Islamic Republic in 1979. 
Between July 1988 and January 1989 alone Amnesty International recorded more than 
2,500 political prisoners who were executed. The real total was believed to be much 
higher.^ 7 1 9 8 9  Amnesty International recorded over 1500 executions announced for 
criminal offences, more than 1000 of which were for drug-trafficking offences.’  ^ The use 
of public flogging in Iran was described by Amnesty International as “cruel, inhuman or 
degrading,” and they urged the Iranian authorities to end all such punishments, whether 
carried out in public or in private. Amnesty International recognized Iran as second only 
to China in tenns of the number of executions.
Criminals were faced with the death penalty, life imprisonment and confiscation 
of property in many cases. According to the Regulation of Revolution Courts and
*2 Revolutionary Courts Regulations 1980 Article, 8. Official Newspaper. Ibid A Mujtahid or Faghih is an 
Islamic scholar (traditionally a clergyman) who has knowledge of Islamic m\es{Sha7i'at) and authority of 
their interpretation in various circumstances
Iranian officials never regarded them as political prisoners. They were members of armed rebellious 
groups that had officially involved in a armed fight against Islamic government. They are considered by 
EU and the USA, as a teirorist giouP. “The European Union’s blacklisting o f Iran’s main opposition 
group, the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI), was the greatest gift to the mullahs ruling 
Iran’ See; http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storvid=1746 Moreover, these reports are 
not regarded by the Iranian authorities as accurate. They assumed these kinds reports as part of 
international tyrannies’ project against the Islamic Revolution.
7^ Amnesty International. 13/15/92 See;
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/iran/document.do?id=7D4EA7D35E816F03802569A600602B9A
‘^Ibid
Amnesty International 13 august 2001 See; 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/iran/document.do?id= 14719625E82F414B80256A A400469CA4 
2*^  See; http://www.bbc.co.ulc/persian/news/story/2005/04/050405_si-deathpenalty-record.shtml 05/04/2005
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Revolution Public Prosecutor’s Office, there was a list of crimes such as treason, crimes 
against the Islamic government, rape, drug trafficking, armed robbery, serious economic 
crimes and so on,^' and a list of punishments including the death penalty, imprisonment, 
exile and confiscation of property that had been acquired illegally.^^ There was no pre- 
detemiined punishment for any particular crime. The principle of legally determined 
punishment was not observed, Mujtahid (Hakem- e- Shar ’e) sentenced based on 
Feqh24 rules. There were summary trials and there was no right of appeal for the 
convicted.
The Council of Revolution or supreme leader selected the Mujtahid members of 
these courts. The Revolutionary Court’s regulations recommended that punishment 
should preferably be performed in the place where the crime was committed. Other 
crimes could be prosecuted based on the Penal Code legislated in 1926 and amended in 
1974. It should be mentioned that these revolutionary eouits still exist and are very 
active with approximately the same jurisdiction, but they are better organized, since they 
became part of the judicial system and now follow the same substantive and procedural 
law. For example, there are 35 active branches of the Revolutionary Courts in Tehran. 
Since they prosecute serious crimes, deliver harsh punishments and have kept their
2^  Regulation of Revolutionary Courts, Approved by Revolution Conncilel980. Article 2 Op. cit
See also, Summary Trial Bill against Anti-Revolution Crimes-1980- Official Newspaper, N o.10018 
22 Ibid., Article 12
22 Although sentences should issued by majority of three judges, but jurist members had right o f veto, 
because it was him that was considered as representative o f the Shari ’ at. Ibid Articl. 11
24 111 Shi'at branch temis Feqh is counterpart o f Shari'at in sunni branch
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previous judges, they preserve some of the previous rules. Their trials are unpublicised, 
and their names are associated with a kind of horror.
In addition to Revolutionary Courts, there are two special courts that operate 
differently from public courts: Military Courts and Special Courts of Clergymen. The 
former were “established by law to investigate crimes committed in connection with 
military or security duties by members of the Army, the police forces, the Islamic 
Revolution Guards Corps and other military and quasi-military g r o u p s . T h e s e  special 
crimes are considered extremely treacherous and treated harshly. These kinds of 
criminals are prosecuted secretly and punished more harshly than other criminals in 
similar circumstances. Prosecution of criminals in the- Special Courts of Clergymen- are 
even stricter This is particularly because it is neither constituted nor operated 
according to certain law, but operates under the supervision of the Supreme Leader. 
Procedurally and substantively it is a stiiking example of the system of Kadi-justice. 
Crimes are not defined and punishments are not determined by penal codes. They are 
totally managed by the clergy and do not allow lawyers to defend their clients unless they 
are clergymen. It is said that the aim of these courts is the preseiwation of the clergymen’s 
sacredness and social standing. It is believed that wrongdoing, anti- social behaviour, or 
behaviour that is not compatible with their religious and social position, damages
22 Constitution Law 1990, Article.172
2^  The Special Court for the Clergy (Dadgah-e vizhe-ye Rouhaniyat) was established based on a letter 
written by the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini dated 25 Khordad 1366 (15 June 1987)(8) in which he appointed 
Ali Razini as Judge (Hakem-e Shar') and Hojjatoleslam All Fallahian as the Prosecutor for the Special 
Court for the Clergy. The functions and scope of the new court were described by Hojjatoleslam Fallahian 
in a press interview published in several newspapers on 7 July 1987. He stated that the court would 
"investigate crimes such as counter-revolution, corruption, fornication, unlawful acts, accusations which 
are incompatible with the status o f  the clergy, and all crimes committed by 'pseudo-clergy', both in terms o f  
the ugly acts they cojmnit and the effect they have on the reputation o f  the clergy". The courts were to be set 
up in Tehran, Mashhad, Tabriz and Shiraz, and later in other cities as necessary. Amnesty International.
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reputation and authority of the clergy as a whole, and also damages Islam. For this 
reason, one of the famous penalties for these (political or non-political) criminals is their 
dethronement. These courts prosecute all criminal and immoral behaviour of clergymen 
and all cases that in some way involve them whether as criminal or victim. The secret 
procedures of these courts, the unpredictability of their sentences, and their strict 
approach to extinct crime have also associated their name with honor and anxiety.
An important stage in the substantial transformations of penal practice in Iran was 
the legislation of the Islamic Penal Code in 1983.27 This penal code was finally approved 
in 1997 by a parliamentary amendment. With this, the content of punishment changed 
profoundly, becoming substantially more severe than before. One element in this 
increased severity was increased criminalization.2^ Moral and victimless crimes increased 
sharply in numbers. Rape, homosexuality (for both men and women), 2^  incest,
In the Islamic Penal Code article 12-17 - that is based on Feqh books in particular Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
book by the name Tahrirol-Vasileh( 1970) - punishments are classified in five categories:
\-Hododd  (singular fonn is had) is a punishment that its type, amount and quality are determined by Feqh. 
These kinds o f penalties are mostly determined by Quran and rarely by Infallible Imams.
2-Chesas (retaliation) is a punishment that should be equal to crime. This punishments peifomis against all 
injuries done against human body, including crimes against individuals including,homicide.
3-De'yeh (blood money)
4-Ta'zir is a penalty that its degree and type is not specified by the Feqh. Ruler (government) is Authorized 
to define crime and determine punishment in this area. Ta'zir can be fines, imprisonment and whipping that 
number o f flogging must be less than number o f flogging in Had (The least Had is 74 lashes). Judge have 
more discretionary power in sentencing and even describing and act as a crime.
5-Preventive (Deteirence) is a punishment that determined by the government (parliament) in order to 
maintain the public interests and public order. It can be in the form o f fine, imprisonment and other 
community punishments. Two points should be noted here, first the main distinguishing feature between 
Ta'zir and preventive punishment is that, Ta'zir is imposed for an act that is religiously illicit, but Shari'ah 
did not determine specific punishment. While in the preventive case there is not any religious background. 
An act is crime because it is haimful for society or individuals.
Second, there is not necessarily relationship between preventive punishment discussed here and deterrent 
punishment known in western countries. They are noit necessarily severe rather are less severe than other 
types o f punishment mentioned above like hodod and gessas.
2^  Jahangir Mansor 1997, Islamic Penal Code Article No.63 
2^  Ibid., Articles. 108-127 82 
2*^ Ibid, Article. 168
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adultery, drinking intoxicating liquor, panderism^^ and apostasy were defined as serious
2^  A sexual procurer as a job.
22 Bakhteyary Head o f Razavy Khorasan Province Judiciary 04-02- 2005 ISNA 
22 Ibid.
Ysagi Aliakbar Head o f the Institution of Prisons in Iran, 25-02-06 BBC News Persian See; 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2006/02/060225_mf_prisoners.shtml 
22 Islamic Penal code. Article 513 
2^  Ibid., Article 106 
27 Ibid., Article 638
crimes to be punished severely, including by the death penalty and flogging. The 
“number of crimes rose to 2000 (at least twice the previous number). Four hundred of 
these crimes potentially are subject to imprisonment,”2^  and the rest to fines, the death 
penalty, confiscation, public flogging, cutting, stoning and so on. The overall number of 
accused who have been sent to prison as detainees or as convicts rose to “600, 000 in a 
year,”22and the number of prisoners rose more than ten times in comparison to 1979.24 I
should be added that in a considerable number of cases flogging, execution and other Itraditional punishments replaced prison. This means that the true figures for punishment "'Iare far greater than the numbers of those sent to prison.
:Purely religious crimes like apostasy received unforgiving penalties. Insulting 
sacred figures like Prophet Mohammad or other great prophets like Jesus, carried the 
sentence of death.22 Committing crime in sacred months like Ramadan, and sacred 
places like the Mosque, led to more intensive punishment than other times and places.
Likewise other behaviours that are religiously prohibited are considered as crimes, if they 
happened publicly, such as eating or drinking in public during the month of Ramadan.
36 'I:;
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As mentioned above, the Iranian government took a harsh approach toward 
crimes against government, security and public order. The harshest forms of penalties 
were used against even ordinary members of rebellious groups that follow a strategy of 
fighting against Islamic government in order to bring about its fall, even if they have not 
taken part in military activities. Further, the punishment of these types of criminals did 
not finish after with death. They were not allowed to be buried in ordinary cemeteries, or 
to have a conventional ceremony and mourning, because these kinds of ceremonies 
belong only to respected people.
Public punishments like public flogging and public execution entered the list of 
penalties t. Under the Islamic Penal Code (IPC), stoning to death, for example, is a penal 
practice that only can be delivered by the pub l i c . I n  particular, judges considered 
flogging as the most popular and influential sentence against moral crimes. Flogging is 
the most commonly used punishment, either independently or in addition to other 
punishments, against religious or non-religious crimes. In the first years of the 
revolution, whipping was mostly carried out in public places. “Public Floggings of 
accused for drinking alcohol or making sexual advances is still earned out 
sporadically. ”4®
The symbolic principle of retaliation is fully reflected in the IPC. The Iranian 
criminal justice system provided for retaliation for all types of crimes against the human
2^  Ibid., Articles 185-8
2^  Article, 101 provided that the time o f performance o f had  will be announced by the judge and presence 
of gi'oup o f faithful that must not be less than three, is necessary.
4*^  BBC World News, 15 August 2001, a report by the name. Row over Public Floggings in Iran.
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body including homicide, injuries and beatings/^ The conditions of retaliation are so 
difficult that, in practice, it can be perfoimed only in homicide cases. Punishment should 
be exactly equal to the injury that has been done by the accused, and criminals must not 
suffer more pain than they caused. Retaliation in murder cases is fixed so that judges 
may not issue the other s en t ences . I t  is very important to know that the right of 
retaliation in all cases of injury and beating belongs to the victim. If the victim or his (or 
her) family wants, a murderer will be killed; if not, he will be free after around three 
years of prison. The victim’s family can carry out the death sentence.
Moreover, there is a contioversial and problematic system ofpfivatization o f 
punishment or permission fo r killing in particular circumstances. Although the state is 
primarily in charge of the penal reaction to any violation of social values, in certain 
conditions members of society are allowed to defend their sacred social values, and carry 
out the penalty in the absence of the state as a representative of society.
In addition, the reduction in the age of criminal responsibility and the abolition of 
time limits on criminal prosecution and performance of punishment, show an absolute 
zero tolerance policy in the ''''Fight Against Smuggling Law", which regards social 
security as one of the most vital social values and imposes the death penalty for merely
IPC. Articles, 204-293 
42 Ibid. Articles, 272-293v 
42 Bazgir 1998, p,39
44 For example according to IPC, if  a killer honestly believed that his victim deserved to be killed he cannot 
be assumed as murderer. This kind o f penal policy gave rise to theoretical and practical problems in 
Iranian society. This issue will be discussed below in more detail
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“resorting to arms in order to frighten P e o p l e . This law determines severe fixed 
punishments and reduces the discretionary power of judges in a considerable number of 
cases. This shows how profoundly penal practice transformed in Iran’s post­
revolutionary penal practice.
Up to now I have tr ied to draw a general picture of penal practice after the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran. I shall now go on to explain how this penal revolution occuiTcd, in 
order to trace the kind of social, political and cultural contexts that brought about this 
deep transformation in the criminal justice system. The subject matter of this chapter is 
an investigation of the relationship between religion and other social forces and the harsh 
penal reactions that have been imposed on against criminals.
I shall first attempt to explain why such profound changes occuiTed in Iran’s 
revolutionary criminal justice system. The Islamic revolution of 1979 so tiansfbrmed 
criminal justice system that it is no exaggeration to say that penal revolution followed 
political revolution. But why penal practice become so harsh after the Islamic 
Revolution? For onlookers, it is clear that there has been a movement toward tiaditional 
and religious punishment. As we will see, there is a close relationship between 
transfoimations in penal practice and the idea of religion. But it is still necessary to 
explain why religion was suddenly placed in such a crucial position in the deteiTnination 
of penal practice.
42lslamic Penal Code, Ibid, Article 183
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As I have argued in previous chapters, from a Durklieimian perspective, social 
punitive reactions have a kind of cultural resonance. They can be considered as an 
expression of society’s common beliefs and sentiments. The stronger and more sacred are 
these morals, the more severe the reaction when they are violated. Penal policies, and the 
transformations that they undergo, can therefore be better understood in light of socio­
cultural transformations, with con'clations between variations in severity and type of 
punishment, and changes in the content of culture. Deep, rapid and profound social 
change has a considerable reflection in penal practice, because society is the crucial 
source of social institutions including punishment. An obvious fluctuation in rigidity or 
flexibility of a certain society’s moral standards can be correlated with a fluctuation in the 
severity of penal practice. Accordingly, an investigation of political and cultural 
transformations could account for the appearance of new fomis of punishment in post 
revolution Iran.
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I Politico-cultural contexts
While punishment is a symbolic and expressive response of collective 
consciousness, it is not clear why that response is so harsh. For Durklieim, the severity of 
the punitive reaction depends on the strength of collective feelings and public conscience. 
For him, when collective consciousness is religious in character, the social reaction will 
be brutal. Blame is no longer the same as in non-religious society in which an act is 
criminal because it offends individuals, society or civil religion. “The offence of man 
against man cannot arouse the same resentment of offence of man against God.”^^  This 
can be relevant to understanding the changes in Iranian criminal justice.
I will investigate how religion in the Iranian society encompassed and contained 
on intermingled set of beliefs and practices regulating ethics, principles of political 
organization and penal policy. As Foucault observed, the event of the Islamic Revolution 
was the resurrection of Islam as a political religion. Religion became a symbol of social 
ambitions uniting all oppositional and revolutionary activities. As we will see below in 
more detail, Islam became a badge of society and eventually led to the establishment of 
an Islamic government and penal practice. But, why did Iranian society, as a developing 
country and the most westernized society in the Middle East in the second half of the 
twentieth century, recognized as modern Iran,‘^  ^return so rapidly to its historical and 
ti aditional background? A shift of back towards traditional values and religion swept 
Iranian society. My claim is that the lack of synchronization between westernization and
4^  Lukes and Scull 1983, p. 125 
47 Bonine and Kiddie, 1981
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existing moral principles was the most influential factor in the changes that culminated in 
the1979 Revolution.
The Shah’s government, and his supporters in Iran and western countries, 
carelessly pursued process of westernization in all industrial, cultural, religious arenas -  
though, importantly not political^® without attending to the anxieties of Iranian society. 
The uneven and sudden presence of modem industries, culture, and civilization in Iran 
appeared as manifestations of corruption and immorality and eventually gave rise to a 
huge disturbances, social explosion and finally revolution. Western values such as 
freedom of alcohol drinking, of relationship between men and women, in particular 
Bfhijabi (lack of veil) as the most obvious symbols of modern culture, appeared as 
symbols of corruption and immorality, compromising the values that underpinned the 
structure of families and society. Yet, the Shah’s regime tried forcefully to modernize all 
aspects of Iranian social life. He attempted to dominate religious establishments through 
modern, scientific, judicial and educational institutions, and as a consequence the Shah’s 
regime was regarded as an enemy of society, religion and as a gi eat criminal that should 
be punished harshly. Collective consciousness directly avenged the Shah’s regime 
through its religious rituals, and its united reaction in the greatest revolution of the 
twentieth century.
Following development of Revolution in 1979 and few months before Victory o f Revolution, Shah 
followed American president (Jimmy Carter) in providing an open political atmosphere, but it was too late. 
It was considered as a sign of his defeat that in addition to freedom of political prisoners as leaders of 
revolution multiplied and accelerated revolution sentiments and speed up victory o f the revolution.
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My claim here is that Iranian society used religion, religious rituals, and religious 
symbols as a shield against the threat to their national identity and social solidarity. An 
endangered moral being, society, stimulated energy and dynamism through religious 
ceremonies. The Islamic Revolution showed that charisma, and in particular religious 
charisma, is not only of historical relevance and can still play an effective role in modern 
society. Thus, Iranian society resorted to religion and sacred symbols; in Foucault’s 
terms it became a perfectly united collective will, collectively sacrificed and geared 
toward a desired end. Now this priceless consequence, sacred social solidarity, had to be 
preserved. The political system became a representative of society, charged with the 
protection of social values. As we will see, the political system, having experienced the 
force of religion, tried to transmit this sacredness to other political, social and moral 
values and consequently justify harsh penal practice. Religion became the foundation for 
social solidarity, and thus every offence against social and political values received a 
passionate reaction.
Foucault aptly reported that Khomeini was not a politician, but an almost mystical 
personality, who was able to guide the demonstrators and maintain their energy. Fle 
rightly reported the readiness of millions of people for sacrifice, arguing that “the image 
[of the unarmed saint versus the king in arms] has its own captivating f o r c e . H e  said, 
“Islam has given its people indefinite resources for resisting.” ®^ But, as we will see, he
4^  Leezenberg 2004, p. 102 
2*^ Ibid., p. 106
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mistakenly used these self-sacrificing behaviours as the ultimate motivation for 
introducing “a spiritual dimension into political life.”^^
political ambition. Khomeini frequently insisted on the unity o f word and word o f
2' Ibid
22 He was apparently unaware of Khomeini’s book of Velayate-Faqih (guardianship o f the jurist, that is, 
ruling by the Shi’at clergy) that was written a decade before the revolution.
22 Ibid., p. 101
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It is true that Imam Khomeini, as Foucault noted, was not a conventional 
politician, but this same characteristic was also the cause of his achievements. He was %
symbol of religion as base of social solidarity. His mysterious personality was the |
symbol of the mystery of religion. In Durkheim terms, he was the '"emblem'' and ‘totem ’ 
of society. In short, Iran appealed to religious totems, rituals and other sacred symbols in 
order to revive and secure social solidarity against immoralities, corruptions and social 
threats. I do not agree with Foucault that Khomeini was not a politician and had no
■unity, the word o f the Islam (not shi'at sect because a considerable portion of the Iranian f
people are Sunnite) as an essential condition of victory and prosperity. He successfully 4I
manipulated religious sentiments and rites “against shah’s regime, the American presence 
as enemy of Iran” and against alleged ‘Zionist conspiracies’ to undermine the nation.”22 
He continued to use religion as a banner for a decade after the triumph of the revolution 
in constructing a political system.
As we will see, the theatrical spectacle of punishment and reproduction of crime’s 
sense in the execution of the condemned man, and the process of reviving and annulling 
the crime before the public, can be analyzed from both Durkheimian and Foucauldian
perspectives. Publicly displaying the criminal with a placard on their back, accompanied 
by police forces, the declaration of their sentence at the foot of the scaffold, the 
confession of the criminal in front of the public through the mass media, perfoimance of 
the execution and exhibition of their corpse at the scene of their crime can be explained in 
tenns of the political process, the presence of the sovereign power, and the active force of 
power’s revenge. Or it can be justified in terms of moral expression and social revenge, 
as Durkheim contended.
As the following arguments show, one should not ignore the fact that guilty 
people in some cases are considered as rebellious and hostile, which calls for revenge.
But the content of sentences, lectures and the cries of people in front of the scaffold, the 
performance of harsh punishment against even minor moral and religious crimes, the 
determination of punishment according to the religious legal rules and so on, all have at 
the first stage a moral and religious message. Any violation of sacred moral and religious 
standards -  as the foundation of social unity - cannot be tolerated. The following 
argument tries to show how the political and judicial system mobilized, promulgating 
conceptions like enemy, conspiracy, sacred and the like in order to strengthen social 
solidarity, the political system and perform harsh punishment.
I-l Politics, institutions and penal policies
The proximity of political and social institutions to religious conceptions and 
institutions gives them a colour of religiosity and sacredness, and every offence against
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them, or the rules that they pronounce, can be seen as a sign of impurity and wickedness. 
In such an environment, in which real and imaginary political or social enemies are ready 
to invade sacred common principles, every criminal can be judged as evil and a soldier of 
the enemy. Historical attitudes towards conspiracy in Iran, the social realities of potential 
and actual enemies in a revolutionary society, and a victory that had been achieved at the 
cost of thousands of sacred martyi’doms brought about remarkable passions against all 
who could be regarded as opponents of a revolutionary and sacred society.
After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, penal practice became politically significant 
because, first, eradication of coiTuption in the performance of justice had been a historical 
and political ambition for centuries, in particular from 1905 onwards, ^"^Secondly, the 
establishment of the Islamic government had been justified partly because of the idea that 
Islamic rules, like Islamic punishments, as divine decrees, could not be performed 
without an Islamic s t a t e . I n  other words, fiom a philosophical point of view, 
perfoiTnance of divine rules in society (including religious punishments as leading part of 
these rules), at least partly justified the establishment of the Islamic state.
Third, “ the Ulama reacted against moral corruption in the Shah’s regime like 
clergymen anywhere in the world: they argued that moral laxity had produced the social 
problem, and that the only way to solve the problem was strictly to enforce the religious
Shi’ at people love Imarn AH. They believed that he had been the most just man in the world and it is 
frequently said; He martyi’ed because of his extreme justice. Revolution o f 1905 begun with demand of 
“House of justice”
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Ervand 1982, p. 474 
Hiro 1987, p. 4
Hashemi Sahrodi Head of Iranian Judiciary 27-01-2005 .ISNA
law.”^^  They believed that ethical principles are the most essential foundations of social 
integrity. Therefore, social, economical and moral corruption was both a religious and 
political humiliation for Islamic society and a sign of inefficiency for the Islamic 
government. Since an Islamic society has historically been a utopia for Muslim people, 
religious revolutionary leaders claimed that in Islamic society corruption and immorality 
would be eradicated. In a society of believers and saints, crime and sin could not be 
tolerated. It was time to prove this theoretical orientation.
Fourth, conspiracy played a crucial role in giving penal practice a highly
politicised role. It was, and still is, accepted as an unquestionable reality that Islamic
society has very sophisticated, well - equipped, well-organized, and strong enemies.
According to the prevailing political ideology, these enemies are continuously planning
for war against Islamic society. Some historical and political events, like the coup d ’etat
.against the democratic government of Dr Mossaddegh by the USA, Saddam Hussein’s 
invasion of Iran in 1981 (supported by supeipowers^^ and some western countries), 
simultaneous civil wars, aimed rebellions across the country, and increasing drug 
offences firmly strengthened the conspiracy theory. This belief has constituted the 
dominant discourse in Iran for more than two decades, and remains strong amongst 
Iranian officials, in particular conservatives.^^
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Fifth, thousands of people, in particular the youth, had been martyred or tortured 
by the shah’s regime during the revolution, in particular in the years 1978-79. Thus, 
feeling of revenge on the one hand, and the performance of divine decrees against the 
previous regime on the other, gave rise to the establishment of revolutionary courts in 
1980. Revolution (regarded as a continuous phenomenon) and revolutionary courts 
continue to act against all anti-revolutionary, organized and serious crimes, rebellion, 
crimes against the government, drug dealing, and so on. Eight years of the Iraq-Iran war 
(1981-1989), in which the masses were largely involved and sacrificed, extraordinarily 
developed the sacredness of social and political values, and strengthened the Iranian 
sense of social integrity produced during the revolution.
In this part of my study I am not going to deal with all economic, political or even 
religious factors as a background to the Revolution. Although issues like economic 
growth following the great rise of oil prices, economic corruption, hyper-inflation, 
unemployment, and the large gap between propertied classes and poor people in Shah’s 
period are important factors in Iran’s revolution, the present study seeks to investigate the 
more powerful historical and social forces that led to the unprecedented political and 
penal revolution. Although a full study of the Islamic revolution of Iran is not my aim, 
an understanding of the eruption of the Islamic Revolution requires knowledge of the 
historical, emotional and religious forces lying like molten rock deep under the surface of 
society. Without a brief discussion of these religious symbols, emotional rituals, and 
charismatic characters, the study of transfonnations in the Iranian society, Islamic
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Revolution and the new wave of harsh justice in the Iranian criminal justice would be 
incomplete.
1-2 Islamic Revolution in Iran 1978-1979
“A revolutionary movement sprang up in Iran at a time of economic prosperity, 
military strength and political s t ab i l i ty .Amer ican  president Jimmy Carter, a few 
months before the victory of revolution, had called Iran, “ an island of stability in one of 
the most troubled areas of the world.”^^  Half a million military personnel, known as the 
fifth army of world, sophisticated intelligence services, and political support from 
western countries (in particular America) failed to defeat a seventy-five-year old exiled 
cleric. For some political analysts, “it seemed to be more a divine miracle than a human 
endeavour.” '^ This miracle continued for some years after the victory of the revolution 
and “offered the world a series of suiprises.”^^
Although political considerations are not the leading thread of this investigation 
the interaction between political and sociological changes and penal policy 
transfonnations necessitates the study of the social and historical contexts that facilitated 
their tmnsformation. In order to better analyse the background of the 1979 Revolution, I 
will look very briefly at apparently unrelated patterns running through twelver shi’ at
^^Hirol985 p. 1 
Ibid
Ibid., p. 2 
Ibid., p. 5
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Islam that came together and contributed to the culmination and intensity of the 1979 
Revolution. These will be analysed in turn.
a) Twelver shi’ism and political legitimation
Shi'at believes in twelve infallible sacred religious leaders as successors of 
Prophet Mohammad, called Imams. The first was Imam Ali, the son-in-law and cousin 
of the Prophet and the last is the Hidden Imam who went into hiding in 874 C.E. As 
shi’at is a “messianic”^^  sect, all political and religious powers were given to Imams by 
god. All the Imams except the Imam Mahdi (hidden imam) were martyi'ed by tyiannical 
governments. The Hidden imam, after his disappearance, introduced four secret 
representatives to connect the people to him. After that, he sent a message stating that he 
would not inti'oduce any more representatives, and that people should refer to the Ulama, 
for answers to their religious questions and social problems.
For shi’at everyone who held political power was, therefore, considered as a 
usurper and illegitimate. Shi’at believers justified themselves through the theory of 
Uaghiyyd’\  which means that you can conceal your faith and delay its assertion in order 
to protect yourself, and your s o c i e t y T h e  presence of Hidden Imam and absolute 
peace, justice and equality in his government is an ultimate ambition of shi’at. They 
always pray to the God for his appearance, on particular, in every Friday early morning, 
because they are promised that he someday would appear on a Friday. The anniversary 
of the his birthday is the biggest religious ceremonies in Shi’at. In contrast to Weber’s
Bonine and Kiddie 1981, p. 35
Shi’at historically has been a minority group amongst other branches o f Islam. Their Imams order them 
to hide their ideas in dangerous situations.
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theory, in which charismatic figures and the charismatic legitimation of political system 
is mainly historical, the case of Hidden Imam in Shi’at shows that in a religious society 
like Iran this conception is fully active and functional. The Hidden Imam as a very 
sacred, prophetic and powerful charismatic character is still alive and Shi’at people in 
countries such as Iran and Iraq enthusiastically follow his decrees, and the ordains of his 
successors. Such as the Ayatollah Kliomeini in Iran, and what we are witnessing now in 
the case of Ayatollah Systany in Iraq.
b) The Pattern of Karbala
The martyrdom of the third Shi'at’ Imam, Hussein, “at the hand of the Umayyad 
aimies of the caliph, Yazid at Karbala in AD 680, is undoubtedly the most important and 
emotive episode in shi'at’s h i s t o r y . F o r  shi'at, martyrdom of the Prophet 
Mohammad’s grandson, son of Imam Ali, is simultaneously the most exti'eme epic and 
tragedy. Around 72 saints, loyal to their Imam, fought against more than thirty thousand 
soldiers. The aim of this sacrifice was the end of corruption and the protection of the 
Islam. “From early childhood, most shi’ats have been immersed in a culture in which the 
martyi'dom to Imam Hussein plays a very important role.” *^’ The name of Imam Hussein 
for Shi’at is synonymous with sacrifice for real Islam and justice -  “‘Poetry celebrating 
the heroic death of (Imam) Hussein had long existed, both in Persian and Arabic.
Singing and mourning for him is part of everyday life, at funerals, and other traditional 
ceremonies, Shi’at commemorate the name and goals of the martyred Imam. The first ten
Momen Moojan, 1979, P. 8 www.northliiII.demon.co.ul/relstud/shia.htm 
Ibid
Avery et al, 1991, p. 724
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days of the Muharram’s month are devoted to particular ceremonies for him, culminating 
on the last day, the day of the martyrdom of the Imam Hussein, Ashura.
Almost all people take part in these massive, mythic and spiritual rituals. They 
sing, cry, whip themselves, exceptionally cut themselves, and march in order and so on.^  ^
People forget themselves and other earthly issues. They put aside material life and forget 
their individual impulses. They experience a different form of life that is full of passion, 
fervour, and enthusiasm. They do not live for themselves, but rather for their sacred 
values and sacred society as their aspiration. In these highly emotional and spiritual 
rituals they call on their Imam, his goals, bravery, his loyal followers, his family and 
young beloved martyi’ed, holy values that he sacrificed himself for and so on. These 
ceremonies are so dramatic and effective that non-Muslim Iranian people like Christians 
try to respect them, take part in these rituals, and even commemorate it independently in 
their churches.
For shi’at. Imam Hussein represents the immense martyrdom of Islam, justice, 
humanity and is a symbol of the fight against tyi’anny, corruption and vice. He is their 
Jesus, who fought for virtue, equality and the principles of the Islam For Shi'at people, 
"thus the Karbala episode is not an event in distant history, but rather a powerful symbol 
kept alive among the shi’at masses by frequent emotive rituals and ceremonies.
This behaviour is religiously and legally allowed, but in such a huge ritual every thing is not under 
control.
Avery et al, 1991, p. 724
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c) The Role of Ulama in society
The contemporary history of Iran cannot be commented on without investigation 
of the active role of the Shi 'at religious scholars (the Ulama), and their hierarchical 
relationship with clergymen (the Rohaneyyat) and other religious institutions like the 
mosque. The Ulama in the early history of shi’at were considered as the holders and 
transmitters of the traditions (hadith) of the prophet and the Imams (prophet’s 
successors). They had had endeavoured to protect the heritage of the Imams and the 
prophet. Over a long time, the Ulama began gradually to be conceived of as the general 
deputies of the Hidden Imam in applying Islamic judgments based on Islamic law, as 
well as some other social activities like the collection of religious taxes {Kums and 
Zakut)/^
The Ulama were long recognized as quietist. However, “by the seventeenth
century [..... ] we hear of leading Ulama (Mujtahids^^) who claim they have more right to
set policy than impious, wine-bibbing s h a h s . T h e y  gradually and sporadically engaged 
in political activities. It is important to note, in this context, that the Ulama in the Shi'at 
sect are different from their colleagues in Sunni. First, Ujma\ consensus, and the 
emulation of the accumulated Ijma “of past generations, limits Ijtihad in Sunni world,”^^
^^Khums is one-fifth of annual revenue that religiously must be paid by the emulators to the Ulama whom 
they fallowed. Zaloit, is one-tenth o f agricultural revenue that should be paid annually by followers to the 
U
71
lama.
* A Mujtahid is a high position religious scholar who could exercise “efforts” (Ijtihad) in interpreting 
religious law and doctrine. They do not necessarily work in other field like philosophy. ‘The final cycle in 
shi'at’s Feqh training (is) training in Ijtihad, to arrive at independent opinion on matters o f law and 
interpretation.’ See Zubaida Sami, Law and Power in the Islamic World, 2003, P. 184 It should be noted 
that, law in this field covers all religious activities including worships, transactions, punishments and other 
individual and social activities.
Bonine Michael and kiddie Nikki 1980,p. 2 
Zubaida Sami 2003. p. 184
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while the dynamic o ï Ijtihad hdiSQà on rational and traditional principles gives Shi'at 
Mujtahids more room for flexibility and autonomy. Ijtihad and the declaration of new 
Fatwa to suit new conditions is a regular practice of high Ulama in Shi'at, “as we saw in 
both the constitutional Revolution of 1906, and the more recent Iranian Revolution of 
1979 and the Islamic Republic it generated.” '^*
Second, the Shi'at Ulama were more politically reactive to threats to their nations 
and countries than Sunni Ulama. This is because Sunni Ulama “had less economic 
independence and strength than the Iranian U l a m a . S h i ' a t  Ulama are economically 
independent through Khums, Zakut and 'Vaqhf (charity) institutions. Third, the Shi'at 
Ulama are generally deputies of a highly sacred and charismatic hidden Imam, who “will 
return to earth as Mahdi (messiah) to institute the millennium of perfect e q u i t y . T h i s  
feature, coupled with their simple and ascetic life, endow with them more charismatic 
character.^^Fourth, the Shi'at Ulama have almost always been independent of the state. 
‘Unlike their Ottoman counterparts, their power did not derive, for the most part, from 
state office or stipend, but from their position in the religious institutions’^ ,^ and their 
followers among the masses. Moreover, the Shi'at Ulama are equipped with a huge
Ibid
Bonine and Kiddie 1980, P. 25
Ibid., p. 2
What is shown by the Ayatollah Systani an Iranian bom Marja' [a senior Alem (singular form of The 
Ulama)] in Iraq is a example o f such position o f the Ulama in society. Although he is not a political 
activist and doesn’t want to be directly engaged in politics like a politician.
Zubaida Sami 2003, p. 182
Religiously every Shi’at must emulate a senior Alem  (singular form of the Ulama) who called Marja', 
literally means reference. Typically this emulation does not cover, political matters.
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hierarchal system of Houzeh^^ in every city and town, mosques, and Hossineyehs^^ that 
are supervised by the junior c l ergymen.These  structures, their independence, and their 
charismatic character gifted them a powerful position in society, although historically 
they have not always applied that power in political struggles.
A historical event may show the potential powers of the Ulama in Shi'at society. 
Nasiru'd-Din shah^^ (1848-1896) was the most powerful mler of the Qajar dynasty, and 
ruled Iran for around fifty years. On 8 March 1890 the shah secretly offered a fifty-year 
monopoly of all activities related to Iran’s tobacco “to Major G.F Talbot of the British- 
owned Imperial Tobacco Company,” '^^  The deal was very unbalanced in favour of the 
British c o m p a n y . A s  a result. Grand Ayatollah Shirazy, who lived in Iraq, “issued a 
Fatw”'^  ^to the effect that every kind of smoking tobacco was religiously forbidden and 
considered as war against the Imam Mahdi: “the nation reacted with astonishing single- 
mindedness; all pipes and cigarettes which were such an essential part, as essential as tea,
Religious system of education. Some writers like Zubaida has used tittle o f Madrasa instead of Houzeh 
that is not conventional and known, (see Ibid. p. 183). For example this year (2005) in Muhiram months 
Houzeh sent 27000 clergymen across country in order to mourning ceremonies o f the Imam Hussein and 
introducing his messages to people(l). This amount should be added to thousands o f clergymen who 
constantly are present in mosques.
(1) Ayatollah Meshkini Ali 04 -02-2005 ISNA
Local religious institutions like mosque that are established for mourning ceremony and commemoration 
of Imam Hussein.
In Western teims Mullah frequently uses instead o f Clergyman or Rohaini (spiritual), while Mullah in 
Iranian culture is considered as a kind o f insult.
Avery Peter 1965, p. xiii 
Hiro 1987, p. 17
Entire tobacco crop o f Iran and other activities related to that offered for a personal gift o f £25000 to 
him, and a annual fee of£15000 plus 25 percent of profits to the state. The yearly consumption o f 10000 
tons of tobacco Iran indicated the magnitude of deal see Hiro Dilip Ibid p. 17 
Avery Peter 1965, p. 104
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of any Persian gathering or recreation were abandoned, even in the royal household.”^^  
This was a nightmare for Shah, who for several decades had tried to put the Ulama out of 
political activities. Crisis engulfed the country, and there was no choice for the Shah but 
cancellation of the concession to the Tobacco Company.
d) Eruption of Revolution
The intensity of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the suddenness with which it 
appeared surprised many people both in Iran itself and in the rest of the world.^^ The 
Shah Mohammad Reza was equipped with numerous instruments of power, including 
“the fifth largest army of the w o r l d , a  strong bureaucracy^^, and a powerful police and 
security forces like SAVK [that acted] as an “iron fist”^^  against any political activity. All 
political opponents, parties, and secularist oppositions were suppressed or destroyed, and 
an expanded governmental party was created which provided the regime with a large 
governmental and party bureaucracy^^. The Shah, the royal family and their loyalists 
were the richest family in Iran,^^ and the “quadrupling of the oil price” '^^  in 1977 made 
them still more powerful and rich. “The Shah’s regime was associated with secularist
Ibid, it is very famous example that, someday, Nasiru'd-Din shah asked his wife to bring him a pipe. His 
wife said; do not you Icnow that it is forbidden. Who said that, asked shah? His wife replied the man who 
allowed me to be your wife, Mirza Shirazi.
Moojan 1979, P. 1 
Ervand 1982, p. 435-36
In the course o f fourteen years (1963-1977), the state bureaucracy grew up from 12 ministries with some 
150000 civil servants to 19 ministries with over 340,000 civil servants’, (see Abrahamian, 1982 p. 438) 
Ibid, pp. 435-39
93 Ibid., pp. 437-38
94 Ibid., p. 435
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politics and with ties to the West and Israel; (likewise) Russia (Soviet Union) and China 
supported the shah.”^^
The shah’s regime had not ignored those social institutions that were considered 
as purely religious but had tried to marginalized or control them. The educational and 
judiciary system had become secular but it had also tried to dominate religious j
institutions. The Faculty of Theology was established in prominent cities like Tehran and 
Mashhad against Houzeh, vri^/z/became a governmental institution, clergymen were 
prohibited from performing their duties, even from the performance of maniage and 
divorce ceremonies, and a governmental institution by the name Army of Religion was 
created to replace clergymen, preachers and other religious leaders. More importantly
SImam Khomeini, the most important opposition Ulama to the Shah’s regime, was exiled 
and sent to Iraq. Everything seemed under control.
However, later events showed that there was a gap between appearance and 
reality, and the regime had no “foundations in the social f ab r i c . Re l i g i ous  institutions 
and Shi'at beliefs remained intact. Marj ’aeyyat/^ the institution that was in charge of i
religious doctrines and society’s leader in religious practices, remained actively present in 
society. In particular a revolutionary Marj'a by the name of Khomeini had developed a 
political doctrine in Shi'at. He did not agree with sporadic reaction against governmental
Bonine and Kiddie 1980, p. 34 
Abrahamian, 1982, p. 496
The senior mujtahids that have emulators called Maij'a and this institution called Matja'eyyat.
corruptions, as had the Ulama in the contemporary history of Iran. Instead, he introduced
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the theory of Velayat-IFaqih. According to this theory Islamic society should be ruled in 
accordance with the Holy Law (the Islamic law), and only an Islamic scholar, and an 
expert in jurisprudence (the Faqih) could have a sufficient knowledge of the shari'a. 
Therefore leadership in an Islamic country belonged by right only to a Faqih.^^ He 
justified his theory through the Quran and Shi'at tradition.
Economic, moral and political corruption in the regime provided Khomeini with a 
suitable platform to provoke a strong reaction. In particular, his general position as 
Na'ibul Imam (Deputy of Imam Mahdi), his charismatic personality that typically he 
borrowed from infallible Imam (the hidden Imam), being sayyed,^^ and his extremely 
simple life (like the lowest and poorest people) made him extremely popular: a hero. For 
him, not only there was no separation between mosque and state, but the state was an 
agent for the perfoimance of Holy Laws. He was fully aware of Iranian religious and 
national sentiments. He followed the Imam Hussein strategy and Aushara/^^ believing 
that, blood defeats the sword. Therefore, he asked the people to come peacefully to the 
street and oppose the government.
Moojan 1979, p. 7
His ideas developed in books by the name Kashfol Asrar and Vilayat~lFaqih in 1942. See; zabaida Sami 
2004,p. 191
Sayyed is a person who decentred horn prophet Mohammad or Imams. The persons that have this 
family tree are more respected in society, especially when they became religious scholar. They wear black 
turbaned.
Shi'at believes that it was the Imam Hussein blood that defect caliph Yasid and his dynasty, Bany- 
Omayyah.
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“In the mid-1970s the Shah’s regime seemed as durable as the massive dams he 
built and proudly named after his relatives.” He was so proud that he sent his aimy, 
equipped with ultramodern weapons, to stamp out rebellions in places far away from Iran 
such as Oman. He had destroyed or suppressed political parties and intellectual 
opposition, and so turned to attacking his religious opponents. A state newspaper 
(Ittila'at) published a diatribe against the anti-regime Ulama in particular. Imam 
Khomeini. This exceeded the threshold of people’s sentimental and religious 
tolerance. The article caused outrage, and holy city of Qum, the bazaar, and Houzeh 
closed down. Theology students and their supporters took to the streets and clashed with 
police, while the crowd shouted “we do not want Yazid government”, “we demand the 
return of Ayatollah Khomeini” and “we demand public apology”. Some people were
killed or injured.
A new wave of démonstrations commenced. The fortieth day of the Qum 
massacre was commemorated in all major cities of Iran. There were peaceful 
demonstrations against the shah and the symbols of his state. There were occasional 
violations against banks, “because they transgressed the Islamic taboo against usury, 
pornographic films and movie houses because they violated the puritanical mores of the
Abrahamian 1982 p. 496
Ibid., p. 505
Ibid
Ibid
There was no official and reliable statistic, officials believed just two were killed but opposition groups 
announced that hundreds were killed or injured.
It is a religious commemoration that is held in third, seventh, and fortieth days o f death to mom the 
dead.
310
society.”^^  ^Tabrize (the second city of Iran at that time) destroyed all governmental 
banks: “as European eyewitnesses reported that banks lost all their records but ‘not a 
single’ cent from their till.’’^ '^ ® This illustrates the fact that it was mostly a sacred and 
religious uprising, people were not concerned with themselves or material interests.
Fortieth commemorations'®^ came frequently and the wave of Revolution rapidly 
swept the whole country; mosques, universities and other social groups were actively 
involved in revolutionary"® activities. The holy Ramadan months arrived on August 5 
1978, and demonstrations and strikes intensified. More massacres, more holy martyrdom 
and more eruption of emotions against the regime ensued. Muhrram month began on 
December 2. Even under normal conditions in this month, in particular Tasua and 
Ashura (ninth and tenth days of the Muharram), religious emotions are at their highest 
level. It was a time for the Shi'at people (who always address the Imam Hussein with, I 
wish I were with you and were killed with you to achieve eternal prosperity) to prove 
their honesty and loyalty. The historical dynamism of Muhrram ceremonies had been 
restored and even multiplied through the experience of a historical religious epic. Now 
people had wholly abandoned their material life and interests and were struggling to 
sacrifice themselves for their sacred values. Millions of people took part in mourning 
ceremonies and thousands of them wore white shrouds “to show their willingness to be
'®?Ibid 
'®^  Ibid
'®^  Traditionally there is a commemoration in the fortieth day o f individual’s death.
' '® I did not addressed the role that played by intellectual and universities, because it is not a 
comprehensive study o f the Revolution. It should be mentioned that their role had never been less crucial 
than other social groups. But all classes including intellectuals, secular politicians paramilitary religious 
and communist groups supported the Revolution that directed by the Imam Khomeini.
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killed.”"  ' The Leader of the Revolution exhorted the public to make more sacrifices 
until blood triumphed over the sword and Islam over the “pagan” Pahlavi’s"^.
No soldiers dared to shoot their fellow citizens mourning the Imam Hussein, as 
they regarded themselves as members of the mourning band. ' Instead they sometimes 
shot their commanders. As the New York times reported “the military decided to 
backtrack during MuhiTam.”" ''
Finally, on February 1, some three million turned out into the streets of Tehran to 
hail Kliomeini’s tiiumphant return. Khomeini, the Prophet and strategist of the 
revolution, had come home,"^ to establish Islamic government, deliver social justice to 
the deprived masses."^ Thus, religion played its part in unifying sacred collective 
sentiments, mobilising the masses and defeating the Shah’s political system. It was a time 
of materialization and institutionalization of religious ideas. The political system 
attempted to keep religious rationalities and sentiments alive and manipulate them against 
political problems like crime.
" ' Ibid., P. 521
"^Khomeini 27-10-1978, pp. 1-4 cited in Ibid 
Ibid., p. 523 
""'ibid
Ibid., p. 526 
"®Ibid., p. 522
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1-3 Sacred political system and penal policy
These sacred emotions and rationalities strengthened the infrastructure of Iranian 
social solidarity and led to the victory of the revolution in 1979. These foundations, 
accompanied by the political enthusiasms of revolution, inflamed and multiplied passions 
and emotions such that no dam could resist them. The relation between mosque and 
politics was strengthened and talk of separating of religion and politics became taboo for 
around two decades A political system based on the ideology of Islam, the “Islamic 
Republic”, was established in 1980."^ One of the prime aims of the Revolution and the 
Islamic Republic was performance of Islamic law and this occurred especially in criminal 
law. This is because in other legal areas either there was no significant gap between 
existing law and Islamic law, like civil law, or there was no alternative Islamic law, and 
there was no contradiction between existing law and Islamic principles, as with 
administrative law, modem commercial law and so on.
However, in the sphere of criminal law, the state of affairs was totally different. 
The existing law was founded on western values, but there was a rich system of Islamic 
procedural and substantive criminal law, and it was insisted religiously and politically 
that it must be applied, because penal practice was seen as an expression of society’s 
morality which was simultaneously aimed at maintaining the integrity of the social
' Those who do not believe this theory were considered as dissidents, deprived o f some rights and 
sometimes prosecuted. For example a famous Iranian philosopher by the name Soroosh who is now 
working with western universities in America, Britain and Germany was not allowed to teach in the Tehran 
University, because, he tried to introduce idea of separation between mosque and politics. He sometimes 
called the Iranian or Islamic Martin Luther.
The Ministry o f Culture and Islamic Guide, 1990, p. 25
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system. It was for precisely this reason that immediately after the revolution the leaders 
of the revolution attempted to appoint Mujtahids, and other religious jurists that had 
traditionally studied Islamic law in Revolutionary and other criminal courts. These courts 
were based on Islamic principles, as there was no enacted Islamic criminal law; non­
criminal courts were still mostly managed by university-trained lawyers. As a result, the 
content, shape and performance of criminal justice entirely changed after the Islamic 
revolution.
After the establishment of the Islamic Republic the political system as a whole 
gradually became a sacred, but sacredness also attached to other political and social 
institutions and characters. Leaders of the revolution (now politicians) who had witnessed 
the forceful power of religion tried to associate the concept of sacredness with political 
and social notions. Indeed all other social and political institutions attempted to lay a 
protective shield of religion around themselves. Terms like sacred regime,"^ sacred 
judiciary system,'^® sacred parliament,'^' sacred Rohaneyyat (clergymen institution),'^^ 
sacred family institution'^^, sacred war against violators'^"', even sacred charity 
institutions,'^^sacred city, sacred society and so on, became part of everyday speeches of
' Dorry Najafabady General Prosecutor o f Iran, 30-1 2005, ISNA 
and Hashemi Shahrody Mahmod Head of Judiciary Ibid 31-1-2005
'^' Moin Mustafa the Minister o f Education Research and Technology, 4/12/2002 Iran Newspaper (Official 
Organ o f Government)
Khatami Ahmad 4/2/2005member of Religious Teachers o f Qum’s Houzeh (seminary) Association. 
www.BaztabjCom
Constitution law, 1990. article 10
Every year anniversary o f violation o f Saddam against Iran commemorate as “sacred defence”. See 
Hashemi Shahrodi, Head o f judiciary ISNA 31/1/05
Doiry Najafabadi. General Prosecutor o f Iran 16/2/2005, ISNA Press
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politicians, journalists and judicial officials. But it was considered that “the judicial 
system is the most sacred of institutions, because it does the most sacred jobs.”'
The Revolution was considered as a “divine gift” '^  ^that “must strongly be 
protected”. T h e  judiciaiy became the most important institution in guarding against 
“any violation of sacred values”. T h e  existence of originally sacred issues like religion 
itself and sacred values, holy figures like prophets and the Imams, and secondary 
consecrated subjects like the political system, political institutions, political figures, 
social security and so on, brought about a long list of crimes and heavy punishments that 
were unknown previously. Purely religious crimes like Ghazf (attributing sexual 
intercourse to men or woman)'^®, every kind of illegal relationship and physical contact 
between man and woman, adultery,'^' rape(man or woman), '^^incest'^^, Moharebeh}^'^ 
use of arms, homosexuality (men or women), insult to prophets, i mams ,apos t a sy  
g am b l i ng , a nd  drinking potentially earned severe punishments.
In addition, crimes or insults against government, the supreme leader, Imam 
Khomeini, Ayatollahs (Maraje), President, Ministers, MPs, and members of Guardian
'""ibid
Messbah, 18/2/2005, ILNA 
Mortazavi 16/2/2005 ISNA 
' Ivan newspaper 23/8/2003
Jahangir, Islamic Penal Cod. 2000. Articles 139 to 164 
'^'Ibid., Articles 63-81 
Ibid., Article section o 
Ibid., Article 82 section A 
Ibid., Article 183-196 
Official Newspaper 1997. Article 513 
Ibid., 701-710 and 166-180
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Counci l en te red  the Iranian penal code, and depending on the intention of the offender, 
could lead to death or prison. The conspiracy theory that indicates the active 
omnipresence of the enemy in all social, cultural and political fields played its role in the 
transfbimation of penal policy. The prime targets of this enemy were seen as the Islamic 
revolution, Islamic republic and Islamic values as the foundation of a new social cohesion 
in new society. It was believed that the battlefield had transfened from an openly 
military war to a secret undermining of the foundations of the political system, and the 
ideology of Islam. This enemy was assumed to be sophisticated, well equipped, and 
cruel. The constant presence of that enemy is still dominant in the political discourse of 
the revolution, in particular amongst officials and conservative politicians. Imam 
Kliomeini deliberately produced the idea of Great Satan as a religious-political symbol 
for the USA and international tyrants, and placing this conception at the centre of all his 
foreign policy. These ideas were highly effective in developing social integration. They 
were symbols of powerful international enemies of the country who caused all social, 
moral and political corruption. He declared that the “Iranian nation today is under attack 
by tyrants of the world. It is a real war although it is not constantly a military fight.”'^ ^
The international enemy is assumed to be an “enemy of religion,”'^  ^attacking 
Islamic society to try to undermine its stiong culture and morality. The head of the 
judiciary, in defending of public flogging, announced that the “endeavours of our enemy 
in opposition to Islamic aspects of our political system is aggravated, they try to increase
Ibid., 514-515 and 609
Khamenaie Supreme Leader o f Iran 19/2/2005, ISNA (Iranian Student News Agency. ) 
Shirazy Makarem 04 -02 - 04 ISNA
316
immoralities and coiTuptions. Hands and plans of enemies are visible behind the scene of 
crimes and social coiTuption.”'"'® These conditions make the “judges duty highly 
crucial.”'"" Thus, all crimes could have political indications. Conspiracy theory is a 
multifunctional idea, increasing the cost of crime whilst legitimating the political system 
and justifying harsh punishment. Because, according to this, perspective criminals, as the 
fifth column of the enemy seiwed the conspiracies of the complicated and powerful 
enemies; they are going to increase immoralities in society, destabilize it, weaken social 
solidarity and finally subordinate or exploit society. Thus, restrictive and harsh 
punishment is functional and useful.
The IPC became very concerned with the intentions of criminals. There is a long 
list of crimes that normally carry sentences of a few years of prison, but the same crimes, 
accompanied by political motivations, will be sentenced with death. For example, arson 
(five years jail without political motive, death without), attempts to assassinate key 
political and religious figures like marja' Supreme Leader, Parliament’s Speaker, 
President and so on (3 to 10 years jail without political motive, death with),'"'^ creating a 
group or quasi-group in order to disturb national security (2 to 10 years jail or death),'"'"' 
resorting to weapons (fr om petty punishment to death), and membership of opposed 
armed groups (from 2 to 10 years imprisonment or death).'"'® Likewise those crimes that
'"*® Social corruption in Iranian culture primarily indicates to fi-ee and illegal relationship between men and 
women, pornographic issues, and alike.
'"" Hashemi Shahrody Head o f judiciary 18/8/2001 Iran Newspaper.
Mansor Jahangir 2000, article 675 
Ibid., Article 515 
Ibid., Article 498 
'"'® Ibid., Aiticle 183 
'"'® Ibid., Article 498
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disrupt the economic system, like forgery of banknotes or hoarding'"'^ and so on, depend 
on intention of criminals (whether they are looking for their personal benefit or 
disruption to the political and economical system, could receive a sentence from five to 
twenty years to jail or to death.)
Moreover, policy-makers preferred subjective, rather than objective, criteria in 
deteraiining the dangerousness of criminals. Policy -makers sometimes ignore iron 
principles (e.g., actus reus) of criminal law and punish attempted crimes as completed 
crimes.'"'^ In post-revolution Iran, then, criminal law reduced the constituent elements of 
crimes and defined offences very widely. The fewer elements there are, the fewer 
elements the prosecutor had to prove. This transformation seemed necessary for easier 
and quicker elimination of threats to society. For example, being an ordinary member of 
armed opposed groups is treated as equivalent to taking part in armed rebellions, fighting 
against the government and killing innocent people.'®® Once trivial criminal activities 
have shown the wickedness and dangerousness of the wrongdoer, there is no need for the 
completion of the crime.
Drug trafficking and dealing of narcotic drugs is an outstanding example of the 
politicizing and populist strategy of the war against crime. It was firmly believed that the 
existence of organized crime was a crucial part of the strategy of enemies of the country. 
The Islamic Republic showed a zero tolerance policy against any kind of illicit traffic in
Storing and concealing o f public needs in order to sell more expensive.
Official Newspaper. 1991, p. 3 These crimes must be prosecuted by the Revolutionary courts without 
delay or waiting their legal turn.
Of similar development in USA. See p, 185-186 
' ®® Ibid., Article 186
318
it as a real war. For example, from 1998 to 2004, around two million drug dealers were 
aiTested, 9573 armed conflicts took place, 11,172 bands and groups of drug traffickers
Iran Newspaper. 23/9/2005
Ibid. This statistics does not include those criminals who sentenced to death. They are killed in armed 
conflictions against police and other governmental forces.
Ibid Jihad means sacred war. Sacred jihad terms used for more emphasis on its sacredness. 
Homicides, thefts, immoral crimes and so on that related to drug dealing or addiction 
'®® Gouverneur Cedric March 2002 Le Monde Diplomatique 
'®® Constitution Law Article 56
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. It considered increased drug dealing as a 
“national threat”'®' aimed at youths and teenagers (75% of Iran’s population), and treated
were destroyed, and 4000 drug dealers were killed by governmental forces.'®^ From
1979 to 2005, 3350 police or other revolutionary and security forces were martyred, and 
10,000 were handicapped in this sacred jihad.'®^ As a result of this “ 75% of prison space 
was occupied by criminals directly (53%) or indirectly (22%) related to drugs.” '®"' There 
is no valid statistic for the number of the death penalties carried out, but considering the 
intensity of the war against drugs, harsh legal punishment (death penalty for possession 
of five grams of heroin), the anger of society against this crime, the iron will of 
government and judiciaiy for eradicating this destructive offence, the massive amount of 
drugs found, and great numbers of criminals aiTCSted generally suggest, that use of death 
penalty has been very high. Notwithstanding these great efforts, Iran has not been 
successful in its war against drugs.'®®
1-4 Political System
Iran’s complex political system is a combination of “elements of a modern 
Islamic theocracy with democracy,”'®® in which sovereignty theoretically belongs to God
■:319
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and the deteimination of the political and social destiny of society has been gifted to 
individuals by God.'®^ Almost all requirements of democracy like freedom of speech, 
free newspapers, free parties and other civil institutions, free elections, equal rights and 
so on, are confiimed by the constitution. *®^ The only restriction is that political 
institutions are not allowed to make decision against Islamic ordinances and the
constitution,’®'^  except where necessitated by the members of the Expediency Council 160
FRESIDENT SEEREMEUEADEBÈili?— 1
ARiVIED FORCES
CABIMET
HEAD OF JUDICIARY
PARLIAMENT
EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL
ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS
KEY: Directèd^eiëcted Appointed or approved _ Vets eand idales-
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Ibid
See Ibid Articles 6, 7, 19, 20, 23, 26, 27 and so on 
Ibid., Article 4
Ibid., Article, 112. They are appointed by the Supreme leader, and are authorized to recognize these 
qualifications.
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As the graph shows the electorate directly or indirectly elects all key political 
actors and governmental institutions.’®’ All politicians are accountable constitutionally.
Moreover, national and international political conditions, civil crises and war, the actual
and imaginary enemies of the political system, the revolutionary condition of society,
international boycotts, and the inseparable relationship between mosque and state have '
provided political conditions where there is a constant and reciprocal relationship
between public opinion and the political system. Members of parliament, as the only
institution that has the right to legislate,’®^ are directly elected by the people without any
particular legal restrictions.’®^ However, supervision of the election by the Guardian
Council has been somewhat controversial, because it has gone beyond its constitutional
rights and disqualified considerable numbers of candidates. Public demands and public
opinion have always been an important concern of Iranian politicians. As the supreme
leader stated “people are the roots of the political system and this political system relies
on the thoughts, votes and beliefs of the people.”’®"’
Unlike Weber, who does not recognize current public opinion as a source of 
legitimacy in society, the political system has to struggle to convince the public on any 
controversial political and social issue. In an analogy with a Freudian psychological 
analysis of personal character, social morality can be divided in two sections: conscious 
and unconscious. Public opinion constitutes the conscious part of social morality that
’®’ There is an exception about Supreme Leader who elected indirectly and pennanently, till he has not lost 
qualifications of leadership or has not died or resigned. See article 107-108
’®^  It is true that occasionally Guardian Council disqualified candidates o f parliament, but constitutionally 
there is no obstacle for being a member o f parliament.
’®^ Ibid., Constitutions Law Article 71.
’®"’ Khamenahei Supreme leader o f Iran. 09-03-01 Iran Newspaper
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actively responds to the social and political events. Unconscious social morality is 
potential social morality, rooted in historical social notions that dynamically affect 
collective consciousness. This is why historical and genealogical study of social 
institutions is crucial to a better understanding of current social events.
However, the judiciary in the Iranian political system has never been fi'ee of 
political t e n s i o n s . O n  the contrary, the judicial system has always been at the centre of 
the most controversial political issues. For them the protection of the political system, 
social values and the satisfaction of the public have been constant concerns. They 
deny the allegation that they have support conservatives over reformers and that they 
have restricted reforaiist politicians and press, claiming that if reformist politicians and 
médias are prosecuted, it is simply because they have committed crimes. They never 
denied their participation in policymaking and the performance of policies required by 
the Islamic Republic of Iran.
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Judiciary’s officials frequently talk to people through T.V, newspaper and other médias. Judiciary has 
particular speaker that every week takes part in a Press Conference and answer media’s questions. He and 
other judiciary’s officials questioned about political criminals, their future, and other remarkable and 
controversial cases. Head o f judiciary accompany with a team o f his colleague every week takes part in a 
public meeting and hears people’s complaint against claimed unfair judicial verdicts and issues orders for 
reconsideration.
Head o f judiciary said; ‘accusation o f politicization to judiciary is unfair’. Iran Newspaper. Jun 24 2002 
but their refoimers are not agree with him, they believed that judiciary system is firmly against refoimers. 
The judiciary banned around hundreds o f newspapers that all o f them supported reformers, because they 
assumed as ‘supporters of west and the U.S.A. See Dorry Najafabadi Ghorbanali, Previous Minister of  
Security and Present General Persecutor. Iran Newspaper Mar 1 2001
The judiciary’s head o f international affairs acknowledged that Iranian judges were politicised to some 
degree and such cases had damaged the judiciary’s image abroad. See larijani mohammad javad 
htto://www.dailytimes.com.plc/default.asp?page=story_23-l-2004_pg4_21
Mahmod Hashemi Shahroodi. Head of the Judiciary 10/2/2005, ISNA . Head o f judiciary believed that, 
in critical conditions in particular, political, security and economical crises, which all o f them are due to 
foreign and international tyr anny’s propagandas, our cultural, security and judicial institutions acted against 
political and press corruption and secured our nation and political system. Regarding our inefficient 
facilities it is miracle of judiciary that secured political system against gigantic dangerous.’
However, achieving public satisfaction and justifying the performance of 
punishment is a significant concern in the criminal justice system. This is because, on the 
one hand, the political system, in cuinent internal and international conditions, clearly 
needs public support and on the other hand, they cannot easily ignore “heavy pressure of 
public opinion in their policy and sentencing.”
The striking case of ''Pakdashr demonstrates how public opinion affects the 
criminal justice system. A young criminal by the name of Bijeh was aiTcsted in 
September 2004 for raping and murdering twenty-two children. He had been arrested 
after killing around 8 children, but was released because of insufficient proof. As a result, 
a wave of “anger and harsh criticism swept the whole country. It was considered as a 
scandal and crisis for the judiciary, police forces and even the whole political system.
The president Kliatami, who had patiently tolerated massive political crises, criticisms 
and pressures on behalf of powerful conservatives, during the previous seven years, for 
the first time talked about his resignation. The “Iranian chief of police apologized to 
people and the victims’ family and promised great transformations in crime control 
policy. Four prosecutors and judges, and sixteen police o f f i c e r s o f  pakdasht, were 
prosecuted because of their failures in this case.'^^ The general prosecutor announced 
that there was no explanation or defence in such an event. The Higher Council of 
National Security attentively considered the issue. Newspapers played their role; they
Seraj Head o f the Tehran Province’s Criminal Courts, 18- 08- 04 ISNA 
BBC News Persian 23- 09-04 
ISNA 19-08- 04 
™  Ibid
BBC News Persian 12-09-04  and 15- 09-04
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called it an “unprecedented felony in the history of Iran.”’ The case was considered as 
a “national disaster and the accused was subsequently prosecuted outwith normal 
criminal procedures and the court sentenced him to 16 times execution, flogging, and 
paying 16 Deyeh shortly after final trial.
By contrast, the case of Aghajari, a university lecturer who was convicted of 
apostasy in November 2002, and sentenced to death, prison, exile and deprivation of 
some social rights, “sparked the largest student protest for (two) years.” The higher 
court eventually reconsidered the sentence and released him from detention. Lately he 
has been acquitted of all charges except a trivial charge, and sentenced to the time he had 
previously served. This new sentence is considered a discretionary verdict, because less 
than that was problematic and for the Judiciary.’^ ^Because it was difficult to explain how 
an accused has been detained for more than his sentence.
University students, particularly in the capital city Tehran and other major cities 
of Iran, have historically been in the vanguard of social movements. They are often 
described as the sensitive antenna of society. They have played a crucial role in 
contemporary social and political movements. They react rapidly reaction to social and 
political problems, and other social groups occasionally follow their reactions and 
protests. Because of this the University and students, as symbols of intellectuals, are 
considered as revivals of clergymen. Thus, their protests should be at least partly treated
Iran Newspaper. 12- 08-2004 
Khorasan newspaper 13-08-04
http://news.bbc.co .ulc/l.hi/world/middle_east/3681229.stm
It was not possible to explained how one could be detained more than his final sentence.
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as a symbol of public opinion. The case of Pakdasht also illustrates the strength of public 
opinion, and the difficulties faced by the judiciary and officials in convincing the public 
that they are serious and powerful enough in responding to criminal activities.
It should be mentioned that newspapers, weblogs and websites nowadays play a 
crucial role in addressing penal policies. After the closure of most reformist 
newspaperdur ing  last six years, they changed the focus of their critical discourse from 
highly sensitive political issues to more social subjects, such as penal practice. These 
days all newspapers have a page of ‘social events’ that are primarily criminal reports, in 
particular political crimes and public penal practices like public executions. There is 
interaction between public opinion and journalists. On the one hand their reports inform 
the public and provoke their sensitivities to responsive issues; on the other hand, the 
public psychologically and financially support and encourage them. Since that shift of 
attention, the influence of newspapers and independent presses has significantly 
increased; as result, the judiciary has tried to interact with them. The Head of Tehran 
Province Bureau of Justice has asked correspondents to prevent public suspicion and 
vilification of the j u d i c i a r y . I n  spite of this, the judicial system is still harshly criticised 
by journalists,’^  ^ forcing the judiciary to try and compromise with them- promising that
Temporary confinement is a legal teims that means judicial officials authorized to temporarily stop 
some activities that they recognized as harmful for society. In this case temporary confinement has been 
unlimited and there is no expectation o f release.
Alizadeh Abassali, Head o f  Tehran province Bureau o f  Justice 16/2/2005 ISNA 
Seharkhiz Eesa, previous general manager of Presses in Khatami’s Cabinet and present member of 
Defence of Press Freedom Association and a journalist, said; “judiciary treated presses as prostitute and 
dangerous criminals.” http://www.emrouz.com Info/showitem.aspx2ID==558P=l 
He indicated to “probation Law 1941” that was about inconigible criminals and used by judiciary for 
banning newspapers.
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prison sentences for journalists would be abolished and journalists treated respectfully.’^  ^
At least theoretically, they have admitted that there are differences between ‘journalists
criminals’ and other criminals.’ ”^
1-5 The Iranian Prison system and religious programs
As Weber noted the, “promot [ion] of bureaucratic centralization in modern Persia 
(Iran)”’ ’^ began at the start of the twentieth century. Since then bureaucracy has been a 
huge part of Iranian government including that of prison. As a result of the rising rate of 
criminalization and rising rate of crime, the prison was installed at the centre of the 
criminal justice system, with more and more prisons being built, throughout the country. 
The prison system in Iran is a legacy of the rehabilitative ideal that was the overarching 
ideology of the pre-revolution penal system. The Iranian penitentiary system is a 
centralized, bureaucratized and to some extent a professionalized system. It is supervised 
by the head of judicial system. The presence of experts, such as psychiatrists, 
criminologists, and physicians, is a sign of the previous rehabilitative system. 
Rehabilitative training, treatment of personal and social diseases and forbearance of 
punishment are legally determined goals of imprisonment.’^^
Shahroodi Hashemi, Head of Judiciary. 29-03-05 Etemad Newspaper 
Alizadeh Abassali, Head o f Tehran Province Bureau of Justice. 01- 03-05 Aftab Newspaper. 
He said; there must be difference between a journalist and a murderer.
Weber 1948, p. 213
Regulations o f Institution of Prison, 1994, Aiticle 44 
See; WWW.ghavanin.com/detail.asp2id=9575 
Ibid, Article 3
326
However, closer attention to the Iranian prison system shows that the Iranian 
criminal justice system has manipulated the bureaucratic system of the prison, and all 
professional and non-professional staff serve as an instrument of moral and religious 
values. The Iranian penitentiary is intended to refoim criminal behaviour, through 
religious education, preaching, regular daily prayers, worship, and control of religious 
and moral behaviours. It is believed that all conectional efforts achieve their best results 
through religious purgatory and self-control. Praying, worshipping and taking part in 
other religious rites are considered to be the best methods of purification. The prison 
chaplaincy is one of the most active sections of the Iranian penitentiary system.'^'’ 
Though these religious programs include non-Muslim prisoners as well. These prisoners 
should be trained according to their own religious ceremonies.
Nowadays prisoner well-being is the most important aim of the religious 
institutions in prison. These institutions try to subordinate rehabilitative programs to 
religiously educational and ritual efforts. These religious efforts are seen as crucial 
contributions to the inmates’ reform. All programs are supervised by clergymen, or are 
in some way related to religious beliefs. Religious institutions control the libraries, and 
most of the library books are religious or at least contain moral messages. There is little 
place for purely secular reformers to focus on rehabilitation outside of a theological 
framework. For example, preaching or taking prisoner to religious ceremonies outside 
prisons like Friday prayer is a regular activity.
For all see Ibid Articles 9-12-13-43-45-47-72-129-171-208 
Ibid. Article 166
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Thus, imprisonment in Iran follows two apparently different agendas, reformation 
and punishment. It has been legally announced, and theoretically insisted on, that prison 
is a punishment, and that prisoners should be expected to lead a restricted and hard life. 
Thus, the expiatory character and deten-ent effect of imprisonment have not been 
forgotten. But it should be noted that both aspects of the prison, punitive, coiTective, 
simultaneously seiwe the same goal: strengthening and supporting society’s morality. For 
example, the family is seen as a basic unit of social structure which occupies a crucial 
place in Iranian penal policy. Thus, prison officials are obliged to support the prisoners’ 
family, and maintain regular relationship between prisoners and their families. Conjugal 
visits, for instance, are widely accepted. The above brief description of imprisonment 
tells us, also, that there is not necessarily a contradiction between the process of 
bureaucratization, professionalization and secularization on the one hand, and the 
emotional, cultural and religious character of punishment on the other.
1-6 Crime Control Policy
A passionate and emotional punitive system does not pennanently and necessarily 
contribute to the foitnation of an irrational and disorganized penal system. As Durkheim 
argued, vengeful emotions should be understood as the energy and engine behind penal 
policy, but these social pressures can be modified, graduated and represented in various 
foiTns. Punishment might be performed in its most modem form but still preserve its 
moral expression. The sacredness of social values, high crime rates, public concerns 
about crime and disorder, and political considerations can give rise not only to harsh
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penal practice, but also to tough and sophisticated crime control policy and law 
enforcement. For Iranian policy makers there are inteinelations between crime, order, 
revolution, religion, politics and the concept of the enemy. Every crime can potentially 
considered as an act against revolution, religion, government or an act of an enemy’s 
agent. In the post- revolution era, the fight against crime is assumed to be the general 
duty of everybody. Crime is committed against the collective consciousness and therefore 
should be responded to collectively. Because of that it is theoretically, legally and 
practically hard to single out a particular institution as the only agency responsible for 
crime control policy. For example, the Islamic Revolution Guards Coips as an army, 
police, security forces, par-military forces or other voluntary groups all consider 
themselves more or less in charge of crime control. Parallel practices in the same field 
occasionally give rise to tensions and conflicts.
In addition to official police forces, created in 1992 (previously rural and urban 
police forces mixed with a revolutionary committee that performed simultaneously with 
them), Basi/^^ paramilitary volunteer forces supervised by the Islamic Revolution 
Guards Corps are present in every urban, rural and bureaucratic jurisdiction. Although 
Basij originally established to defend the country in wartime, it gradually transformed 
into a revolutionary force against every disorderly activity that threatened society. It is 
true that the battle against the hidden foreign enemy has settled down, but it has been
186 Newspaper, Ministry o f  Justice 1980, No, 10328
This quasi-military institution was established by the Revolution Council in 1980 and played crucial role in 
Iraq-Iran war from 1980-1988. This institution played simultaneously as a police force in every local 
place.
It is a powerful Revolutionary Aimy, beside main Arm, that act both like Anny in boarders and as a 
police and security force when is necessaiy.
329
continued on other fronts, such as the war on crime, and the fight against immoral 
behaviour. These battles are considered as another sacred war against secret agents of the 
enemy. It is for this reason that paramilitary forces and institutions, established for war, 
became actively involved in the area of crime control.
Hostility against corruption, immoral acts and crime became part of the everyday 
activity of all the social institutions. There are supeiwisory bureaus in the centre of the 
every bureaucratic jurisdiction that control both administrative affairs and criminal 
activities. There are representatives of the Ministry of Security in other ministries and 
governmental organizations while manage all activities against the revolution, the 
government, and others anti-security activities. As a peripheral task they independently, 
or in co-operation with other forces, take part in crime control policy.
The Institution of Social Protection is an expanded agency of crime control that 
was created in accordance with regulations issued by the Head of the Judiciary, and is 
managed by the Bureau of Justice across the country. This institution co-operates with 
the judiciary through neighbourhood control and reporting crimes to the judiciary, and is 
occasionally involved in law enforcement in trivial crimes. Furthermore,
For example, as ISNA reported Basij forces, perfoimed an operation in 10/2/2005 in 15 provinces and 
sized remarkable amount o f Narcotic drug, wine, cassette, CD, guns and other prohibited materials. These 
materials and accused submitted to the justice Bureau.
Law of Establishment of Islamic Republic Security Ministry. 1984
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in the Islamic Republic of Iran, amr beh Ma'raf wa nahye az munkar^^ (calling 
for good and preventing of immoral behaviour) is a universal and reciprocal duty 
that must be fulfilled by the people with respect to one another, by government 
with respect to the people, and by the people with respect to the government. The 
conditions, limits, and nature of this duty will be specified by law.’^ ’
Accordingly, another institution by the name of Amr beh maruf wa nahy az monkar was 
established, and acts in all cities and towns. This institutions, supervised by clergymen, 
tries to prevent the demoralization of youth through speaking to them in the streets and 
asking them to behave themselves, and in particular asking women not to appear in 
public without a proper hijabP^ Occasionally they help other security or police forces 
through reporting immoral activities or arresting wrongdoers.
In addition to the several institutions mentioned above, after the presidential 
election in 1998 and Khatami’s triumph over the conseiwatives, new agencies of control 
were established or developed in Iran. Conservatives were suspicious of institutions that 
were under reformers’ control, such as the Ministry of Security. They believed that the 
reformers were not serious enough in the fight against dissidents, immorality, and cultural 
and political deviants. Since then, they have installed or supported ‘parallel institutions’ 
alongside other official establishments of control.
It is a Quranic principle, based on an Ayeh 71 Sura 9 which strongly held by shi at. This rule indicates 
that all Muslims are reciprocally responsible and should prevent each other and government from bad 
behaviours and recommend for goods.
Constitution Law 1990 Article 8
According to article 638 of IPC this kind of behaviour considered as a crime.
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The institutions mentioned above mostly developed through a process of 
govemmentally supported privatization and public involvement. This policy is assumed 
to be a less costly and more efficient way of dealing with crime. This approach sought to 
fill the gap between government and society, strengthening collective consciousness and 
social so lid a rity ,a n d  immunizing the political system against conspiracies and 
opposing groups. Therefore, politicians endeavoured to install more quangos and non­
governmental groups in the crime control area.
Those official institutions that in some way are charged with crime control have 
lately intensified the movement toward privatization. Perhaps politicians and policy 
makers have recognized that a preventive policy is more efficient than a punitive 
approach. Moreover, as will be discussed below, the political system is under pressure 
fi'om international organizations due to the carrying out of some physical punishments.’^ '’ 
Therefore the judiciary established Social Protection Institution in 2004, and 
simultaneously police began to install local p o lic e .M o reo v e r, the judiciary system 
expanded a kind of restorative justice system across the country and submitted all less 
serious cases to non-professional judges. This policy has allowed the judiciary system to 
deal with more important cases.
German Radio, DW-World. DE Deutsche Well 14/1/2005 for example reported that; European 
Parliament members asked Iran to abolish death penalty immediately and amend the Islamic Penal Code. 
Hossieny, Commander Chief police of the North Khorasan Province 9/2/2005, Khorasan Newspaper
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II Changing Culture of Crime and Punishment
The study of punishment in Iran after Revolution of 1979 can strongly 
demonstrate how patterns of penal practice in societies broadly follow the social, cultural 
and religious values of that society. It is a striking example of the correspondence 
between changing models of repression and transformations in perceptions and attitudes.
Il l  Changing Conceptions of Criminology, Crime and Criminal Law
As argued, for Iranian traditional judges,conceptions of individualization, 
psychological and sociological cause of crimes, and other criminological notions seemed 
strange. What they have learned are divine rules, in which everything is determined 
previously. This traditional criminal law has developed over a period of fifteen hundreds 
years. Historically there had been little opportunity for application of these penal codes. 
The Islamic Revolution 1979 was the first opportunity for systematic performance of the 
Islamic penal codes for more than a thousand years. As mentioned above, all these 
traditional criminal texts were translated and codified as the Iranian Penal Code. It is true 
that the judge is bound to judge each case on the basis of the Penal Code, but in case of
After the Islamic Revolution, almost all revolutionary courts and most other criminal courts were mled 
by clergymen or judges that had studied Islamic Criminal Law (Feqh). This system o f criminal justice 
tiaditionally includes definitions of crime and detenninations o f punishment. These criminal conceptions 
are collected in conventional texts called the Books of Hodod, Ghesas, Deyat, and Tazirat. ( See:Faez 1991, 
pp. 125-40) These criminal texts are very similar to penal codes, but they are accompanied with a full 
account of their theoretical and religious peimission. They define crimes, specify their particular penalties, 
method of prosecution, perfonnance o f penal practice and so on. They can be considered as both 
substantive and procedural criminal law. The books mentioned, in addition to similar books in the area of 
civil Law, commercial Law and the like constitute the Islamic jurisprudence of the Shi’at branch.’ All 
religious students (called Talabeh) who are going to be a clergyman, a Faghih (Mujtahid) or an Ayatollah 
(marja) must study Islamic Jurisprudence in Houzeh
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The religious perspective on crime, criminals and punishment in the Iranian 
criminal justice system has had a significant impact on the severity of punishment.
Constitution Law, 1990,Article 169
’^^Bazgirl998,p. 69
the absence of enacted law, he has to deliver his judgement on the basis of authoritative 
Islamic sources and authentic fatwas (the Ulama’s comments). The judge, in the case of |
the absence or deficiency of law in the matter, or its brevity or contradictory nature, 
cannot refrain from admitting and examining cases and delivering his j u d g e m e n t . A s  
mentioned previously, sometimes judges resort to the Quran or other authorized religious 
texts as reference for their sentences or more authority for their legal verdict.
On the other hand, political and scientific tensions between these products of the
.religious education system {Houzeh) and the university- themselves a product of the west
Iin contemporary Iran - brought about a suspicious climate, in which judges did not allow 1themselves to take criminological concepts into account. Their distrust of^  and 
unfamiliarity with, modem criminological ideologies like rehabilitation marginalized
Aconcepts like individualization, rehabilitative treatment and so on from the process of 
sentencing. Moreover, there are considerable numbers of Islamic punishments that are 
inflexible. Penal practices of Hodood and Ghesas are absolutely fixed in respect of type 
and amount of punishment in various circumstances. For example, intentional killing 
must be punished through the retaliation mechanism and neither legislator nor judges can
make alternative decisions. In other words, the discretionary power of judges is firmly 
restricted in such fields.
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Although, not all sins are considered as crime and visa versa, this rule covers only 
Hodood and Ghesas (small number of crime), while in the sphere of Tazir, the major part 
of crimes, every sin can be a crim e/’” It was traditionally up to judges {Kadi- justice 
system), and in modem societies govemment can identify every sin as a crim e/”^ As a 
result most sins were criminalized and the list of religious crimes became longer. 
Moreover, as a general rule immoral and religiously prohibited activities that are 
performed publicly are regarded as crimes. As a result of the approximation of sin and 
crime in the Iranian criminal justice system, the discrete identification of crime and sin is 
hardly possible. Furthermore, although there are immoral wrongdoings that are not a sin, 
and some religiously restricted acts are not crimes, they are assumed as grounds and 
facilitators of sin and crime that should be prevented.
In Iranian society, not only do judicial officials and policy makers defend moral 
and religious values in terms of crime and punishment, but also officials, social 
institutions, and private sectors respond to amoral behaviour - disregarding the fact that 
these acts are not legally identified as crime. The Iranian judiciary, police, quasi-police 
and volunteer forces time and again react against immoral and religiously prohibited 
activities (sins). They treat these kinds of behaviour, like relationships between girls and
Crime jn religious terms is and act that according to Quran or other authorized references like prophet 
and Imam’s says faces a punitive reaction.
90Î Faze1991,p. 60
There is a long list o f sins that after Islamic Revolution are legally identified as crimes, while in 
traditional text they did not treated as crime. For example bad hejabi’, usury ,^ committing any sin frankly 
in public^ place. Bribery'’, transaction of alcohol Gambling^ and so on
1 IPC. Ibid Article 638
2 Ibid. Article 595
3 Ibid., Article 638
4 Ibid. Article 588-594
5 Ibid., Article 702
6 Ibid., Article 705
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boys (talking, walking, mixed gatherings, parties and entertainments and so on), as 
something that must be avoided. Institutions like amre beh maroof Basij and even 
the judiciary consider themselves as religiously responsible for taking action against such 
kinds of immoral acts.^’’'’ It should be noted that there is a strong traditional legal theory 
in the Iranian criminal justice system, inherited from French criminal justice and 
confirmed by Iranian constitutional law, that crime can only be identified by the 
par l i ament .But ,  there are still judges that follow another religious rule that indicates 
that judges are authorized to consider any sin as a crime, and sentence based on the 
Islamic references and their discretion.
However, the proximity of crime and sin has led not only to a longer list of 
crimes, but also to a harsher reaction against them. This is because, in the new conception 
of crime, criminals not only harm others and society but also violate godly decrees. They 
violate superior and sacred values and deserve to be treated harshly. Such a religious 
outlook, and the close proximity of crime to sin guides society, in particular religiously 
trained judges, to a strict approach to criminals. They view criminals, especially those 
who commit serious crimes, as “evil” ”^*^, “Satan”, ^'Eblis’'^ ^^  and so on, and as being 
incoiTigible in nature.
Sometimes these behaviours are not crime or even sin, but they are regarded as acts that undemiine 
moral principles and are seen to lead to sin, crime and finally social disintegration; thus, they should be 
prohibited.
Reyahi 21-09-04 ISNA. He argued that; Regulations o f Institution of Social Protection treated crimes 
and sins equally.
Constitution law 1990, Article 22, 32, 33, 36
Bazgir 1995 NO.3017: Five young criminals 2sentenced to death because o f their Satanic’ and ‘evil’ 
acts of rubbery and murdering four innocent victims, two men and two women.”' Judge called them as 
Satan and evil.
ISNA 18-07-04. Two members of ‘Eblis Gang group’ who found guilty as kidnapper, rapper and drug 
tiafficker executed publicly in Najafabad city.
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From an Islamic perspective, human beings are a mixed character of goodness 
and wickedness. Despite all social and natural obstacles, he that is equipped with a free 
will and is wise enough to follow divine decrees can achieve his salvation. For the public 
and officials, criminals (especially those who have committed serious crimes against 
individuals and property), are considered as individuals who have an immoral, inhuman 
and incorrigible personality. They follow Satan’s orders and their unrestrained impulses. 
Committing crime is a sign of their wicked nature. In particular, if these culprits do not 
respond to the Islamic penalties and repeat their transgression there would be no doubt 
about their evil and incorrigible character. They are unpleasant and cruel persons who 
willingly follow their animal temptations. Teims like “W olf’, “Jackal” ”^^ , “Bath of 
night”^’”, “Hyena”, “Black”, “Scorpio Band”,^’^  “ruffians and rogues”^’  ^ and so on are 
terms used by people, journalists and officials for describing criminals’ personality, 
which shows Iranian social attitudes toward them. They are cruel men that brutally killed
Eblis is a Quranic word that is almost a synonym o f Satan accompanied with stronger sense of 
wickedness.
^’’^ Etmad Newspaper, 25/02/2005
^’ ’Esteki 20/8/2004, Etmad Newspaper, It was a report about judiciary, security and police officers’ failure 
in pakdasht e in which 22 children raped and killed.
It is well-known nickname that typically attributes to gangs
Mortazavi 9/9/2004 ISNA. General Prosecutor o f Tehran, said; first priority o f prosecution office and 
police forces must be harsh approach to ruffians and rogues. We must treat them so hard that they shocked 
once they hear our name.
Plis description o f ruffians and rogues covers criminals of serious crimes, including; sexual harassment, 
acts against public decency, rape, creation network o f conuption, drinking alcohol, extortion, providing a 
place for gambling, kidnapping threatening of public welfare, threatening people, public quan el and alike.
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innocent children^’'’ or old men or wom en/’^and are not deserving of any sympathy or 
mercy/
Iranian people have historically regarded themselves as victims of a miscairiage 
of justice. It is an ovei-whelming belief that their first and most popular Imam, Imam Ali, 
was martyred because of being extremely fair in his govemment, judgment and equal 
treatment people. The most important slogan of Iranian social movements during last 
hundred years has been justice. For example the constitutional revolution of 1905 
commenced with the demanding of a “house of justice”. ’^^  The crucial motivation of the 
recent revolution in 1979 was the imagining of the Imam Ali’s govemment. People 
loiow a large number of stories about his fair judgments, disregarding the social, political 
and religious positions of parties of trial. The most important slogan of Imam Khomeini 
was “social justice.
Since then, justice, in particular judicial justice, has been a principal ambition of 
the Iranian people. Justice in terms of equality of people in before court is frequently
Hossieny Majid Shiraz prosecutor 17/9/2004, Etemad Newspaper. He said; two cruel criminals who 
tragically had killed an innocent child were executed in public place. He said this sentence was confmried 
by the supreme courts and performed with rituals.
 ^  ^Bazgi Ibid. 1998 p. 69. Issue No, 3017 in 1995. In this case five young men sentenced to death, 
because they had cruelly killed four old men and women to steal their money. They were simply burglars 
and murderers; just one o f them had a knife, but because o f their calamitous way o f killing judge described 
their act as aimed burglars that disturbed social security( IPC article 185). As result he sentenced all of 
them to death. His sentence shows that he is highly affected by the social attitudes. He called them, Satan, 
mother o f conuption, cruel and so on. Sutprisingly supreme courts uphold this sentence.
For example, in crimes like theft and robbery '^®, drinking^'*’ and sexual intercourse by unmarried men or 
women, it is believed that, delinquents should be killed when they have been punished three times for the 
same crime and commit that crime for a fourth time. This means that they receive a clear message 
frequently (100 lashes for an unmarried rapist, for example) while he or she is neither rehabilitated nor 
detened. Then, there is no choice except removing this inconigible evil from society.
Arberry et al 1991, p. 732-733 
Abrahamianl982, p. 535
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cited as the most important aim of the judicial system /’^  In Iranian culture, when 
someone talks about miscamages of justice, it means that criminals have gone 
unpunished. Conceptually there are connections between justice and certainty of 
punishment. Justice is against any discrimination and differentiation between various 
criminals because of their social, political, financial position. And yet it has been and is 
the case that justice is meted out only to poor people.
Considering crime as corruption has had a deep effect on the Iranian criminal 
justice system. The idea of coiTuption carries a strong sense of immorality and 
religiosity. In particular, it indicates an illicit relationship between a man and a women, 
which is considered as the most striking symbol of corruption. During the two last 
decades, however, the term corruption has been applied to such a vast range of behaviour
T O D  T O  1that it has covered almost all anti-religious crimes, including terrorist activities, 
economic^^^and anti-security^^^ crimes. Indeed, this originally religious term has been 
pui-posefully attached to various crimes in order to achieve public support and justify 
harsh penal practice. Corruption has gradually become a str ong symbol of serious anti­
social behaviours. Corruption on Earth as a Quranic temi was employed in some legal
For example, the first Deputy o f the judiciary recently announced that the “establishment o f justice has 
been the most crucial concern o f our Imams, society expects us to let people to taste sweetness of justice. 
Judges must immunise themselves against any external pressure and manipuIation.Ra'eesi 20- 08-04 
ISNA.
220
.1
IPC, Op. cite, Article 515.
Law o f Disturbance in Economical System 1991, 16- 02-05 ISNA.
There is particular institution that called Institution o f Combat Against Economical Conuption. Heads of 
three braches (president, speaker o f Parliament, and Head of judiciary) are main members o f this institution 
that harmonize fight against economical corruptions.
IPC, ibid Article 507. Armed and non-armed anti-regime groups called by this article as corrupted 
groups.
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texts without any legal definition or fixed theoretical explanation. However it indicates 
the highest level of corruption, in the most serious crimes. Any economic crime, or
crime against property or the person could reach the level of corruption on Earth. 
Practically, revolutionary courts can prosecute offences as corruption on earth if they 
vastly affect society in political, economic, moral or emotional aspects. For example, the 
murderer of 22 children in the pakdasht case was sent to Revolutionary courts to be 
prosecuted on the base of corruption on Earth. This conception initially had highly 
religious, moral and social colour, but nowadays it has a rather more political bent, since 
this term is applied mostly by the Revolutionary courts against opposed groups and 
sometimes dissidents, like in the Aghajari case.
Because the political system was aware of the power of public antagonism against 
corruption, it has since tried to expand an initially moral and religious conception to other 
areas of anti-social and illegal behaviours. In a Durkheimian sense, society employed a 
strong religious symbol in defence of social values. The role of political considerations in 
manipulation of these kinds of powerful sacred conception cannot be ignored; but, more 
importantly this shows that there are strong contexts of religious collective sentiments 
that are ready to react or support punitive reaction against these sorts of immoral conduct.
Ibid Article 2
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II-2 Changing Attitudes toward Punishment
Strong belief in religion and the sacred nature of social, moral and political issues 
in Iranian society endowed penal practice with an expiatory and vengeful character, and 
led to the establishment of harsh penal policy in Iran post-revolution. Sacred ideas and 
social sensibilities, as very powerful social forces, strongly react against encroachments 
on the moral domain. These emotional responses, associated with political 
considerations, played a crucial role in the establishment of harsh criminal justice. After 
the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the potential and historical social dynamism of religious 
forces materialized in social engineering, in policy -making in general and penal policy in 
particular. Thousands of sacrifices, during around ten years of civil and foreign war, 
strengthened and institutionalised the religious emotions that had erupted during the 
revolution. The period of war and civil crises was a key opportunity for politicians to 
expand, materialise and express these sacred emotions in Iranian penal policy. It was 
taken for granted that enemies of religion, values and the nation supported the Shah’s 
regime and were producing this war and other social disturbances. For around twenty 
years, the dominant discourse was that ‘we have given blood’ for these religious and 
moral values, justice, equality, family, virtue, and a utopia of divine society with no 
immorality, sin and crime. These enthusiasms, accompanied with a strong belief in a 
sophisticated omnipresent enemy who endeavours to destroy or undermine the 
foundations of these aspirations, amplification of these kinds of sentiments through mass 
media and the manipulation of political actors and agencies, brought about a highly 
suspicious and harsh attitude toward criminals as agents of the enemy, and great attention
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toward penal practice as a defensive weapon of social integration and a destructive 
weapon against enemies.
Religious and social expiation is one of the significant characteristics of penal 
practice in Iran. Offenders are socially and morally in debt for their offences. They are 
seen to have injured or undermined social morality and only their suffering can lead to 
redemption. There is no room for utilitarian or rehabilitative considerations, in particular 
in serious crimes that have seriously wounded social sentiments. For example in the 
Pakdasht case mentioned above, the offender was sentenced to 16 deaths and 100 lashes 
on his bare back that had to be delivered before his execution in front of people in public 
place.^^^ Humiliation of criminals and their flogging before execution cannot follow any 
aim other than expiation, suffering, vengeance, and the imposition of shame and 
retribution.^^*^
Moral principles, in particular in the sphere of the family, are strongly held in 
Iranian society. The institution of family is morally and religiously regarded as sacred. 
According to Iranian constitutional law, “since the family is the fundamental unit of 
Islamic society, all laws, regulations, and pertinent programs must tend to facilitate the 
foimation of family, and to safeguard its sacredness and the stability of family relations 
on the basis of the law and the ethics of Islam.”^^  ^ There is a list of cruel penal practices
BBC News Persian, 31/03/05
As the media reported, these ceremonies were still insufficient to satisfy the thousands o f people who 
gathered to witness his death - they cursed him and asked officials to let them punish him. A teenager 
sti uggled to kill the criminal and stabbed him before perfonnance o f his punishment. See: ISNA 16 -03- 
2005
Constitution Law 1990 Article 10
342
that safeguard the sanctity and stability of the family. Vindictive punishments for free 
sexual relationship especially for adultery, homosexuality between men or women, bad 
hijabi^^^ relation between girls and boys before engagement, and so on are symbols of 
the powerful moral principles of the family, and will of the policy - makers to preserve it. 
All official and non-official police forces, in particular volunteer forces, are highly 
motivated to deal with this group of crimes, by bringing them to justice or preaching and 
preventing them in streets and public places. For example, “police forces found 390,318 
houses of corruption^^^ and destroyed 16,000 bands that performed in 2002.”^^ ”
If the moral foundations of the family are crucial, it is partly because the family is 
seen as the most essential constituent unit of society and every deficiency in its 
fundamentals directly destabilizes social ethics as foundations for social solidarity. 
Iranian judicial officials consider the moral foundations of society as a whole vital, 
because “society will be at risk if morality in society is violated.”^^ ’ For Iranian 
politicians and the judicial system, the “borders of beliefs are more crucial than 
geographical territory, and so public prosecutor’s offices must strictly approach violators 
of moral and social r i g h t s . A s  will be discussed below, although social mentalities 
and sensibilities have transformed considerably in Iran, Iranian society remains highly
It is believed that appearance o f women in public places without proper clothes and showing their 
beauties to others undermined moral standards and damaged institution o f family.
Ghalibaf Bagher Iranian Chief Police, 0 9 -3 1  - 2003 Iran Newspaper
The terms of house o f corruption refers to places where prostitutions are working and a place where 
mixed paities including mixed dancing and drinking are happened.
DoiTy Najafabadi, Iranian General Prosecutor, 05 -0 9  -  2005,. Iran Newspaper 
Ibid
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sensitive to moral issues like Namoosi?^^ As an Iran Newspaper reported on the first of 
February 2003, the ritual public execution of four young killers by the names of Vahid, 
Majid, Ehsan and Kazem was performed, in Farahani Square of Arak city (centre of 
central province), in front of crowd. They had kidnapped and raped two girls. The Head 
of Arak Bureau of justice delivered a speech before their execution by hanging. He said: 
“anybody that breaks the front of family and encroaches on it must be hanged by scaffold 
of retribution because they have made obscene behaviours and injured public decency. 
Youth must respect moral principles.
Political and judicial systems consider themselves as safeguards of all legal and 
normative rules. Any violation of these sacred social values are repressed intensely. 
Moral and victimless crimes are widespread throughout the Iranian Penal Code, with a 
particular chapter devoted to “Offences Against Public Morals and Decency”. A n y  
immoral activities between men and women, excluding adultery, such as kissing, any 
publicly illicit act, improper hijab, managing a property where activities against public 
morality take place, encouraging people to violate public morals, or any activity related
Namoos includes closer female relatives including wife, daughters, mother and sisters, In some more 
traditional areas it may includes other relatives as well. Nomoosi murderers nowadays is a complicated 
social and judicial problem in some area o f Iran. In particular in Arab residence provinces such as 
Khozestan. Head o f Bureau o f justice in Khozestan province reported that: during last month (Oct. 2004) 
13 Namosi murders happened in this province that ten o f them are committed by members o f  
family.(typically husband brother and father o f a woman). He said; they tried to transform nature of their 
acts and disguise it as suicide or accident.(ISNA- 24/02/2005).
Member o f family co-operate to kill who has committed adultery or other irreligious sexual relationship, 
they ask somebody to kill her. Then, they do not report that event. If it is revealed, they will not demand 
retaliation and murderer will be release at most after few years imprisonment. This problem was highly 
problematic until 1997, because there was no penalty except retaliation. As a result these kinds of 
murderers were absolutely released. In 1997 parliament added imprisonment for those murderers that for 
some reason are not retaliated. (IPC Article 208)
Iran Newspaper. 1/2/2003. Simultaneously the same newspaper reported that four members of a second 
band o f girl hunters. ( Those who kidnap girls in order to rape are called girl hunters) by the names 
Mohammad Ali; Davood and Nader would be publicly executed in the same city.
^^^IPC,Op. cit. Chapter 18
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to pornography and the sex industi’y that injures public morality and decency are regarded 
as relatively serious crimes that faced flogging, prison or fme/^^
The media, in particular independent newspapers, play a crucial role in 
intensifying public consciousness toward crime and criminals. The judicial system, 
police and security officials are often seen as having failed in their j o b . “These 
catastrophes (serious crimes) show that all levels of society are i n s e c u r e . P e o p l e  do 
not want officials to apologize; they want security and safety, for society and for their 
c h i l d r e n . I n  another case, relating to “Black Eagle” who had raped nine children in 
Mashhad, the Khorasan Newspaper wrote: “in these kinds of crimes that injure public 
decency criminals must be harshly punished. Although their public execution is 
temporarily calming, after that officials must reasure people about security.” '^”’ But 
sometimes, emotions against moral crimes are too profound to require media motivation. 
Occasionally these feelings are so strong and destructive that media and other officials 
are obliged to make great efforts to tranquilize them.
However, there is a kind of interaction between collective sentiments and 
individual emotions in punitive reactions against moral offences. According to Durkheim, 
it is true that social sentiments are constituted by the collection of individual feelings, but 
collective consciousness is an independent entity that can put individuals under heavy
Ibid., chapter 18 Article 637 - 641 
Etemad Newspaper 20/8/2004
Shariati, Reporter of Social Commission o f Parliament’s. Etemad Newspaper 20/8/2004 
Ibid
Sa'eedian, Khorasan Newspaper 28/02/2005
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psychological pressure. These social forces are sometimes so strong that it is impossible 
for persons to act differently. For example; Iranian people, in particular in more 
tiaditional and less-modernized provinces, are highly intolerant and prejudiced about 
their 'Namoos'. Any contact with them out of legal or religious engagement, even with 
their consent, or any verbal insult, gives rise to highly dangerous and wildly aggiessive 
sentiments. The result of these encroachments on Namoos is typically eternal hostility or 
homicide. These kinds of emotions are totally out of control, because in such conditions 
feelings of humiliation and vengeance are so powerful that one cannot think about the 
ramifications of his behaviour.
These feelings of social humiliation and embaiTassment multiply the sensation of 
vengeance for individuals and force them towards an immediate and cruel punitive 
reaction. For example, a 23-year-old man burned and killed his sister; she was in the 
ninth month of her pregnancy due to being raped by a man who had eventually married 
her. The accused said in front of the court; “my family has lost its reputation, all people 
in the village shouted and clapped when my sister came to our home. All people hold me 
up to ridicule and life was impossible for m e.... He was sentenced to a six-month 
imprisonment and to pay half of the deyeh (blood money) to the victim’s husband.^'” It is 
not immediately obvious, why he was sentenced so leniently, for according to IPC, in 
such cases the guilty must be sentenced to at least three years imprisonment.^'’^
Bazgir 1998, P. 79 this sentence was upholded by 27"' branch o f Supreme Court in 1994 
Op. cit, IPC Article, 208 In a similar case, the accused killed the victim because he saw his mother 
alone with him in a building, and assumed them to be having an affair. The judge sentenced him only to 
deyeh, claiming that he honestly believed that he deserved to be killed, because his belief in his mother’s 
infidelity was reasonable.( Ibid, IPC, Article 295 this Article provided that; if  somebody honestly believed 
that victim deserved to be killed then revealed that he has made a mistake lie is not murder. If he proves his
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The above cases show that these individual and collective sentiments are so strong 
that, penal policy makers and judges cannot ignore them. They have to observe these 
attitudes and express them in their policy and judgement. These social forces make it 
hard to take stance against Namoosi crimes. There is a kind of privatization in the 
performance of punishment; it is permitted to kill violators of yours or others’ Namoos. 
One can kill his wife and her lover if he finds them having a sexual relationship. Further, 
there are harsh penalties for criminals in this area including; s toning ,publ i c  
f logging ,dea th  penal ty , cu t t i ng  hair as a humiliating penalty,exile^"^^ and so on. 
As society supports these types of homicides, and occasionally even admires them, the 
judicial system has shown a kind of sympathy to these Namoosi murderers.
These social sentiments are not originally rooted in religious ideas. Rather they 
have gone beyond religious permissions or recommendations. Islamic law allows you 
unlimitedly to defend your or others’ N a m o o s , b u t  you are not authorized to follow 
your vengeful emotions after that or commit crime in any sexual relationship except 
sexual intercourse. You are not legally or religiously permitted to go further and perfoitn
claim (that victim legaly deserved to be killed), he will be acquitted. If not it will be considered as 
accidental killing and he will pay Deyeh.) Judges lend a sympathetic ear to criminals in such cases, 
illush ating how the judicial system can be affected by the collective sentiments.
IPC. Op. cit, Article, 83
Ibid. Article, 84,86
Ibid. Article 82
Ibid. Article 87. This complementary punishment is delivered only for men, because showing women 
uncovered and without scarf is an obvious sin.
Ibid Article 87
Ibid, Article 61. In IPC you are allowed to defend your or other’s life, Namoos and property. This 
defence is not limited. It can be continued up to elimination of risk, but general conditions o f defence like 
necessity o f defence, proportionality o f risk and defence and commencing from less dangerous act and so 
on are required.
347
punishment. How, then, can one justify such harsh reaction on behalf of society and 
individuals? If we refer to Durkheim’s theory of society as the source of religion and 
conception of sacred, it can be said that religiosity of social phenomena is not necessarily 
rooted in religious texts or official religion. Society creates sacred conceptions where it is 
necessary to defend its fundamental values, even though they seem officially in-eligious. 
Namoos is an extremely sacred issue and causes highly emotional reactions that are 
prohibited according to official religion.
There are politically closer relationships between conservatives as a ruling gi’oup, 
particularly in the judicial system (especially criminal courts), and traditional social 
sentiments. Powerful religious gi’oups put the judiciary under pressure to show zero 
tolerance to social conuption and immorality. For around 20 years, after any weekly 
Friday prayer, in every routine demonstration, in every public meeting there are cries of ; 
“God is greater, death to h y p o c r i t e s , “armed traffickers should be executed”, “armed 
hypocrites should be executed” and so on. These religious mentalities and public panics 
are resonant with Iranian crime control policies and punitive reactions
It is a well known terms that attributed to leading opposition group by the name, “organization of  
Mojahedin of Iran’s people.” They had a class-based or a Marxian inteipretation o f Islam. In 1982 this 
group started to fight militarily against Islamic Republic o f Iran.
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I ll  Majesty of Punishment and Mercy
The above discussion of harsh legal punishment in Iran cannot fully explain the 
Iranian penal system. There are significant obstacles to the performance of punishment, 
so that a considerable portion of punishments, fully or partially, becomes impractical. 
Mercy in general and mercy for criminals (even murderers) is a Quranic principle.^^^ 
Public mercy through legislation and private mercy, in particular through the Supreme 
Leader, exempt partially or fully a large number of convicted criminals from 
punishment. There are charitable institutions that pay for those criminals that are jailed 
because they cannot afford to pay their fines or financial damages.
Victim satisfaction is a determinant factor in the mitigation or cancellation of 
punishment in a considerable number of crimes. For example, in retaliation rituals of 
murderers in front of the victim and criminal’s family, there are intentional delays. 
Officials and the murderer’s family try to create an atmosphere of sympathy and 
convince the victim’s family to forgive a miserable man or woman who is spending the 
last minutes of his life. Indeed, it often happens that the victim’s family remove the rope 
from the murderer’s neck. It should be noted, however, that victims or their family have 
no role in the prosecution or performance of penal practice in moral crimes like adultery, 
homosexuality, and crimes against religion and government.
^^^Quran, Sura 1, Versus 178 and 238
According to Constitution law Article 110 supreme leaders is privileged to pardon criminals. For 
example in last anniversary o f revolution 3401 criminals released through his pardon. ISNA. 10-02- 2005 
A charity institutio 
jail. ISNA. 6/2/2005
n by the name Emdad Committee payid for 8000 prisoner and released them from
349
Moreover, Islamic criminal procedure in serious crimes like adultery is so 
complicated, that it is as if there was no intention of sentencing or delivering the penalty. 
In adultery, there must be four impartial and virtuous female witnesses (while those who 
seeks to see such scenes cannot be considered as righteous) that have fully witnessed the 
sexual intercourse; they are questioned individually and the most trivial difference 
between their statements leads to their flogging. A reasonable repentance by an accused 
could cancel the perfonnance of punishment. According to religious principles 
judiciary officials must not insist on proving the case.^^^ “The accused should not be 
under pressure to confess, rather it is religiously recommended that criminal should not 
confess.”^^  ^ He or she should confess four times in front of judges, as “confession in 
fi'ont of other officials like inspectors, prosecutors, and police officers are not valid.”^^*"
,0
'f
,257
Closer attention shows that, these are almost impossible crimes since the restrictions of 
proof are so great.’
These conditions become more difficult when criminals are to be stoned. In this 
case it must be proved that they (married men or women) have had good sexual 
relationships with their spouse, and there is no disruption in their sexual relationships- 
their claims about these obstacles will be accepted unless judges reasonably believed that
B a z g ir , 2 0 0 1 , p. 121
254 Î;:'As a lawyer, I witnessed a case that a man had applied to the court for divorce certification because his 
wife had committed adultery. His wife was ready to confess, but there was no question about her offence.
The judge asked some questions about divorce and issued the divorce certification.
There are two famous cases of adultery that managed by prophet Mohammad and Imam Ali; that cited 
in Sunni and shi’ at tiaditional texts. In both case they tried to prevent from accused confession. They 
tried implicitly to introduce some reason for their exemption from punishment. In one case Prophet 
Mohammad threatened the accused and said you confessed three times, if  you repeat I have to deliver 
God’s decree. After performance o f punishment imam Ali said; I wish he had confessed in front o f God 
not me. One must not disgrace himself. See Hor Amoli 1973,p. 327-8 ,
Official Newspaper 1992, p.. 23
Ghavami (a clergyman and previous MP) 30-01- 2005 MP ISNA
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they are lying. It is essential to note that in my experience and observations^^^ the legal 
and religions obstacles mentioned are not always actual bamers to the presentation of 
punishment, because there are a lot of judges who are not familiar with these theoretical 
and legal grounds, most of the accused are not familiar with their legal rights and in the 
most cases lawyers are not present. The accused assume that their confession would be 
effective in mitigation of punishment. Most of them do not know that is it possible for 
them to deny what they admitted in front of police officers. The police are enthusiastic in 
proving the case, mostly through confession, and often under pressure.
The conditions of judgment and sentencing become harder in performance of had 
in theft (Cutting off of the hand)^^^. There are around thirty stipulations that must all be 
met for the performance of the punishment. For example, the thief should not be in 
circumstances of misfortune, the property must have been sheltered and protected 
carefully, the owner must request the punishment or the offender can buy the property, or 
repent before prosecution, and so on^ *^ .^ Since accomplishment of these conditions is very 
difficult, in most cases judges do not initially consider the theft as crime that leads to the 
had but rather as a normal theft.
i
I have worked simultaneously as a lecturer in University and as a lawyer in criminal courts for 8 years 
in Mashhad (Second city o f Iran after Tehran capital city)
It should be mentioned that these conditions are applied in Hodood. Sever punishments like stoning, 
death penalty, relation and so on. Tazirat need not these procedures o f proof,
IPC, Op. cit. Articles 197-203
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The presumption of innocence is, theoretically a constitutionally and authoritative 
principle in Iranian criminal procedure.^^' This standard is reinforced by the other well 
known rule in serious crimes -Dar 'a- which means that judges must be one hundred 
percent certain in their sentencing: even a trivial hesitation is considered as an absolute 
obstacle to sentencing an offender to a harsh punishment. There are a considerable 
number of sentences that are overturned in supreme courts because it is believed there 
were some petty doubts. For example in typical case where two young men confessed 
their homosexually and court sentenced them to death, Supreme Court overturned the 
verdict, because there was a doubt about offenders’ repentance. The Supreme Court 
documented his verdict by Dar ’a rule.
Broadly speaking, in addition to what has been said above, there is a gap between 
the sentence given and punishment itself in the Iranian criminal justice system. For 
example, according to Islamic jurisprudence, the penalty for apostasy is death. After the 
Islamic revolution hundreds of thousands of Iranian youths explicitly announced that they 
had become communist, and that they explicitly co-operated with communist groups. 
They had plainly committed apostasy, but none of them were prosecuted. The age of 
criminal responsibility religiously and legally is 15 years old for boys and 9 years old for 
girls, but it is claimed that “for the last seven years no young man or woman under 18 has
^^'constitution law 1990, Article 37, provided that, Innocence is presumed, and no one is held guilty o f a 
charge unless his or her guilty is established by a legally authorized court.
Bazgir 2000, p. 125
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been e x e c u t e d . T h e  judiciary has cuiTently sent a bill to Parliament to the effect that 
execution for under 18s will be legally abolished.
Hajinohammadali Fahimeh 16-01-2005. ISNA. As a social service officer, he said; there are 30 under 
18 murders in Rehabilitative and Training Bureau of Rejaee Town that are sentenced to death but they are 
not executed yet. We are stiuggling to ask victims’ families forgive them. Similar conditions can be seen 
in similar institutions.
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IV New Society, Change and Anticipation
Nowadays Iranian society seems different from what we has been seen during last 
two decades. A religious society with strong religious sentiments, a strict belief in the 
relationship between mosque and state, high moral standards, and strong social solidarity 
and political consensus among politicians, is to be replaced with profound practical and 
intellectual doubts about all theses factors. Youth in general (70% of the population) and 
universities’ students in particular, as the engine of social movements in recent decades, 
are faced with epistemological crises. They are anti-ideology and anti-political. Recent 
research has shown that: “They are influenced by the technological revolution, 
metaphorical world (internet), human rights and individual identity”^^ '^  and he gap 
between generation has increased. A comprehensive study among 27, 000 Iranian youth 
indicates that patterns of behaviour have changed, and behavioural patterns are focused 
on popular groups such as artists (mostly actors and actresses 27/5%), athletes (26/5%) 
intellectuals (21%), clergymen (6%) politicians (3%) and so on,^ *^ ^
The emigration of intellectuals is an acknowledged problem and a serious concern 
for politicians, especially reformists, in Iran. The cause is, arguably “because they 
(intellectuals) feel they have lost their social and political d i g n i t y . I m m o r a l i t y  and 
wealcness of religious faith are crucial concerns of both conservatives and reformers in
Zarifian 22 -  09- 2004 ISNA. Deputy Minister o f Science, Research and Technology. He added that it 
does not mean that they are not religious any more, rather they are not satisfied with traditional sources and 
interpretation o f religion.
Lotfabadi, 2004, pp. 12-30 
Zarifian , Op. cit
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rates, alcoholic^^^ drinking and addiction^^^ are very high. Nowadays social deviations 
including, “escaping of girls from home, domestic violence, begging, drug addiction and 
moral coiTuptions have increased annually by 15%”.^ "^'
Some sociologists believe that Iran’s new social and structural conditions are 
obvious signs of an anomic society. Dominant social values have been undermined and
challenge in interaction with modernism.
Illegal transaction o f wine in Iran estimated 40 million litters per year that cost 400 billion Tomans, 
,around 500 million dollars, www.bastab.com 23 Sep 2004 
Akbari 01-03-05 ILNA 
274 Motamedi 04-12-04 ISNA
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,
;3Iran. They believe that, “hopelessness, indifference and lack of belief are increasing, it is p
;
an alert.” *^^  ^ 7
■f■i-.
,As if Islamic culture has not influenced our education system, there is no colour 
of the Islamic culture among students, Ramadan and non-Ramadan month makes 
no difference for students.. ..[to]usurp religiously is worst than alcoholic drinking 
but, unfortunately it is sometimes frankly and sometimes invisibly increasing.
Many surveys show that immorality, and crimes have increased.^^^ Social
Îstructures like the family are damaged and the gap between men and women’s crimes has |
'ildecreased.^^^ In words of an Iranian criminologist “we are faced with parents resignation 
phenomena. Despite all the restrictions and the severe approach to violent crime
Zibakalam 2/7/2005 ISNA. He (as a famous moderate reformer) said; we will arrive nowhere, until v:
politicians will not accept problems.
Jannati. 22-09-04. Tehran, Friday Fray’s Lecturer. ISNA 
Sina Press, 22-09-04
KhoiTamjo 25-05-05 Iran Newspaper j
Azazi 20- 10- 04, Iran Newspaper. As a sociologist she believed our culture faced with fundamental
new values are emerging but as yet are not established. It is a period of transfoimation 
from a traditional society to a modem one. This transformative circumstance and anomic 
condition has “influenced all dimensions of social life, from driving, individual’s 
morality, social morality to the management system of the c o u n t r y . T h e  social crisis, 
anomie and noimlessness in Iranian society “supported by a recent survey carried out 
among the y o u t h A s  a conclusion of this survey the current decay is called a “period 
of social, economic and political anomy.”^^ ^
However, according to my thesis, such formations should be repeated in penal 
practice as an index of society. Although we must wait to see the full consequences of 
these profound transfoi*mations that have started to occur in Iranian society, I want to 
suggest that these changes are very real. Even now, voices of change can be heard in the 
Iranian criminal justice system. The criminalization movement has stopped and 
decriminalization has been introduced as a policy by the head of judiciary. He has 
insisted that, “decriminalization, limited use of prison, and rehabilitation of criminals 
must be our continuous agenda”. F o r  him, these are part of the real Islamic penal 
policy. Cutting off the hands of thieves and stoning are practically omitted from Iranian 
penal p rac t i ces .Pub l i c  flogging is seriously quest ioned^and now is perfoiTned 
behind walls. Furthemiore Imam Khomeini has been quoted that “if there are, internally 
or internationally, negative effect for public punishment which give rise to suspicion to
Baghi 26/12/04. An interview with Radio DW-World. DE DEOTSCHE WELLE.
Marja’ee 2003 , p.l 
' ' ' ib id
Hashemi Shaliroodi Head o f judiciary. 25- 10- 04 ISNA
Alizadeh Abbasali Head o f Tehran’s Bureau o f justice 18 -02-05 See; WWW.bastab.com 
Izadpana Social Deputy o f Judiciary, 10- 08- 01, Iran Newspaper
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Islam, all of them should be stopped.”'^' Permission for abortion in particular conditions, 
a scientific and rational approach to crimes like addiction- for example distribution of 
hygienic ampoules amongst addicts, instead of their prosecution- are patterns of the new 
penal policy in Iran. Once social conditions, thoughts and feelings are transformed one 
can expect alteration in penal policies.
Nowadays punishment has become a controversial subject of challenge between 
reformers, who have been supported by public opinion in the previous three elections 
(two presidential elections and a parliament election), and conservatives.'^' Even some 
moderate conservatives like Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi have joined the criticism, saying, 
“if punishments earned out in public have an adverse effects on public opinion, they 
should not take place in public.”'^ ' Reformists are saying these kinds of penal practices 
“are an attempt by Islamic conservatives to discredit the refonnist government.”'^ "' 
Despite resistance to the idea of change, alterations in the social climate have gradually 
put the criminal justice system under irresistible pressure. Last year the head of the 
judiciary stopped a considerable number of death penalties. When he ordered the 
stopping of the execution of three hijackers, it was regarded by some reformists as “a step 
foiward.”'^^
Rahmani Representative o f Supreme Leader in Police Forces. 10- 08- 01 Iran Newspaper 
A row has broken out in Iran over the growing number of public floggings o f young people accused of 
drinking alcohol or making sexual advances. BBC News World Middle East 15 Aug 2001 
Ibid 
Ibid
Baghi 23-01- 05. Shargh Newspaper. He is head of NGO by the name Association o f Prisoner Rights 
and a well-known reformist that struggles for transfoimation of Iranian penal policy. In above article he 
tried to show that, once public opinion hated punishment like death penalty, Islam does not allow you to 
perform it.
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American crimes (in Iraq and other eountries). It is the biggest s t u p i d i t y . C h a n g e s  in 
cultural and political grounds as a result of globalization have led to critical attitudes 
toward harsh punishments. “The wave of sensational public hangings and whippings has 
drawn criticism from refbim-minded (and majority elected) officials who claim that such
286
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As a top Iranian judicial official recently said; “Iran may alter its system of capital 
punishments and could release some jailed political dissidents. The judicial system is 
striving to become more modernised, more responsive, less politicised.”'^^ He continued
that stoning was suspended last year “because it was prompting sympathy with the 
victims, not due to pressure from the European Union.
Although Iranian judicial officials pretend that international pressures have no /
influence on their decision-making, for me, the effects of the globalization process on 
transformations of Iranian penal poliey are undeniable. This proeess has systematically, %
put forceful pressure on the criminal justice system. On the one hand, globalization, 
through massive systems like the Internet or satellite has deeply communicated with 
Iranian culture. This connection has transformed previous social attitudes towards the 
west. As the grandson of Imam Khomeini, on the 26"’ anniversary of the Islamic 
Revolution, said; “the most bitter point of our history is that some of us fall in love with 
their killers. They endeavour to rationalize, theorize and make a philosophy for
'.f:Larijani. The judiciary’s head o f International office. 23-01-04 
http://www.iranexpert.com/2Q04/iudge23ianuarv.htm ■
Ihid  I
Khomeini Hassan 11-02-05, Fars Press /
punishments might harm Iran’s reputation abroad at a time when president Khatami 
fights hard to project Iran as an example Islamic democracy in the world.”'^^
On the other hand, western international institutions like Amnesty International, 
international NGO’s and the like have tried to influence Iranian penal policy through 
threats encouragement, boycotts and so on. For example, the EU is engaged in a long 
process of negotiation with Iranian officials in order to simultaneously stop Iran’s nuclear 
program and involve human right considerations in the performance of punishment.'^" 
Iran’s judiciary co-operated with UN human right officials in 2003, after seven years 
disconnection. As a judiciary official said; “it will continue despite the substantial 
international criticism.”'^ ' He said: “all punishments in Iran could undergo a revision. 
We are not annoyed by a request for revision from other groups or countries, we are 
annoyed when we are accused.”'" ' An Iranian Nobel Prize winner of 2004 Shirin Ebadi, 
due to her great efforts in human right activities in Iran has lead a critical discourse in the 
sphere of penal practice. Her international position is a fiim obstacle in the way of any 
criminal prosecution. It is, however, crucial to recall that many punishments that are 
nowadays negotiable were originally God’s decrees. For me this is the start of a 
profound change in Iranian penal policy.
Both movements, toward a severe penal practice after the Islamic Revolution in 
1979, and the new movement toward a modernized penal policy can be understood in
Daily People Newspaper, See: 
http://english.people.com.cn/englislT/2Q011Q9/04/eng2001094 79340.html 
BBC News Persian, 24 -10 - 04 
Mohammad, Op. cite 
'" ' Ibid
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light of the relationship between social structures and penal practice. An enormous social 
wave toward religion and religiosity of collective consciousness, in Durkheim’s teim, 
gave rise to harsh penal policy. A steadfast social solidarity based on traditional religious 
beliefs resisted all international pressure toward transformations for around two decades. 
Although it is very difficult to anticipate the trajectory of Iranian society, it can be said 
that a gradual and partial- alteration of social religiosity is bringing about a noticeable 
change in Iranian penal policy.
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V Conclusion
As we have seen Iranian society resorted to religion as a shelter against rapid 
industrialisation and modernisation, that seemed dangerous to morality as the base of 
social solidarity. Cultural manifestations of the West pervasively exported to Iran, were 
considered as representations of eorruption and immorality. Soeiety took refuge in 
religion and religious rituals for a revival of its normative values. This process brought 
about a huge movement towards traditional and religious values. Collective 
consciousness became religious in character, grounding and uniting Iranian society 
against its internal and external enemies.
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 was a product of the re-establishment of 
historieal, soeial and religious forces in Iranian society. The impact of these forces was so 
powerful that no dam could resist. Society, with its common moral and religious 
standards, dominated all individuals. The revival and authority of these universal sacred 
norms led to stronger soeial solidarity. Those values and popular ideals that historically 
had had a latent contribution to the shaping of soeial structures were revived and 
officially took part in the re-construction of political and legal institutions. Indeed these 
popular religious ideals were embodied in the new forms of governmental institutions. 
Social values had revived and strengthened in the mixed religious ceremonies and 
political demonstrations. There was such a mixture of religious, moral and social values 
that their boundaries were blurred.
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Social foundations, like social coherence, family and so on, relied increasingly on 
religion and became more sacred and intense. In Durkheim’s terms, religion and society 
was a translation of one another. Social values, in coexistence with religious ideals, 
became more sanctified. That process went so far that finally, in 1990, the constitution 
confirmed that in the case of contradiction between social interests and religious rules in 
policy-making, the foimer should be preferred. Indeed, it was accepted that religious 
rules should not be and indeed are not an obstacle for social development.'"' According 
to this rationale, the function of religion is facilitation of social life and not as an 
impediment to social progress.
As we saw, the theatrieal spectacle of punishment and reproduction of the crime’s 
meaning in the execution of the eondemned, and the process of reviving and annulling 
the crime before the public can be analyzed from both Durkheimian and Foucauldian 
perspectives. The rituals of punishment can be explained in terms of the political process 
and the presence of the sovereign power as an active force of power’s revenge, or in 
teims of moral expression and social revenge. However, while one should not ignore the 
fact that guilty people in some eases are considered rebellious and hostile, which calls for 
revenge, but, the content of sentences, the lectures and cries of people in fi ont of the 
scaffold, the determination of harsh punishment against even minor moral and religious
According to the Constitution Law, article 112; the Nation's Exigency Council shall meet at any time 
the Guardian Council judges a proposed bill o f the Islamic Consultative Assembly to be against the 
principles of Shari’ a or the Constitution, and the Assembly is 'unable to meet the expectations of the 
Guardian Council, resorting to the social necessities. In such cases if, the Nation's Exigency Council 
confirmed social necessities and interests in a proposed bill it will be approved even though it is against 
original rules o f the Shari'a or the constitution law. For example, exchange of blood, banking based on 
usurp, treatment o f  the ill women by the male doctors and so on are originally forbidden, but if  they are 
necessary for the individuals or the society as a whole, they are permitted. Indeed these permissions or new 
rules are considered as real religious rules in the new conditions. As a general rules in the shi’at every 
original rules could change to the secondary m le in various circumstances.
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crimes, the determination of punishment according to religious legal rules, and so on, all 
have at the first sight a moral and religious message. Indeed penal practice indicates that 
any violation of sacred moral and religious standards, as the foundation of social unity, 
cannot be tolerated. Thus, from my point of view, punishment must be considered more 
as moral expression of society than a political process or technology of discipline.
The category ''Corruption on earth” is a striking example of the affinity between 
religion and society and its effects in the area of criminal justice. This general label, that 
is synonymous with use of the death penalty, does not attach to a particular crime, as 
some have assumed, but rather to all economic and political crimes, crimes against the 
individual, moral and victimless crimes, and organized crime. Use of this term depends 
on the severity of a crime, and its impact on the society, in particular the amount of 
anxiety, disturbance and anger that is created in society. In other words "earth ” is a 
symbol of the "society” and the Quranic term 'conuption on earth’ means disturbance to 
society as a whole. The common elements of these crimes, and the most essential factor 
in considering a crime as 'conuption on earth’ is that it threatens society as a whole and 
give rises to a whole range of indignation and anxiety in a community. If crimes only 
partly attack social values and structure, ‘conuption on earth’ includes those crimes that 
offend the most important value:, social solidarity and society itself. Accordingly, drug 
trafficking, organized and armed crimes, rebellions, serial killings, crimes against 
national security, government, and other crimes that threaten the social entity all are 
entitled 'conuption on earth’.
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The above analysis paves the way for a better understanding of penal practice in 
the Iranian criminal justice system. As Durkheim believed, punishment is an index of 
social solidarity and an expression of the communal sentiments that have been violated.
As we have seen in the Iranian criminal justice system, severity of punishment is related 
to the gravity of the crime, the sacredness of the values that are violated, and the extent of 
resentment and passion that they produce in the society. Social and religious values 
become barely distinguishable, and religious values are symbols of social values, as if 
they are social requirements that are embodied in religious forms. Thus, as we have seen, 
insult to religious values brings about a wild wind of anger and imtation among 
collective sentiments and by the same token a most severe punitive reaction. Punishment 
of the death penalty for apostasy, every insult to the great prophets, Quran and so on, are 
illusti'ative examples in this area.
However, as Durldieim believed, social facts - like those studied in this chapter - 
tell us that the essence and nature of penal practices, more than anything else, are an 
inational and passionate reaction against injuries that have been done to stiongly held 
social beliefs. Although these punitive reactions are originally emotional and vengeful 
and not directed towards any particular purpose, they automatically find their functions. 
The punitive response reacts against the source of the threat and tries to destroy or curtail 
it. As investigations in this chapter have shown, propagation of crime is deemed an 
efficient instrument of internal and international enemies aimed at religious, moral and 
cultural values in order to undermine them and destabilize social solidarity. Thus, a harsh
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reaction against some criminals as the fifth column'""' can be considered as a social action 
of self -defence. The more dangerous and organized are these offensive activities, the 
more serious a reaction becomes necessary. Conspiracy theories, the delivery of harsh 
punishment against moral crimes, drug tiafficking, purely religious crimes, espionage, 
treason and crimes against national security could all be analysed in this regard.
Penal practice is a cure for the social solidarity that has received serious injury 
through the offence of social values. The strongly held communal ethics have been 
dishonoured and social sentiments are wounded and humiliated. Thus, two things must be 
done: rehabilitation of the collective emotions and confirmation of the majesty of social 
standards. Penal practice contributes to those two functions. The performance of 
punishment, in particular public punishment, in the Iranian criminal justice system, shows 
that moral values are still alive, respected and honoured. The shame and humiliation 
attached to the punishment becalms those communal emotions that are disturbed.
However, there are two crucial points that should be noted. Firstly, I do not 
claim that Durkheimian account of punishment fully explains current criminal justice in 
Iran. Regulations of the prison system in Iran'"^ show that, at least in theory, the legacy 
of the rehabilitative ideal is the dominant discourse in administration of prisons. Prisoners
A  secret subversive group that works against a country or organization from the inside, as in The right- 
to-life movement has established a fifth  column among freedom-of-choice activists. This term was invented 
by General Emilio Mo la during the Spanish Civil War in a radio broadcast on October 16, 1936, in which 
he said that he had una quinta columna (“a fifth column”) of sympathizers for General Franco among the 
Republicans holding the city o f Madrid, and it would join his four columns o f troops when they attacked. 
The teim was popularized by Ernest Hemingway and later extended to any traitorous insiders. See: 
http://site.answers.com/the%20fifth%20column%20
Official Newspaper o f the Ministry o f Justice 1983 No, 1/18351 
http://www.ghavanin.com/detail.asp7id-l 163
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are differentiated, criminologists and psychologists are present in the central prisons of 
the provinces, and prison officers work through a distinctive hierarchical bureaucratic 
system and have considerable discretionary power in treating prisoners. Those conditions, 
in addition to lack of access of the media to the prison, gives the prison system a kind of 
independency and immunisation that to some extent reduces or modifies the effect of 
social forces.
Secondly, as discussed above, in this, the third decade after the revolution, the 
intellectual and emotional content of society has rapidly transformed. The youth, as the 
largest part of the population, have no experience of the Shah’s regime, of revolution, or 
of civil and external war. Instead, on the one hand, they have experienced economic, 
social and political problems. On the other, globalization has massively influenced their 
mentalities through international media such as the Internet, satellite TV and so on. As 
argued earlier, nowadays they are looking for different life styles, values and aspirations. 
This transformation does not belong only to the youth; rather now the previous 
generation is critically considering the last three decades and looking for reform and 
transformation. As Boaventura de Sousa Santos has argued, “discrepancy between 
experiences and expectations”'"" is a ground for transformation. In the area of penal 
practice, public punishment, for example, is not a popular ritual any more. In Durkheim’s 
terms, there are obvious signals of anomie in the new circumstances of the Iranian 
society. These social conditions can be considered as an intermediate stage between 
solidarity arising from similarities and solidarity arising from a newly conceived division
296 Santos Boaventura de Sousa, 2002, p. 2
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of labour. Such recent social conditions have started to affect the criminal justice system, 
but more profound transformations are on the way.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
I Theoretical Approaches
The technological and bureaucratic analysis of punishment is the dominant 
discourse in the contemporary sociology of penal practice. The Foucauldian and 
Weberian approaches lies at the very centre of the literature of the sociology of 
punishment. All criminal justice system procedures, penal regulations, functions of 
modem prisons, rehabilitative treatments, welfare sanctions, strict regimes of prisons and 
other styles of law enforcements are now conceptualized these frameworks.
Understanding the nature and essence of punishment through processes of 
rationalization, professionalization and bureaucratization separates the institution of 
punishment from its social context, and in particular morality and religion. It is assumed 
that professional institutions and their expert staff are following the right expertise in the 
form of bureaucratic hierarchy and institutional demands. The Weberian literature 
introduces an impersonal and dehumanized perspective on punishment. Within this 
framework, all irrational and emotional elements are eliminated from the analysis of 
penal practice. The criminal justice system is considered as an isolated sphere governed 
by its own particular managerial goals.
The positive influences of Weberian and in particular Foucauldian thoughts in 
sociological understandings of punishment is undeniable, but the power of these 
perspectives has lead to an intellectual neglect of a crucial dimension of penal practice.
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A technological approach to penal practice reduces the sociology of punishment to the 
sociology of management, discipline and control. From such a standpoint, the 
examination of the regulatory power of government and social institutions becomes the 
dominant subject matter of the sociology of punishment, and punishment is defined as the 
efforts of dominant institutions to enforce order and control, regulating behaviour in the 
pursuit of political and economic aims. This control and managerial -oriented 
perspective fails to describe comprehensively the nature of punishment in modem 
societies.
However, punishment should not be analyzed solely in terms of reference to 
power. It cannot be understood only in light of a set of power-knowledge schemes. The 
present study has undertaken to show that focusing on punishment as a political tactic, 
managerial technique, or calculated instrument for the puiposive control of behaviour is 
misleading and misses out an essential part of penal practice. Such a superficial 
perspective on punishment can be misleadingly taken as pointing to the real substance of 
punishment. If penal practice is analysed as a method of social discipline and social 
order, as a technical phenomenon, however effectively designed it may be, it may thereby 
ignore the roots of penal practice in society itself.
I have argued in this study, that the modem sociology of punishment overlooks a
crucial dimension of penal practice. Garland aptly recognized the cultural resonance of
punishment, but his broad description, including both cognitive and emotive aspects of
,culture, is not adequate. His generic term ‘culture’ covering all aspects of social life is
not easily applicable to understanding the essential nature of punishment. He argues that 
there is a kind of conelation between culture in terms of mentalities and sensibilities and 
penal practice. But this argument does not by itself show how, for example, the 
contribution of social passions gives rise to harsh penal policies. In other words, this 
leaves open the fundamental question of how and why social sentiments respond to 
particular categories of conduct. The role of social beliefs and sentiments in the adoption 
and implementation of a penal system is dependent on the substance of social values.
This means, discovering the nature of punishment as a social phenomenon requires more 
specific analysis.
A naiTower Durkheimian description of culture, as a normative aspect of culture 
or moral culture, creates a clearer and closer link between culture and penal practice. For 
Durkheim the common feature of crimes is that they universally invoke well-defined and 
deeply engrained collective sentiments. He dealt with those aspects of culture that have 
acquired a moral and obligatory character. Crime is crime because it collides with 
collective values perceived as transcendent and corresponding to exalted sacred beliefs. 
The most important insight that one can gain from Durkheim is his description of the 
sacred and its connection with punishment in society. The definition he gives to 
emotions stirred by crimes is of primary importance and relevance to an understanding of 
punishment today. This is the unique aspect of the social process of punishment opened 
up by Durklieim’s theory of punishment.
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' Lukes (1992). p. 360
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Durkheim argues that punishment is a fundamentally inational, passionate and 
vengeful response to serious violations of the ‘collective consciousnesses’ which 
he defines as the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average 
member of a society [which] forms a determinate system with a life of its own.'
IThe notion of sacred social values was addressed in passing in Durklieim’s I‘Division of Labour,’ and fully developed in his last major work, ‘The Elementary Forms
„lï,
of Religious Life. ’ There he explored the role of the sacred and its relationship with Ipunishment; he systematically defined and interpreted the relationship identifiable in the
y 7link between religion and punishment in primitive societies; he theoretically explained 
the conelation between religion and society in all societies. Notwithstanding that his 
theory of the sacred, religion, society and punishment is a legacy so rich that is capable of J
■ feexplaining important dimensions of penal practice in modern society, he simply did not
address the question of religion and society in modem societies. Modem thinkers like 
Weber and Foucault overlooked the theme of social solidarity as a moral phenomenon 
and its relationship with punishment. Durkheim, however, applied this concept of social 
solidarity as an analytical tool in investigating the mutual links between society, religion 
and punishment. According to him, common moral principles generate a sacred domain 
and thereby condition the authority of a society. In a Durkheimian framework, society is 
impossible without a body of sacred moral principles.
Î
i
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Any offence against the above-cited concept of sacred, or the deeply engrained 
sentiments gives in society, gives rise to a deep anger in the heart of members of that 
society. Indeed, a powerful religious phenomenon can be identified in his analysis of 
punishment and societies. Durkheim denied religion as a concept endowed with any 
supernatural and metaphysical characteristics: religion, for him, is nothing other than a 
unified system of beliefs and practices related to highly respected concepts. Such a 
religion could be found in traditional or civic foims. Civil religion makes no appeal to the 
supernatural. It is founded on community symbols such as humanity, freedom, 
democracy and so on.
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Durklieim linked religion to sacred social forces. According to him, as sacred
social principles they exist in modem societies, indeed are highly honoured in the modem
.world, comparable to the way in which primitive societies respected their religious
.beliefs. Differences between traditional and modem religions are thus more a matter of 
degree than of substance. A supernatural religion and its related issues are considered
more sacred than human or civic religion. Conceptions such as justice, law, individual
dignity, nation, democracy, and fi'eedom are constituent factors of civil religion. These
,sacred conceptions are regarded as highly respectable and are considered as foundations 
of civil society. The deification of liberty, democracy, equality, justice and alike is 
evident in political speeches, parliamentary arguments, in media dialogues, court 
procedures, civil celebrations and so on. If laws and the outcomes of judicial processes
are accepted as the last word and ultimate decision in social and individual conflicts, they 
are accepted by virtue of their validity as symbols of sacred social values. The
supremacy of legal rules and judicial decisions can be understood through reference to 
sacred moral values. In exactly the same way, unfair judgments, laws against liberty, 
individuals’ dignity and human rights give rise to a whole range of disputes, opposition 
and challenges. A detailed scrutiny of penal codes in modem societies shows how values 
like individuals’ rights and justice are shielded from acts qualified as belonging to the 
realm of crime. Indeed the criminal laws of modem societies can be seen as an 
expression of modem religion and morality in any given country.
Traditional and metaphysical religions are stronger in ternis of sacred values, 
social solidarity and severity of punishment. More sacred social values bring about more 
severe social punitive reactions. Man-made religion is less sacred than a divine religion, 
and consequently emotions stirred by crimes in modern societies are less severe than in 
primitive societies. As Durkheim argued, “a transgression is comespondingly more 
shocking if the offended being is superior in nature and dignity to the transgressor.”  ^ The 
offence of man against man-made values cannot arouse the same resentment as an 
offence by man against godly values as a strong feeling of sympathy for individual 
offenders serves effectively to counterbalance the sentiments that are aroused by crime.
In the case of a supernaturally sacred society, even a strong pity for the criminal cannot 
contradict, however, the indignation aroused by the act of sacrilege. Such sympathy 
toward criminals could hardly reduce the severity of penal practice, because the two 
sentiments are too imbalanced, and asymmetrical.
 ^Giddens 1995 p. 13
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A provocative question, then, is whether civil religion is a one-way movement 
toward modernization, or whether movement towards traditional religion is a likely result 
of modernization. As discussed above, religion, whether supernatural or civic, is a 
foundation of social solidarity. If a society’s solidarity is threatened by contradictions 
between elements of sacred social values, for example, and an individual’s dignity and 
social interests, the existence of a foreign enemy or for whatever political, economic and 
social considerations, a stronger social integiation than is noimally expected is required.
In such conditions, resort to traditional forms of religion can be a functional choice.
Society has all the essential elements to produce religious sensations, and requirements of 
creation or revival of a sacred being, in terms of metaphysical religion. Under such 
conditions, society gradually or incidentally refers to traditional religious values; 
collective sentiments become more religious in nature.
As a result of social disintegration due to technological progress and the
transformation of social structures, a great shift in sexual behavior and family structure,
the rise of single parent families and so on in the USA, there arose a threat to the fabric of
social integration. More or less similar patterns of high-speed modernization and
. .westernization attacked traditions, existing moral standards and religious principles and,
indeed, the structure of social solidarity in Iran. A movement toward morality and
religious tradition, as the base of social cohesion, is visible in both societies; society is
.trying to discover constructive and positive responses for the present situation, seen to be 
one of social decay. Social processes of value fomiation, changing values in a positive
-Îmanner, and instilling both a moral restoration and a spiritual renewal are dimensions of
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this revolution. In such a framework, religion can be felt to be the one force in society 
that can help promote social solidarity. In Durkheimian terms, society had to be sheltered 
under a religious umbrella because it was in a dangerous situation.
As arguments in previous chapters have shown, a movement toward traditional 
values of order, family, religion and social authority has swept through American and 
Iranian societies. Indeed, what has been discussed in teims of a revival of religious 
beliefs and emotions, as forceful ideas and sentiments in both societies, have been more 
or less the result of these social transformations. The wave of backlash in late modem 
America, showing a serious concern for the traditional themes of order, family and 
authority, has put United States’ penal policy under heavy pressure, with the effects of a 
gi’owing process toward a new solidarity. As argued above, this process has occurred 
even more forcefully in Iranian society.
As a result of these processes, collective consciousness in the societies of USA 
and Iran has become, to various degi’ees, more religious: any violation of the moral and 
social standards has had to face harsh reactions. Some distinctively fierce American 
Christian and Iranian Islamic-Shi’ at beliefs and sentiments have influence penal policy 
makers in both countries in the last three decades. Criminal justice has become harsher, 
similar to what has been witnessed in primitive religious societies, where punishments 
are more severe and criminals have to suffer more blame and social stigma.
375
II Comparison Between Two Cases
The presence of sophisticated technologies such as electi'onic monitoring, 
complicated facilities and the application of modernized styles of crime control and 
modem prison systems in the United States and lack of these conditions in Iran, does not 
necessarily indicate crucial differences between their criminal justice systems. 
Dissimilarities refer more to modes of the penal practice and to the existence of more 
developed technologies in delivering punishment or not, while similarities concem their 
content and the social message they express.
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There are thus striking similarities in penal practice between the USA and Iran.
Divergences are mostly related to techniques, apparatuses used, and more generally to
fomis of punishments; meanwhile; the bases, rationale and nature of punishments in both
systems are more similar than different. The humiliation of criminals, the coexistence of
sin and crime, the degradation of culprits, the lack of sympathy for criminals, considering
.them as social enemies, inflexibility against wrongdoers, the denies of rehabilitative 
ideals and ignoring expertise in dealing with criminals, criminalization, increasing moral 
and victimless crimes, and so on, are the most crucial likenesses between the penal 
policies in the USA and Iran.
As a result of changing policies and principles of criminal justice in the USA and 
Iran during the last third of the twentieth century, the fonn and content of punishment
have changed broadly in both countries. These alterations have not only occuned in I
potential victims against a community of actual and potential offenders.’^
the severity of penal practice, "the revival of public shaming sanctions,” the humiliation
of criminals, "degradation through punishment” , social elimination policy through the 
death penalty or imprisonment as a kind of “social death”*’ and stigmatizing shame 
"[which] involves assigning master status to a person because of his or her
legislation, sentencing and performance of punishment, but also in pattern of law 
enforcement. In such a new era, crime is treated as a matter of control through '
controlling everyone. It has been a fight ‘on behalf of the community of actual and
A religious conception of human beings as rational and free individuals has led to
'
a particular understanding of wrongdoing and an aggressive approach towards
wrongdoers, an approach that for a long time had been displaced by correctionalist and 
rehabilitative theories. Both systems have more or less denied measures of 
individualization and have tended to shift their emphasis from the offender to the offence. 
This is because, as Durkheim believed, the main concem in criminal justice systems is 
that where a crime violates transcendent values, the personality of criminals, or his 
mental and social situation are secondary issues. Any strike against sacred social values 
provokes an autonomous passionate reaction.
■h
Among the other similarities between the penal systems in the USA and Iran, are
^  +I1C1 I n i m t l i  "'A
3 Ibid
 ^A book Review by J. Savelsberg Joachim, 2005 P. 229 
^Ibid
*^Joshua Page 2004.p. 372
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lawbreaking.”  ^Criminals are considered as repugnant elements that must be rejected. 
They are no longer like us; rather they are dangerous and undeserved outsiders who 
should be harshly treated. They are “fundamentally different from citizens self-evidently 
portrayed as law-abiding.”^The members of this class are considered as social enemies 
and a national threat, and cannot be considered as honorable persons or enjoy social 
advantages. They live outside the framework of accepted social standards and were 
rejected by society. Denying prisoners access to higher education in Clinton’s USA, for 
example, illustrates the lack of room for utilitarian calculation in American penal 
practices.^ This example, like others cited in the previous two chapters, has contributed to 
recent efforts to develop Emile Durkheim’s expressive theory of punitive sanctions.
Another example of the expression of social condemnation in penal practice is the 
preventing of criminals from obtaining employment in governmental institutions and in 
many private organizations, constituting the majority of job opportunities in the Iranian 
labor market. Despite this social fact, criminologists and penologists believe that idleness 
and unemployment, in particular for those who are experienced criminals, is a highly 
dangerous situation and leads to rising crime rates. 'Hon-criminal record certification is, 
however, still an essential document for most job applications. These examples show 
that society cannot easily forgive those who breach its behavioral standards. Criminals 
lose their social standing; in particular those who have committed serious crimes may 
never be able to reintegrate into society and re-achieve social statues. Even the material
’^ .Scheff 1996,p. 742 
 ^ Joshua 2004, p. 368
 ^Congress passed legislation in 1994 that denied Pell Grants- the primary source o f funding for 
postsecondary correctional education (PSCE) — to prisoners, despite evidence that PSCE helped reduce 
recidivism and bolster carceral order. See Ibid, p, 357
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public sentiments are not destructive but rather constructive of social solidarity.
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compensation of victims and society through social rehabilitation will rarely return them
to their original social position. Under conditions of equal qualifications for employment, 
those with a criminal record, even having served their sentence and been rehabilitated, 
are discriminated against in favor of those with no criminal record. This shows the 
enduring attachment of stigma attached to criminals. These examples show that 
punishment still has an irrational and non-calculable character. Crime implies that
I
honoured social values are shaken, and thus crime damages their authority as a base for
I
social unanimity.
II
■Ï';
How, then, can a utilitarian, purposive, rehabilitative and technical account
.7-explain this new image of penal practice in the cases of Iran and the USA? As argued 
above, both criminal justice systems have denied measures of individualization and
■■■Irehabilitation and have tended to shift their focus from the offender to the offence. Is it a Ifimatter of knowing, supervision, and docility of individuals, as Foucault explained in his 
theory of power-knowledge and punishment? How could Iranian and USA penal practice
&
.be explained in light of rational, scientific and professional modes of penal practice? Is 
what is being witnessed contemporarily in both countries a sign of successfully
eliminating from criminal justice organizations all personal, irrational and emotional 7
elements which escape calculation? On the contrary, in both countries the penal practice
,system is not merely a technical and professional process. Contrary to Weber’s ideas, |
Foucault’s account of penal practice in modem societies lead us to ignore 
important elements of the nature of penal practice. According to his theory of modem
Foucault 1977, p. 47
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Viewing punishment as tactics, expressive of a technology of power, and ignoring
the role of cultural and religious forces, gives rise to an inadequate account of penal
.practice. In contrast to Foucault’s analysis of classic punishment -that the guilty man had 
to be punished intensively simply because he attacked the dignity of the sovereign - ;
punishment was inflicted harshly because he broke religious social rules. In society,
sacred social values and social solidarity are the sources of the sovereign’s dignity.
According to such an analysis, sovereignty in pre-industrial societies was the symbol and
guardian of sacred values. The state has been and is sacred because it is a symbol of
sacred social values. Criminals must be treated harshly not only because they attack the
power and “force of law [as] the force of prince”, but also because they dishonour law
.as a prime symbol of divine rules. It is to be agreed with Foucault that the intensity of
punishment and inequality between crime and punishment in pre- modem societies shows
,the presence of superior powers and active forces of revenge; but it is here submitted that
:■
it would be more correct to replace this superior power with transcendent and sacred 
godly values. In this case the meaning of inequality between crime and punishment, and 
the presence of active forces of revenge, is more plausible in light of the inequality 
between God and man. This is precisely what Durkheim made clear in his theory of 
punishment in pre-industrial society, in which collective consciousness is religious in 
character.
punishment, the object of the new penal policy is to influence the individual’s mind and 
soul. Foucault argued that coiporal forms of punishment disappeared and gave way to 
gentler sorts of penal practices. He considered individualization and corrective programs 
as a key trend in modem society, disguising the face of power, understood as part of a 
massive strategy of normalization. But, as shown, in both case studies rehabilitative 
programs have collapsed and attention has shifted ftom the offender to the offence.
The present study has tried to show how the institutions of criminal justice in the
modern world are not free from social pressures or public opinion. The scientific and
managerial approach, which conceives of punishment in technical terms, is not fully
capable of explaining penal practice, because such a bureaucratic approach forgets the
social meaning of penal practice. The differentiation and categorization of criminals as
. .essential aspects of rehabilitative systems, the imperative presence of various bodies of 
scientific knowledge, and the requirements of bureaucracy in criminal justice institutions 
have not changed the nature of punishment, which contributes in serve social demands.
#  
.ÎÏ
Penal practice is still an expression of social sentiments linked to the feeling of damage
or threat to sacred social beliefs. Both cases showed that despite the undeniable
ramifications of rationalization in criminal justice, the emotional, moral and religious
character of punishment has not been fully displaced. There is a correlation between the
movement of those societies towards religion and the severity of punishment. Religiosity
. .and the acredness of social values have brought about a more punitive reaction towards
■ ..criminal activities. The question of why these regressive movements toward traditional
..., 
,1
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values and religion have happened in the USA and Iran has been answered in light of 
Durklieim’s theory of religion, society and punishment.
382
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III Cultural perceptions, emotions and punishment
Kenneth 1982,p. 75
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Durkheim’s main theoretical interest was in the functioning and substance of the 
collective consciousness which cover much of what modern sociology entitles culture. 'I
This especially covered those moral aspects of culture that have an obligatory and sacred 
character, deviance from which brings into play sanctions typical of a society at that
particular stage of development. ' ^  |
I
IThe history of punishment can be seen as documenting the relationship between 
changes of attitudes and shifts in penal practice. One of the key questions in chapter 2 
and chapter 3 was how changing modes of repression can reveal an account of changing .7:
perceptions and attitudes. The present study undertook to examine how various 
perspectives on justice; morality, human being and state have given rise to different 
forms of punishment.
New criminological thoughts, since the 1970s in the USA and since 1979 in Iran 
have been significantly affected by religious interpretations of human nature, crime and 7 J
punishment. The return of retribution in USA and Iran is closely associated with these g
-Ireligious sentiments. In such a perspective, offences and criminal behaviour are the 
outcome of individuals’ free will. In the second case (Iran), for religious and traditional 
judges and the criminal justice system, typical conceptions of individualization, 
psychological and sociological factors of crimes, and other criminological notions simply
seemed strange. Judges’ distrust and unfamiliarity with modem criminological ideologies 
like rehabilitation, as well as detached conceptions like individualization, and 
rehabilitative treatment, were alien to the Iranian criminal justice system.
Proximity of crime and sin, and identifying more moral crimes, not only has led to 
a longer list of crimes but also has brought about a harsher reaction against them. Since, 
according to Durkheim, collective consciousness and all social values are more or less 
sacred in character, currently a distinction between social values and religious values is 
not easy. As discussed, in primitive societies one source of cultural values is religion, 
with consequent social reactions which are more repressive and punitive. Vengeful 
reaction against violating sacred issues is explosive and harsh, although it can be 
modified or channelled through social and penal institutions.
Moral patterns were measured as the backbone of the social entity. Then, 
expiation religiously and socially is one of the significant characteristics of penal 
practice. Offenders in both cases, albeit in different ways, were regarded socially and 
morally in debt. They are seen to have injured or undermined social morality and only 
their suffering may lead to redemption. There is no room for utilitarian or rehabilitative 
considerations, in particular in serious crimes. Disgrace of criminals and their beating 
before execution cannot have any aim but expiation, vengeance and retribution.
However, as argued in the present study, there is a positive correlation between 
shifting emotions and attitudes towards crime and criminals and changing penal practice.
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For Durkheim, Elias and Spierenburg transfomiations in penal policy cannot be 
understood without looking at changes in sensibilities. Durkheim considered criminal law 
to be an index of society, and for Spierenburg changing modes of repression were 
reflections of changing emotions. Elias showed how emotions as part of human beings 
are developed through processes of socialization and civilization. The dynamic impact of 
emotional forces on penal policy is undeniable. For example, a shift in sensibilities and 
sympathy to the offenders led to the abolition of brutal and barbaric foims of punishment 
and gave rise to gentler ways of punishment during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. During this period, criminals were regarded as victims of their misery and of 
miserable social conditions as well as abnonnal personality. The sympathy for offenders 
was sti'ong, as there were no victims, and society was supposed to be responsible for its 
own shortcomings.
However, during the late twentieth century in the USA and post- revolution Iran, 
in contrast Elias’ thesis, the aim of reformistic emotions and sympathies turned from 
offenders to actual and potential victims, individual victims and society. Criminals were 
again viewed as free and cruel human beings driven by their untamed impulses and 
pleasures. The victim’s right movement in the U.S.A commenced with disapproval with 
sympathy for criminals. The advocates of this movement blamed the criminal justice for 
being concerned more for the offenders than the damaged and deprived victims. The 
movement of victim support went further and assumed society to be the potential victim. 
In these circumstances penalty not only does not call for any sympathy to offenders, but 
on the contrary punishment is a resolution satisfying both the victim and society.
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Moreover, there is an interaction between public anxiety about crime and 
insecurity, on the one hand, and penal practice on the other. Public opinion, as current 
culture, is capable of exerting significant pressure on the authorities to do something. In 
a majority-rule political system, politicians should ‘directly reflect public o p i n i o n . O n  
the other hand, these social conditions can be considered as golden opportunities for 
political actors, because politicians need issues like crime and punishment that have a 
relatively broad appeal. If media or politicians play a crucial role in the area of criminal 
justice, it is because these issues have the potential for broad social appeal. Criminal 
justice is a sensitive and appealing subject -  matter, that politicians and media try to 
manipulate.
What nowadays is known, and is discussed as populist penal policy, is very close 
to the Durkheimian idea of the state as representative of collective consciousness. The 
sentencing guidelines in the USA, and the shift away from the judicial system toward, a 
legislative one in criminal law in the USA, is considered to be a step toward the 
démocratisation of the political and judicial system of the USA. It can be analysed as a 
movement in which there is more connection between collective sentiments and the state. 
The same situation can be seen in Iran’s criminal justice system, as a member of the civil 
law family in which criminal law is fully codified, taking penal policy out of the hands of 
judges and giving it to the public. This broadens Durkheim’s communicative and
Norander Barbara 2000, p. 774
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expressive theory of penalty to encompass notions of collective sentiments and the role of 
politicians as agents of collective sentiments.
Durkheim’s theory has suffers from several limitations, in particular in the way 
that it views the question of the relationship between society and the state. Collective 
consciousness as a foundation of society simply exists in society, and actively functions 
as it functioned in mechanical societies. For him, punishment does merely reflect and 
reaffirm values that already exist in society. The state merely reflects the will of ‘the 
people’. Duiidieim’s idealistic conception of the state as a representative of collective 
consciousness prevented him from introducing obvious notions of political power, social 
conflict, and from evaluating how political elites and politicians apply punishment as an 
instrument for their political purposes. Despite his neglect of political and economic 
interests and their role in social domination, as frequently pointed out in the present 
study, Durkheim offered great insights through his dramatic, communicative and 
expressive theory of punishment, a theory which cannot be abandoned.
More importantly, the subject of religion in particular godly religion should be
place high on the agenda in the sociological study of penal practice. Modernization is not
necessarily a one-way movement towards secularization, rationalization and
Westernization, as Weber identified. Modernization can appear in light of religion in
western and eastern countries. Thus, punishment should not be understood only in terms
. . .of complex forms of power and discipline, as Foucault explained. The time has arrived to
387
take religion seriously as a powerful cultural factor in the sociological study of 
punishment.
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